CephFS stores file data across multiple RADOS objects. An object is the
atomic unit of storage, so the writeback code must clean only folios
that belong to the same object with each OSD request.
CephFS also supports RAID0-style striping of file contents: if enabled,
each object stores multiple unbroken "stripe units" covering different
portions of the file; if disabled, a "stripe unit" is simply the whole
object. The stripe unit is (usually) reported as the inode's block size.
Though the writeback logic could, in principle, lock all dirty folios
belonging to the same object, its current design is to lock only a
single stripe unit at a time. Ever since this code was first written,
it has determined this size by checking the inode's block size.
However, the relatively-new fscrypt support needed to reduce the block
size for encrypted inodes to the crypto block size (see 'fixes' commit),
which causes an unnecessarily high number of write operations (~1024x as
many, with 4MiB objects) and correspondingly degraded performance.
Fix this (and clarify intent) by using i_layout.stripe_unit directly in
ceph_define_write_size() so that encrypted inodes are written back with
the same number of operations as if they were unencrypted.
Fixes: 94af0470924c ("ceph: add some fscrypt guardrails")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks(a)gmail.com>
---
fs/ceph/addr.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c
index f2db05b51a3b..b97a6120d4b9 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/addr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c
@@ -1000,7 +1000,8 @@ unsigned int ceph_define_write_size(struct address_space *mapping)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_fs_client(inode);
- unsigned int wsize = i_blocksize(inode);
+ struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
+ unsigned int wsize = ci->i_layout.stripe_unit;
if (fsc->mount_options->wsize < wsize)
wsize = fsc->mount_options->wsize;
--
2.51.2
If `locked_pages` is zero, the page array must not be allocated:
ceph_process_folio_batch() uses `locked_pages` to decide when to
allocate `pages`, and redundant allocations trigger
ceph_allocate_page_array()'s BUG_ON(), resulting in a worker oops (and
writeback stall) or even a kernel panic. Consequently, the main loop in
ceph_writepages_start() assumes that the lifetime of `pages` is confined
to a single iteration.
The ceph_submit_write() function claims ownership of the page array on
success. But failures only redirty/unlock the pages and fail to free the
array, making the failure case in ceph_submit_write() fatal.
Free the page array (and reset locked_pages) in ceph_submit_write()'s
error-handling 'if' block so that the caller's invariant (that the array
does not outlive the iteration) is maintained unconditionally, making
failures in ceph_submit_write() recoverable as originally intended.
Fixes: 1551ec61dc55 ("ceph: introduce ceph_submit_write() method")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks(a)gmail.com>
---
fs/ceph/addr.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c
index 2b722916fb9b..467aa7242b49 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/addr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c
@@ -1466,6 +1466,14 @@ int ceph_submit_write(struct address_space *mapping,
unlock_page(page);
}
+ if (ceph_wbc->from_pool) {
+ mempool_free(ceph_wbc->pages, ceph_wb_pagevec_pool);
+ ceph_wbc->from_pool = false;
+ } else
+ kfree(ceph_wbc->pages);
+ ceph_wbc->pages = NULL;
+ ceph_wbc->locked_pages = 0;
+
ceph_osdc_put_request(req);
return -EIO;
}
--
2.51.2
Greetings!
This is the mlmmj program managing the <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> mailing
list.
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- 206207
Hi,
This Linux kernel patch series introduces support for error recovery for
passthrough PCI devices on System Z (s390x).
Background
----------
For PCI devices on s390x an operating system receives platform specific
error events from firmware rather than through AER.Today for
passthrough/userspace devices, we don't attempt any error recovery and
ignore any error events for the devices. The passthrough/userspace devices
are managed by the vfio-pci driver. The driver does register error handling
callbacks (error_detected), and on an error trigger an eventfd to
userspace. But we need a mechanism to notify userspace
(QEMU/guest/userspace drivers) about the error event.
Proposal
--------
We can expose this error information (currently only the PCI Error Code)
via a device feature. Userspace can then obtain the error information
via VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl and take appropriate actions such as driving
a device reset.
This is how a typical flow for passthrough devices to a VM would work:
For passthrough devices to a VM, the driver bound to the device on the host
is vfio-pci. vfio-pci driver does support the error_detected() callback
(vfio_pci_core_aer_err_detected()), and on an PCI error s390x recovery
code on the host will call the vfio-pci error_detected() callback. The
vfio-pci error_detected() callback will notify userspace/QEMU via an
eventfd, and return PCI_ERS_RESULT_CAN_RECOVER. At this point the s390x
error recovery on the host will skip any further action(see patch 6) and
let userspace drive the error recovery.
Once userspace/QEMU is notified, it then injects this error into the VM
so device drivers in the VM can take recovery actions. For example for a
passthrough NVMe device, the VM's OS NVMe driver will access the device.
At this point the VM's NVMe driver's error_detected() will drive the
recovery by returning PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET, and the s390x error
recovery in the VM's OS will try to do a reset. Resets are privileged
operations and so the VM will need intervention from QEMU to perform the
reset. QEMU will invoke the VFIO_DEVICE_RESET ioctl to now notify the
host that the VM is requesting a reset of the device. The vfio-pci driver
on the host will then perform the reset on the device to recover it.
Thanks
Farhan
ChangeLog
---------
v6 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/2c609e61-1861-4bf3-b019-a11c137d26a5@linux.ibm.…
v6 -> v7
- Rebase on 6.19-rc4
- Update commit message based on Niklas's suggestion (patch 3).
v5 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251113183502.2388-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v5 -> v6
- Rebase on 6.18 + Lukas's PCI: Universal error recoverability of
devices series (https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1763483367.git.lukas@wunner.de/)
- Re-work config space accessibility check to pci_dev_save_and_disable() (patch 3).
This avoids saving the config space, in the reset path, if the device's config space is
corrupted or inaccessible.
v4 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250924171628.826-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v4 -> v5
- Rebase on 6.18-rc5
- Move bug fixes to the beginning of the series (patch 1 and 2). These patches
were posted as a separate fixes series
https://lore.kernel.org/all/a14936ac-47d6-461b-816f-0fd66f869b0f@linux.ibm.…
- Add matching pci_put_dev() for pci_get_slot() (patch 6).
v3 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250911183307.1910-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v3 -> v4
- Remove warn messages for each PCI capability not restored (patch 1)
- Check PCI_COMMAND and PCI_STATUS register for error value instead of device id
(patch 1)
- Fix kernel crash in patch 3
- Added reviewed by tags
- Address comments from Niklas's (patches 4, 5, 7)
- Fix compilation error non s390x system (patch 8)
- Explicitly align struct vfio_device_feature_zpci_err (patch 8)
v2 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250825171226.1602-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v2 -> v3
- Patch 1 avoids saving any config space state if the device is in error
(suggested by Alex)
- Patch 2 adds additional check only for FLR reset to try other function
reset method (suggested by Alex).
- Patch 3 fixes a bug in s390 for resetting PCI devices with multiple
functions. Creates a new flag pci_slot to allow per function slot.
- Patch 4 fixes a bug in s390 for resource to bus address translation.
- Rebase on 6.17-rc5
v1 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250813170821.1115-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v1 - > v2
- Patches 1 and 2 adds some additional checks for FLR/PM reset to
try other function reset method (suggested by Alex).
- Patch 3 fixes a bug in s390 for resetting PCI devices with multiple
functions.
- Patch 7 adds a new device feature for zPCI devices for the VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE
ioctl. The ioctl is used by userspace to retriece any PCI error
information for the device (suggested by Alex).
- Patch 8 adds a reset_done() callback for the vfio-pci driver, to
restore the state of the device after a reset.
- Patch 9 removes the pcie check for triggering VFIO_PCI_ERR_IRQ_INDEX.
Farhan Ali (9):
PCI: Allow per function PCI slots
s390/pci: Add architecture specific resource/bus address translation
PCI: Avoid saving config space state if inaccessible
PCI: Add additional checks for flr reset
s390/pci: Update the logic for detecting passthrough device
s390/pci: Store PCI error information for passthrough devices
vfio-pci/zdev: Add a device feature for error information
vfio: Add a reset_done callback for vfio-pci driver
vfio: Remove the pcie check for VFIO_PCI_ERR_IRQ_INDEX
arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h | 29 ++++++++
arch/s390/pci/pci.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++-------------
drivers/pci/host-bridge.c | 4 +-
drivers/pci/pci.c | 19 +++++-
drivers/pci/slot.c | 25 ++++++-
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 20 ++++--
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c | 3 +-
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_priv.h | 9 +++
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_zdev.c | 45 ++++++++++++-
include/linux/pci.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/vfio.h | 16 +++++
12 files changed, 292 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
On s390 systems, which use a machine level hypervisor, PCI devices are
always accessed through a form of PCI pass-through which fundamentally
operates on a per PCI function granularity. This is also reflected in the
s390 PCI hotplug driver which creates hotplug slots for individual PCI
functions. Its reset_slot() function, which is a wrapper for
zpci_hot_reset_device(), thus also resets individual functions.
Currently, the kernel's PCI_SLOT() macro assigns the same pci_slot object
to multifunction devices. This approach worked fine on s390 systems that
only exposed virtual functions as individual PCI domains to the operating
system. Since commit 44510d6fa0c0 ("s390/pci: Handling multifunctions")
s390 supports exposing the topology of multifunction PCI devices by
grouping them in a shared PCI domain. When attempting to reset a function
through the hotplug driver, the shared slot assignment causes the wrong
function to be reset instead of the intended one. It also leaks memory as
we do create a pci_slot object for the function, but don't correctly free
it in pci_slot_release().
Add a flag for struct pci_slot to allow per function PCI slots for
functions managed through a hypervisor, which exposes individual PCI
functions while retaining the topology.
Fixes: 44510d6fa0c0 ("s390/pci: Handling multifunctions")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Farhan Ali <alifm(a)linux.ibm.com>
---
drivers/pci/pci.c | 5 +++--
drivers/pci/slot.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/pci.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c
index 13dbb405dc31..c105e285cff8 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c
@@ -4832,8 +4832,9 @@ static int pci_reset_hotplug_slot(struct hotplug_slot *hotplug, bool probe)
static int pci_dev_reset_slot_function(struct pci_dev *dev, bool probe)
{
- if (dev->multifunction || dev->subordinate || !dev->slot ||
- dev->dev_flags & PCI_DEV_FLAGS_NO_BUS_RESET)
+ if (dev->subordinate || !dev->slot ||
+ dev->dev_flags & PCI_DEV_FLAGS_NO_BUS_RESET ||
+ (dev->multifunction && !dev->slot->per_func_slot))
return -ENOTTY;
return pci_reset_hotplug_slot(dev->slot->hotplug, probe);
diff --git a/drivers/pci/slot.c b/drivers/pci/slot.c
index 50fb3eb595fe..ed10fa3ae727 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/slot.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/slot.c
@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ static ssize_t cur_speed_read_file(struct pci_slot *slot, char *buf)
return bus_speed_read(slot->bus->cur_bus_speed, buf);
}
+static bool pci_dev_matches_slot(struct pci_dev *dev, struct pci_slot *slot)
+{
+ if (slot->per_func_slot)
+ return dev->devfn == slot->number;
+
+ return PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn) == slot->number;
+}
+
+static bool pci_slot_enabled_per_func(void)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_S390))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
static void pci_slot_release(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct pci_dev *dev;
@@ -73,7 +89,7 @@ static void pci_slot_release(struct kobject *kobj)
down_read(&pci_bus_sem);
list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list)
- if (PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn) == slot->number)
+ if (pci_dev_matches_slot(dev, slot))
dev->slot = NULL;
up_read(&pci_bus_sem);
@@ -166,7 +182,7 @@ void pci_dev_assign_slot(struct pci_dev *dev)
mutex_lock(&pci_slot_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(slot, &dev->bus->slots, list)
- if (PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn) == slot->number)
+ if (pci_dev_matches_slot(dev, slot))
dev->slot = slot;
mutex_unlock(&pci_slot_mutex);
}
@@ -265,6 +281,9 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr,
slot->bus = pci_bus_get(parent);
slot->number = slot_nr;
+ if (pci_slot_enabled_per_func())
+ slot->per_func_slot = 1;
+
slot->kobj.kset = pci_slots_kset;
slot_name = make_slot_name(name);
@@ -285,7 +304,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr,
down_read(&pci_bus_sem);
list_for_each_entry(dev, &parent->devices, bus_list)
- if (PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn) == slot_nr)
+ if (pci_dev_matches_slot(dev, slot))
dev->slot = slot;
up_read(&pci_bus_sem);
diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h
index 864775651c6f..08fa57beb7b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/pci.h
+++ b/include/linux/pci.h
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ struct pci_slot {
struct list_head list; /* Node in list of slots */
struct hotplug_slot *hotplug; /* Hotplug info (move here) */
unsigned char number; /* PCI_SLOT(pci_dev->devfn) */
+ unsigned int per_func_slot:1; /* Allow per function slot */
struct kobject kobj;
};
--
2.43.0
In vmw_compat_shader_add(), the return value check of vmw_shader_alloc()
is not proper. Modify the check for the return pointer 'res'.
Found by code review and compiled on ubuntu 20.04.
Fixes: 18e4a4669c50 ("drm/vmwgfx: Fix compat shader namespace")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang(a)isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c
index 69dfe69ce0f8..7ed938710342 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c
@@ -923,8 +923,10 @@ int vmw_compat_shader_add(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
ttm_bo_unreserve(&buf->tbo);
res = vmw_shader_alloc(dev_priv, buf, size, 0, shader_type);
- if (unlikely(ret != 0))
+ if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(res);
goto no_reserve;
+ }
ret = vmw_cmdbuf_res_add(man, vmw_cmdbuf_res_shader,
vmw_shader_key(user_key, shader_type),
--
2.25.1
The Task::group_leader() method currently allows you to access the
group_leader() of any task, for example one you hold a refcount to. But
this is not safe in general since the group leader could change when a
task exits. See for example commit a15f37a40145c ("kernel/sys.c: fix the
racy usage of task_lock(tsk->group_leader) in sys_prlimit64() paths").
All existing users of Task::group_leader() call this method on current,
which is guaranteed running, so there's not an actual issue in Rust code
today. But to prevent code in the future from making this mistake,
restrict Task::group_leader() so that it can only be called on current.
There are some other cases where accessing task->group_leader is okay.
For example it can be safe if you hold tasklist_lock or rcu_read_lock().
However, only supporting current->group_leader is sufficient for all
in-tree Rust users of group_leader right now. Safe Rust functionality
for accessing it under rcu or while holding tasklist_lock may be added
in the future if required by any future Rust module.
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aTLnV-5jlgfk1aRK@redhat.com/
Fixes: 313c4281bc9d ("rust: add basic `Task`")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
---
The rust/kernel/task.rs file has had changes land through a few
different trees:
* Originally task.rs landed through Christian's tree together with
file.rs and pid_namespace.rs
* The change to add CurrentTask landed through Andrew Morton's tree
together with mm.rs
* There was a patch to mark some methods #[inline] that landed through
tip via Boqun.
I don't think there's a clear owner for this file, so to break ambiguity
I'm doing to declare that this patch is intended for Andrew Morton's
tree. Please let me know if you think a different tree is appropriate.
---
rust/kernel/task.rs | 24 ++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/kernel/task.rs b/rust/kernel/task.rs
index 49fad6de06740a9b9ad80b2f4b430cc28cd134fa..9440692a3a6d0d3f908d61d51dcd377a272f6957 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/task.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/task.rs
@@ -204,18 +204,6 @@ pub fn as_ptr(&self) -> *mut bindings::task_struct {
self.0.get()
}
- /// Returns the group leader of the given task.
- pub fn group_leader(&self) -> &Task {
- // SAFETY: The group leader of a task never changes after initialization, so reading this
- // field is not a data race.
- let ptr = unsafe { *ptr::addr_of!((*self.as_ptr()).group_leader) };
-
- // SAFETY: The lifetime of the returned task reference is tied to the lifetime of `self`,
- // and given that a task has a reference to its group leader, we know it must be valid for
- // the lifetime of the returned task reference.
- unsafe { &*ptr.cast() }
- }
-
/// Returns the PID of the given task.
pub fn pid(&self) -> Pid {
// SAFETY: The pid of a task never changes after initialization, so reading this field is
@@ -345,6 +333,18 @@ pub fn active_pid_ns(&self) -> Option<&PidNamespace> {
// `release_task()` call.
Some(unsafe { PidNamespace::from_ptr(active_ns) })
}
+
+ /// Returns the group leader of the current task.
+ pub fn group_leader(&self) -> &Task {
+ // SAFETY: The group leader of a task never changes while the task is running, and `self`
+ // is the current task, which is guaranteed running.
+ let ptr = unsafe { (*self.as_ptr()).group_leader };
+
+ // SAFETY: `current.group_leader` stays valid for at least the duration in which `current`
+ // is running, and the signature of this function ensures that the returned `&Task` can
+ // only be used while `current` is still valid, thus still running.
+ unsafe { &*ptr.cast() }
+ }
}
// SAFETY: The type invariants guarantee that `Task` is always refcounted.
---
base-commit: 8f0b4cce4481fb22653697cced8d0d04027cb1e8
change-id: 20251218-task-group-leader-a71931ced643
Best regards,
--
Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
commit ed3ba9b6e280e14cc3148c1b226ba453f02fa76c upstream.
SIOCBRDELIF is passed to dev_ioctl() first and later forwarded to
br_ioctl_call(), which causes unnecessary RTNL dance and the splat
below [0] under RTNL pressure.
Let's say Thread A is trying to detach a device from a bridge and
Thread B is trying to remove the bridge.
In dev_ioctl(), Thread A bumps the bridge device's refcnt by
netdev_hold() and releases RTNL because the following br_ioctl_call()
also re-acquires RTNL.
In the race window, Thread B could acquire RTNL and try to remove
the bridge device. Then, rtnl_unlock() by Thread B will release RTNL
and wait for netdev_put() by Thread A.
Thread A, however, must hold RTNL after the unlock in dev_ifsioc(),
which may take long under RTNL pressure, resulting in the splat by
Thread B.
Thread A (SIOCBRDELIF) Thread B (SIOCBRDELBR)
---------------------- ----------------------
sock_ioctl sock_ioctl
`- sock_do_ioctl `- br_ioctl_call
`- dev_ioctl `- br_ioctl_stub
|- rtnl_lock |
|- dev_ifsioc '
' |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...)
|- netdev_hold(dev, ...) .
/ |- rtnl_unlock ------. |
| |- br_ioctl_call `---> |- rtnl_lock
Race | | `- br_ioctl_stub |- br_del_bridge
Window | | | |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...)
| | | May take long | `- br_dev_delete(dev, ...)
| | | under RTNL pressure | `- unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, ...)
| | | | `- rtnl_unlock
\ | |- rtnl_lock <-' `- netdev_run_todo
| |- ... `- netdev_run_todo
| `- rtnl_unlock |- __rtnl_unlock
| |- netdev_wait_allrefs_any
|- netdev_put(dev, ...) <----------------'
Wait refcnt decrement
and log splat below
To avoid blocking SIOCBRDELBR unnecessarily, let's not call
dev_ioctl() for SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF.
In the dev_ioctl() path, we do the following:
1. Copy struct ifreq by get_user_ifreq in sock_do_ioctl()
2. Check CAP_NET_ADMIN in dev_ioctl()
3. Call dev_load() in dev_ioctl()
4. Fetch the master dev from ifr.ifr_name in dev_ifsioc()
3. can be done by request_module() in br_ioctl_call(), so we move
1., 2., and 4. to br_ioctl_stub().
Note that 2. is also checked later in add_del_if(), but it's better
performed before RTNL.
SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF have been processed in dev_ioctl() since
the pre-git era, and there seems to be no specific reason to process
them there.
[0]:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for wpan3 to become free. Usage count = 2
ref_tracker: wpan3@ffff8880662d8608 has 1/1 users at
__netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4282 [inline]
netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4311 [inline]
dev_ifsioc+0xc6a/0x1160 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:624
dev_ioctl+0x255/0x10c0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:826
sock_do_ioctl+0x1ca/0x260 net/socket.c:1213
sock_ioctl+0x23a/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1318
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a4/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fixes: 893b19587534 ("net: bridge: fix ioctl locking")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: yan kang <kangyan91(a)outlook.com>
Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/SY8P300MB0421225D54EB92762AE8F0F2A1D32@SY8P3…
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)fomichev.me>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor(a)blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250316192851.19781-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com>
[cascardo: fixed conflict at dev_ifsioc]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com>
---
include/linux/if_bridge.h | 6 ++----
net/bridge/br_ioctl.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
net/bridge/br_private.h | 3 +--
net/core/dev_ioctl.c | 15 ---------------
net/socket.c | 19 +++++++++----------
5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/if_bridge.h b/include/linux/if_bridge.h
index 509e18c7e740..37082feae336 100644
--- a/include/linux/if_bridge.h
+++ b/include/linux/if_bridge.h
@@ -62,11 +62,9 @@ struct br_ip_list {
#define BR_DEFAULT_AGEING_TIME (300 * HZ)
struct net_bridge;
-void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br,
- unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr,
+void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *uarg));
-int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd,
- struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg);
+int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_IGMP_SNOOPING)
int br_multicast_list_adjacent(struct net_device *dev,
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c b/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c
index 9922497e59f8..85c23a38bdb2 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c
@@ -368,10 +368,26 @@ static int old_deviceless(struct net *net, void __user *uarg)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd,
- struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg)
+int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg)
{
int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ struct ifreq ifr;
+
+ if (cmd == SIOCBRADDIF || cmd == SIOCBRDELIF) {
+ void __user *data;
+ char *colon;
+
+ if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (get_user_ifreq(&ifr, &data, uarg))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ifr.ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ - 1] = 0;
+ colon = strchr(ifr.ifr_name, ':');
+ if (colon)
+ *colon = 0;
+ }
rtnl_lock();
@@ -404,7 +420,21 @@ int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd,
break;
case SIOCBRADDIF:
case SIOCBRDELIF:
- ret = add_del_if(br, ifr->ifr_ifindex, cmd == SIOCBRADDIF);
+ {
+ struct net_device *dev;
+
+ dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr.ifr_name);
+ if (!dev || !netif_device_present(dev)) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!netif_is_bridge_master(dev)) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = add_del_if(netdev_priv(dev), ifr.ifr_ifindex, cmd == SIOCBRADDIF);
+ }
break;
}
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_private.h b/net/bridge/br_private.h
index 8acb427ae6de..0cf756677953 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_private.h
+++ b/net/bridge/br_private.h
@@ -874,8 +874,7 @@ br_port_get_check_rtnl(const struct net_device *dev)
/* br_ioctl.c */
int br_dev_siocdevprivate(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq,
void __user *data, int cmd);
-int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd,
- struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg);
+int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg);
/* br_multicast.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_BRIDGE_IGMP_SNOOPING
diff --git a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c
index 6ddfd7bfc512..30fca446f58a 100644
--- a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c
+++ b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c
@@ -375,19 +375,6 @@ static int dev_ifsioc(struct net *net, struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *data,
case SIOCWANDEV:
return dev_siocwandev(dev, &ifr->ifr_settings);
- case SIOCBRADDIF:
- case SIOCBRDELIF:
- if (!netif_device_present(dev))
- return -ENODEV;
- if (!netif_is_bridge_master(dev))
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- dev_hold(dev);
- rtnl_unlock();
- err = br_ioctl_call(net, netdev_priv(dev), cmd, ifr, NULL);
- dev_put(dev);
- rtnl_lock();
- return err;
-
case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
err = net_hwtstamp_validate(ifr);
if (err)
@@ -574,8 +561,6 @@ int dev_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr,
case SIOCBONDRELEASE:
case SIOCBONDSETHWADDR:
case SIOCBONDCHANGEACTIVE:
- case SIOCBRADDIF:
- case SIOCBRDELIF:
case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index 1d71fa44ace4..f3d0a8d66cce 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1097,12 +1097,10 @@ static ssize_t sock_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(br_ioctl_mutex);
-static int (*br_ioctl_hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br,
- unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr,
+static int (*br_ioctl_hook)(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *uarg);
-void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br,
- unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr,
+void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd,
void __user *uarg))
{
mutex_lock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
@@ -1111,8 +1109,7 @@ void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(brioctl_set);
-int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd,
- struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg)
+int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg)
{
int err = -ENOPKG;
@@ -1121,7 +1118,7 @@ int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd,
mutex_lock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
if (br_ioctl_hook)
- err = br_ioctl_hook(net, br, cmd, ifr, uarg);
+ err = br_ioctl_hook(net, cmd, uarg);
mutex_unlock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
return err;
@@ -1218,7 +1215,9 @@ static long sock_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
case SIOCSIFBR:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
- err = br_ioctl_call(net, NULL, cmd, NULL, argp);
+ case SIOCBRADDIF:
+ case SIOCBRDELIF:
+ err = br_ioctl_call(net, cmd, argp);
break;
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
@@ -3321,6 +3320,8 @@ static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
case SIOCGPGRP:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
+ case SIOCBRADDIF:
+ case SIOCBRDELIF:
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
case SIOCGSKNS:
@@ -3358,8 +3359,6 @@ static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
case SIOCGIFPFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFTXQLEN:
case SIOCSIFTXQLEN:
- case SIOCBRADDIF:
- case SIOCBRDELIF:
case SIOCGIFNAME:
case SIOCSIFNAME:
case SIOCGMIIPHY:
--
2.47.3