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[PATCH v2] tpm2-sessions: address out-of-range indexing

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID. Address the issue by: 1. Rename 'name_size' as 'tpm2_name_size' so that it is bit easier to recognize and make it a fallible function. 2. Check for only known algorithms in 'tpm2_name_size'. Return -EINVAL for unrecognized algorithms. 3. In order to correctly propagate possible errors make also 'tpm2_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible and address their possible errors at the call sites. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v2: There was spurious extra field added to tpm2_hash by mistake. drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 ++++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 108 ++++++++++++++-------- include/linux/tpm.h | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 38 ++++++-- 4 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b6ccf901623..e63254135a74 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -202,8 +207,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -261,7 +272,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) + goto out; + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..82b9d9096fd1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -141,19 +141,28 @@ struct tpm2_auth { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* - * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) + * Calculate size of the TPMT_HA payload of TPM2B_NAME. */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int tpm2_name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SM3_256: + return SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + } + + return -EINVAL; } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +170,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int name_size_alg; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -172,9 +182,15 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) return -EINVAL; offset += val; /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + name_size_alg = tpm2_name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (name_size_alg < 0) + return name_size_alg; + + if (val != name_size_alg) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -222,46 +238,59 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; + int name_size; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + return -ENOMEM; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + return -EIO; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); + } } else { if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + return -EINVAL; } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + name_size = tpm2_name_size(name); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size); + } #endif + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -537,7 +566,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +578,10 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int name_size; if (!auth) - return; + return -EINVAL; /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -559,10 +589,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) cc = be32_to_cpu(head->ordinal); i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); - if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; - } + if (i < 0) + return -EINVAL; + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +605,8 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + return -EINVAL; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +637,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + return -EINVAL; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + return -EINVAL; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +674,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + name_size = tpm2_name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], name_size); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +699,7 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0e9e043f728c..1a59f0190eb3 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -528,8 +528,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e165b117bbca..33544b6bc105 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out_put; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +337,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out; + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -438,7 +449,12 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -450,7 +466,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -497,7 +516,11 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -522,7 +545,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); -- 2.52.0

5 days, 23 hours

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[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: address out-of-range indexing

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID. Address the issue by: 1. Rename 'name_size' as 'tpm2_name_size' so that it is bit easier to recognize and make it a fallible function. 2. Check for only known algorithms in 'tpm2_name_size'. Return -EINVAL for unrecognized algorithms. 3. In order to correctly propagate possible errors make also 'tpm2_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible and address their possible errors at the call sites. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 ++++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 108 ++++++++++++++-------- include/linux/tpm.h | 7 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 38 ++++++-- 4 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b6ccf901623..e63254135a74 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -202,8 +207,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -261,7 +272,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) + goto out; + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..82b9d9096fd1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -141,19 +141,28 @@ struct tpm2_auth { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* - * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) + * Calculate size of the TPMT_HA payload of TPM2B_NAME. */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int tpm2_name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SM3_256: + return SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + } + + return -EINVAL; } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +170,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int name_size_alg; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -172,9 +182,15 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) return -EINVAL; offset += val; /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + name_size_alg = tpm2_name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (name_size_alg < 0) + return name_size_alg; + + if (val != name_size_alg) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -222,46 +238,59 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; + int name_size; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + return -ENOMEM; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + return -EIO; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); + } } else { if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + return -EINVAL; } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + name_size = tpm2_name_size(name); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size); + } #endif + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -537,7 +566,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +578,10 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int name_size; if (!auth) - return; + return -EINVAL; /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -559,10 +589,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) cc = be32_to_cpu(head->ordinal); i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); - if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; - } + if (i < 0) + return -EINVAL; + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +605,8 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + return -EINVAL; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +637,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + return -EINVAL; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + return -EINVAL; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +674,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + name_size = tpm2_name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], name_size); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +699,7 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0e9e043f728c..f168c547abae 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ enum tpm2_session_attributes { struct tpm2_hash { unsigned int crypto_id; unsigned int tpm_id; + unsigned int hash_size; }; int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal); @@ -528,8 +529,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e165b117bbca..33544b6bc105 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out_put; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +337,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out; + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -438,7 +449,12 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -450,7 +466,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -497,7 +516,11 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -522,7 +545,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); -- 2.52.0

5 days, 23 hours

1
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[PATCH] clk: keystone: syscon-clk: fix regmap leak on probe failure

by Johan Hovold

The mmio regmap allocated during probe is never freed. Switch to using the device managed allocator so that the regmap is released on probe failures (e.g. probe deferral) and on driver unbind. Fixes: a250cd4c1901 ("clk: keystone: syscon-clk: Do not use syscon helper to build regmap") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.15 Cc: Andrew Davis <afd(a)ti.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c b/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c index c509929da854..ecf180a7949c 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c +++ b/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int ti_syscon_gate_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(base)) return PTR_ERR(base); - regmap = regmap_init_mmio(dev, base, &ti_syscon_regmap_cfg); + regmap = devm_regmap_init_mmio(dev, base, &ti_syscon_regmap_cfg); if (IS_ERR(regmap)) return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(regmap), "failed to get regmap\n"); -- 2.51.2

6 days

2
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[PATCH] clk: samsung: exynos-clkout: Assign .num before accessing .hws

by Nathan Chancellor

Commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") annotated the hws member of 'struct clk_hw_onecell_data' with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS) about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[] is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in exynos_clkout_probe() due to .num being assigned after .hws[] has been accessed: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c:178:18 index 0 is out of range for type 'clk_hw *[*]' Move the .num initialization to before the first access of .hws[], clearing up the warning. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") Reported-by: Jochen Sprickerhof <jochen(a)sprickerhof.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/aSIYDN5eyKFKoXKL@eldamar.lan/ Tested-by: Jochen Sprickerhof <jochen(a)sprickerhof.de> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c b/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c index 5f1a4f5e2e59..5b21025338bd 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c +++ b/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static int exynos_clkout_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) clkout->mux.shift = EXYNOS_CLKOUT_MUX_SHIFT; clkout->mux.lock = &clkout->slock; + clkout->data.num = EXYNOS_CLKOUT_NR_CLKS; clkout->data.hws[0] = clk_hw_register_composite(NULL, "clkout", parent_names, parent_count, &clkout->mux.hw, &clk_mux_ops, NULL, NULL, &clkout->gate.hw, @@ -185,7 +186,6 @@ static int exynos_clkout_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto err_unmap; } - clkout->data.num = EXYNOS_CLKOUT_NR_CLKS; ret = of_clk_add_hw_provider(clkout->np, of_clk_hw_onecell_get, &clkout->data); if (ret) goto err_clk_unreg; --- base-commit: b6430552c8cd95e90bb842ce2f421e7a5381859f change-id: 20251124-exynos-clkout-fix-ubsan-bounds-error-93071375ec78 Best regards, -- Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org>

6 days, 1 hour

5
4
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[PATCH] bcache: call bio_endio() to replace directly calling bio->bi_end_io()

by colyli＠fnnas.com

From: Coly Li <colyli(a)fnnas.com> When a bcache device is not attached to a cache device, current code calls the request's bi_end_io() callback directly. The correct method is to call bio_endio(bio) instead of bio->bi_end_io(bio). This patch fixes the incorrect calling. Fixes: bc082a55d25c ("bcache: fix inaccurate io state for detached bcache devices") Fixes: 40f567bbb3b0 ("md: bcache: check the return value of kzalloc() in detached_dev_do_request()") Reported-by: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20251121081748.1443507-1-zhangshida@kyl… Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)infradead.org> Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org #4.17+ Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)fnnas.com> --- drivers/md/bcache/request.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/request.c b/drivers/md/bcache/request.c index af345dc6fde1..7b815064db54 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/request.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/request.c @@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ static void detached_dev_end_io(struct bio *bio) } kfree(ddip); - bio->bi_end_io(bio); + bio_endio(bio); } static void detached_dev_do_request(struct bcache_device *d, struct bio *bio, @@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ static void detached_dev_do_request(struct bcache_device *d, struct bio *bio, ddip = kzalloc(sizeof(struct detached_dev_io_private), GFP_NOIO); if (!ddip) { bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; - bio->bi_end_io(bio); + bio_endio(bio); return; } @@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ static void detached_dev_do_request(struct bcache_device *d, struct bio *bio, if ((bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD) && !bdev_max_discard_sectors(dc->bdev)) - bio->bi_end_io(bio); + bio_endio(bio); else submit_bio_noacct(bio); } -- 2.47.3

6 days, 5 hours

1
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[PATCH] counter: interrupt-cnt: Drop IRQF_NO_THREAD flag

by A. Sverdlin

From: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> An IRQ handler can either be IRQF_NO_THREAD or acquire spinlock_t, as CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING warns: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.18.0-rc1+git... #1 ----------------------------- some-user-space-process/1251 is trying to lock: (&counter->events_list_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: counter_push_event [counter] other info that might help us debug this: context-{2:2} no locks held by some-user-space-process/.... stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1251 Comm: some-user-space-process 6.18.0-rc1+git... #1 PREEMPT Call trace: show_stack (C) dump_stack_lvl dump_stack __lock_acquire lock_acquire _raw_spin_lock_irqsave counter_push_event [counter] interrupt_cnt_isr [interrupt_cnt] __handle_irq_event_percpu handle_irq_event handle_simple_irq handle_irq_desc generic_handle_domain_irq gpio_irq_handler handle_irq_desc generic_handle_domain_irq gic_handle_irq call_on_irq_stack do_interrupt_handler el0_interrupt __el0_irq_handler_common el0t_64_irq_handler el0t_64_irq ... and Sebastian correctly points out. Remove IRQF_NO_THREAD as an alternative to switching to raw_spinlock_t, because the latter would limit all potential nested locks to raw_spinlock_t only. Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117151314.xwLAZrWY@linutronix.de/ Fixes: a55ebd47f21f ("counter: add IRQ or GPIO based counter") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> --- drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c b/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c index 6c0c1d2d7027d..e6100b5fb082e 100644 --- a/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c +++ b/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c @@ -229,8 +229,7 @@ static int interrupt_cnt_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) irq_set_status_flags(priv->irq, IRQ_NOAUTOEN); ret = devm_request_irq(dev, priv->irq, interrupt_cnt_isr, - IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING | IRQF_NO_THREAD, - dev_name(dev), counter); + IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING, dev_name(dev), counter); if (ret) return ret; -- 2.51.1

6 days, 7 hours

5
6
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[PATCH] fs: ocfs2: fix kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain

by Prithvi Tambewagh

syzbot reported a kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() because the `cl_next_free_rec` field of the allocation chain list is 0, triggring the BUG_ON(!cl->cl_next_free_rec) condition and panicking the kernel. To fix this, `cl_next_free_rec` is checked inside the caller of ocfs2_find_victim_chain() i.e. ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits() and if it is equal to 0, ocfs2_error() is called, to log the corruption and force the filesystem into read-only mode, to prevent further damage. Reported-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=96d38c6e1655c1420a72 Tested-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c index 6ac4dcd54588..84bb2d11c2aa 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c @@ -1993,6 +1993,13 @@ static int ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(struct ocfs2_alloc_context *ac, cl = (struct ocfs2_chain_list *) &fe->id2.i_chain; + if (le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) == 0) { + status = ocfs2_error(ac->ac_inode->i_sb, + "Chain allocator dinode %llu has 0 chains\n", + (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(fe->i_blkno)); + goto bail; + } + victim = ocfs2_find_victim_chain(cl); ac->ac_chain = victim; base-commit: 939f15e640f193616691d3bcde0089760e75b0d3 -- 2.34.1

6 days, 10 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH] fs: ocfs2: fix kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain

by Prithvi Tambewagh

syzbot reported a kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() because the `cl_next_free_rec` field of the allocation chain list is 0, triggring the BUG_ON(!cl->cl_next_free_rec) condition and panicking the kernel. To fix this, `cl_next_free_rec` is checked inside the caller of ocfs2_find_victim_chain() i.e. ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits() and if it is equal to 0, ocfs2_error() is called, to log the corruption and force the filesystem into read-only mode, to prevent further damage. Reported-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=96d38c6e1655c1420a72 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c index 6ac4dcd54588..c7eb6efc00b4 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c @@ -1993,6 +1993,13 @@ static int ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(struct ocfs2_alloc_context *ac, cl = (struct ocfs2_chain_list *) &fe->id2.i_chain; + if( le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) == 0) { + status = ocfs2_error(ac->ac_inode->i_sb, + "Chain allocator dinode %llu has 0 chains\n", + (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(fe->i_blkno)); + goto bail; + } + victim = ocfs2_find_victim_chain(cl); ac->ac_chain = victim; base-commit: 939f15e640f193616691d3bcde0089760e75b0d3 -- 2.34.1

6 days, 10 hours

1
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👉 DUOONE OLED SPAN/FOLD Launch — Black Friday & Cyber Monday Rewards on Kickstarter🎉

by InnLead Innovative

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6 days, 11 hours

1
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Re: Patch "mptcp: Fix proto fallback detection with BPF" has been added to the 6.1-stable tree

by Matthieu Baerts

Hi Greg, Sasha, Jiayuan, On 27/11/2025 14:41, gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org wrote: > > This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled > > mptcp: Fix proto fallback detection with BPF > > to the 6.1-stable tree which can be found at: > http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… > > The filename of the patch is: > mptcp-fix-proto-fallback-detection-with-bpf.patch > and it can be found in the queue-6.1 subdirectory. > > If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, > please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. @Sasha: thank you for having resolved the conflicts for this patch (and many others related to MPTCP recently). Sadly, it is causing troubles. @Greg/Sasha: is it possible to remove it from 6.1, 5.15 and 5.10 queues please? (The related patch in 6.6 and above is OK) @Jiayuan: did you not specify you initially saw this issue on a v6.1 kernel? By chance, do you already have a fix for that version? Cheers, Matt -- Sponsored by the NGI0 Core fund.

6 days, 17 hours

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