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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:49:18 +0100 Subject: KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> commit ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 upstream. As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Safford <safford(a)us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- security/keys/trusted.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char } ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *di if (!ret) ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *d paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, *bloblen = storedsize; } out: - kfree(td); + kzfree(td); return ret; } @@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_p if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(tb); + kzfree(tb); return ret; } @@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; - kfree(tb); + kzfree(tb); return ret; } @@ -961,12 +961,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct ke if (!ret && options->pcrlock) ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); out: - kfree(datablob); - kfree(options); + kzfree(datablob); + kzfree(options); if (!ret) rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); else - kfree(payload); + kzfree(payload); return ret; } @@ -975,8 +975,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_ struct trusted_key_payload *p; p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); - memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); - kfree(p); + kzfree(p); } /* @@ -1018,7 +1017,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); if (ret != Opt_update) { ret = -EINVAL; - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ @@ -1031,22 +1030,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } if (new_o->pcrlock) { ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } } rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); out: - kfree(datablob); - kfree(new_o); + kzfree(datablob); + kzfree(new_o); return ret; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ebiggers(a)google.com are queue-3.18/keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in" failed to apply to 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 3.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2017 00:47:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read() When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per the documentation for keyctl_read(). We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior of the "encrypted" key type. Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben(a)decadent.org.uk> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.38+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris(a)oracle.com> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index bd85315cbfeb..98aa89ff7bfd 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, p = dereference_key_locked(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; - if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) - return 2 * p->blob_len; - ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; } - kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; }

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Please integrate commit 2b02c20 (cdc_ncm) into 4.4

by Porto Rio

Hello, please integrate/backport the following commit into stable kernel release 4.4: Commit-ID: 2b02c20ce0c28974b44e69a2e2f5ddc6a470ad6f (see https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2b02c20ce0c28974b44e69a2e2f5ddc6a4…) Subject: "cdc_ncm: Set NTB format again after altsetting switch for Huawei devices" (The patch has been submitted and merged into the mainline.) We regard this commit as a fix/workaround for a change in firmware behavior observed in some recent huawei devices (e.g.: Huawei MS2131 LTE stick). As these devices are unusable with the 4.4.x LTS kernel we suggest to include this workarround as there will be more and more LTE sticks to expect until EOS in 2022... See also the mail below of the originator of the commit. (It may also make sense to integrate it into the other stable kernel release) Thank you very much! Kind regards, Matthias ---- Sender: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs(a)gmail.com> Date: 08.11.2017 23:21 Subject: Re: Question regarding commit: cdc_ncm: Set NTB format again after altsetting switch for Huawei devices Hello Mathias. First of all, thank you for your interest in huawei_cdc_ncm driver and contacting me. This commit could be backported to 4.4 kernel, I didn't send that to stable(a)vger.kernel.org . Let me know if there are any difficulties doing so. Or I might do the submission in some days. I think that commit could be related to a bug: even if it's arguable. That bug infact, is not related to the Linux kernel itself, but to the huawei firmware. So I don't think there will be a bug tracker entry. Thanks for all, Enrico

7 years, 5 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 2/3] IB/core: disable memory registration of fileystem-dax vmas

by Christoph Hellwig

On Mon, Nov 06, 2017 at 04:57:21PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > Until there is a solution to the dma-to-dax vs truncate problem it is > not safe to allow RDMA to create long standing memory registrations > against filesytem-dax vmas. Looks good: Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>

7 years, 5 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 1/3] mm: introduce get_user_pages_longterm

by Christoph Hellwig

> +long get_user_pages_longterm(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages, > + unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages, > + struct vm_area_struct **vmas) > +{ > + struct vm_area_struct **__vmas = vmas; How about calling the vma argument vma_arg, and the one used vma to make thigns a little more readable? > + struct vm_area_struct *vma_prev = NULL; > + long rc, i; > + > + if (!pages) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (!vmas && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_DAX)) { > + __vmas = kzalloc(sizeof(struct vm_area_struct *) * nr_pages, > + GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!__vmas) > + return -ENOMEM; > + } > + > + rc = get_user_pages(start, nr_pages, gup_flags, pages, __vmas); > + > + /* skip scan for fs-dax vmas if they are compile time disabled */ > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_DAX)) > + goto out; Instead of all this IS_ENABLED magic I'd recomment to just conditionally compile this function and define it to get_user_pages in the header if FS_DAX is disabled. Else this looks fine to me.

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [RFC PATCH] mm: fix device-dax pud write-faults triggered by get_user_pages()

by Dan Williams

Currently only get_user_pages_fast() can safely handle the writable gup case due to its use of pud_access_permitted() to check whether the pud entry is writable. In the gup slow path pud_write() is used instead of pud_access_permitted() and to date it has been unimplemented, just calls BUG_ON(). kernel BUG at ./include/linux/hugetlb.h:244! [..] RIP: 0010:follow_devmap_pud+0x482/0x490 [..] Call Trace: follow_page_mask+0x28c/0x6e0 __get_user_pages+0xe4/0x6c0 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x130/0x1b0 get_user_pages_fast+0x89/0xb0 iov_iter_get_pages_alloc+0x114/0x4a0 nfs_direct_read_schedule_iovec+0xd2/0x350 ? nfs_start_io_direct+0x63/0x70 nfs_file_direct_read+0x1e0/0x250 nfs_file_read+0x90/0xc0 Use pud_access_permitted() to implement pud_write(), a later cleanup can remove {pte,pmd,pud}_write and replace them with {pte,pmd,pud}_access_permitted() drectly so that we only have one set of helpers these kinds of checks. For now, implementing pud_write() simplifies -stable backports. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Fixes: a00cc7d9dd93 ("mm, x86: add support for PUD-sized transparent hugepages") Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> --- Sending this as RFC for opinion on whether this should just be a pud_flags() & _PAGE_RW check, like pmd_write, or pud_access_permitted() that also takes protection keys into account. include/linux/hugetlb.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/hugetlb.h b/include/linux/hugetlb.h index fbf5b31d47ee..6a142b240ef7 100644 --- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h +++ b/include/linux/hugetlb.h @@ -242,8 +242,7 @@ static inline int pgd_write(pgd_t pgd) #ifndef pud_write static inline int pud_write(pud_t pud) { - BUG(); - return 0; + return pud_access_permitted(pud, WRITE); } #endif

7 years, 5 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] blk-mq: respect queue dead via blk_mq_quiesce_queue

by Ming Lei

On Sun, Nov 05, 2017 at 08:10:08PM +0800, Ming Lei wrote: > blk-mq never respects queue dead, and this may cause use-after-free on > any kind of queue resources. This patch respects the rule by calling > blk_mq_quiesce_queue() when queue is marked as DEAD. > > This patch fixes the following kernel crash: > > [ 42.170824] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) > [ 42.172011] IP: blk_mq_flush_busy_ctxs+0x5a/0xe0 > [ 42.172011] PGD 25d8d1067 P4D 25d8d1067 PUD 25d458067 PMD 0 > [ 42.172011] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP > [ 42.172011] Dumping ftrace buffer: > [ 42.172011] (ftrace buffer empty) > [ 42.172011] Modules linked in: scsi_debug ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack libcrc32c bridge stp llc fuse iptable_filter ip_tables sd_mod sg mptsas mptscsih mptbase crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas nvme lpc_ich serio_raw ahci virtio_scsi libahci libata nvme_core binfmt_misc dm_mod iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi null_blk configs > [ 42.172011] CPU: 0 PID: 2750 Comm: fio Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7.blk_mq_io_hang+ #507 > [ 42.172011] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.9.3-1.fc25 04/01/2014 > [ 42.172011] task: ffff88025dc18000 task.stack: ffffc900028c4000 > [ 42.172011] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_flush_busy_ctxs+0x5a/0xe0 > [ 42.172011] RSP: 0018:ffffc900028c7be0 EFLAGS: 00010246 > [ 42.172011] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8802775907c8 > [ 42.172011] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc900028c7c50 RDI: ffff88025de25c00 > [ 42.172011] RBP: ffffc900028c7c28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8802595692c0 > [ 42.172011] R10: ffffc900028c7e50 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: ffffc900028c7c50 > [ 42.172011] R13: ffff88025de25cd8 R14: ffffc900028c7d78 R15: ffff88025de25c00 > [ 42.172011] FS: 00007faa8653f7c0(0000) GS:ffff88027fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 > [ 42.172011] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [ 42.172011] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000002593df006 CR4: 00000000003606f0 > [ 42.172011] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 > [ 42.172011] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 > [ 42.172011] Call Trace: > [ 42.172011] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x1b4/0x1f0 > [ 42.172011] ? preempt_schedule+0x27/0x30 > [ 42.172011] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x8b/0xa0 > [ 42.172011] __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0xb7/0x100 > [ 42.172011] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x14/0x20 > [ 42.172011] blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0xda/0x120 > [ 42.172011] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x179/0x280 > [ 42.172011] blk_flush_plug_list+0x102/0x290 > [ 42.172011] blk_finish_plug+0x2c/0x40 > [ 42.172011] do_io_submit+0x3fa/0x780 > [ 42.172011] SyS_io_submit+0x10/0x20 > [ 42.172011] ? SyS_io_submit+0x10/0x20 > [ 42.172011] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 > [ 42.172011] RIP: 0033:0x7faa80ff8697 > [ 42.172011] RSP: 002b:00007ffe08236de8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000d1 > [ 42.172011] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000001f1e600 RCX: 00007faa80ff8697 > [ 42.172011] RDX: 000000000208e638 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 00007faa6ecae000 > [ 42.172011] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000001f1e0e0 > [ 42.172011] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007faa614f19e0 > [ 42.172011] R13: 00007faa614ff0b0 R14: 00007faa614fef50 R15: 0000000100000000 > [ 42.172011] Code: e0 00 00 00 c7 45 bc 00 00 00 00 85 c0 74 76 4c 8d af d8 00 00 00 49 89 ff 44 8b 45 bc 4c 89 c0 49 c1 e0 06 4d 03 87 e8 00 00 00 <49> 83 38 00 4d 89 c6 74 41 41 8b 8f dc 00 00 00 41 89 c4 31 db > [ 42.172011] RIP: blk_mq_flush_busy_ctxs+0x5a/0xe0 RSP: ffffc900028c7be0 > [ 42.172011] CR2: 0000000000000000 > [ 42.172011] ---[ end trace 2432dfddf9b84061 ]--- > [ 42.172011] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception > [ 42.172011] Dumping ftrace buffer: > [ 42.172011] (ftrace buffer empty) > [ 42.172011] Kernel Offset: disabled > [ 42.172011] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception > > Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> > --- > block/blk-core.c | 4 ++++ > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/block/blk-core.c b/block/blk-core.c > index 048be4aa6024..0b121f29e3b1 100644 > --- a/block/blk-core.c > +++ b/block/blk-core.c > @@ -658,6 +658,10 @@ void blk_cleanup_queue(struct request_queue *q) > queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_DEAD, q); > spin_unlock_irq(lock); > > + /* respect queue DEAD via quiesce for blk-mq */ > + if (q->mq_ops) > + blk_mq_quiesce_queue(q); > + > /* for synchronous bio-based driver finish in-flight integrity i/o */ > blk_flush_integrity(); Hi Jens, Could you consider this patch? This issue can be reproduced easily in heavy IO and device remove test on SCSI. -- Ming

7 years, 5 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v2 04/17] lpfc: Fix crash after bad bar setup on driver attachment

by James Smart

In test cases where an instance of the driver is detached and reattached, the driver will crash on reattachment. There is a compound if statement that will skip over the bar setup if the pci_resource_start call is not successful. The driver erroneously returns success to its bar setup in this scenario even though the bars aren't properly configured. Rework the offending code segment for proper initialization steps. If the pci_resource_start call fails, -ENOMEM is now returned. Sample stack: rport-5:0-10: blocked FC remote port time out: removing rport BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) ... lpfc_sli4_wait_bmbx_ready+0x32/0x70 [lpfc] ... ... RIP: 0010:... ... lpfc_sli4_wait_bmbx_ready+0x32/0x70 [lpfc] Call Trace: ... lpfc_sli4_post_sync_mbox+0x106/0x4d0 [lpfc] ... ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x176/0x420 ... ? __kmalloc+0x2e/0x230 ... lpfc_sli_issue_mbox_s4+0x533/0x720 [lpfc] ... ? mempool_alloc+0x69/0x170 ... ? dma_generic_alloc_coherent+0x8f/0x140 ... lpfc_sli_issue_mbox+0xf/0x20 [lpfc] ... lpfc_sli4_driver_resource_setup+0xa6f/0x1130 [lpfc] ... ? lpfc_pci_probe_one+0x23e/0x16f0 [lpfc] ... lpfc_pci_probe_one+0x445/0x16f0 [lpfc] ... local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0 ... work_for_cpu_fn+0x14/0x20 ... process_one_work+0x17a/0x440 Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+ Signed-off-by: Dick Kennedy <dick.kennedy(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart(a)broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.com> --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c index 745aff753396..fc9f91327724 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_init.c @@ -9437,44 +9437,62 @@ lpfc_sli4_pci_mem_setup(struct lpfc_hba *phba) lpfc_sli4_bar0_register_memmap(phba, if_type); } - if ((if_type == LPFC_SLI_INTF_IF_TYPE_0) && - (pci_resource_start(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR2))) { - /* - * Map SLI4 if type 0 HBA Control Register base to a kernel - * virtual address and setup the registers. - */ - phba->pci_bar1_map = pci_resource_start(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR2); - bar1map_len = pci_resource_len(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR2); - phba->sli4_hba.ctrl_regs_memmap_p = - ioremap(phba->pci_bar1_map, bar1map_len); - if (!phba->sli4_hba.ctrl_regs_memmap_p) { - dev_printk(KERN_ERR, &pdev->dev, - "ioremap failed for SLI4 HBA control registers.\n"); + if (if_type == LPFC_SLI_INTF_IF_TYPE_0) { + if (pci_resource_start(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR2)) { + /* + * Map SLI4 if type 0 HBA Control Register base to a + * kernel virtual address and setup the registers. + */ + phba->pci_bar1_map = pci_resource_start(pdev, + PCI_64BIT_BAR2); + bar1map_len = pci_resource_len(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR2); + phba->sli4_hba.ctrl_regs_memmap_p = + ioremap(phba->pci_bar1_map, + bar1map_len); + if (!phba->sli4_hba.ctrl_regs_memmap_p) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, + "ioremap failed for SLI4 HBA " + "control registers.\n"); + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out_iounmap_conf; + } + phba->pci_bar2_memmap_p = + phba->sli4_hba.ctrl_regs_memmap_p; + lpfc_sli4_bar1_register_memmap(phba); + } else { + error = -ENOMEM; goto out_iounmap_conf; } - phba->pci_bar2_memmap_p = phba->sli4_hba.ctrl_regs_memmap_p; - lpfc_sli4_bar1_register_memmap(phba); } - if ((if_type == LPFC_SLI_INTF_IF_TYPE_0) && - (pci_resource_start(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR4))) { - /* - * Map SLI4 if type 0 HBA Doorbell Register base to a kernel - * virtual address and setup the registers. - */ - phba->pci_bar2_map = pci_resource_start(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR4); - bar2map_len = pci_resource_len(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR4); - phba->sli4_hba.drbl_regs_memmap_p = - ioremap(phba->pci_bar2_map, bar2map_len); - if (!phba->sli4_hba.drbl_regs_memmap_p) { - dev_printk(KERN_ERR, &pdev->dev, - "ioremap failed for SLI4 HBA doorbell registers.\n"); - goto out_iounmap_ctrl; - } - phba->pci_bar4_memmap_p = phba->sli4_hba.drbl_regs_memmap_p; - error = lpfc_sli4_bar2_register_memmap(phba, LPFC_VF0); - if (error) + if (if_type == LPFC_SLI_INTF_IF_TYPE_0) { + if (pci_resource_start(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR4)) { + /* + * Map SLI4 if type 0 HBA Doorbell Register base to + * a kernel virtual address and setup the registers. + */ + phba->pci_bar2_map = pci_resource_start(pdev, + PCI_64BIT_BAR4); + bar2map_len = pci_resource_len(pdev, PCI_64BIT_BAR4); + phba->sli4_hba.drbl_regs_memmap_p = + ioremap(phba->pci_bar2_map, + bar2map_len); + if (!phba->sli4_hba.drbl_regs_memmap_p) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, + "ioremap failed for SLI4 HBA" + " doorbell registers.\n"); + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out_iounmap_ctrl; + } + phba->pci_bar4_memmap_p = + phba->sli4_hba.drbl_regs_memmap_p; + error = lpfc_sli4_bar2_register_memmap(phba, LPFC_VF0); + if (error) + goto out_iounmap_all; + } else { + error = -ENOMEM; goto out_iounmap_all; + } } return 0; -- 2.13.1

7 years, 5 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v3] scsi: require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to write to procfs interface

by ebiederm＠xmission.com

Aleksa Sarai <asarai(a)suse.de> writes: > On 11/05/2017 01:56 PM, Aleksa Sarai wrote: >> Previously, the only capability effectively required to operate on the >> /proc/scsi interface was CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (or for some other files, >> having an fsuid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID was enough). This means that >> semi-privileged processes could interfere with core components of a >> system (such as causing a DoS by removing the underlying SCSI device of >> the host's / mount). > > An alternative to this patch would be to make the open(2) call fail, if you try > to open it write-only or read-write. Not sure which would be preferred (should > it be possible to pass /proc/scsi/scsi to a semi-privileged process to write > to?). Making open fail is very much the preferred solution. Testing for permission on write can be avoided by finding a suid root application whose error output acts like a suid cat. The best current practice for adding this kind of permission check is to add the check in open. For some older use cases where we made this mistake we had to maintian a check during write to avoid breaking userspace. But as this check is new there is no reason to add a check anywhere except in open. Eric

7 years, 5 months

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Re: [Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 3.16 000/294] 3.16.50-rc1 review

by Guenter Roeck

On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 04:59:58PM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote: > On Thu, 2017-11-09 at 08:03 -0800, Guenter Roeck wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 12:40:36PM +0000, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > > On Thu, 2017-11-09 at 13:21 +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > > > > On Thu, Nov 9, 2017 at 1:08 PM, Greg KH <greg(a)kroah.com> wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 12:55:30PM +0100, Arnd Bergmann wrote: > > > > > > [...] > > > > > > I think if you upload the branch to the stable-rc git, that should produce > > > > > > the automated build and boot results via email or via the > > > > > > https://kernelci.org/job/ interface. Once there are some results > > > > > > there, I'll go through the list once more to see what warnings > > > > > > and failures remain. > > > > > > > > > > I don't know of a way to have others push to that tree/branch at the > > > > > moment :( > > > > > > > > > > I'll go update that branch now... > > > > > > > > Thanks! > > > > > > > > With the arm-soc tree, we simply have a shared group-id on > > > > gitolite.kernel.org and everyone in that group can push to it. > > > > > > > > If that is the only thing you need, it should be trivial to let Ben > > > > and Sasha push to /pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/*.git as well, > > > > I'm sure helpdesk(a)kernel.org can arrange that. Of course if you are > > > > worried about having multiple accounts with write access to all the > > > > branches, then that wouldn't be enough. > > > > > > I think I'd rather send a pull request to Greg at the start of the > > > review period. > > > > > > > If you change the trees I am supposed to pull from for my builders, > > please let me know. > > If you're happy to keep supporting quilt-in-git then there's no change. > I check your builders page and try to fix up build failures before even > making a release candidate. > Ah yes, kernelci won't pick that up. No problem to keep kerneltests going as long as it adds value. Guenter

7 years, 5 months

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