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[PATCH v6 1/6] drm/amdgpu: Fix gfx9 update PTE mtype flag MIME-Version: 1.0

by Philip Yang

Fix copy&paste error, that should have been an assignment instead of an or, otherwise MTYPE_UC 0x3 can not be updated to MTYPE_RW 0x1. CC stables. cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c index 97a04e3171f2..205c34eb8d11 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c @@ -1204,16 +1204,16 @@ static void gmc_v9_0_get_vm_pte(struct amdgpu_device *adev, *flags = AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_NC); break; case AMDGPU_VM_MTYPE_WC: - *flags |= AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_WC); + *flags = AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_WC); break; case AMDGPU_VM_MTYPE_RW: - *flags |= AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_RW); + *flags = AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_RW); break; case AMDGPU_VM_MTYPE_CC: - *flags |= AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_CC); + *flags = AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_CC); break; case AMDGPU_VM_MTYPE_UC: - *flags |= AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_UC); + *flags = AMDGPU_PTE_MTYPE_VG10(*flags, MTYPE_UC); break; } -- 2.50.1

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[PATCH 0/2] accel/rocket: fix unwinding in error paths of two functions

by Quentin Schulz

As reported[1], in the current state of master (that is, *without* that[2] patch, yet unmerged), it is possible to trigger Oops/out-of-bounds errors/unbalanced runtime PM by simply compiling DRM_ACCEL_ROCKET built-in (=y) instead of as a module (=m). This fixes points 1 and 2 reported here[1] by fixing the unwinding in two functions to properly undo everything done in the same function prior to the error. Note that this doesn't mean the Rocket device is usable if one core is missing. In fact, it seems it doesn't as I'm hit with many rocket fdac0000.npu: NPU job timed out followed by one rocket fdad0000.npu: NPU job timed out (and that, five times) whenever core0 (fdab0000.npu) fails to probe and I'm running the example from https://docs.mesa3d.org/teflon.html#do-some-inference-with-mobilenetv1 so something else probably needs some additional love. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rockchip/0b20d760-ad4f-41c0-b733-39db10d6cc41… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rockchip/20251205064739.20270-1-rmxpzlb@gmail… Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz(a)cherry.de> --- Quentin Schulz (2): accel/rocket: fix unwinding in error path in rocket_core_init accel/rocket: fix unwinding in error path in rocket_probe drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_core.c | 7 +++++-- drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_drv.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- base-commit: a619746d25c8adafe294777cc98c47a09759b3ed change-id: 20251212-rocket-error-path-f9784c46a503 Best regards, -- Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz(a)cherry.de>

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[PATCH v2 1/3] randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task

by Ryan Roberts

kstack_offset was previously maintained per-cpu, but this caused a couple of issues. So let's instead make it per-task. Issue 1: add_random_kstack_offset() and choose_random_kstack_offset() expected and required to be called with interrupts and preemption disabled so that it could manipulate per-cpu state. But arm64, loongarch and risc-v are calling them with interrupts and preemption enabled. I don't _think_ this causes any functional issues, but it's certainly unexpected and could lead to manipulating the wrong cpu's state, which could cause a minor performance degradation due to bouncing the cache lines. By maintaining the state per-task those functions can safely be called in preemptible context. Issue 2: add_random_kstack_offset() is called before executing the syscall and expands the stack using a previously chosen rnadom offset. choose_random_kstack_offset() is called after executing the syscall and chooses and stores a new random offset for the next syscall. With per-cpu storage for this offset, an attacker could force cpu migration during the execution of the syscall and prevent the offset from being updated for the original cpu such that it is predictable for the next syscall on that cpu. By maintaining the state per-task, this problem goes away because the per-task random offset is updated after the syscall regardless of which cpu it is executing on. Fixes: 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dd8c37bc-795f-4c7a-9086-69e584d8ab24@arm.com/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com> --- include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++++ init/main.c | 1 - kernel/fork.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h index 1d982dbdd0d0..5d3916ca747c 100644 --- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h +++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, randomize_kstack_offset); -DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); /* * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because @@ -50,15 +49,14 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); * add_random_kstack_offset - Increase stack utilization by previously * chosen random offset * - * This should be used in the syscall entry path when interrupts and - * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to - * the stack. For testing the resulting entropy, please see: - * tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh + * This should be used in the syscall entry path after user registers have been + * stored to the stack. Preemption may be enabled. For testing the resulting + * entropy, please see: tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh */ #define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ - u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ + u32 offset = current->kstack_offset; \ u8 *ptr = __kstack_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)); \ /* Keep allocation even after "ptr" loses scope. */ \ asm volatile("" :: "r"(ptr) : "memory"); \ @@ -69,9 +67,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); * choose_random_kstack_offset - Choose the random offset for the next * add_random_kstack_offset() * - * This should only be used during syscall exit when interrupts and - * preempt are disabled. This position in the syscall flow is done to - * frustrate attacks from userspace attempting to learn the next offset: + * This should only be used during syscall exit. Preemption may be enabled. This + * position in the syscall flow is done to frustrate attacks from userspace + * attempting to learn the next offset: * - Maximize the timing uncertainty visible from userspace: if the * offset is chosen at syscall entry, userspace has much more control * over the timing between choosing offsets. "How long will we be in @@ -85,14 +83,20 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ - u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ + u32 offset = current->kstack_offset; \ offset = ror32(offset, 5) ^ (rand); \ - raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \ + current->kstack_offset = offset; \ } \ } while (0) + +static inline void random_kstack_task_init(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + tsk->kstack_offset = 0; +} #else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */ #define add_random_kstack_offset() do { } while (0) #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { } while (0) +#define random_kstack_task_init(tsk) do { } while (0) #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */ #endif diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index d395f2810fac..9e0080ed1484 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1591,6 +1591,10 @@ struct task_struct { unsigned long prev_lowest_stack; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET + u32 kstack_offset; +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE void __user *mce_vaddr; __u64 mce_kflags; diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index b84818ad9685..27fcbbde933e 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -830,7 +830,6 @@ static inline void initcall_debug_enable(void) #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, randomize_kstack_offset); -DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); static int __init early_randomize_kstack_offset(char *buf) { diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index b1f3915d5f8e..b061e1edbc43 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ #include <linux/thread_info.h> #include <linux/kstack_erase.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> #include <linux/scs.h> #include <linux/io_uring.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> @@ -2231,6 +2232,7 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( if (retval) goto bad_fork_cleanup_io; + random_kstack_task_init(p); stackleak_task_init(p); if (pid != &init_struct_pid) { -- 2.43.0

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¿Cuánto cuesta una mala contratación?

by Valeria Pérez

¿Cuánto cuesta una mala contratación? body { margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; color: #333; background-color: #ffffff; } table { border-spacing: 0; width: 100%; max-width: 600px; margin: auto; } td { padding: 12px 20px; } a { color: #1a73e8; text-decoration: none; } .footer { font-size: 12px; color: #888888; text-align: center; } Una mala contratación cuesta 3X el salario. Evítalo con datos, no percepciones. Hola, , ¿Sabías que una mala contratación cuesta hasta 3 veces el salario anual? El 74% de empresas admite haber contratado a la persona equivocada. El motivo: decisiones basadas en percepciones, no en datos objetivos. PsicoSmart te ayuda a evaluar talento con precisión: 31 pruebas psicométricas validadas para medir liderazgo, honestidad e inteligencia 2,500+ exámenes técnicos especializados por industria Verificación de identidad con captura fotográfica automática Resultados en minutos, accesible desde cualquier dispositivo Reduce hasta 60% el riesgo de error en selección. ¿Quieres una demostración gratuita? Responde este correo y te contacto en menos de 24 horas. Saludos, -------------- Atte.: Valeria Pérez Ciudad de México: (55) 5018 0565 WhatsApp: +52 33 1607 2089 Si no deseas recibir más correos, haz clic aquí para darte de baja. Para remover su dirección de esta lista haga <a href="https://s1.arrobamail.com/unsuscribe.php?id=yiwtsrewiswqtiseup">click aquí</a>

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Re: Patch "efi/cper: Add a new helper function to print bitmasks" has been added to the 6.18-stable tree

by Ard Biesheuvel

Why are these patches being backported? On Mon, 15 Dec 2025 at 12:08, Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> wrote: > > This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled > > efi/cper: Add a new helper function to print bitmasks > > to the 6.18-stable tree which can be found at: > http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… > > The filename of the patch is: > efi-cper-add-a-new-helper-function-to-print-bitmasks.patch > and it can be found in the queue-6.18 subdirectory. > > If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, > please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. > > > > commit 06d39b93424e64e47244b0ccb97a3c6b2c033cfe > Author: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> > Date: Thu Aug 14 09:52:54 2025 -0700 > > efi/cper: Add a new helper function to print bitmasks > > [ Upstream commit a976d790f49499ccaa0f991788ad8ebf92e7fd5c ] > > Add a helper function to print a string with names associated > to each bit field. > > A typical example is: > > const char * const bits[] = { > "bit 3 name", > "bit 4 name", > "bit 5 name", > }; > char str[120]; > unsigned int bitmask = BIT(3) | BIT(5); > > #define MASK GENMASK(5,3) > > cper_bits_to_str(str, sizeof(str), FIELD_GET(MASK, bitmask), > bits, ARRAY_SIZE(bits)); > > The above code fills string "str" with "bit 3 name|bit 5 name". > > Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> > Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> > > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c > index 928409199a1a4..79ba688a64f8d 100644 > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ > * Specification version 2.4. > */ > > +#include <linux/bitmap.h> > #include <linux/kernel.h> > #include <linux/module.h> > #include <linux/time.h> > @@ -106,6 +107,65 @@ void cper_print_bits(const char *pfx, unsigned int bits, > printk("%s\n", buf); > } > > +/** > + * cper_bits_to_str - return a string for set bits > + * @buf: buffer to store the output string > + * @buf_size: size of the output string buffer > + * @bits: bit mask > + * @strs: string array, indexed by bit position > + * @strs_size: size of the string array: @strs > + * > + * Add to @buf the bitmask in hexadecimal. Then, for each set bit in @bits, > + * add the corresponding string describing the bit in @strs to @buf. > + * > + * A typical example is:: > + * > + * const char * const bits[] = { > + * "bit 3 name", > + * "bit 4 name", > + * "bit 5 name", > + * }; > + * char str[120]; > + * unsigned int bitmask = BIT(3) | BIT(5); > + * #define MASK GENMASK(5,3) > + * > + * cper_bits_to_str(str, sizeof(str), FIELD_GET(MASK, bitmask), > + * bits, ARRAY_SIZE(bits)); > + * > + * The above code fills the string ``str`` with ``bit 3 name|bit 5 name``. > + * > + * Return: number of bytes stored or an error code if lower than zero. > + */ > +int cper_bits_to_str(char *buf, int buf_size, unsigned long bits, > + const char * const strs[], unsigned int strs_size) > +{ > + int len = buf_size; > + char *str = buf; > + int i, size; > + > + *buf = '\0'; > + > + for_each_set_bit(i, &bits, strs_size) { > + if (!(bits & BIT_ULL(i))) > + continue; > + > + if (*buf && len > 0) { > + *str = '|'; > + len--; > + str++; > + } > + > + size = strscpy(str, strs[i], len); > + if (size < 0) > + return size; > + > + len -= size; > + str += size; > + } > + return len - buf_size; > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cper_bits_to_str); > + > static const char * const proc_type_strs[] = { > "IA32/X64", > "IA64", > diff --git a/include/linux/cper.h b/include/linux/cper.h > index 0ed60a91eca9d..58f40477c824e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/cper.h > +++ b/include/linux/cper.h > @@ -588,6 +588,8 @@ const char *cper_mem_err_type_str(unsigned int); > const char *cper_mem_err_status_str(u64 status); > void cper_print_bits(const char *prefix, unsigned int bits, > const char * const strs[], unsigned int strs_size); > +int cper_bits_to_str(char *buf, int buf_size, unsigned long bits, > + const char * const strs[], unsigned int strs_size); > void cper_mem_err_pack(const struct cper_sec_mem_err *, > struct cper_mem_err_compact *); > const char *cper_mem_err_unpack(struct trace_seq *,

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[PATCH net v2] erspan: Initialize options_len before referencing options.

by Frode Nordahl

The struct ip_tunnel_info has a flexible array member named options that is protected by a counted_by(options_len) attribute. The compiler will use this information to enforce runtime bounds checking deployed by FORTIFY_SOURCE string helpers. As laid out in the GCC documentation, the counter must be initialized before the first reference to the flexible array member. After scanning through the files that use struct ip_tunnel_info and also refer to options or options_len, it appears the normal case is to use the ip_tunnel_info_opts_set() helper. Said helper would initialize options_len properly before copying data into options, however in the GRE ERSPAN code a partial update is done, preventing the use of the helper function. Before this change the handling of ERSPAN traffic in GRE tunnels would cause a kernel panic when the kernel is compiled with GCC 15+ and having FORTIFY_SOURCE configured: memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 Call Trace: <IRQ> __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf erspan_rcv.cold+0x68/0x83 ? ip_route_input_slow+0x816/0x9d0 gre_rcv+0x1b2/0x1c0 gre_rcv+0x8e/0x100 ? raw_v4_input+0x2a0/0x2b0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1ea/0x210 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x86/0x110 ip_local_deliver+0x65/0x110 ? ip_rcv_finish_core+0xd6/0x360 ip_rcv+0x186/0x1a0 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Variable-Attributes.html#index-co… Reported-at: https://launchpad.net/bugs/2129580 Fixes: bb5e62f2d547 ("net: Add options as a flexible array to struct ip_tunnel_info") Signed-off-by: Frode Nordahl <fnordahl(a)ubuntu.com> --- v2: - target correct netdev tree and properly cc stable in commit message. - replace repeated long in-line comments and link with a single line. - document search for any similar offenses in the code base in commit message. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251212073202.13153-1-fnordahl@ubuntu.com/ net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 6 ++++-- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index 761a53c6a89a..8178c44a3cdd 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -330,6 +330,10 @@ static int erspan_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tnl_ptk_info *tpi, if (!tun_dst) return PACKET_REJECT; + /* MUST set options_len before referencing options */ + info = &tun_dst->u.tun_info; + info->options_len = sizeof(*md); + /* skb can be uncloned in __iptunnel_pull_header, so * old pkt_md is no longer valid and we need to reset * it @@ -344,10 +348,8 @@ static int erspan_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tnl_ptk_info *tpi, memcpy(md2, pkt_md, ver == 1 ? ERSPAN_V1_MDSIZE : ERSPAN_V2_MDSIZE); - info = &tun_dst->u.tun_info; __set_bit(IP_TUNNEL_ERSPAN_OPT_BIT, info->key.tun_flags); - info->options_len = sizeof(*md); } skb_reset_mac_header(skb); diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c index c82a75510c0e..4603554d4c7f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c @@ -535,6 +535,10 @@ static int ip6erspan_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, if (!tun_dst) return PACKET_REJECT; + /* MUST set options_len before referencing options */ + info = &tun_dst->u.tun_info; + info->options_len = sizeof(*md); + /* skb can be uncloned in __iptunnel_pull_header, so * old pkt_md is no longer valid and we need to reset * it @@ -543,7 +547,6 @@ static int ip6erspan_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, skb_network_header_len(skb); pkt_md = (struct erspan_metadata *)(gh + gre_hdr_len + sizeof(*ershdr)); - info = &tun_dst->u.tun_info; md = ip_tunnel_info_opts(info); md->version = ver; md2 = &md->u.md2; @@ -551,7 +554,6 @@ static int ip6erspan_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, ERSPAN_V2_MDSIZE); __set_bit(IP_TUNNEL_ERSPAN_OPT_BIT, info->key.tun_flags); - info->options_len = sizeof(*md); ip6_tnl_rcv(tunnel, skb, tpi, tun_dst, log_ecn_error); -- 2.51.0

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[PATCH] virtiofs: fix NULL dereference in virtio_fs_add_queues_sysfs()

by Qianchang Zhao

virtio_fs_add_queues_sysfs() creates per-queue sysfs kobjects via kobject_create_and_add(). The current code checks the wrong variable after the allocation: - kobject_create_and_add() may return NULL on failure. - The code incorrectly checks fs->mqs_kobj (the parent kobject), which is expected to be non-NULL at this point. - If kobject_create_and_add() fails, fsvq->kobj is NULL but the code can still call sysfs_create_group(fsvq->kobj, ...), leading to a NULL pointer dereference and kernel panic (DoS). Fix by validating fsvq->kobj immediately after kobject_create_and_add() and aborting on failure, so sysfs_create_group() is never called with a NULL kobject. Reported-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhitong Liu <liuzhitong1993(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com> --- fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c b/fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c index 6bc7c97b0..b2f6486fe 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c +++ b/fs/fuse/virtio_fs.c @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int virtio_fs_add_queues_sysfs(struct virtio_fs *fs) sprintf(buff, "%d", i); fsvq->kobj = kobject_create_and_add(buff, fs->mqs_kobj); - if (!fs->mqs_kobj) { + if (!fsvq->kobj) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out_del; } -- 2.34.1

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CES 2026: Audience Breakdown & Leads

by Jessica Garcia

Hi , Trust you're in good spirits. Is the idea of buying the CES 2026 attendees' details for your marketing efforts something you'd like to explore? Expo Name: Consumer Electronics Show 2026 Total Number of records: 40,000 records List includes: Company Name, Contact Name, Job Title, Mailing Address, Phone, Emails, etc. Best chance to connect with participants Feel free to contact me if you are interested in acquiring this list so that I can share pricing information with you Hoping for your prompt feedback. Regards Jessica Marketing Manager Campaign Data Leads., Please reply with REMOVE if you don't wish to receive further emails

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[PATCH v2] spi: fsl-cpm: Check length parity before switching to 16 bit mode

by Christophe Leroy

Commit fc96ec826bce ("spi: fsl-cpm: Use 16 bit mode for large transfers with even size") failed to make sure that the size is really even before switching to 16 bit mode. Until recently the problem went unnoticed because kernfs uses a pre-allocated bounce buffer of size PAGE_SIZE for reading EEPROM. But commit 8ad6249c51d0 ("eeprom: at25: convert to spi-mem API") introduced an additional dynamically allocated bounce buffer whose size is exactly the size of the transfer, leading to a buffer overrun in the fsl-cpm driver when that size is odd. Add the missing length parity verification and remain in 8 bit mode when the length is not even. Fixes: fc96ec826bce ("spi: fsl-cpm: Use 16 bit mode for large transfers with even size") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/638496dd-ec60-4e53-bad7-eb657f67d580@csgroup.eu/ Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu> Reviewed-by: Sverdlin Alexander <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> --- v2: Updated with comments from Alexander --- drivers/spi/spi-fsl-spi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-spi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-spi.c index 2f2082652a1a..481a7b28aacd 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-spi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-spi.c @@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static int fsl_spi_prepare_message(struct spi_controller *ctlr, if (t->bits_per_word == 16 || t->bits_per_word == 32) t->bits_per_word = 8; /* pretend its 8 bits */ if (t->bits_per_word == 8 && t->len >= 256 && - (mpc8xxx_spi->flags & SPI_CPM1)) + !(t->len & 1) && (mpc8xxx_spi->flags & SPI_CPM1)) t->bits_per_word = 16; } } -- 2.49.0

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[PATCH 6.6.y] ext4: fix error message when rejecting the default hash

by Ankan Biswas

From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman(a)suse.de> [ Upstream commit a2187431c395cdfbf144e3536f25468c64fc7cfa ] Commit 985b67cd8639 ("ext4: filesystems without casefold feature cannot be mounted with siphash") properly rejects volumes where s_def_hash_version is set to DX_HASH_SIPHASH, but the check and the error message should not look into casefold setup - a filesystem should never have DX_HASH_SIPHASH as the default hash. Fix it and, since we are there, move the check to ext4_hash_info_init. Fixes:985b67cd8639 ("ext4: filesystems without casefold feature cannot be mounted with siphash") Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/87jzg1en6j.fsf_-_@mailhost.krisman.be Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> [ The commit a2187431c395 intended to remove the if-block which was used for an old SIPHASH rejection check. ] Signed-off-by: Ankan Biswas <spyjetfayed(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 1 + fs/ext4/super.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 7afce7b744c0..85ba12a48f26 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2459,6 +2459,7 @@ static inline __le16 ext4_rec_len_to_disk(unsigned len, unsigned blocksize) #define DX_HASH_HALF_MD4_UNSIGNED 4 #define DX_HASH_TEA_UNSIGNED 5 #define DX_HASH_SIPHASH 6 +#define DX_HASH_LAST DX_HASH_SIPHASH static inline u32 ext4_chksum(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi, u32 crc, const void *address, unsigned int length) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 16a6c249580e..613f2bac439d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5138,16 +5138,27 @@ static int ext4_load_super(struct super_block *sb, ext4_fsblk_t *lsb, return ret; } -static void ext4_hash_info_init(struct super_block *sb) +static int ext4_hash_info_init(struct super_block *sb) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es; unsigned int i; + sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version; + + if (sbi->s_def_hash_version > DX_HASH_LAST) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, + "Invalid default hash set in the superblock"); + return -EINVAL; + } else if (sbi->s_def_hash_version == DX_HASH_SIPHASH) { + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, + "SIPHASH is not a valid default hash value"); + return -EINVAL; + } + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) sbi->s_hash_seed[i] = le32_to_cpu(es->s_hash_seed[i]); - sbi->s_def_hash_version = es->s_def_hash_version; if (ext4_has_feature_dir_index(sb)) { i = le32_to_cpu(es->s_flags); if (i & EXT2_FLAGS_UNSIGNED_HASH) @@ -5165,6 +5176,7 @@ static void ext4_hash_info_init(struct super_block *sb) #endif } } + return 0; } static int ext4_block_group_meta_init(struct super_block *sb, int silent) @@ -5309,7 +5321,9 @@ static int __ext4_fill_super(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb) if (err) goto failed_mount; - ext4_hash_info_init(sb); + err = ext4_hash_info_init(sb); + if (err) + goto failed_mount; err = ext4_handle_clustersize(sb); if (err) -- 2.52.0

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