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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: VMX: Inject #UD if guest tries to execute SEAMCALL or" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9d7dfb95da2cb5c1287df2f3468bcb70d8b31087 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112029-degree-siesta-988c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9d7dfb95da2cb5c1287df2f3468bcb70d8b31087 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2025 11:21:47 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Inject #UD if guest tries to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li(a)intel.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h index 9792e329343e..1baa86dfe029 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ #define EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE 68 #define EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK 74 #define EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY 75 +#define EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL 76 #define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL 77 #define EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ_IMM 84 #define EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE_IMM 85 diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 76271962cb70..bcea087b642f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -6728,6 +6728,14 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, case EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY: /* Notify VM exit is not exposed to L1 */ return false; + case EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL: + case EXIT_REASON_TDCALL: + /* + * SEAMCALL and TDCALL unconditionally VM-Exit, but aren't + * virtualized by KVM for L1 hypervisors, i.e. L1 should + * never want or expect such an exit. + */ + return false; default: return true; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index f87c216d976d..91b6f2f3edc2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6032,6 +6032,12 @@ static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return 1; } +static int handle_tdx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); + return 1; +} + #ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { @@ -6157,6 +6163,8 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = { [EXIT_REASON_ENCLS] = handle_encls, [EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK] = handle_bus_lock_vmexit, [EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY] = handle_notify, + [EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL] = handle_tdx_instruction, + [EXIT_REASON_TDCALL] = handle_tdx_instruction, [EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ_IMM] = handle_rdmsr_imm, [EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE_IMM] = handle_wrmsr_imm, };

1 month, 1 week

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: VMX: Inject #UD if guest tries to execute SEAMCALL or" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

1 month, 1 week

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Fix and simplify LBR virtualization handling with" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 8a4821412cf2c1429fffa07c012dd150f2edf78c # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112000-coziness-scurvy-29f4@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 8a4821412cf2c1429fffa07c012dd150f2edf78c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 00:45:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Fix and simplify LBR virtualization handling with nested The current scheme for handling LBRV when nested is used is very complicated, especially when L1 does not enable LBRV (i.e. does not set LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK). To avoid copying LBRs between VMCB01 and VMCB02 on every nested transition, the current implementation switches between using VMCB01 or VMCB02 as the source of truth for the LBRs while L2 is running. If L2 enables LBR, VMCB02 is used as the source of truth. When L2 disables LBR, the LBRs are copied to VMCB01 and VMCB01 is used as the source of truth. This introduces significant complexity, and incorrect behavior in some cases. For example, on a nested #VMEXIT, the LBRs are only copied from VMCB02 to VMCB01 if LBRV is enabled in VMCB01. This is because L2's writes to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR to enable LBR are intercepted and propagated to VMCB01 instead of VMCB02. However, LBRV is only enabled in VMCB02 when L2 is running. This means that if L2 enables LBR and exits to L1, the LBRs will not be propagated from VMCB02 to VMCB01, because LBRV is disabled in VMCB01. There is no meaningful difference in CPUID rate in L2 when copying LBRs on every nested transition vs. the current approach, so do the simple and correct thing and always copy LBRs between VMCB01 and VMCB02 on nested transitions (when LBRV is disabled by L1). Drop the conditional LBRs copying in __svm_{enable/disable}_lbrv() as it is now unnecessary. VMCB02 becomes the only source of truth for LBRs when L2 is running, regardless of LBRV being enabled by L1, drop svm_get_lbr_vmcb() and use svm->vmcb directly in its place. Fixes: 1d5a1b5860ed ("KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251108004524.1600006-4-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index a6443feab252..da6e80b3ac35 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -677,11 +677,10 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12 */ svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb12); vmcb02->save.dbgctl &= ~DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS; - svm_update_lbrv(&svm->vcpu); - - } else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) { + } else { svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb01); } + svm_update_lbrv(&svm->vcpu); } static inline bool is_evtinj_soft(u32 evtinj) @@ -833,11 +832,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip; } - vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext & - LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV)) - vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= - (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK); + /* LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK is controlled by svm_update_lbrv() */ if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm)) vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK; @@ -1189,13 +1184,12 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu); if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && - (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) { + (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02); - svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); - } else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) { + else svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb01, vmcb02); - svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); - } + + svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); if (vnmi) { if (vmcb02->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 53201f13a43c..10c21e4c5406 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -808,13 +808,7 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb) static void __svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); - - svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - - /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */ - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr); + to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; } void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -825,35 +819,15 @@ void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static void __svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); - KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm); - svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - - /* - * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them - * on nested guest entries. - */ - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->vmcb); -} - -static struct vmcb *svm_get_lbr_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) -{ - /* - * If LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR MSRs are always kept in - * vmcb01. If LBR virtualization is enabled and L1 is running VMs of - * its own, the MSRs are moved between vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed. - */ - return svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK ? svm->vmcb : - svm->vmcb01.ptr; + to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; } void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) || + bool enable_lbrv = (svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) || (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)); @@ -2733,19 +2707,19 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux; break; case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_from; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.br_from; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_to; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.br_to; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_from; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.last_excp_from; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_to; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.last_excp_to; break; case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA: msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr; @@ -3013,10 +2987,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) if (data & DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS) return 1; - if (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl == data) + if (svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl == data) break; - svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl = data; + svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl = data; vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_LBR); svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); break;

1 month, 1 week

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Fix and simplify LBR virtualization handling with" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 8a4821412cf2c1429fffa07c012dd150f2edf78c # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112058-passenger-nerd-c32d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 8a4821412cf2c1429fffa07c012dd150f2edf78c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 00:45:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Fix and simplify LBR virtualization handling with nested The current scheme for handling LBRV when nested is used is very complicated, especially when L1 does not enable LBRV (i.e. does not set LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK). To avoid copying LBRs between VMCB01 and VMCB02 on every nested transition, the current implementation switches between using VMCB01 or VMCB02 as the source of truth for the LBRs while L2 is running. If L2 enables LBR, VMCB02 is used as the source of truth. When L2 disables LBR, the LBRs are copied to VMCB01 and VMCB01 is used as the source of truth. This introduces significant complexity, and incorrect behavior in some cases. For example, on a nested #VMEXIT, the LBRs are only copied from VMCB02 to VMCB01 if LBRV is enabled in VMCB01. This is because L2's writes to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR to enable LBR are intercepted and propagated to VMCB01 instead of VMCB02. However, LBRV is only enabled in VMCB02 when L2 is running. This means that if L2 enables LBR and exits to L1, the LBRs will not be propagated from VMCB02 to VMCB01, because LBRV is disabled in VMCB01. There is no meaningful difference in CPUID rate in L2 when copying LBRs on every nested transition vs. the current approach, so do the simple and correct thing and always copy LBRs between VMCB01 and VMCB02 on nested transitions (when LBRV is disabled by L1). Drop the conditional LBRs copying in __svm_{enable/disable}_lbrv() as it is now unnecessary. VMCB02 becomes the only source of truth for LBRs when L2 is running, regardless of LBRV being enabled by L1, drop svm_get_lbr_vmcb() and use svm->vmcb directly in its place. Fixes: 1d5a1b5860ed ("KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251108004524.1600006-4-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index a6443feab252..da6e80b3ac35 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -677,11 +677,10 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12 */ svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb12); vmcb02->save.dbgctl &= ~DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS; - svm_update_lbrv(&svm->vcpu); - - } else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) { + } else { svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb01); } + svm_update_lbrv(&svm->vcpu); } static inline bool is_evtinj_soft(u32 evtinj) @@ -833,11 +832,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip; } - vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext & - LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV)) - vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= - (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK); + /* LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK is controlled by svm_update_lbrv() */ if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm)) vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK; @@ -1189,13 +1184,12 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu); if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && - (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) { + (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02); - svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); - } else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) { + else svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb01, vmcb02); - svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); - } + + svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); if (vnmi) { if (vmcb02->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 53201f13a43c..10c21e4c5406 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -808,13 +808,7 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb) static void __svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); - - svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - - /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */ - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr); + to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; } void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -825,35 +819,15 @@ void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static void __svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); - KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm); - svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - - /* - * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them - * on nested guest entries. - */ - if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) - svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->vmcb); -} - -static struct vmcb *svm_get_lbr_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) -{ - /* - * If LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR MSRs are always kept in - * vmcb01. If LBR virtualization is enabled and L1 is running VMs of - * its own, the MSRs are moved between vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed. - */ - return svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK ? svm->vmcb : - svm->vmcb01.ptr; + to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; } void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) || + bool enable_lbrv = (svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) || (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)); @@ -2733,19 +2707,19 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux; break; case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_from; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.br_from; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_to; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.br_to; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_from; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.last_excp_from; break; case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP: - msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_to; + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.last_excp_to; break; case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA: msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr; @@ -3013,10 +2987,10 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) if (data & DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS) return 1; - if (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl == data) + if (svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl == data) break; - svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl = data; + svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl = data; vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_LBR); svm_update_lbrv(vcpu); break;

1 month, 1 week

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Always recalculate LBR MSR intercepts in" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

1 month, 1 week

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Always recalculate LBR MSR intercepts in" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x fbe5e5f030c22ae717ee422aaab0e00ea84fab5e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025112047-rind-cartoon-4426@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From fbe5e5f030c22ae717ee422aaab0e00ea84fab5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 00:45:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Always recalculate LBR MSR intercepts in svm_update_lbrv() svm_update_lbrv() is called when MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is updated, and on nested transitions where LBRV is used. It checks whether LBRV enablement needs to be changed in the current VMCB, and if it does, it also recalculate intercepts to LBR MSRs. However, there are cases where intercepts need to be updated even when LBRV enablement doesn't. Example scenario: - L1 has MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR cleared. - L1 runs L2 without LBR_CTL_ENABLE (no LBRV). - L2 sets DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR in MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, svm_update_lbrv() sets LBR_CTL_ENABLE in VMCB02 and disables intercepts to LBR MSRs. - L2 exits to L1, svm_update_lbrv() is not called on this transition. - L1 clears MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, svm_update_lbrv() finds that LBR_CTL_ENABLE is already cleared in VMCB01 and does nothing. - Intercepts remain disabled, L1 reads to LBR MSRs read the host MSRs. Fix it by always recalculating intercepts in svm_update_lbrv(). Fixes: 1d5a1b5860ed ("KVM: x86: nSVM: correctly virtualize LBR msrs when L2 is running") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251108004524.1600006-3-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index 39538098002b..53201f13a43c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -806,25 +806,29 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb) vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR); } -void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static void __svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */ if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr); } -static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + __svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); + svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); +} + +static void __svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm); svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK; - svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); /* * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them @@ -853,13 +857,18 @@ void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) && (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)); - if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv) - return; + if (enable_lbrv && !current_enable_lbrv) + __svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); + else if (!enable_lbrv && current_enable_lbrv) + __svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu); - if (enable_lbrv) - svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu); - else - svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu); + /* + * During nested transitions, it is possible that the current VMCB has + * LBR_CTL set, but the previous LBR_CTL had it cleared (or vice versa). + * In this case, even though LBR_CTL does not need an update, intercepts + * do, so always recalculate the intercepts here. + */ + svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu); } void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm)

1 month, 1 week

Agentic AI sector Email List

by Melissa Gorga

Hi There, Hope you're doing well! I wanted to reach out and see if you'd be interested in a verified Agentic AI Companies & Decision-Makers List. specifically curated for organizations building solutions for enterprise teams, operations, automation, customer support, finance, retail, logistics, and other data-driven industries. If this could support your business, I'd be happy to Share counts, samples, and pricing-or we can schedule a quick Zoom meeting. Let me know how you'd prefer to proceed. Best regards, Melissa Business Development Specialist | B2B Data Provider

1 month, 1 week

[PATCH v2] drm/imx/tve: fix probe device leak

by Johan Hovold

Make sure to drop the reference taken to the DDC device during probe on probe failure (e.g. probe deferral) and on driver unbind. Fixes: fcbc51e54d2a ("staging: drm/imx: Add support for Television Encoder (TVEv2)") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 3.10 Cc: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel(a)pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li(a)nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - add missing NULL ddc check drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3/imx-tve.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3/imx-tve.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3/imx-tve.c index fd1e617e171e..68bbbdbd347b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3/imx-tve.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/imx/ipuv3/imx-tve.c @@ -525,6 +525,13 @@ static const struct component_ops imx_tve_ops = { .bind = imx_tve_bind, }; +static void imx_tve_put_device(void *_dev) +{ + struct device *dev = _dev; + + put_device(dev); +} + static int imx_tve_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; @@ -546,6 +553,12 @@ static int imx_tve_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ddc_node) { tve->ddc = of_find_i2c_adapter_by_node(ddc_node); of_node_put(ddc_node); + if (tve->ddc) { + ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, imx_tve_put_device, + &tve->ddc->dev); + if (ret) + return ret; + } } tve->mode = of_get_tve_mode(np); -- 2.51.0

1 month, 1 week

[PATCH 1/2] ata: libata-scsi: Fix system suspend for a security locked drive

by Niklas Cassel

Commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") fixed ata_to_sense_error() to properly generate sense key ABORTED COMMAND (without any additional sense code), instead of the previous bogus sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST with the additional sense code UNALIGNED WRITE COMMAND, for a failed command. However, this broke suspend for Security locked drives (drives that have Security enabled, and have not been Security unlocked by boot firmware). The reason for this is that the SCSI disk driver, for the Synchronize Cache command only, treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command (regardless of ASC / ASCQ). After commit cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") the code that treats any sense data with sense key ILLEGAL REQUEST as a successful command is no longer applicable, so the command fails, which causes the system suspend to be aborted: sd 1:0:0:0: PM: dpm_run_callback(): scsi_bus_suspend returns -5 sd 1:0:0:0: PM: failed to suspend async: error -5 PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected To make suspend work once again, for a Security locked device only, return sense data LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED, the actual sense data which a real SCSI device would have returned if locked. The SCSI disk driver treats this sense data as a successful command. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ilia Baryshnikov <qwelias(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220704 Fixes: cf3fc037623c ("ata: libata-scsi: Fix ata_to_sense_error() status handling") Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/ata.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c b/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c index b43a3196e2be..58efa88e4882 100644 --- a/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c @@ -992,6 +992,13 @@ static void ata_gen_ata_sense(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) return; } + if (ata_id_is_locked(dev->id)) { + /* Security locked */ + /* LOGICAL UNIT ACCESS NOT AUTHORIZED */ + ata_scsi_set_sense(dev, cmd, DATA_PROTECT, 0x74, 0x71); + return; + } + if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_RTF_FILLED)) { ata_dev_dbg(dev, "Missing result TF: reporting aborted command\n"); diff --git a/include/linux/ata.h b/include/linux/ata.h index 792e10a09787..c9013e472aa3 100644 --- a/include/linux/ata.h +++ b/include/linux/ata.h @@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ struct ata_bmdma_prd { #define ata_id_has_ncq(id) ((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] & (1 << 8)) #define ata_id_queue_depth(id) (((id)[ATA_ID_QUEUE_DEPTH] & 0x1f) + 1) #define ata_id_removable(id) ((id)[ATA_ID_CONFIG] & (1 << 7)) +#define ata_id_is_locked(id) (((id)[ATA_ID_DLF] & 0x7) == 0x7) #define ata_id_has_atapi_AN(id) \ ((((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] != 0x0000) && \ ((id)[ATA_ID_SATA_CAPABILITY] != 0xffff)) && \ -- 2.51.1

1 month, 1 week

[PATCH 6.12.y] net: dsa: sja1105: fix kasan out-of-bounds warning in sja1105_table_delete_entry()

by Chen Yu

From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> [ Upstream commit 5f2b28b79d2d1946ee36ad8b3dc0066f73c90481 ] There are actually 2 problems: - deleting the last element doesn't require the memmove of elements [i + 1, end) over it. Actually, element i+1 is out of bounds. - The memmove itself should move size - i - 1 elements, because the last element is out of bounds. The out-of-bounds element still remains out of bounds after being accessed, so the problem is only that we touch it, not that it becomes in active use. But I suppose it can lead to issues if the out-of-bounds element is part of an unmapped page. Fixes: 6666cebc5e30 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Add support for VLAN operations") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250318115716.2124395-4-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <xnguchen(a)sina.cn> --- drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c index baba204ad62f..2ac91fe2a79b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c @@ -1921,8 +1921,10 @@ int sja1105_table_delete_entry(struct sja1105_table *table, int i) if (i > table->entry_count) return -ERANGE; - memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size, - (table->entry_count - i) * entry_size); + if (i + 1 < table->entry_count) { + memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size, + (table->entry_count - i - 1) * entry_size); + } table->entry_count--; -- 2.17.1

1 month, 1 week

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