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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] NFSD: Clear SECLABEL in the suppattr_exclcreat bitmap" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 27d17641cacfedd816789b75d342430f6b912bd2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122920-sequence-vixen-bb32@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 27d17641cacfedd816789b75d342430f6b912bd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2025 11:00:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] NFSD: Clear SECLABEL in the suppattr_exclcreat bitmap >From RFC 8881: 5.8.1.14. Attribute 75: suppattr_exclcreat > The bit vector that would set all REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED > attributes that are supported by the EXCLUSIVE4_1 method of file > creation via the OPEN operation. The scope of this attribute > applies to all objects with a matching fsid. There's nothing in RFC 8881 that states that suppattr_exclcreat is or is not allowed to contain bits for attributes that are clear in the reported supported_attrs bitmask. But it doesn't make sense for an NFS server to indicate that it /doesn't/ implement an attribute, but then also indicate that clients /are/ allowed to set that attribute using OPEN(create) with EXCLUSIVE4_1. Ensure that the SECURITY_LABEL and ACL bits are not set in the suppattr_exclcreat bitmask when they are also not set in the supported_attrs bitmask. Fixes: 8c18f2052e75 ("nfsd41: SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT attribute") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 30ce5851fe4c..51ef97c25456 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -3375,6 +3375,11 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_encode_fattr4_suppattr_exclcreat(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 supp[3]; memcpy(supp, nfsd_suppattrs[resp->cstate.minorversion], sizeof(supp)); + if (!IS_POSIXACL(d_inode(args->dentry))) + supp[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_ACL; + if (!args->contextsupport) + supp[2] &= ~FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL; + supp[0] &= NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD0; supp[1] &= NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD1; supp[2] &= NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD2;

5 days, 4 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] NFSD: Clear SECLABEL in the suppattr_exclcreat bitmap" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 27d17641cacfedd816789b75d342430f6b912bd2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122919-carried-livestock-9465@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 27d17641cacfedd816789b75d342430f6b912bd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2025 11:00:49 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] NFSD: Clear SECLABEL in the suppattr_exclcreat bitmap >From RFC 8881: 5.8.1.14. Attribute 75: suppattr_exclcreat > The bit vector that would set all REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED > attributes that are supported by the EXCLUSIVE4_1 method of file > creation via the OPEN operation. The scope of this attribute > applies to all objects with a matching fsid. There's nothing in RFC 8881 that states that suppattr_exclcreat is or is not allowed to contain bits for attributes that are clear in the reported supported_attrs bitmask. But it doesn't make sense for an NFS server to indicate that it /doesn't/ implement an attribute, but then also indicate that clients /are/ allowed to set that attribute using OPEN(create) with EXCLUSIVE4_1. Ensure that the SECURITY_LABEL and ACL bits are not set in the suppattr_exclcreat bitmask when they are also not set in the supported_attrs bitmask. Fixes: 8c18f2052e75 ("nfsd41: SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT attribute") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index 30ce5851fe4c..51ef97c25456 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -3375,6 +3375,11 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_encode_fattr4_suppattr_exclcreat(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 supp[3]; memcpy(supp, nfsd_suppattrs[resp->cstate.minorversion], sizeof(supp)); + if (!IS_POSIXACL(d_inode(args->dentry))) + supp[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_ACL; + if (!args->contextsupport) + supp[2] &= ~FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL; + supp[0] &= NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD0; supp[1] &= NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD1; supp[2] &= NFSD_SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT_WORD2;

5 days, 5 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xfs: fix a memory leak in xfs_buf_item_init()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x fc40459de82543b565ebc839dca8f7987f16f62e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122919-catty-unrated-e504@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From fc40459de82543b565ebc839dca8f7987f16f62e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang(a)isrc.iscas.ac.cn> Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2025 17:06:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] xfs: fix a memory leak in xfs_buf_item_init() xfs_buf_item_get_format() may allocate memory for bip->bli_formats, free the memory in the error path. Fixes: c3d5f0c2fb85 ("xfs: complain if anyone tries to create a too-large buffer log item") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang(a)isrc.iscas.ac.cn> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c index 8d85b5eee444..f4c5be67826e 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item.c @@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ xfs_buf_item_init( map_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(chunks, NBWORD); if (map_size > XFS_BLF_DATAMAP_SIZE) { + xfs_buf_item_free_format(bip); kmem_cache_free(xfs_buf_item_cache, bip); xfs_err(mp, "buffer item dirty bitmap (%u uints) too small to reflect %u bytes!",

5 days, 5 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Immediately refresh APICv controls as needed on" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 29763138830916f46daaa50e83e7f4f907a3236b # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122927-delegate-composed-5765@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 29763138830916f46daaa50e83e7f4f907a3236b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang(a)oracle.com> Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 15:19:05 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Immediately refresh APICv controls as needed on nested VM-Exit If an APICv status updated was pended while L2 was active, immediately refresh vmcs01's controls instead of pending KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE as kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() only calls into vendor code if a change is necessary. E.g. if APICv is inhibited, and then activated while L2 is running: kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() | -> __kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() | -> apic->apicv_active = true | -> vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl() | -> vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status = true | -> return Then L2 exits to L1: __nested_vmx_vmexit() | -> kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE) vcpu_enter_guest(): KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE -> kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() | -> __kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() | -> return // because if (apic->apicv_active == activate) Reported-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aQ2jmnN8wUYVEawF@intel.com Fixes: 7c69661e225c ("KVM: nVMX: Defer APICv updates while L2 is active until L1 is active") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang(a)oracle.com> [sean: write changelog] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205231913.441872-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index bcea087b642f..1725c6a94f99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "trace.h" #include "vmx.h" #include "smm.h" +#include "x86_ops.h" static bool __read_mostly enable_shadow_vmcs = 1; module_param_named(enable_shadow_vmcs, enable_shadow_vmcs, bool, S_IRUGO); @@ -5216,7 +5217,7 @@ void __nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason, if (vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status) { vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_apicv_status = false; - kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APICV_UPDATE, vcpu); + vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(vcpu); } if (vmx->nested.update_vmcs01_hwapic_isr) {

5 days, 5 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: s390: Fix gmap_helper_zap_one_page() again" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.18.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 2f393c228cc519ddf19b8c6c05bf15723241aa96 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-grant-reformist-a323@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.18.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2f393c228cc519ddf19b8c6c05bf15723241aa96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2025 16:40:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: s390: Fix gmap_helper_zap_one_page() again A few checks were missing in gmap_helper_zap_one_page(), which can lead to memory corruption in the guest under specific circumstances. Add the missing checks. Fixes: 5deafa27d9ae ("KVM: s390: Fix to clear PTE when discarding a swapped page") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay(a)linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay(a)linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap_helpers.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap_helpers.c index 549f14ad08af..d41b19925a5a 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap_helpers.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap_helpers.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static void ptep_zap_softleaf_entry(struct mm_struct *mm, softleaf_t entry) void gmap_helper_zap_one_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vmaddr) { struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned long pgstev; spinlock_t *ptl; pgste_t pgste; pte_t *ptep; @@ -65,9 +66,13 @@ void gmap_helper_zap_one_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vmaddr) if (pte_swap(*ptep)) { preempt_disable(); pgste = pgste_get_lock(ptep); + pgstev = pgste_val(pgste); - ptep_zap_softleaf_entry(mm, softleaf_from_pte(*ptep)); - pte_clear(mm, vmaddr, ptep); + if ((pgstev & _PGSTE_GPS_USAGE_MASK) == _PGSTE_GPS_USAGE_UNUSED || + (pgstev & _PGSTE_GPS_ZERO)) { + ptep_zap_softleaf_entry(mm, softleaf_from_pte(*ptep)); + pte_clear(mm, vmaddr, ptep); + } pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste); preempt_enable();

5 days, 5 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xfs: fix a memory leak in xfs_buf_item_init()" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

5 days, 5 hours

[PATCH 5/5] ceph: Fix write storm on fscrypted files

by Sam Edwards

CephFS stores file data across multiple RADOS objects. An object is the atomic unit of storage, so the writeback code must clean only folios that belong to the same object with each OSD request. CephFS also supports RAID0-style striping of file contents: if enabled, each object stores multiple unbroken "stripe units" covering different portions of the file; if disabled, a "stripe unit" is simply the whole object. The stripe unit is (usually) reported as the inode's block size. Though the writeback logic could, in principle, lock all dirty folios belonging to the same object, its current design is to lock only a single stripe unit at a time. Ever since this code was first written, it has determined this size by checking the inode's block size. However, the relatively-new fscrypt support needed to reduce the block size for encrypted inodes to the crypto block size (see 'fixes' commit), which causes an unnecessarily high number of write operations (~1024x as many, with 4MiB objects) and grossly degraded performance. Fix this (and clarify intent) by using i_layout.stripe_unit directly in ceph_define_write_size() so that encrypted inodes are written back with the same number of operations as if they were unencrypted. Fixes: 94af0470924c ("ceph: add some fscrypt guardrails") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index b3569d44d510..cb1da8e27c2b 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -1000,7 +1000,8 @@ unsigned int ceph_define_write_size(struct address_space *mapping) { struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_fs_client(inode); - unsigned int wsize = i_blocksize(inode); + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); + unsigned int wsize = ci->i_layout.stripe_unit; if (fsc->mount_options->wsize < wsize) wsize = fsc->mount_options->wsize; -- 2.51.2

5 days, 6 hours

[PATCH 3/5] ceph: Free page array when ceph_submit_write fails

by Sam Edwards

If `locked_pages` is zero, the page array must not be allocated: ceph_process_folio_batch() uses `locked_pages` to decide when to allocate `pages`, and redundant allocations trigger ceph_allocate_page_array()'s BUG_ON(), resulting in a worker oops (and writeback stall) or even a kernel panic. Consequently, the main loop in ceph_writepages_start() assumes that the lifetime of `pages` is confined to a single iteration. The ceph_submit_write() function claims ownership of the page array on success. But failures only redirty/unlock the pages and fail to free the array, making the failure case in ceph_submit_write() fatal. Free the page array in ceph_submit_write()'s error-handling 'if' block so that the caller's invariant (that the array does not outlive the iteration) is maintained unconditionally, allowing failures in ceph_submit_write() to be recoverable as originally intended. Fixes: 1551ec61dc55 ("ceph: introduce ceph_submit_write() method") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 2b722916fb9b..91cc43950162 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -1466,6 +1466,13 @@ int ceph_submit_write(struct address_space *mapping, unlock_page(page); } + if (ceph_wbc->from_pool) { + mempool_free(ceph_wbc->pages, ceph_wb_pagevec_pool); + ceph_wbc->from_pool = false; + } else + kfree(ceph_wbc->pages); + ceph_wbc->pages = NULL; + ceph_osdc_put_request(req); return -EIO; } -- 2.51.2

5 days, 6 hours

[PATCH 1/5] ceph: Do not propagate page array emplacement errors as batch errors

by Sam Edwards

When fscrypt is enabled, move_dirty_folio_in_page_array() may fail because it needs to allocate bounce buffers to store the encrypted versions of each folio. Each folio beyond the first allocates its bounce buffer with GFP_NOWAIT. Failures are common (and expected) under this allocation mode; they should flush (not abort) the batch. However, ceph_process_folio_batch() uses the same `rc` variable for its own return code and for capturing the return codes of its routine calls; failing to reset `rc` back to 0 results in the error being propagated out to the main writeback loop, which cannot actually tolerate any errors here: once `ceph_wbc.pages` is allocated, it must be passed to ceph_submit_write() to be freed. If it survives until the next iteration (e.g. due to the goto being followed), ceph_allocate_page_array()'s BUG_ON() will oops the worker. (Subsequent patches in this series make the loop more robust.) Note that this failure mode is currently masked due to another bug (addressed later in this series) that prevents multiple encrypted folios from being selected for the same write. For now, just reset `rc` when redirtying the folio and prevent the error from propagating. After this change, ceph_process_folio_batch() no longer returns errors; its only remaining failure indicator is `locked_pages == 0`, which the caller already handles correctly. The next patch in this series addresses this. Fixes: ce80b76dd327 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sam Edwards <CFSworks(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ceph/addr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/addr.c b/fs/ceph/addr.c index 63b75d214210..3462df35d245 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/addr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/addr.c @@ -1369,6 +1369,7 @@ int ceph_process_folio_batch(struct address_space *mapping, rc = move_dirty_folio_in_page_array(mapping, wbc, ceph_wbc, folio); if (rc) { + rc = 0; folio_redirty_for_writepage(wbc, folio); folio_unlock(folio); break; -- 2.51.2

5 days, 6 hours

[PATCH v2] mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts

by SeongJae Park

If damon_call() is executed against a DAMON context that is not running, the function returns error while keeping the damon_call_control object linked to the context's call_controls list. Let's suppose the object is deallocated after the damon_call(), and yet another damon_call() is executed against the same context. The function tries to add the new damon_call_control object to the call_controls list, which still has the pointer to the previous damon_call_control object, which is deallocated. As a result, use-after-free happens. This can actually be triggered using the DAMON sysfs interface. It is not easily exploitable since it requires the sysfs write permission and making a definitely weird file writes, though. Please refer to the report for more details about the issue reproduction steps. Fix the issue by making two changes. Firstly, move the final kdamond_call() for cancelling all existing damon_call() requests from terminating DAMON context to be done before the ctx->kdamond reset. This makes any code that sees NULL ctx->kdamond can safely assume the context may not access damon_call() requests anymore. Secondly, let damon_call() to cleanup the damon_call_control objects that were added to the already-terminated DAMON context, before returning the error. Fixes: 004ded6bee11 ("mm/damon: accept parallel damon_call() requests") Reported-by: JaeJoon Jung <rgbi3307(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20251224094401.20384-1-rgbi3307@gmail.com Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.17.x Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> --- Changes from v1 (https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251228183105.289441-1-sj@kernel.org): - Do final kdamond_call() before ctx->kdamond reset. - Fix Fixes: tag. mm/damon/core.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/damon/core.c b/mm/damon/core.c index 2d3e8006db50..199529dd7c66 100644 --- a/mm/damon/core.c +++ b/mm/damon/core.c @@ -1442,6 +1442,35 @@ bool damon_is_running(struct damon_ctx *ctx) return running; } +/* + * damon_call_handle_inactive_ctx() - handle DAMON call request that added to + * an inactive context. + * @ctx: The inactive DAMON context. + * @control: Control variable of the call request. + * + * This function is called in a case that @control is added to @ctx but @ctx is + * not running (inactive). See if @ctx handled @control or not, and cleanup + * @control if it was not handled. + * + * Returns 0 if @control was handled by @ctx, negative error code otherwise. + */ +static int damon_call_handle_inactive_ctx( + struct damon_ctx *ctx, struct damon_call_control *control) +{ + struct damon_call_control *c; + + mutex_lock(&ctx->call_controls_lock); + list_for_each_entry(c, &ctx->call_controls, list) { + if (c == control) { + list_del(&control->list); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->call_controls_lock); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&ctx->call_controls_lock); + return 0; +} + /** * damon_call() - Invoke a given function on DAMON worker thread (kdamond). * @ctx: DAMON context to call the function for. @@ -1472,7 +1501,7 @@ int damon_call(struct damon_ctx *ctx, struct damon_call_control *control) list_add_tail(&control->list, &ctx->call_controls); mutex_unlock(&ctx->call_controls_lock); if (!damon_is_running(ctx)) - return -EINVAL; + return damon_call_handle_inactive_ctx(ctx, control); if (control->repeat) return 0; wait_for_completion(&control->completion); @@ -2797,13 +2826,13 @@ static int kdamond_fn(void *data) if (ctx->ops.cleanup) ctx->ops.cleanup(ctx); kfree(ctx->regions_score_histogram); + kdamond_call(ctx, true); pr_debug("kdamond (%d) finishes\n", current->pid); mutex_lock(&ctx->kdamond_lock); ctx->kdamond = NULL; mutex_unlock(&ctx->kdamond_lock); - kdamond_call(ctx, true); damos_walk_cancel(ctx); mutex_lock(&damon_lock); base-commit: 40fd05d807b3a7678e3284b8a9a6cb89a32fa8ce -- 2.47.3

5 days, 7 hours

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