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[PATCH v5.10] scsi: core: ufs: Fix a hang in the error handler

by Shivani Agarwal

From: Sanjeev Yadav <sanjeev.y(a)mediatek.com> [ Upstream commit 8a3514d348de87a9d5e2ac00fbac4faae0b97996 ] ufshcd_err_handling_prepare() calls ufshcd_rpm_get_sync(). The latter function can only succeed if UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS is not set because resuming involves submitting a SCSI command and ufshcd_queuecommand() returns SCSI_MLQUEUE_HOST_BUSY if UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS is set. Fix this hang by setting UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS after ufshcd_rpm_get_sync() has been called instead of before. Backtrace: __switch_to+0x174/0x338 __schedule+0x600/0x9e4 schedule+0x7c/0xe8 schedule_timeout+0xa4/0x1c8 io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 wait_for_common_io+0xa8/0x160 //waiting on START_STOP wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x10/0x20 blk_execute_rq+0xe4/0x1e4 scsi_execute_cmd+0x108/0x244 ufshcd_set_dev_pwr_mode+0xe8/0x250 __ufshcd_wl_resume+0x94/0x354 ufshcd_wl_runtime_resume+0x3c/0x174 scsi_runtime_resume+0x64/0xa4 rpm_resume+0x15c/0xa1c __pm_runtime_resume+0x4c/0x90 // Runtime resume ongoing ufshcd_err_handler+0x1a0/0xd08 process_one_work+0x174/0x808 worker_thread+0x15c/0x490 kthread+0xf4/0x1ec ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Sanjeev Yadav <sanjeev.y(a)mediatek.com> [ bvanassche: rewrote patch description ] Fixes: 62694735ca95 ("[SCSI] ufs: Add runtime PM support for UFS host controller driver") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250523201409.1676055-1-bvanassche@acm.org Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <peter.wang(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [Shivani: Modified to apply on 5.10.y] Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal(a)broadcom.com> --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 54e7d96bf..c1f232472 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -5766,10 +5766,12 @@ static void ufshcd_err_handler(struct work_struct *work) spin_unlock_irqrestore(hba->host->host_lock, flags); return; } - ufshcd_set_eh_in_progress(hba); spin_unlock_irqrestore(hba->host->host_lock, flags); + ufshcd_err_handling_prepare(hba); + spin_lock_irqsave(hba->host->host_lock, flags); + ufshcd_set_eh_in_progress(hba); ufshcd_scsi_block_requests(hba); /* * A full reset and restore might have happened after preparation -- 2.40.4

3 days, 21 hours

[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size

by Jarkko Sakkinen

[ Upstream commit 6e9722e9a7bfe1bbad649937c811076acf86e1fd ] 'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst. Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for unrecognized values. Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic. End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as the session state would be then by definition corrupted. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 +++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 134 +++++++++++++++------- include/linux/tpm.h | 13 ++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 29 ++++- 4 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index dfdcbd009720..74764eae9f10 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -250,7 +250,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -265,8 +269,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -324,7 +334,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return err; + } + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index cf0b83154044..d020b74ed23c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -144,16 +144,23 @@ struct tpm2_auth { /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + default: + pr_warn("tpm: unsupported name algorithm: 0x%04x\n", hash_alg); + return -EINVAL; + } } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +168,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int ret; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -173,8 +181,13 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset += val; /* name */ val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (val != ret) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -221,46 +234,72 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. + * + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + goto err; + } } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + if (name) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n", + handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + ret = name_size(name); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); + } +#endif + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -578,11 +617,9 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command * buffer with it. * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -592,10 +629,13 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 *hmac = NULL; u32 attrs; u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sha256_state sctx; + struct sha256_ctx sctx; + int ret; - if (!auth) - return; + if (!auth) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -604,9 +644,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "command 0x%08x not found\n", cc); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -620,9 +662,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -653,12 +695,14 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -690,8 +734,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + ret = name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -712,6 +759,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1); tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + auth->passphrase_len, hmac); + return 0; + +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index a3d8305e88a5..9472e13f33c2 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -521,8 +521,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -569,10 +569,13 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf) + +static inline int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm_buf *buf) { + return 0; } + static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 024be262702f..10d1201a33e4 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +334,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -444,7 +450,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -456,7 +465,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -506,7 +518,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -531,7 +545,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc > 0) -- 2.52.0

3 days, 21 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-stream-lasso-ba6e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 15:38:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA payload. Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return name and name size for all handle types back to the caller. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index be4a9c7f2e1a..34e3599f094f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -11,8 +11,11 @@ * used by the kernel internally. */ +#include "linux/dev_printk.h" +#include "linux/tpm.h" #include "tpm.h" #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> static bool disable_pcr_integrity; module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 385014dbca39..3f389e2f6f58 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -163,53 +163,61 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name) } } -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name) { - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - int ret; - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - if (val != ret) - return -EINVAL; - - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ + int rc, name_size_alg; struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; + + if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE && + mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32)); + return sizeof(u32); + } rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); if (rc) return rc; tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic"); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); + } - return rc; + /* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */ + offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + + /* + * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of + * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes). + */ + if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]); + + if (name_size_alg < 0) + return name_size_alg; + + if (rc != name_size_alg) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc); + return name_size_alg; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ @@ -243,6 +251,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; + u16 name_size_alg; int slot; int ret; #endif @@ -273,8 +282,10 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { if (!name) { ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - if (ret) + if (ret < 0) goto err; + + name_size_alg = ret; } } else { if (name) { @@ -286,13 +297,8 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) { - ret = name_size(name); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); - } + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg); #endif return 0;

3 days, 21 hours

[PATCH] pinctrl: meson: amlogic-a4: mark the GPIO controller as sleeping

by Bartosz Golaszewski

The GPIO controller is configured as non-sleeping but it uses generic pinctrl helpers which use a mutex for synchronization. This will cause lockdep splats when used together with shared GPIOs going through the GPIO shared proxy driver. Fixes: 6e9be3abb78c ("pinctrl: Add driver support for Amlogic SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl(a)googlemail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFBinCAc7CO8gfNQakCu3LfkYXuyTd2iRpMRm8EKXSL0mw… Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c b/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c index d9e3a8d5932a..ded7b218e2ec 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c @@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static const struct gpio_chip aml_gpio_template = { .direction_input = aml_gpio_direction_input, .direction_output = aml_gpio_direction_output, .get_direction = aml_gpio_get_direction, - .can_sleep = false, + .can_sleep = true, }; static void init_bank_register_bit(struct aml_pinctrl *info, -- 2.47.3

3 days, 21 hours

[PATCH] leds: led-class: Only Add LED to leds_list when it is fully ready

by Hans de Goede

Before this change the LED was added to leds_list before led_init_core() gets called adding it the list before led_classdev.set_brightness_work gets initialized. This leaves a window where led_trigger_register() of a LED's default trigger will call led_trigger_set() which calls led_set_brightness() which in turn will end up queueing the *uninitialized* led_classdev.set_brightness_work. This race gets hit by the lenovo-thinkpad-t14s EC driver which registers 2 LEDs with a default trigger provided by snd_ctl_led.ko in quick succession. The first led_classdev_register() causes an async modprobe of snd_ctl_led to run and that async modprobe manages to exactly hit the window where the second LED is on the leds_list without led_init_core() being called for it, resulting in: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 5608 at kernel/workqueue.c:4234 __flush_work+0x344/0x390 Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2S01F0B/21N2S01F0B, BIOS N42ET93W (2.23 ) 09/01/2025 ... Call trace: __flush_work+0x344/0x390 (P) flush_work+0x2c/0x50 led_trigger_set+0x1c8/0x340 led_trigger_register+0x17c/0x1c0 led_trigger_register_simple+0x84/0xe8 snd_ctl_led_init+0x40/0xf88 [snd_ctl_led] do_one_initcall+0x5c/0x318 do_init_module+0x9c/0x2b8 load_module+0x7e0/0x998 Close the race window by moving the adding of the LED to leds_list to after the led_init_core() call. Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- Note no Fixes tag as this problem has been around for a long long time, so I could not really find a good commit for the Fixes tag. --- drivers/leds/led-class.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/leds/led-class.c b/drivers/leds/led-class.c index f3faf37f9a08..6b9fa060c3a1 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/led-class.c +++ b/drivers/leds/led-class.c @@ -560,11 +560,6 @@ int led_classdev_register_ext(struct device *parent, #ifdef CONFIG_LEDS_BRIGHTNESS_HW_CHANGED led_cdev->brightness_hw_changed = -1; #endif - /* add to the list of leds */ - down_write(&leds_list_lock); - list_add_tail(&led_cdev->node, &leds_list); - up_write(&leds_list_lock); - if (!led_cdev->max_brightness) led_cdev->max_brightness = LED_FULL; @@ -574,6 +569,11 @@ int led_classdev_register_ext(struct device *parent, led_init_core(led_cdev); + /* add to the list of leds */ + down_write(&leds_list_lock); + list_add_tail(&led_cdev->node, &leds_list); + up_write(&leds_list_lock); + #ifdef CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGERS led_trigger_set_default(led_cdev); #endif -- 2.52.0

3 days, 22 hours

[PATCH can v2] can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak

by Marc Kleine-Budde

In gs_can_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to the parent->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(), the URB is processed and resubmitted. In gs_can_close() the URBs are freed by calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(parent->rx_submitted). However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors the URB before the close function is called. This means that once an in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not released in gs_can_close(). Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() to the parent->rx_submitted anchor. Fixes: d08e973a77d1 ("can: gs_usb: Added support for the GS_USB CAN devices") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> --- Changes in v2: - correct "Fixes" tag - add stable(a)v.k.o on Cc - Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20251225-gs_usb-fix-memory-leak-v1-1-a7b09e70d01d@… --- drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c index a0233e550a5a..d093babbc320 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c @@ -751,6 +751,8 @@ static void gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb) hf, parent->hf_size_rx, gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback, parent); + usb_anchor_urb(urb, &parent->rx_submitted); + rc = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC); /* USB failure take down all interfaces */ --- base-commit: 1806d210e5a8f431ad4711766ae4a333d407d972 change-id: 20251225-gs_usb-fix-memory-leak-062c24898cc9 Best regards, -- Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>

3 days, 22 hours

[PATCH] pinctrl: meson: mark the GPIO controller as sleeping

by Bartosz Golaszewski

The GPIO controller is configured as non-sleeping but it uses generic pinctrl helpers which use a mutex for synchronization. This can cause the following lockdep splat with shared GPIOs enabled on boards which have multiple devices using the same GPIO: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 142, name: kworker/u25:3 preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 INFO: lockdep is turned off. irq event stamp: 46379 hardirqs last enabled at (46379): [<ffff8000813acb24>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x74/0x78 hardirqs last disabled at (46378): [<ffff8000813abf38>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x84/0x88 softirqs last enabled at (46330): [<ffff8000800c71b4>] handle_softirqs+0x4c4/0x4dc softirqs last disabled at (46295): [<ffff800080010674>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 142 Comm: kworker/u25:3 Tainted: G C 6.19.0-rc4-next-20260105+ #11963 PREEMPT Tainted: [C]=CRAP Hardware name: Khadas VIM3 (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 __might_resched+0x144/0x248 __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 __mutex_lock+0x5c/0x894 mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 pinctrl_get_device_gpio_range+0x44/0x128 pinctrl_gpio_set_config+0x40/0xdc gpiochip_generic_config+0x28/0x3c gpio_do_set_config+0xa8/0x194 gpiod_set_config+0x34/0xfc gpio_shared_proxy_set_config+0x6c/0xfc [gpio_shared_proxy] gpio_do_set_config+0xa8/0x194 gpiod_set_transitory+0x4c/0xf0 gpiod_configure_flags+0xa4/0x480 gpiod_find_and_request+0x1a0/0x574 gpiod_get_index+0x58/0x84 devm_gpiod_get_index+0x20/0xb4 devm_gpiod_get+0x18/0x24 mmc_pwrseq_emmc_probe+0x40/0xb8 platform_probe+0x5c/0xac really_probe+0xbc/0x298 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0xdc/0x164 __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x138 bus_for_each_drv+0x80/0xdc __device_attach+0xa8/0x1b0 Fixes: 6ac730951104 ("pinctrl: add driver for Amlogic Meson SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski(a)samsung.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/00107523-7737-4b92-a785-14ce4e93b8cb@samsung.co… Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson.c b/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson.c index 18295b15ecd9..4507dc8b5563 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson.c @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int meson_gpiolib_register(struct meson_pinctrl *pc) pc->chip.set = meson_gpio_set; pc->chip.base = -1; pc->chip.ngpio = pc->data->num_pins; - pc->chip.can_sleep = false; + pc->chip.can_sleep = true; ret = gpiochip_add_data(&pc->chip, pc); if (ret) { -- 2.47.3

3 days, 22 hours

[PATCH] drm/xe: fix WQ_MEM_RECLAIM passed as max_active to alloc_workqueue()

by Marco Crivellari

Workqueue xe-ggtt-wq has been allocated using WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, but the flag has been passed as 3rd parameter (max_active) instead of 2nd (flags) creating the workqueue as per-cpu with max_active = 8 (the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM value). So change this by set WQ_MEM_RECLAIM as the 2nd parameter with a default max_active. Fixes: 60df57e496e4 ("drm/xe: Mark GGTT work queue with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marco Crivellari <marco.crivellari(a)suse.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt.c index ef481b334af4..793d7324a395 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt.c @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ int xe_ggtt_init_early(struct xe_ggtt *ggtt) else ggtt->pt_ops = &xelp_pt_ops; - ggtt->wq = alloc_workqueue("xe-ggtt-wq", 0, WQ_MEM_RECLAIM); + ggtt->wq = alloc_workqueue("xe-ggtt-wq", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0); if (!ggtt->wq) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.52.0

3 days, 22 hours

[PATCH v2 00/12] drm/bridge: convert users of of_drm_find_bridge(), part 2

by Luca Ceresoli

This series converts all DRM bridge drivers (*) from the now deprecated of_drm_find_bridge() to its replacement of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() which allows correct bridge refcounting. It also converts per-driver "next_bridge" pointers to the unified drm_bridge::next_bridge which puts the reference automatically on bridge deallocation. This is part of the work to support hotplug of DRM bridges. The grand plan was discussed in [0]. Here's the work breakdown (➜ marks the current series): 1. ➜ add refcounting to DRM bridges struct drm_bridge, based on devm_drm_bridge_alloc() A. ✔ add new alloc API and refcounting (v6.16) B. ✔ convert all bridge drivers to new API (v6.17) C. ✔ kunit tests (v6.17) D. ✔ add get/put to drm_bridge_add/remove() + attach/detach() and warn on old allocation pattern (v6.17) E. ➜ add get/put on drm_bridge accessors 1. ✔ drm_bridge_chain_get_first_bridge(), add cleanup action (v6.18) 2. ✔ drm_bridge_get_prev_bridge() (v6.18) 3. ✔ drm_bridge_get_next_bridge() (v6.19) 4. ✔ drm_for_each_bridge_in_chain() (v6.19) 5. ✔ drm_bridge_connector_init (v6.19) 6. … protect encoder bridge chain with a mutex 7. ➜ of_drm_find_bridge a. ✔… add of_drm_get_bridge(), convert basic direct users (v6.20?, one driver still pending) b. ➜ convert direct of_drm_get_bridge() users, part 2 c. … convert direct of_drm_get_bridge() users, part 3 d. convert direct of_drm_get_bridge() users, part 4 e. convert bridge-only drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() users 8. drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge, *_of_get_bridge 9. ✔ enforce drm_bridge_add before drm_bridge_attach (v6.19) F. ✔ debugfs improvements 1. ✔ add top-level 'bridges' file (v6.16) 2. ✔ show refcount and list lingering bridges (v6.19) 2. … handle gracefully atomic updates during bridge removal A. ✔ Add drm_dev_enter/exit() to protect device resources (v6.20?) B. … protect private_obj removal from list 3. … DSI host-device driver interaction 4. ✔ removing the need for the "always-disconnected" connector 5. finish the hotplug bridge work, moving code to the core and potentially removing the hotplug-bridge itself (this needs to be clarified as points 1-3 are developed) [0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250206-hotplug-drm-bridge-v6-0-9d6f2c9c3058@… This work is a continuation of the work to correctly handle bridge refcounting for existing of_drm_find_bridge(). The ground work is in: - commit 293a8fd7721a ("drm/bridge: add of_drm_find_and_get_bridge()") - commit 9da0e06abda8 ("drm/bridge: deprecate of_drm_find_bridge()") - commit 3fdeae134ba9 ("drm/bridge: add next_bridge pointer to struct drm_bridge") The whole conversion is split in multiple series to make the review process a bit smoother. Parts 3 and 4 are converting non-bridge drivers (mostly encoders). (*) One bridge driver (synopsys/dw-hdmi) is converted in another series, together with its (non-bridge) users. Additionally this series converts drm_of_panel_bridge_remove() which is a special case, and has a bugfix for it too. Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli(a)bootlin.com> --- Changes in v2: - Fix bug in samsung-dsim code, patch 10; update patch 12 on top of those changes - Fix in imx8qxp-ldb code, patch 9 - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260107-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-drm_of_find_brid… --- Luca Ceresoli (12): drm: of: drm_of_panel_bridge_remove(): fix device_node leak drm: of: drm_of_panel_bridge_remove(): convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: sii902x: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: thc63lvd1024: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: tfp410: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: tpd12s015: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: lt8912b: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: imx8mp-hdmi-pvi: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: imx8qxp-ldb: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drm/bridge: samsung-dsim: samsung_dsim_host_attach: use a temporary variable for the next bridge drm/bridge: samsung-dsim: samsung_dsim_host_attach: don't use the bridge pointer as an error indicator drm/bridge: samsung-dsim: samsung_dsim_host_attach: convert to of_drm_find_and_get_bridge() drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/imx/imx8mp-hdmi-pvi.c | 15 ++++++----- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/imx/imx8qxp-ldb.c | 12 ++++++++- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt8912b.c | 31 +++++++++++------------ drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/samsung-dsim.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/sii902x.c | 7 +++--- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/thc63lvd1024.c | 7 +++--- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-tfp410.c | 27 ++++++++++---------- drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-tpd12s015.c | 8 +++--- include/drm/bridge/samsung-dsim.h | 1 - include/drm/drm_of.h | 6 ++++- 10 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 814b88f91b121246b35be9c519b537041fe3d178 change-id: 20251223-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-drm_of_find_bridge-2-12c6bbcb6896 Best regards, -- Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli(a)bootlin.com>

4 days

[PATCH v3] usb: xhci: Fix memory leak in xhci_disable_slot()

by Zilin Guan

xhci_alloc_command() allocates a command structure and, when the second argument is true, also allocates a completion structure. Currently, the error handling path in xhci_disable_slot() only frees the command structure using kfree(), causing the completion structure to leak. Use xhci_free_command() instead of kfree(). xhci_free_command() correctly frees both the command structure and the associated completion structure. Since the command structure is allocated with zero-initialization, command->in_ctx is NULL and will not be erroneously freed by xhci_free_command(). This bug was found using an experimental static analysis tool we are developing. The tool is based on the LLVM framework and is specifically designed to detect memory management issues. It is currently under active development and not yet publicly available, but we plan to open-source it after our research is published. The bug was originally detected on v6.13-rc1 using our static analysis tool, and we have verified that the issue persists in the latest mainline kernel. We performed build testing on x86_64 with allyesconfig using GCC=11.4.0. Since triggering these error paths in xhci_disable_slot() requires specific hardware conditions or abnormal state, we were unable to construct a test case to reliably trigger these specific error paths at runtime. Fixes: 7faac1953ed1 ("xhci: avoid race between disable slot command and host runtime suspend") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> --- Changes in v3: - Update the commit message to reflect that the analysis applies to the mainline kernel. Changes in v2: - Add detailed information required by researcher guidelines. - Clarify the safety of using xhci_free_command() in this context. - Correct the Fixes tag to point to the commit that introduced this issue. drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c index 02c9bfe21ae2..f0beed054954 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c @@ -4137,7 +4137,7 @@ int xhci_disable_slot(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, u32 slot_id) if (state == 0xffffffff || (xhci->xhc_state & XHCI_STATE_DYING) || (xhci->xhc_state & XHCI_STATE_HALTED)) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); - kfree(command); + xhci_free_command(xhci, command); return -ENODEV; } @@ -4145,7 +4145,7 @@ int xhci_disable_slot(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, u32 slot_id) slot_id); if (ret) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); - kfree(command); + xhci_free_command(xhci, command); return ret; } xhci_ring_cmd_db(xhci); -- 2.34.1

4 days, 2 hours

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