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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [tip:sched/urgent] sched/rt: Use container_of() to get root domain in rto_push_irq_work_func()

by Steven Rostedt

I see this was just applied to Linus's tree. It probably should be tagged for stable as well. -- Steve On Tue, 6 Feb 2018 03:54:16 -0800 "tip-bot for Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <tipbot(a)zytor.com> wrote: > Commit-ID: ad0f1d9d65938aec72a698116cd73a980916895e > Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ad0f1d9d65938aec72a698116cd73a980916895e > Author: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> > AuthorDate: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 20:45:37 -0500 > Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> > CommitDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 10:20:33 +0100 > > sched/rt: Use container_of() to get root domain in rto_push_irq_work_func() > > When the rto_push_irq_work_func() is called, it looks at the RT overloaded > bitmask in the root domain via the runqueue (rq->rd). The problem is that > during CPU up and down, nothing here stops rq->rd from changing between > taking the rq->rd->rto_lock and releasing it. That means the lock that is > released is not the same lock that was taken. > > Instead of using this_rq()->rd to get the root domain, as the irq work is > part of the root domain, we can simply get the root domain from the irq work > that is passed to the routine: > > container_of(work, struct root_domain, rto_push_work) > > This keeps the root domain consistent. > > Reported-by: Pavan Kondeti <pkondeti(a)codeaurora.org> > Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> > Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> > Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> > Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault(a)gmx.de> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> > Fixes: 4bdced5c9a292 ("sched/rt: Simplify the IPI based RT balancing logic") > Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEU1=PkiHO35Dzna8EQqNSKW1fr1y1zRQ5y66X117MG06sQtN… > Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> > --- > kernel/sched/rt.c | 15 ++++++++------- > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c > index 862a513..2fb627d 100644 > --- a/kernel/sched/rt.c > +++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c > @@ -1907,9 +1907,8 @@ static void push_rt_tasks(struct rq *rq) > * the rt_loop_next will cause the iterator to perform another scan. > * > */ > -static int rto_next_cpu(struct rq *rq) > +static int rto_next_cpu(struct root_domain *rd) > { > - struct root_domain *rd = rq->rd; > int next; > int cpu; > > @@ -1985,7 +1984,7 @@ static void tell_cpu_to_push(struct rq *rq) > * Otherwise it is finishing up and an ipi needs to be sent. > */ > if (rq->rd->rto_cpu < 0) > - cpu = rto_next_cpu(rq); > + cpu = rto_next_cpu(rq->rd); > > raw_spin_unlock(&rq->rd->rto_lock); > > @@ -1998,6 +1997,8 @@ static void tell_cpu_to_push(struct rq *rq) > /* Called from hardirq context */ > void rto_push_irq_work_func(struct irq_work *work) > { > + struct root_domain *rd = > + container_of(work, struct root_domain, rto_push_work); > struct rq *rq; > int cpu; > > @@ -2013,18 +2014,18 @@ void rto_push_irq_work_func(struct irq_work *work) > raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock); > } > > - raw_spin_lock(&rq->rd->rto_lock); > + raw_spin_lock(&rd->rto_lock); > > /* Pass the IPI to the next rt overloaded queue */ > - cpu = rto_next_cpu(rq); > + cpu = rto_next_cpu(rd); > > - raw_spin_unlock(&rq->rd->rto_lock); > + raw_spin_unlock(&rd->rto_lock); > > if (cpu < 0) > return; > > /* Try the next RT overloaded CPU */ > - irq_work_queue_on(&rq->rd->rto_push_work, cpu); > + irq_work_queue_on(&rd->rto_push_work, cpu); > } > #endif /* HAVE_RT_PUSH_IPI */ >

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] memremap: fix softlockup reports at teardown

by Dan Williams

The cond_resched() currently in the setup path needs to be duplicated in the teardown path. Rather than require each instance of for_each_device_pfn() to open code the same sequence, embed it in the helper. Link: https://github.com/intel/ixpdimm_sw/issues/11 Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse(a)redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 71389703839e ("mm, zone_device: Replace {get, put}_zone_device_page()...") Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> --- kernel/memremap.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/memremap.c b/kernel/memremap.c index 4849be5f9b3c..4dd4274cabe2 100644 --- a/kernel/memremap.c +++ b/kernel/memremap.c @@ -275,8 +275,15 @@ static unsigned long pfn_end(struct dev_pagemap *pgmap) return (res->start + resource_size(res)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; } +static unsigned long pfn_next(unsigned long pfn) +{ + if (pfn % 1024 == 0) + cond_resched(); + return pfn + 1; +} + #define for_each_device_pfn(pfn, map) \ - for (pfn = pfn_first(map); pfn < pfn_end(map); pfn++) + for (pfn = pfn_first(map); pfn < pfn_end(map); pfn = pfn_next(pfn)) static void devm_memremap_pages_release(void *data) { @@ -337,10 +344,10 @@ void *devm_memremap_pages(struct device *dev, struct dev_pagemap *pgmap) resource_size_t align_start, align_size, align_end; struct vmem_altmap *altmap = pgmap->altmap_valid ? &pgmap->altmap : NULL; + struct resource *res = &pgmap->res; unsigned long pfn, pgoff, order; pgprot_t pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL; - int error, nid, is_ram, i = 0; - struct resource *res = &pgmap->res; + int error, nid, is_ram; align_start = res->start & ~(SECTION_SIZE - 1); align_size = ALIGN(res->start + resource_size(res), SECTION_SIZE) @@ -409,8 +416,6 @@ void *devm_memremap_pages(struct device *dev, struct dev_pagemap *pgmap) list_del(&page->lru); page->pgmap = pgmap; percpu_ref_get(pgmap->ref); - if (!(++i % 1024)) - cond_resched(); } devm_add_action(dev, devm_memremap_pages_release, pgmap);

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH -mm] mm, swap, frontswap: Fix THP swap if frontswap enabled

by Huang, Ying

From: Huang Ying <ying.huang(a)intel.com> It was reported by Sergey Senozhatsky that if THP (Transparent Huge Page) and frontswap (via zswap) are both enabled, when memory goes low so that swap is triggered, segfault and memory corruption will occur in random user space applications as follow, kernel: urxvt[338]: segfault at 20 ip 00007fc08889ae0d sp 00007ffc73a7fc40 error 6 in libc-2.26.so[7fc08881a000+1ae000] #0 0x00007fc08889ae0d _int_malloc (libc.so.6) #1 0x00007fc08889c2f3 malloc (libc.so.6) #2 0x0000560e6004bff7 _Z14rxvt_wcstoutf8PKwi (urxvt) #3 0x0000560e6005e75c n/a (urxvt) #4 0x0000560e6007d9f1 _ZN16rxvt_perl_interp6invokeEP9rxvt_term9hook_typez (urxvt) #5 0x0000560e6003d988 _ZN9rxvt_term9cmd_parseEv (urxvt) #6 0x0000560e60042804 _ZN9rxvt_term6pty_cbERN2ev2ioEi (urxvt) #7 0x0000560e6005c10f _Z17ev_invoke_pendingv (urxvt) #8 0x0000560e6005cb55 ev_run (urxvt) #9 0x0000560e6003b9b9 main (urxvt) #10 0x00007fc08883af4a __libc_start_main (libc.so.6) #11 0x0000560e6003f9da _start (urxvt) After bisection, it was found the first bad commit is bd4c82c22c367e068 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). The root cause is as follow. When the pages are written to storage device during swapping out in swap_writepage(), zswap (fontswap) is tried to compress the pages instead to improve the performance. But zswap (frontswap) will treat THP as normal page, so only the head page is saved. After swapping in, tail pages will not be restored to its original contents, so cause the memory corruption in the applications. This is fixed via splitting THP at the begin of swapping out if frontswap is enabled. To avoid frontswap to be enabled at runtime, whether the page is THP is checked before using frontswap during swapping out too. Reported-and-tested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang(a)intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk(a)oracle.com> Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet(a)ieee.org> Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning(a)redhat.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.14 Fixes: bd4c82c22c367e068 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out") --- mm/page_io.c | 2 +- mm/vmscan.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/page_io.c b/mm/page_io.c index b41cf9644585..6dca817ae7a0 100644 --- a/mm/page_io.c +++ b/mm/page_io.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int swap_writepage(struct page *page, struct writeback_control *wbc) unlock_page(page); goto out; } - if (frontswap_store(page) == 0) { + if (!PageTransHuge(page) && frontswap_store(page) == 0) { set_page_writeback(page); unlock_page(page); end_page_writeback(page); diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index bee53495a829..d1c1e00b08bb 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #include <linux/swapops.h> #include <linux/balloon_compaction.h> +#include <linux/frontswap.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -1063,14 +1064,23 @@ static unsigned long shrink_page_list(struct list_head *page_list, /* cannot split THP, skip it */ if (!can_split_huge_page(page, NULL)) goto activate_locked; + /* + * Split THP if frontswap enabled, + * because it cannot process THP + */ + if (frontswap_enabled()) { + if (split_huge_page_to_list( + page, page_list)) + goto activate_locked; + } /* * Split pages without a PMD map right * away. Chances are some or all of the * tail pages can be freed without IO. */ - if (!compound_mapcount(page) && - split_huge_page_to_list(page, - page_list)) + else if (!compound_mapcount(page) && + split_huge_page_to_list(page, + page_list)) goto activate_locked; } if (!add_to_swap(page)) { -- 2.15.1

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCHv2 1/1] ext4: don't put symlink in pagecache into highmem

by Jin Qian

From: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> partial backport from 21fc61c73c3903c4c312d0802da01ec2b323d174 upstream to v4.4 to prevent virt_to_page on highmem. ext4_encrypted_follow_link uses kmap() for cpage caddr = kmap(cpage); _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr calls virt_to_page on the kmapped address. _ext4_fname_disk_to_usr() ext4_fname_decrypt() sg_init_one() sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len); sg_set_page(sg, virt_to_page(buf), buflen, offset_in_page(buf)); Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian(a)android.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 1 + fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 + fs/ext4/symlink.c | 10 +++------- fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 4df1cb19a243..f0cabc8c96cb 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4417,6 +4417,7 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; ext4_set_aops(inode); } + inode_nohighmem(inode); } else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) { inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations; diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 4c36dca486cc..32960b3ecd4f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -3151,6 +3151,7 @@ static int ext4_symlink(struct inode *dir, if ((disk_link.len > EXT4_N_BLOCKS * 4)) { if (!encryption_required) inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations; + inode_nohighmem(inode); ext4_set_aops(inode); /* * We cannot call page_symlink() with transaction started diff --git a/fs/ext4/symlink.c b/fs/ext4/symlink.c index e8e7af62ac95..287c3980fa0b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/symlink.c +++ b/fs/ext4/symlink.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook cpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, 0, NULL); if (IS_ERR(cpage)) return ERR_CAST(cpage); - caddr = kmap(cpage); + caddr = page_address(cpage); caddr[size] = 0; } @@ -75,16 +75,12 @@ static const char *ext4_encrypted_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, void **cook /* Null-terminate the name */ if (res <= plen) paddr[res] = '\0'; - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } return *cookie = paddr; errout: - if (cpage) { - kunmap(cpage); + if (cpage) page_cache_release(cpage); - } kfree(paddr); return ERR_PTR(res); } diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index b0edef500590..b95615f3fc50 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2028,3 +2028,9 @@ void inode_set_flags(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags, new_flags) != old_flags)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_set_flags); + +void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode) +{ + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_nohighmem); diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index c8decb7075d6..f746a59fcc88 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -3066,5 +3066,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode) } extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path); +extern void inode_nohighmem(struct inode *inode); #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */ -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 5/9] X.509: fix NULL dereference when restricting key with unsupported_sig

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> The asymmetric key type allows an X.509 certificate to be added even if its signature's hash algorithm is not available in the crypto API. In that case 'payload.data[asym_auth]' will be NULL. But the key restriction code failed to check for this case before trying to use the signature, resulting in a NULL pointer dereference in key_or_keyring_common() or in restrict_link_by_signature(). Fix this by returning -ENOPKG when the signature is unsupported. Reproducer when all the CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512* options are disabled and keyctl has support for the 'restrict_keyring' command: keyctl new_session keyctl restrict_keyring @s asymmetric builtin_trusted openssl req -new -sha512 -x509 -batch -nodes -outform der \ | keyctl padd asymmetric desc @s Fixes: a511e1af8b12 ("KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c index 86fb68508952..7c93c7728454 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); * * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a * matching parent certificate in the trusted list, -EKEYREJECTED if the - * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted and some other error if - * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. + * signature check fails or the key is blacklisted, -ENOPKG if the signature + * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching + * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. */ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, @@ -88,6 +89,8 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, return -EOPNOTSUPP; sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; + if (!sig) + return -ENOPKG; if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) return -ENOKEY; @@ -139,6 +142,8 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, return -EOPNOTSUPP; sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; + if (!sig) + return -ENOPKG; if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) return -ENOKEY; @@ -222,9 +227,9 @@ static int key_or_keyring_common(struct key *dest_keyring, * * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, - * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if - * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be - * performed. + * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses + * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate + * but the signature check cannot be performed. */ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, @@ -249,9 +254,9 @@ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring, * * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list, - * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, and some other error if - * there is a matching certificate but the signature check cannot be - * performed. + * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature check fails, -ENOPKG if the signature uses + * unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching certificate + * but the signature check cannot be performed. */ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *dest_keyring, const struct key_type *type, -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 2/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate blacklisting

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> If there is a blacklisted certificate in a SignerInfo's certificate chain, then pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() sets sinfo->blacklisted and returns 0. But, pkcs7_verify() fails to handle this case appropriately, as it actually continues on to the line 'actual_ret = 0;', indicating that the SignerInfo has passed verification. Consequently, PKCS#7 signature verification ignores the certificate blacklist. Fix this by not considering blacklisted SignerInfos to have passed verification. Also fix the function comment with regards to when 0 is returned. Fixes: 03bb79315ddc ("PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 2f6a768b91d7..97c77f66b20d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -366,8 +366,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * * (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or: * - * (*) 0 if no signature chains were found to be blacklisted or to contain - * unsupported crypto, or: + * (*) 0 if a signature chain passed verification, or: * * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or: * @@ -423,8 +422,11 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo); - if (sinfo->blacklisted && actual_ret == -ENOPKG) - actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + if (sinfo->blacklisted) { + if (actual_ret == -ENOPKG) + actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + continue; + } if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOPKG) { sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true; -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/9] PKCS#7: fix certificate chain verification

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When pkcs7_verify_sig_chain() is building the certificate chain for a SignerInfo using the certificates in the PKCS#7 message, it is passing the wrong arguments to public_key_verify_signature(). Consequently, when the next certificate is supposed to be used to verify the previous certificate, the next certificate is actually used to verify itself. An attacker can use this bug to create a bogus certificate chain that has no cryptographic relationship between the beginning and end. Fortunately I couldn't quite find a way to use this to bypass the overall signature verification, though it comes very close. Here's the reasoning: due to the bug, every certificate in the chain beyond the first actually has to be self-signed (where "self-signed" here refers to the actual key and signature; an attacker might still manipulate the certificate fields such that the self_signed flag doesn't actually get set, and thus the chain doesn't end immediately). But to pass trust validation (pkcs7_validate_trust()), either the SignerInfo or one of the certificates has to actually be signed by a trusted key. Since only self-signed certificates can be added to the chain, the only way for an attacker to introduce a trusted signature is to include a self-signed trusted certificate. But, when pkcs7_validate_trust_one() reaches that certificate, instead of trying to verify the signature on that certificate, it will actually look up the corresponding trusted key, which will succeed, and then try to verify the *previous* certificate, which will fail. Thus, disaster is narrowly averted (as far as I could tell). Fixes: 6c2dc5ae4ab7 ("X.509: Extract signature digest and make self-signed cert checks earlier") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.7+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 39e6de0c2761..2f6a768b91d7 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, sinfo->index); return 0; } - ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, p->sig); + ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, x509->sig); if (ret < 0) return ret; x509->signer = p; -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 101/114] pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: fix off-by-one error when checking buffer limits With pipe-user-pages-hard set to 'N', users were actually only allowed up to 'N - 1' buffers; and likewise for pipe-user-pages-soft. Fix this to allow up to 'N' buffers, as would be expected. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-5-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: b0b91d18e2e9 ("pipe: fix limit checking in pipe_set_size()") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-fix-off-by-one-error-when-checking-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -605,12 +605,12 @@ static unsigned long account_pipe_buffer static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_soft; + return pipe_user_pages_soft && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_soft; } static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs) { - return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; + return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs > pipe_user_pages_hard; } static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) _

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 100/114] pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Subject: pipe: actually allow root to exceed the pipe buffer limits pipe-user-pages-hard and pipe-user-pages-soft are only supposed to apply to unprivileged users, as documented in both Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt and the pipe(7) man page. However, the capabilities are actually only checked when increasing a pipe's size using F_SETPIPE_SZ, not when creating a new pipe. Therefore, if pipe-user-pages-hard has been set, the root user can run into it and be unable to create pipes. Similarly, if pipe-user-pages-soft has been set, the root user can run into it and have their pipes limited to 1 page each. Fix this by allowing the privileged override in both cases. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180111052902.14409-4-ebiggers3@gmail.com Fixes: 759c01142a5d ("pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/pipe.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff -puN fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits fs/pipe.c --- a/fs/pipe.c~pipe-actually-allow-root-to-exceed-the-pipe-buffer-limits +++ a/fs/pipe.c @@ -613,6 +613,11 @@ static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(u return pipe_user_pages_hard && user_bufs >= pipe_user_pages_hard; } +static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) +{ + return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) { struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; @@ -629,12 +634,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info( user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs); - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) { + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) { user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1); pipe_bufs = 1; } - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs)) + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) goto out_revert_acct; pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer), @@ -1065,7 +1070,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_in if (nr_pages > pipe->buffers && (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + is_unprivileged_user()) { ret = -EPERM; goto out_revert_acct; } _

7 years, 4 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [patch 097/114] kasan: rework Kconfig settings

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Subject: kasan: rework Kconfig settings We get a lot of very large stack frames using gcc-7.0.1 with the default -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope --param asan-stack=1 options, which can easily cause an overflow of the kernel stack, e.g. drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2434:1: warning: the frame size of 46176 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2800lib.c:5650:1: warning: the frame size of 23632 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes lib/atomic64_test.c:250:1: warning: the frame size of 11200 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/handlers.c:2621:1: warning: the frame size of 9208 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv090x.c:3431:1: warning: the frame size of 6816 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes fs/fscache/stats.c:287:1: warning: the frame size of 6536 bytes is larger than 3072 bytes To reduce this risk, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope is now split out into a separate CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA Kconfig option, leading to stack frames that are smaller than 2 kilobytes most of the time on x86_64. An earlier version of this patch also prevented combining KASAN_EXTRA with KASAN_INLINE, but that is no longer necessary with gcc-7.0.1. All patches to get the frame size below 2048 bytes with CONFIG_KASAN=y and CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=n have been merged by maintainers now, so we can bring back that default now. KASAN_EXTRA=y still causes lots of warnings but now defaults to !COMPILE_TEST to disable it in allmodconfig, and it remains disabled in all other defconfigs since it is a new option. I arbitrarily raise the warning limit for KASAN_EXTRA to 3072 to reduce the noise, but an allmodconfig kernel still has around 50 warnings on gcc-7. I experimented a bit more with smaller stack frames and have another follow-up series that reduces the warning limit for 64-bit architectures to 1280 bytes (without CONFIG_KASAN). With earlier versions of this patch series, I also had patches to address the warnings we get with KASAN and/or KASAN_EXTRA, using a "noinline_if_stackbloat" annotation. That annotation now got replaced with a gcc-8 bugfix (see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715) and a workaround for older compilers, which means that KASAN_EXTRA is now just as bad as before and will lead to an instant stack overflow in a few extreme cases. This reverts parts of commit commit 3f181b4 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y"). Two patches in linux-next should be merged first to avoid introducing warnings in an allmodconfig build: 3cd890dbe2a4 ("media: dvb-frontends: fix i2c access helpers for KASAN") 16c3ada89cff ("media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN") Do we really need to backport this? I think we do: without this patch, enabling KASAN will lead to unavoidable kernel stack overflow in certain device drivers when built with gcc-7 or higher on linux-4.10+ or any version that contains a backport of commit c5caf21ab0cf8. Most people are probably still on older compilers, but it will get worse over time as they upgrade their distros. The warnings we get on kernels older than this should all be for code that uses dangerously large stack frames, though most of them do not cause an actual stack overflow by themselves.The asan-stack option was added in linux-4.0, and commit 3f181b4d8652 ("lib/Kconfig.debug: disable -Wframe-larger-than warnings with KASAN=y") effectively turned off the warning for allmodconfig kernels, so I would like to see this fix backported to any kernels later than 4.0. I have done dozens of fixes for individual functions with stack frames larger than 2048 bytes with asan-stack, and I plan to make sure that all those fixes make it into the stable kernels as well (most are already there). Part of the complication here is that asan-stack (from 4.0) was originally assumed to always require much larger stacks, but that turned out to be a combination of multiple gcc bugs that we have now worked around and fixed, but sanitize-address-use-after-scope (from v4.10) has a much higher inherent stack usage and also suffers from at least three other problems that we have analyzed but not yet fixed upstream, each of them makes the stack usage more severe than it should be. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171221134744.2295529-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/Kconfig.debug | 2 +- lib/Kconfig.kasan | 11 +++++++++++ scripts/Makefile.kasan | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.debug --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ config ENABLE_MUST_CHECK config FRAME_WARN int "Warn for stack frames larger than (needs gcc 4.4)" range 0 8192 - default 0 if KASAN + default 3072 if KASAN_EXTRA default 2048 if GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY default 1280 if (!64BIT && PARISC) default 1024 if (!64BIT && !PARISC) diff -puN lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings lib/Kconfig.kasan --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/lib/Kconfig.kasan @@ -20,6 +20,17 @@ config KASAN Currently CONFIG_KASAN doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB (the resulting kernel does not boot). +config KASAN_EXTRA + bool "KAsan: extra checks" + depends on KASAN && DEBUG_KERNEL && !COMPILE_TEST + help + This enables further checks in the kernel address sanitizer, for now + it only includes the address-use-after-scope check that can lead + to excessive kernel stack usage, frame size warnings and longer + compile time. + https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81715 has more + + choice prompt "Instrumentation type" depends on KASAN diff -puN scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings scripts/Makefile.kasan --- a/scripts/Makefile.kasan~kasan-rework-kconfig-settings +++ a/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ else endif +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-address-use-after-scope) +endif CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin _

7 years, 4 months

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