- Linux-stable-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH 4.4.y 066/101] prctl: Add speculation control prctls

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> commit b617cfc858161140d69cc0b5cc211996b557a1c7 upstream Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance impacting mitigations. PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with the following meaning: Bit Define Description 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. The common return values are: EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl() arguments are not 0 ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values: ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between architectures. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/nospec.h | 5 +++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 11 ++++++ kernel/sys.c | 20 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 122 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt diff --git a/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddbebcd --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/spec_ctrl.txt @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +=================== +Speculation Control +=================== + +Quite some CPUs have speculation related misfeatures which are in fact +vulnerabilites causing data leaks in various forms even accross privilege +domains. + +The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various +forms. Some of these mitigations are compile time configurable and some on +the kernel command line. + +There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can +be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled +environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via +:manpage:`prctl(2)`. + +There are two prctl options which are related to this: + + * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL + + * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL + +PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL +----------------------- + +PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature +which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-2 with +the following meaning: + +==== ================ =================================================== +Bit Define Description +==== ================ =================================================== +0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by + PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL +1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is + disabled +2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is + enabled +==== ================ =================================================== + +If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. + +If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is +available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation +misfeature will fail. + +PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL +----------------------- +PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which +is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand +in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. + +Common error codes +------------------ +======= ================================================================= +Value Meaning +======= ================================================================= +EINVAL The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused + prctl(2) arguments are not 0 + +ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature +======= ================================================================= + +PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes +----------------------------------- +======= ================================================================= +Value Meaning +======= ================================================================= +0 Success + +ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor + PR_SPEC_DISABLE + +ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible. + See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL. +======= ================================================================= + +Speculation misfeature controls +------------------------------- +- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass + + Invocations: + * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h index e791ebc..700bb8a 100644 --- a/include/linux/nospec.h +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h @@ -55,4 +55,9 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index, \ (typeof(_i)) (_i & _mask); \ }) + +/* Speculation control prctl */ +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which); +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl); + #endif /* _LINUX_NOSPEC_H */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index a8d0759..3b316be 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -197,4 +197,15 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 +/* Per task speculation control */ +#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL 52 +#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53 +/* Speculation control variants */ +# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0 +/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ +# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0 +# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0) +# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1) +# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2) + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 6624919..d80c33f 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -2075,6 +2075,16 @@ static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) } #endif +int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(unsigned long which) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) { @@ -2269,6 +2279,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, case PR_GET_FP_MODE: error = GET_FP_MODE(me); break; + case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(arg2); + break; + case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL: + if (arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(arg2, arg3); + break; default: error = -EINVAL; break;

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 065/101] x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> commit 28a2775217b17208811fa43a9e96bd1fdf417b86 upstream Having everything in nospec-branch.h creates a hell of dependencies when adding the prctl based switching mechanism. Move everything which is not required in nospec-branch.h to spec-ctrl.h and fix up the includes in the relevant files. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 14 -------------- arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index ac2fdc96..47c454c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -183,26 +183,12 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64); extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void); -/* - * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR - * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This - * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or - * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case. - * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter. - */ -extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64); -extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64); - /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ enum ssb_mitigation { SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE, SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE, }; -/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */ -extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base; -extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask; - extern char __indirect_thunk_start[]; extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ad6442 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_ +#define _ASM_X86_SPECCTRL_H_ + +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> + +/* + * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR + * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This + * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or + * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case. + * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter. + */ +extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64); +extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64); + +/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */ +extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base; +extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask; + +#endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 4452f38..14e9849 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> -#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/smp.h> #include <asm/pci-direct.h> #include <asm/delay.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index b8911af..47a3cc0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/module.h> -#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> #include <asm/bugs.h> #include <asm/processor.h> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 4265437..df7827a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ #include <asm/desc.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> #include <asm/kvm_para.h> -#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/virtext.h> #include "trace.h" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 63c44a9..1814388 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/irq_remapping.h> -#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include "trace.h" #include "pmu.h"

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 064/101] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15, 16, 17]h if requested

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> commit 764f3c21588a059cd783c6ba0734d4db2d72822d upstream AMD does not need the Speculative Store Bypass mitigation to be enabled. The parameters for this are already available and can be done via MSR C001_1020. Each family uses a different bit in that MSR for this. [ tglx: Expose the bit mask via a variable and move the actual MSR fiddling into the bugs code as that's the right thing to do and also required to prepare for dynamic enable/disable ] [ Srivatsa: Removed __ro_after_init for 4.4.y ] Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 9510f5f..b7cdd1c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS (7*32+24) /* "" AMD RDS implementation */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index c786d01..ac2fdc96 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -199,6 +199,10 @@ enum ssb_mitigation { SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE, }; +/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */ +extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base; +extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask; + extern char __indirect_thunk_start[]; extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 9b29414..4452f38 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/smp.h> #include <asm/pci-direct.h> #include <asm/delay.h> @@ -519,6 +520,26 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MWAITX)) use_mwaitx_delay(); + + if (c->x86 >= 0x15 && c->x86 <= 0x17) { + unsigned int bit; + + switch (c->x86) { + case 0x15: bit = 54; break; + case 0x16: bit = 33; break; + case 0x17: bit = 10; break; + default: return; + } + /* + * Try to cache the base value so further operations can + * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS. + */ + if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS); + x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit; + } + } } static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -794,6 +815,11 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) { + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS); + set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS); + } } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c37e211..b8911af 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; */ static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; +/* + * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control. + * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu(). + */ +u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base; +u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask; + void __init check_bugs(void) { identify_boot_cpu(); @@ -51,7 +58,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may - * have unknown values. + * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD + * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family. */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); @@ -153,6 +161,14 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host); +static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void) +{ + u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask; + + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) + wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval); +} + #ifdef RETPOLINE static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; @@ -442,6 +458,11 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) switch (cmd) { case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO: + /* + * AMD platforms by default don't need SSB mitigation. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) + break; case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON: mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE; break; @@ -468,6 +489,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS); break; case X86_VENDOR_AMD: + x86_amd_rds_enable(); break; } } @@ -489,6 +511,9 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask); + + if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) + x86_amd_rds_enable(); } #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 2f1d403..7405c86 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -851,6 +851,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = { { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5, }, { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5, }, { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5, }, + { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x12, }, + { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x11, }, + { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x10, }, + { X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0xf, }, { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4, }, {} };

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 063/101] x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> commit 1115a859f33276fe8afb31c60cf9d8e657872558 upstream Intel and AMD SPEC_CTRL (0x48) MSR semantics may differ in the future (or in fact use different MSRs for the same functionality). As such a run-time mechanism is required to whitelist the appropriate MSR values. [ tglx: Made the variable __ro_after_init ] [ Srivatsa: Removed __ro_after_init for 4.4.y ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 56b84a5..c37e211 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); */ static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +/* + * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in + * x86_spec_ctrl_base. + */ +static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; + void __init check_bugs(void) { identify_boot_cpu(); @@ -116,7 +122,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val) { - if (val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS)) + if (val & x86_spec_ctrl_mask) WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val); else wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val); @@ -458,6 +464,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) { case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS; + x86_spec_ctrl_mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_RDS; x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS); break; case X86_VENDOR_AMD: @@ -481,7 +488,7 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation() void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) - x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS)); + x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask); } #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 062/101] x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> commit 772439717dbf703b39990be58d8d4e3e4ad0598a upstream Intel CPUs expose methods to: - Detect whether RDS capability is available via CPUID.7.0.EDX[31], - The SPEC_CTRL MSR(0x48), bit 2 set to enable RDS. - MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, Bit(4) no need to enable RRS. With that in mind if spec_store_bypass_disable=[auto,on] is selected set at boot-time the SPEC_CTRL MSR to enable RDS if the platform requires it. Note that this does not fix the KVM case where the SPEC_CTRL is exposed to guests which can muck with it, see patch titled : KVM/SVM/VMX/x86/spectre_v2: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS. And for the firmware (IBRS to be set), see patch titled: x86/spectre_v2: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits [ tglx: Distangled it from the intel implementation and kept the call order ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index f4701f0..a29edb7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_RDS (1 << 2) /* Reduced Data Speculation */ #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -56,6 +57,11 @@ #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO (1 << 4) /* + * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass + * attack, so no Reduced Data Speculation control + * required. + */ #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 826aa81..56b84a5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val) { - if (val & ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS) + if (val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS)) WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val); else wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val); @@ -443,8 +443,28 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) break; } - if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE) + /* + * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: + * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. + * - X86_FEATURE_RDS - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass + * - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation + */ + if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE); + /* + * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD uses + * a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family. + */ + switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) { + case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: + x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RDS; + x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS); + break; + case X86_VENDOR_AMD: + break; + } + } + return mode; } @@ -458,6 +478,12 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation() #undef pr_fmt +void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void) +{ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_RDS)); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index eb78ddf..2f1d403 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -859,7 +859,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 ia32_cap = 0; - if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass)) + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); + + if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) && + !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDS_NO)) setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) @@ -871,9 +875,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown)) return; - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap); - /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO) return; @@ -1216,6 +1217,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) enable_sep_cpu(); #endif mtrr_ap_init(); + x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); } struct msr_range { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h index 2584265..3b19d82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h @@ -46,4 +46,7 @@ extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[], extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + +extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); + #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 77d9f68..ac25d1e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS); } /*

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 061/101] x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> commit 24f7fc83b9204d20f878c57cb77d261ae825e033 upstream Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability. Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example, malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack. As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command line control knobs: nospec_store_bypass_disable spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on] By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not. The parameters are as follows: - auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate mitigation. - on - disable Speculative Store Bypass - off - enable Speculative Store Bypass [ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done when the CPU does not support RDS ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 33 +++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 143 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index e60d0b5..dc138b8 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -2460,6 +2460,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent to spectre_v2=off. + nospec_store_bypass_disable + [HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability + noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to enabling legacy floating-point and sse state. @@ -3623,6 +3626,36 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. + spec_store_bypass_disable= + [HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation + (Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability) + + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a + a common industry wide performance optimization known + as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which recent stores + to the same memory location may not be observed by + later loads during speculative execution. The idea + is that such stores are unlikely and that they can + be detected prior to instruction retirement at the + end of a particular speculation execution window. + + In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded + store can be used in a cache side channel attack, for + example to read memory to which the attacker does not + directly have access (e.g. inside sandboxed code). + + This parameter controls whether the Speculative Store + Bypass optimization is used. + + on - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass + off - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass + auto - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an + implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and + picks the most appropriate mitigation + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spec_store_bypass_disable=auto. + spia_io_base= [HW,MTD] spia_fio_base= spia_pedr= diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 3fce65d..9510f5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled*/ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 11db69a..c786d01 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -193,6 +193,12 @@ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void); extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64); extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64); +/* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ +enum ssb_mitigation { + SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE, + SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE, +}; + extern char __indirect_thunk_start[]; extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 0ad13b1..826aa81 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <asm/intel-family.h> static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); +static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); /* * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any @@ -52,6 +53,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */ spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); + /* + * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store + * Bypass vulnerability. + */ + ssb_select_mitigation(); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP. @@ -357,6 +364,99 @@ retpoline_auto: } #undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt + +static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE; + +/* The kernel command line selection */ +enum ssb_mitigation_cmd { + SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE, + SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO, + SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON, +}; + +static const char *ssb_strings[] = { + [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled" +}; + +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd; +} ssb_mitigation_options[] = { + { "auto", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */ + { "on", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */ + { "off", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */ +}; + +static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void) +{ + enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO; + char arg[20]; + int ret, i; + + if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) { + return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE; + } else { + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable", + arg, sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) + return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) { + if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option)) + continue; + + cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd; + break; + } + + if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) { + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg); + return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO; + } + } + + return cmd; +} + +static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) +{ + enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE; + enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDS)) + return mode; + + cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline(); + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) && + (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE || + cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO)) + return mode; + + switch (cmd) { + case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO: + case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON: + mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE; + break; + case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE: + break; + } + + if (mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE); + return mode; +} + +static void ssb_select_mitigation() +{ + ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation(); + + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) + pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); +} + +#undef pr_fmt #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS @@ -382,6 +482,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); + case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: + return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); + default: break; }

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 060/101] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> commit 0cc5fa00b0a88dad140b4e5c2cead9951ad36822 upstream Add the CPU feature bit CPUID.7.0.EDX[31] which indicates whether the CPU supports Reduced Data Speculation. [ tglx: Split it out from a later patch ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 08cf4f7..3fce65d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RDS (18*32+31) /* Reduced Data Speculation */ /* * BUG word(s)

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 059/101] x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> commit c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf upstream Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores. Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are some Atoms and some Xeon Phi. It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 +++++++ include/linux/cpu.h | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu index ea6a043..50f9568 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu @@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass Date: January 2018 Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org> Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index bc76bf3..08cf4f7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -315,5 +315,6 @@ #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */ #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */ +#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index e71e281..0ad13b1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -403,4 +403,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, c { return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); +} #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 97558d1..eb78ddf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -835,10 +835,33 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = { {} }; +static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = { + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM }, + { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5, }, + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5, }, + { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5, }, + { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4, }, + {} +}; + static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 ia32_cap = 0; + if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass)) + setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS); + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation)) return; diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c index 3db71af..143edea 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c @@ -518,14 +518,22 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL); static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, &dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr, &dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr, + &dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr, NULL }; diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 7e04bcd..2f9d120 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); +extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf); extern __printf(4, 5) struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 058/101] x86/cpu/intel: Add Knights Mill to Intel family

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Piotr Luc <piotr.luc(a)intel.com> commit 0047f59834e5947d45f34f5f12eb330d158f700b upstream Add CPUID of Knights Mill (KNM) processor to Intel family list. Signed-off-by: Piotr Luc <piotr.luc(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst(a)gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk(a)redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161012180520.30976-1-piotr.luc@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index 0b27c1e..e13ff5a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -67,5 +67,6 @@ /* Xeon Phi */ #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL 0x57 /* Knights Landing */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM 0x85 /* Knights Mill */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_INTEL_FAMILY_H */

7 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 4.4.y 057/101] x86/cpu: Rename Merrifield2 to Moorefield

by Srivatsa S. Bhat

From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> commit f5fbf848303c8704d0e1a1e7cabd08fd0a49552f upstream Merrifield2 is actually Moorefield. Rename it accordingly and drop tail digit from Merrifield1. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160906184254.94440-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.int… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa(a)csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h index 12fa187..0b27c1e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 0x37 /* BayTrail/BYT / Valleyview */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */ -#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD1 0x4A /* Tangier */ -#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD2 0x5A /* Annidale */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD 0x4A /* Tangier */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Annidale */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE 0x7A

7 years

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror