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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122927-germicide-venus-61d2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 09:01:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in memory for journal sb Copying the file system while it is mounted as read-only results in a mount failure: [~]# mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sdc [~]# mount /dev/sdc -o ro /mnt/test [~]# dd if=/dev/sdc of=/dev/sda bs=1M [~]# mount /dev/sda /mnt/test1 [ 1094.849826] JBD2: journal checksum error [ 1094.850927] EXT4-fs (sda): Could not load journal inode mount: mount /dev/sda on /mnt/test1 failed: Bad message The process described above is just an abstracted way I came up with to reproduce the issue. In the actual scenario, the file system was mounted read-only and then copied while it was still mounted. It was found that the mount operation failed. The user intended to verify the data or use it as a backup, and this action was performed during a version upgrade. Above issue may happen as follows: ext4_fill_super set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb) if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) incompat = JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_CSUM_V3; if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal, compat, 0, incompat); lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); //The data in the journal sb was modified, but the checksum was not updated, so the data remaining in memory has a mismatch between the data and the checksum. unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); In this case, the journal sb copied over is in a state where the checksum and data are inconsistent, so mounting fails. To solve the above issue, update the checksum in memory after modifying the journal sb. Fixes: 4fd5ea43bc11 ("jbd2: checksum journal superblock") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251103010123.3753631-1-yebin(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c index 2fe1786a8f1b..c973162d5b31 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c @@ -2354,6 +2354,12 @@ int jbd2_journal_set_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb->s_feature_compat |= cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat |= cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); @@ -2383,9 +2389,17 @@ void jbd2_journal_clear_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb = journal->j_superblock; + lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat &= ~cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); + unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_clear_features);

3 days, 18 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122959-residence-cover-1b11@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:58:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming from external I/O cause on only limited harm. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: bcfff8384f6c ("tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array") Tested-by: Lai Yi <yi1.lai(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 30d00219f9f3..082b910ddf0d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); - kfree(chip->allocated_banks); #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC kfree(chip->auth); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index cf64c7385105..b49a790f1bd5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -799,11 +799,6 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr) */ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(1, sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) - return -ENOMEM; - chip->allocated_banks[0].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; chip->allocated_banks[0].digest_size = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]; chip->allocated_banks[0].crypto_id = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5532e53a2dd3..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -550,11 +550,9 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]); - - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(nr_possible_banks, - sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) { + if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) { + pr_err("tpm: out of bank capacity: %u > %u\n", + nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index b15360ff78d7..53de9488c509 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ #include <crypto/aes.h> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ -#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE +#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ enum tpm2_curves { struct tpm_digest { u16 alg_id; - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; struct tpm_bank_info { @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned int groups_cnt; u32 nr_allocated_banks; - struct tpm_bank_info *allocated_banks; + struct tpm_bank_info allocated_banks[TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS]; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];

3 days, 18 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] gfs2: fix freeze error handling" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 4cfc7d5a4a01d2133b278cdbb1371fba1b419174 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-defense-blanching-5c39@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 4cfc7d5a4a01d2133b278cdbb1371fba1b419174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Velichayshiy <a.velichayshiy(a)ispras.ru> Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2025 12:05:18 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] gfs2: fix freeze error handling After commit b77b4a4815a9 ("gfs2: Rework freeze / thaw logic"), the freeze error handling is broken because gfs2_do_thaw() overwrites the 'error' variable, causing incorrect processing of the original freeze error. Fix this by calling gfs2_do_thaw() when gfs2_lock_fs_check_clean() fails but ignoring its return value to preserve the original freeze error for proper reporting. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: b77b4a4815a9 ("gfs2: Rework freeze / thaw logic") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Signed-off-by: Alexey Velichayshiy <a.velichayshiy(a)ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/fs/gfs2/super.c b/fs/gfs2/super.c index 644b2d1e7276..54c6f2098f01 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/super.c @@ -749,9 +749,7 @@ static int gfs2_freeze_super(struct super_block *sb, enum freeze_holder who, break; } - error = gfs2_do_thaw(sdp, who, freeze_owner); - if (error) - goto out; + (void)gfs2_do_thaw(sdp, who, freeze_owner); if (error == -EBUSY) fs_err(sdp, "waiting for recovery before freeze\n");

3 days, 18 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] gfs2: fix freeze error handling" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

3 days, 18 hours

[PATCH 1/5] x86, fpu: introduce fpu_load_guest_fpstate()

by Paolo Bonzini

Create a variant of fpregs_lock_and_load() that KVM can use in its vCPU entry code after preemption has been disabled. While basing it on the existing logic in vcpu_enter_guest(), ensure that fpregs_assert_state_consistent() always runs and sprinkle a few more assertions. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 +------- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h index cd6f194a912b..0820b2621416 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ extern void *get_xsave_addr(struct xregs_state *xsave, int xfeature_nr); /* KVM specific functions */ extern bool fpu_alloc_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); extern void fpu_free_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); +extern void fpu_load_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu); extern int fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, bool enter_guest); extern int fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfeatures); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 3ab27fb86618..a480fa8c65d5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -878,6 +878,23 @@ void fpregs_lock_and_load(void) fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); } +void fpu_load_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU + struct fpu *fpu = x86_task_fpu(current); + WARN_ON_ONCE(gfpu->fpstate != fpu->fpstate); +#endif + + lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + fpregs_restore_userregs(); + + fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); + if (gfpu->xfd_err) + wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, gfpu->xfd_err); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(fpu_load_guest_fpstate); + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU /* * If current FPU state according to its tracking (loaded FPU context on this diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index ff8812f3a129..01d95192dfc5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -11300,13 +11300,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu); } - fpregs_assert_state_consistent(); - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) - switch_fpu_return(); - - if (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err) - wrmsrq(MSR_IA32_XFD_ERR, vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err); - + fpu_load_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu); kvm_load_xfeatures(vcpu, true); if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs && -- 2.52.0

3 days, 18 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: don't rewrite ret from inode_permission" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0185c2292c600993199bc6b1f342ad47a9e8c678 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122956-output-cornmeal-7c59@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0185c2292c600993199bc6b1f342ad47a9e8c678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 17:08:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: don't rewrite ret from inode_permission In our user safe ino resolve ioctl we'll just turn any ret into -EACCES from inode_permission(). This is redundant, and could potentially be wrong if we had an ENOMEM in the security layer or some such other error, so simply return the actual return value. Note: The patch was taken from v5 of fscrypt patchset (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/cover.1706116485.git.josef@toxicpanda.c…) which was handled over time by various people: Omar Sandoval, Sweet Tea Dorminy, Josef Bacik. Fixes: 23d0b79dfaed ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 59cef7e376a0..a10b60439718 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -1910,10 +1910,8 @@ static int btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = inode_permission(idmap, &temp_inode->vfs_inode, MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC); iput(&temp_inode->vfs_inode); - if (ret) { - ret = -EACCES; + if (ret) goto out_put; - } if (key.offset == upper_limit) break;

3 days, 19 hours

[PATCH 6.12] lib/crypto: riscv/chacha: Avoid s0/fp register

by Eric Biggers

From: Vivian Wang <wangruikang(a)iscas.ac.cn> commit 43169328c7b4623b54b7713ec68479cebda5465f upstream. In chacha_zvkb, avoid using the s0 register, which is the frame pointer, by reallocating KEY0 to t5. This makes stack traces available if e.g. a crash happens in chacha_zvkb. No frame pointer maintenance is otherwise required since this is a leaf function. Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang(a)iscas.ac.cn> Fixes: bb54668837a0 ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated ChaCha20") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251202-riscv-chacha_zvkb-fp-v2-1-7bd00098c9dc@i… Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> --- arch/riscv/crypto/chacha-riscv64-zvkb.S | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/chacha-riscv64-zvkb.S b/arch/riscv/crypto/chacha-riscv64-zvkb.S index bf057737ac69..fbef93503571 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/crypto/chacha-riscv64-zvkb.S +++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/chacha-riscv64-zvkb.S @@ -58,11 +58,12 @@ #define CONSTS3 t0 #define TMP t1 #define VL t2 #define STRIDE t3 #define NROUNDS t4 -#define KEY0 s0 +#define KEY0 t5 +// Avoid s0/fp to allow for unwinding #define KEY1 s1 #define KEY2 s2 #define KEY3 s3 #define KEY4 s4 #define KEY5 s5 @@ -139,11 +140,10 @@ // The counter is treated as 32-bit, following the RFC7539 convention. SYM_FUNC_START(chacha20_zvkb) srli LEN, LEN, 6 // Bytes to blocks addi sp, sp, -96 - sd s0, 0(sp) sd s1, 8(sp) sd s2, 16(sp) sd s3, 24(sp) sd s4, 32(sp) sd s5, 40(sp) @@ -275,11 +275,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(chacha20_zvkb) slli TMP, VL, 6 add OUTP, OUTP, TMP add INP, INP, TMP bnez LEN, .Lblock_loop - ld s0, 0(sp) ld s1, 8(sp) ld s2, 16(sp) ld s3, 24(sp) ld s4, 32(sp) ld s5, 40(sp) base-commit: 567bd8cbc2fe6b28b78864cbbbc41b0d405eb83c -- 2.52.0

3 days, 19 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] gfs2: fix freeze error handling" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

3 days, 19 hours

[PATCH v3] hfsplus: return error when node already exists in hfs_bnode_create

by Shardul Bankar

When hfs_bnode_create() finds that a node is already hashed (which should not happen in normal operation), it currently returns the existing node without incrementing its reference count. This causes a reference count inconsistency that leads to a kernel panic when the node is later freed in hfs_bnode_put(): kernel BUG at fs/hfsplus/bnode.c:676! BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&node->refcnt)) This scenario can occur when hfs_bmap_alloc() attempts to allocate a node that is already in use (e.g., when node 0's bitmap bit is incorrectly unset), or due to filesystem corruption. Returning an existing node from a create path is not normal operation. Fix this by returning ERR_PTR(-EEXIST) instead of the node when it's already hashed. This properly signals the error condition to callers, which already check for IS_ERR() return values. Reported-by: syzbot+1c8ff72d0cd8a50dfeaa(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1c8ff72d0cd8a50dfeaa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/784415834694f39902088fa8946850fc1779a318.camel@… Fixes: 634725a92938 ("[PATCH] hfs: cleanup HFS+ prints") Signed-off-by: Shardul Bankar <shardul.b(a)mpiricsoftware.com> --- v3 changes: - This is posted standalone as discussed in the v2 thread. v2 changes: - Implement Slava's suggestion: return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST) for already-hashed nodes. - Keep the node-0 allocation guard as a minimal, targeted hardening measure. fs/hfsplus/bnode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c b/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c index 191661af9677..250a226336ea 100644 --- a/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c +++ b/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c @@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ struct hfs_bnode *hfs_bnode_create(struct hfs_btree *tree, u32 num) if (node) { pr_crit("new node %u already hashed?\n", num); WARN_ON(1); - return node; + return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); } node = __hfs_bnode_create(tree, num); if (!node) -- 2.34.1

3 days, 19 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: don't rewrite ret from inode_permission" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0185c2292c600993199bc6b1f342ad47a9e8c678 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122956-email-disrupt-f2c8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0185c2292c600993199bc6b1f342ad47a9e8c678 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 17:08:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: don't rewrite ret from inode_permission In our user safe ino resolve ioctl we'll just turn any ret into -EACCES from inode_permission(). This is redundant, and could potentially be wrong if we had an ENOMEM in the security layer or some such other error, so simply return the actual return value. Note: The patch was taken from v5 of fscrypt patchset (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/cover.1706116485.git.josef@toxicpanda.c…) which was handled over time by various people: Omar Sandoval, Sweet Tea Dorminy, Josef Bacik. Fixes: 23d0b79dfaed ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 59cef7e376a0..a10b60439718 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -1910,10 +1910,8 @@ static int btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, ret = inode_permission(idmap, &temp_inode->vfs_inode, MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC); iput(&temp_inode->vfs_inode); - if (ret) { - ret = -EACCES; + if (ret) goto out_put; - } if (key.offset == upper_limit) break;

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