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[PATCH 6.12 002/112] timers: Fix NULL function pointer race in timer_shutdown_sync()

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Yipeng Zou <zouyipeng(a)huawei.com> commit 20739af07383e6eb1ec59dcd70b72ebfa9ac362c upstream. There is a race condition between timer_shutdown_sync() and timer expiration that can lead to hitting a WARN_ON in expire_timers(). The issue occurs when timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function to NULL while the timer is still running on another CPU. The race scenario looks like this: CPU0 CPU1 <SOFTIRQ> lock_timer_base() expire_timers() base->running_timer = timer; unlock_timer_base() [call_timer_fn enter] mod_timer() ... timer_shutdown_sync() lock_timer_base() // For now, will not detach the timer but only clear its function to NULL if (base->running_timer != timer) ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true); if (shutdown) timer->function = NULL; unlock_timer_base() [call_timer_fn exit] lock_timer_base() base->running_timer = NULL; unlock_timer_base() ... // Now timer is pending while its function set to NULL. // next timer trigger <SOFTIRQ> expire_timers() WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) // hit ... lock_timer_base() // Now timer will detach if (base->running_timer != timer) ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true); if (shutdown) timer->function = NULL; unlock_timer_base() The problem is that timer_shutdown_sync() clears the timer function regardless of whether the timer is currently running. This can leave a pending timer with a NULL function pointer, which triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE(!fn) check in expire_timers(). Fix this by only clearing the timer function when actually detaching the timer. If the timer is running, leave the function pointer intact, which is safe because the timer will be properly detached when it finishes running. Fixes: 0cc04e80458a ("timers: Add shutdown mechanism to the internal functions") Signed-off-by: Yipeng Zou <zouyipeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251122093942.301559-1-zouyipeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- kernel/time/timer.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/kernel/time/timer.c +++ b/kernel/time/timer.c @@ -1505,10 +1505,11 @@ static int __try_to_del_timer_sync(struc base = lock_timer_base(timer, &flags); - if (base->running_timer != timer) + if (base->running_timer != timer) { ret = detach_if_pending(timer, base, true); - if (shutdown) - timer->function = NULL; + if (shutdown) + timer->function = NULL; + } raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base->lock, flags);

1 hour, 51 minutes

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[PATCH 6.12 001/112] KVM: arm64: Check the untrusted offset in FF-A memory share

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene(a)google.com> commit 103e17aac09cdd358133f9e00998b75d6c1f1518 upstream. Verify the offset to prevent OOB access in the hypervisor FF-A buffer in case an untrusted large enough value [U32_MAX - sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region) + 1, U32_MAX] is set from the host kernel. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Ene <sebastianene(a)google.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251017075710.2605118-1-sebastianene@google.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 struct ffa_mem_region_attributes *ep_mem_access; struct ffa_composite_mem_region *reg; struct ffa_mem_region *buf; - u32 offset, nr_ranges; + u32 offset, nr_ranges, checked_offset; int ret = 0; if (addr_mbz || npages_mbz || fraglen > len || @@ -474,7 +474,12 @@ static void __do_ffa_mem_xfer(const u64 goto out_unlock; } - if (fraglen < offset + sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region)) { + if (check_add_overflow(offset, sizeof(struct ffa_composite_mem_region), &checked_offset)) { + ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS; + goto out_unlock; + } + + if (fraglen < checked_offset) { ret = FFA_RET_INVALID_PARAMETERS; goto out_unlock; }

1 hour, 51 minutes

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[PATCH 6.17 049/175] dt-bindings: pinctrl: toshiba,visconti: Fix number of items in groups

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> commit 316e361b5d2cdeb8d778983794a1c6eadcb26814 upstream. The "groups" property can hold multiple entries (e.g. toshiba/tmpv7708-rm-mbrc.dts file), so allow that by dropping incorrect type (pinmux-node.yaml schema already defines that as string-array) and adding constraints for items. This fixes dtbs_check warnings like: toshiba/tmpv7708-rm-mbrc.dtb: pinctrl@24190000 (toshiba,tmpv7708-pinctrl): pwm-pins:groups: ['pwm0_gpio16_grp', 'pwm1_gpio17_grp', 'pwm2_gpio18_grp', 'pwm3_gpio19_grp'] is too long Fixes: 1825c1fe0057 ("pinctrl: Add DT bindings for Toshiba Visconti TMPV7700 SoC") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley(a)microchip.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/toshiba,visconti-pinctrl.yaml | 26 +++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/toshiba,visconti-pinctrl.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/toshiba,visconti-pinctrl.yaml @@ -50,18 +50,20 @@ patternProperties: groups: description: Name of the pin group to use for the functions. - $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/string - enum: [i2c0_grp, i2c1_grp, i2c2_grp, i2c3_grp, i2c4_grp, - i2c5_grp, i2c6_grp, i2c7_grp, i2c8_grp, - spi0_grp, spi0_cs0_grp, spi0_cs1_grp, spi0_cs2_grp, - spi1_grp, spi2_grp, spi3_grp, spi4_grp, spi5_grp, spi6_grp, - uart0_grp, uart1_grp, uart2_grp, uart3_grp, - pwm0_gpio4_grp, pwm0_gpio8_grp, pwm0_gpio12_grp, - pwm0_gpio16_grp, pwm1_gpio5_grp, pwm1_gpio9_grp, - pwm1_gpio13_grp, pwm1_gpio17_grp, pwm2_gpio6_grp, - pwm2_gpio10_grp, pwm2_gpio14_grp, pwm2_gpio18_grp, - pwm3_gpio7_grp, pwm3_gpio11_grp, pwm3_gpio15_grp, - pwm3_gpio19_grp, pcmif_out_grp, pcmif_in_grp] + items: + enum: [i2c0_grp, i2c1_grp, i2c2_grp, i2c3_grp, i2c4_grp, + i2c5_grp, i2c6_grp, i2c7_grp, i2c8_grp, + spi0_grp, spi0_cs0_grp, spi0_cs1_grp, spi0_cs2_grp, + spi1_grp, spi2_grp, spi3_grp, spi4_grp, spi5_grp, spi6_grp, + uart0_grp, uart1_grp, uart2_grp, uart3_grp, + pwm0_gpio4_grp, pwm0_gpio8_grp, pwm0_gpio12_grp, + pwm0_gpio16_grp, pwm1_gpio5_grp, pwm1_gpio9_grp, + pwm1_gpio13_grp, pwm1_gpio17_grp, pwm2_gpio6_grp, + pwm2_gpio10_grp, pwm2_gpio14_grp, pwm2_gpio18_grp, + pwm3_gpio7_grp, pwm3_gpio11_grp, pwm3_gpio15_grp, + pwm3_gpio19_grp, pcmif_out_grp, pcmif_in_grp] + minItems: 1 + maxItems: 8 drive-strength: enum: [2, 4, 6, 8, 16, 24, 32]

1 hour, 51 minutes

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[PATCH 6.17 035/175] Revert "drm/tegra: dsi: Clear enable register if powered by bootloader"

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Diogo Ivo <diogo.ivo(a)tecnico.ulisboa.pt> commit 660b299bed2a2a55a1f9102d029549d0235f881c upstream. Commit b6bcbce33596 ("soc/tegra: pmc: Ensure power-domains are in a known state") was introduced so that all power domains get initialized to a known working state when booting and it does this by shutting them down (including asserting resets and disabling clocks) before registering each power domain with the genpd framework, leaving it to each driver to later on power its needed domains. This caused the Google Pixel C to hang when booting due to a workaround in the DSI driver introduced in commit b22fd0b9639e ("drm/tegra: dsi: Clear enable register if powered by bootloader") meant to handle the case where the bootloader enabled the DSI hardware module. The workaround relies on reading a hardware register to determine the current status and after b6bcbce33596 that now happens in a powered down state thus leading to the boot hang. Fix this by reverting b22fd0b9639e since currently we are guaranteed that the hardware will be fully reset by the time we start enabling the DSI module. Fixes: b6bcbce33596 ("soc/tegra: pmc: Ensure power-domains are in a known state") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Diogo Ivo <diogo.ivo(a)tecnico.ulisboa.pt> Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251103-diogo-smaug_ec_typec-v1-1-be656ccda391@te… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/dsi.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/dsi.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/tegra/dsi.c @@ -913,15 +913,6 @@ static void tegra_dsi_encoder_enable(str u32 value; int err; - /* If the bootloader enabled DSI it needs to be disabled - * in order for the panel initialization commands to be - * properly sent. - */ - value = tegra_dsi_readl(dsi, DSI_POWER_CONTROL); - - if (value & DSI_POWER_CONTROL_ENABLE) - tegra_dsi_disable(dsi); - err = tegra_dsi_prepare(dsi); if (err < 0) { dev_err(dsi->dev, "failed to prepare: %d\n", err);

1 hour, 52 minutes

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[PATCH 6.17 031/175] ata: libata-scsi: Add missing scsi_device_put() in ata_scsi_dev_rescan()

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Yihang Li <liyihang9(a)h-partners.com> commit b32cc17d607e8ae7af037303fe101368cb4dc44c upstream. Call scsi_device_put() in ata_scsi_dev_rescan() if the device or its queue are not running. Fixes: 0c76106cb975 ("scsi: sd: Fix TCG OPAL unlock on system resume") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <liyihang9(a)h-partners.com> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c @@ -4901,8 +4901,10 @@ void ata_scsi_dev_rescan(struct work_str spin_unlock_irqrestore(ap->lock, flags); if (do_resume) { ret = scsi_resume_device(sdev); - if (ret == -EWOULDBLOCK) + if (ret == -EWOULDBLOCK) { + scsi_device_put(sdev); goto unlock_scan; + } dev->flags &= ~ATA_DFLAG_RESUMING; } ret = scsi_rescan_device(sdev);

1 hour, 52 minutes

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[PATCH 6.17 028/175] selinux: move avdcache to per-task security struct

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> commit dde3a5d0f4dce1d1a6095e6b8eeb59b75d28fb3b upstream. The avdcache is meant to be per-task; move it to a new task_security_struct that is duplicated per-task. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5d7ddc59b3d89b724a5aa8f30d0db94ff8d2d93f ("selinux: reduce path walk overhead") Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: line length fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 14 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void cred_init_security(void) /* NOTE: the lsm framework zeros out the buffer on allocation */ tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred)); - tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->avdcache.sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; + tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } /* @@ -3106,10 +3106,10 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permissi * Clear the task's AVD cache in @tsec and reset it to the current policy's * and task's info. */ -static inline void task_avdcache_reset(struct cred_security_struct *tsec) +static inline void task_avdcache_reset(struct task_security_struct *tsec) { memset(&tsec->avdcache.dir, 0, sizeof(tsec->avdcache.dir)); - tsec->avdcache.sid = tsec->sid; + tsec->avdcache.sid = current_sid(); tsec->avdcache.seqno = avc_policy_seqno(); tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1; } @@ -3123,7 +3123,7 @@ static inline void task_avdcache_reset(s * Search @tsec for a AVD cache entry that matches @isec and return it to the * caller via @avdc. Returns 0 if a match is found, negative values otherwise. */ -static inline int task_avdcache_search(struct cred_security_struct *tsec, +static inline int task_avdcache_search(struct task_security_struct *tsec, struct inode_security_struct *isec, struct avdc_entry **avdc) { @@ -3133,7 +3133,7 @@ static inline int task_avdcache_search(s if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_DIR) return -ENOENT; - if (unlikely(tsec->sid != tsec->avdcache.sid || + if (unlikely(current_sid() != tsec->avdcache.sid || tsec->avdcache.seqno != avc_policy_seqno())) { task_avdcache_reset(tsec); return -ENOENT; @@ -3163,7 +3163,7 @@ static inline int task_avdcache_search(s * Update the AVD cache in @tsec with the @avdc and @audited info associated * with @isec. */ -static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct cred_security_struct *tsec, +static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct task_security_struct *tsec, struct inode_security_struct *isec, struct av_decision *avd, u32 audited) @@ -3197,7 +3197,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru { int mask; u32 perms; - struct cred_security_struct *tsec; + u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct avdc_entry *avdc; int rc, rc2; @@ -3209,8 +3210,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru if (!mask) return 0; - tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); - if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec)) + tsec = selinux_task(current); + if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec, sid)) return 0; isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, requested & MAY_NOT_BLOCK); @@ -3230,7 +3231,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru struct av_decision avd; /* Cache miss. */ - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, (requested & MAY_ACCESS) ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, @@ -3279,11 +3280,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { - struct cred_security_struct *tsec; + struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + tsec = selinux_task(current); - if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec)) + if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec, current_sid())) return 0; return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); @@ -4147,7 +4148,10 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct tas unsigned long clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_task(current); + struct task_security_struct *new_tsec = selinux_task(task); + *new_tsec = *old_tsec; return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); } @@ -7170,6 +7174,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struc struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct cred_security_struct), + .lbs_task = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ struct cred_security_struct { u32 create_sid; /* fscreate SID */ u32 keycreate_sid; /* keycreate SID */ u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */ +} __randomize_layout; + +struct task_security_struct { #define TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE (1 << 2) struct { u32 sid; /* current SID for cached entries */ @@ -53,10 +56,11 @@ struct cred_security_struct { } avdcache; } __randomize_layout; -static inline bool task_avdcache_permnoaudit(struct cred_security_struct *tsec) +static inline bool task_avdcache_permnoaudit(struct task_security_struct *tsec, + u32 sid) { return (tsec->avdcache.permissive_neveraudit && - tsec->sid == tsec->avdcache.sid && + sid == tsec->avdcache.sid && tsec->avdcache.seqno == avc_policy_seqno()); } @@ -176,6 +180,12 @@ static inline struct cred_security_struc return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred; } +static inline struct task_security_struct * +selinux_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_task; +} + static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file) { return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file;

1 hour, 52 minutes

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[PATCH 6.17 027/175] selinux: rename task_security_struct to cred_security_struct

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> commit 75f72fe289a7f76204a728668edcf20e4a2a6097 upstream. Before Linux had cred structures, the SELinux task_security_struct was per-task and although the structure was switched to being per-cred long ago, the name was never updated. This change renames it to cred_security_struct to avoid confusion and pave the way for the introduction of an actual per-task security structure for SELinux. No functional change. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 8 ++-- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_call */ static void cred_init_security(void) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *tsec; /* NOTE: the lsm framework zeros out the buffer on allocation */ @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static void cred_init_security(void) */ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(cred); return tsec->sid; @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel( struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, @@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relab struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); @@ -1784,7 +1784,7 @@ out: * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned. */ static int -selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, +selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct cred_security_struct *tsec, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) @@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; @@ -2247,8 +2247,8 @@ static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void) } static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec, - const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) + const struct cred_security_struct *old_tsec, + const struct cred_security_struct *new_tsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); @@ -2301,8 +2301,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; - struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *old_tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); @@ -2479,7 +2479,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_fi */ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *new_tsec; struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; @@ -2525,7 +2525,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_cred */ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 osid, sid; int rc; @@ -2907,7 +2907,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_a { u32 newsid; int rc; - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *tsec; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, @@ -2925,7 +2925,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(s const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count); u32 newsid, clen; @@ -3106,7 +3106,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permissi * Clear the task's AVD cache in @tsec and reset it to the current policy's * and task's info. */ -static inline void task_avdcache_reset(struct task_security_struct *tsec) +static inline void task_avdcache_reset(struct cred_security_struct *tsec) { memset(&tsec->avdcache.dir, 0, sizeof(tsec->avdcache.dir)); tsec->avdcache.sid = tsec->sid; @@ -3123,7 +3123,7 @@ static inline void task_avdcache_reset(s * Search @tsec for a AVD cache entry that matches @isec and return it to the * caller via @avdc. Returns 0 if a match is found, negative values otherwise. */ -static inline int task_avdcache_search(struct task_security_struct *tsec, +static inline int task_avdcache_search(struct cred_security_struct *tsec, struct inode_security_struct *isec, struct avdc_entry **avdc) { @@ -3163,7 +3163,7 @@ static inline int task_avdcache_search(s * Update the AVD cache in @tsec with the @avdc and @audited info associated * with @isec. */ -static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct task_security_struct *tsec, +static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct cred_security_struct *tsec, struct inode_security_struct *isec, struct av_decision *avd, u32 audited) @@ -3197,7 +3197,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru { int mask; u32 perms; - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct avdc_entry *avdc; int rc, rc2; @@ -3279,7 +3279,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *tsec; tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); @@ -3655,7 +3655,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(str static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { struct lsm_prop prop; - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; if (new_creds == NULL) { @@ -3693,7 +3693,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(s static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; @@ -4157,8 +4157,8 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct tas static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + const struct cred_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); + struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; return 0; @@ -4169,8 +4169,8 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct c */ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + const struct cred_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); + struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); *tsec = *old_tsec; } @@ -4191,7 +4191,7 @@ static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(cons */ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -4215,7 +4215,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -4740,7 +4740,7 @@ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, /* socket security operations */ -static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, +static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct cred_security_struct *tsec, u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) { if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { @@ -4793,7 +4793,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; int rc; @@ -4812,7 +4812,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int fam static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); @@ -6522,7 +6522,7 @@ static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p, char **value) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec; int error; u32 sid; u32 len; @@ -6577,7 +6577,7 @@ err_unlock: static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *tsec; struct cred *new; u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid; int error; @@ -6872,7 +6872,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struc static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec; struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k); tsec = selinux_cred(cred); @@ -7169,7 +7169,7 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struc #endif struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { - .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct cred_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct avdc_entry { bool permissive; /* AVC permissive flag */ }; -struct task_security_struct { +struct cred_security_struct { u32 osid; /* SID prior to last execve */ u32 sid; /* current SID */ u32 exec_sid; /* exec SID */ @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct task_security_struct { } avdcache; } __randomize_layout; -static inline bool task_avdcache_permnoaudit(struct task_security_struct *tsec) +static inline bool task_avdcache_permnoaudit(struct cred_security_struct *tsec) { return (tsec->avdcache.permissive_neveraudit && tsec->sid == tsec->avdcache.sid && @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ struct perf_event_security_struct { }; extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes; -static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred) +static inline struct cred_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred) { return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred; } @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ selinux_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm * */ static inline u32 current_sid(void) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); return tsec->sid; }

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[PATCH 6.17 025/175] ata: libata-scsi: Fix system suspend for a security locked drive

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Niklas Cassel <cassel(a)kernel.org> commit b11890683380a36b8488229f818d5e76e8204587 upstream. Commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") fixed ata_to_sense_error() to properly generate sense key ABORTED COMMAND (without any additional sense code), instead of the previous bogus sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST with the additional sense code UNALIGNED WRITE COMMAND, for a failed command. However, this broke suspend for Security locked drives (drives that have Security enabled, and have not been Security unlocked by boot firmware). The reason for this is that the SCSI disk driver, for the Synchronize Cache command only, treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command (regardless of ASC / ASCQ). After commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") the code that treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command is no longer applicable, so the command fails, which causes the system suspend to be aborted: sd 1:0:0:0: PM: dpm_run_callback(): scsi_bus_suspend returns -5 sd 1:0:0:0: PM: failed to suspend async: error -5 PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected To make suspend work once again, for a Security locked device only, return sense data LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED, the actual sense data which a real SCSI device would have returned if locked. The SCSI disk driver treats this sense data as a successful command. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ilia Baryshnikov <qwelias(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220704 Fixes: cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/ata.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c @@ -992,6 +992,13 @@ static void ata_gen_ata_sense(struct ata return; } + if (ata_id_is_locked(dev->id)) { + /* Security locked */ + /* LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED */ + ata_scsi_set_sense(dev, cmd, DATA_PROTECT, 0x74, 0x71); + return; + } + if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_RTF_FILLED)) { ata_dev_dbg(dev, "Missing result TF: reporting aborted command\n"); --- a/include/linux/ata.h +++ b/include/linux/ata.h @@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ struct ata_bmdma_prd { #define ata_id_has_ncq(id) ((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] & (1 << 8)) #define ata_id_queue_depth(id) (((id)[ATA_ID_QUEUE_DEPTH] & 0x1f) + 1) #define ata_id_removable(id) ((id)[ATA_ID_CONFIG] & (1 << 7)) +#define ata_id_is_locked(id) (((id)[ATA_ID_DLF] & 0x7) == 0x7) #define ata_id_has_atapi_AN(id) \ ((((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] != 0x0000) && \ ((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] != 0xffff)) && \

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[PATCH 6.17 024/175] ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Fix EINJV2 initialization and injection

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com> commit d2932a59c2d4fb364396f21df58431c44918dd47 upstream. ACPI 6.6 specification for EINJV2 appends an extra structure to the end of the existing struct set_error_type_with_address. Several issues showed up in testing. 1) Initialization was broken by an earlier fix [1] since is_v2 is only set while performing an injection, not during initialization. 2) A buggy BIOS provided invalid "revision" and "length" for the extension structure. Add several sanity checks. 3) When injecting legacy error types on an EINJV2 capable system, don't copy the component arrays. Fixes: 6c7058514991 ("ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Check if user asked for EINJV2 injection") # [1] Fixes: b47610296d17 ("ACPI: APEI: EINJ: Enable EINJv2 error injections") Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck(a)intel.com> [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Cc: 6.17+ <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.17+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119012712.178715-1-tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/einj-core.c @@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ bool einj_initialized __ro_after_init; static void __iomem *einj_param; static u32 v5param_size; +static u32 v66param_size; static bool is_v2; static void einj_exec_ctx_init(struct apei_exec_context *ctx) @@ -283,6 +284,24 @@ static void check_vendor_extension(u64 p acpi_os_unmap_iomem(p, sizeof(v)); } +static u32 einjv2_init(struct einjv2_extension_struct *e) +{ + if (e->revision != 1) { + pr_info("Unknown v2 extension revision %u\n", e->revision); + return 0; + } + if (e->length < sizeof(*e) || e->length > PAGE_SIZE) { + pr_info(FW_BUG "Bad1 v2 extension length %u\n", e->length); + return 0; + } + if ((e->length - sizeof(*e)) % sizeof(e->component_arr[0])) { + pr_info(FW_BUG "Bad2 v2 extension length %u\n", e->length); + return 0; + } + + return (e->length - sizeof(*e)) / sizeof(e->component_arr[0]); +} + static void __iomem *einj_get_parameter_address(void) { int i; @@ -310,28 +329,21 @@ static void __iomem *einj_get_parameter_ v5param_size = sizeof(v5param); p = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v5, sizeof(*p)); if (p) { - int offset, len; - memcpy_fromio(&v5param, p, v5param_size); acpi5 = 1; check_vendor_extension(pa_v5, &v5param); - if (is_v2 && available_error_type & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) { - len = v5param.einjv2_struct.length; - offset = offsetof(struct einjv2_extension_struct, component_arr); - max_nr_components = (len - offset) / - sizeof(v5param.einjv2_struct.component_arr[0]); - /* - * The first call to acpi_os_map_iomem above does not include the - * component array, instead it is used to read and calculate maximum - * number of components supported by the system. Below, the mapping - * is expanded to include the component array. - */ + if (available_error_type & ACPI65_EINJV2_SUPP) { + struct einjv2_extension_struct *e; + + e = &v5param.einjv2_struct; + max_nr_components = einjv2_init(e); + + /* remap including einjv2_extension_struct */ acpi_os_unmap_iomem(p, v5param_size); - offset = offsetof(struct set_error_type_with_address, einjv2_struct); - v5param_size = offset + struct_size(&v5param.einjv2_struct, - component_arr, max_nr_components); - p = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v5, v5param_size); + v66param_size = v5param_size - sizeof(*e) + e->length; + p = acpi_os_map_iomem(pa_v5, v66param_size); } + return p; } } @@ -527,6 +539,7 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, u64 param3, u64 param4) { struct apei_exec_context ctx; + u32 param_size = is_v2 ? v66param_size : v5param_size; u64 val, trigger_paddr, timeout = FIRMWARE_TIMEOUT; int i, rc; @@ -539,11 +552,11 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, if (acpi5) { struct set_error_type_with_address *v5param; - v5param = kmalloc(v5param_size, GFP_KERNEL); + v5param = kmalloc(param_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!v5param) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy_fromio(v5param, einj_param, v5param_size); + memcpy_fromio(v5param, einj_param, param_size); v5param->type = type; if (type & ACPI5_VENDOR_BIT) { switch (vendor_flags) { @@ -601,7 +614,7 @@ static int __einj_error_inject(u32 type, break; } } - memcpy_toio(einj_param, v5param, v5param_size); + memcpy_toio(einj_param, v5param, param_size); kfree(v5param); } else { rc = apei_exec_run(&ctx, ACPI_EINJ_SET_ERROR_TYPE); @@ -1099,9 +1112,14 @@ static void einj_remove(struct faux_devi struct apei_exec_context ctx; if (einj_param) { - acpi_size size = (acpi5) ? - v5param_size : - sizeof(struct einj_parameter); + acpi_size size; + + if (v66param_size) + size = v66param_size; + else if (acpi5) + size = v5param_size; + else + size = sizeof(struct einj_parameter); acpi_os_unmap_iomem(einj_param, size); if (vendor_errors.size)

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[PATCH 6.17 022/175] mptcp: Fix proto fallback detection with BPF

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> commit c77b3b79a92e3345aa1ee296180d1af4e7031f8f upstream. The sockmap feature allows bpf syscall from userspace, or based on bpf sockops, replacing the sk_prot of sockets during protocol stack processing with sockmap's custom read/write interfaces. ''' tcp_rcv_state_process() syn_recv_sock()/subflow_syn_recv_sock() tcp_init_transfer(BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB) bpf_skops_established <== sockops bpf_sock_map_update(sk) <== call bpf helper tcp_bpf_update_proto() <== update sk_prot ''' When the server has MPTCP enabled but the client sends a TCP SYN without MPTCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() performs a fallback on the subflow, replacing the subflow sk's sk_prot with the native sk_prot. ''' subflow_syn_recv_sock() subflow_ulp_fallback() subflow_drop_ctx() mptcp_subflow_ops_undo_override() ''' Then, this subflow can be normally used by sockmap, which replaces the native sk_prot with sockmap's custom sk_prot. The issue occurs when the user executes accept::mptcp_stream_accept::mptcp_fallback_tcp_ops(). Here, it uses sk->sk_prot to compare with the native sk_prot, but this is incorrect when sockmap is used, as we may incorrectly set sk->sk_socket->ops. This fix uses the more generic sk_family for the comparison instead. Additionally, this also prevents a WARNING from occurring: result from ./scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 337 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:68 mptcp_stream_accept \ (net/mptcp/protocol.c:4005) Modules linked in: ... PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> do_accept (net/socket.c:1989) __sys_accept4 (net/socket.c:2028 net/socket.c:2057) __x64_sys_accept (net/socket.c:2067) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f87ac92b83d ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 0b4f33def7bb ("mptcp: fix tcp fallback crash") Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251111060307.194196-3-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c @@ -60,11 +60,13 @@ static u64 mptcp_wnd_end(const struct mp static const struct proto_ops *mptcp_fallback_tcp_ops(const struct sock *sk) { + unsigned short family = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_family); + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6) - if (sk->sk_prot == &tcpv6_prot) + if (family == AF_INET6) return &inet6_stream_ops; #endif - WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_prot != &tcp_prot); + WARN_ON_ONCE(family != AF_INET); return &inet_stream_ops; }

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