From: Chris Down <chris(a)chrisdown.name>
Subject: mm, memcg: throttle allocators based on ancestral memory.high
Prior to this commit, we only directly check the affected cgroup's
memory.high against its usage. However, it's possible that we are being
reclaimed as a result of hitting an ancestor memory.high and should be
penalised based on that, instead.
This patch changes memory.high overage throttling to use the largest
overage in its ancestors when considering how many penalty jiffies to
charge. This makes sure that we penalise poorly behaving cgroups in the
same way regardless of at what level of the hierarchy memory.high was
breached.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8cd132f84bd7e16cdb8fde3378cdbf05ba00d387.158403614…
Fixes: 0e4b01df8659 ("mm, memcg: throttle allocators when failing reclaim over memory.high")
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <chris(a)chrisdown.name>
Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [5.4.x+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memcontrol.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c~mm-memcg-throttle-allocators-based-on-ancestral-memoryhigh
+++ a/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -2297,28 +2297,41 @@ static void high_work_func(struct work_s
#define MEMCG_DELAY_SCALING_SHIFT 14
/*
- * Scheduled by try_charge() to be executed from the userland return path
- * and reclaims memory over the high limit.
+ * Get the number of jiffies that we should penalise a mischievous cgroup which
+ * is exceeding its memory.high by checking both it and its ancestors.
*/
-void mem_cgroup_handle_over_high(void)
+static unsigned long calculate_high_delay(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
+ unsigned int nr_pages)
{
- unsigned long usage, high, clamped_high;
- unsigned long pflags;
- unsigned long penalty_jiffies, overage;
- unsigned int nr_pages = current->memcg_nr_pages_over_high;
- struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
+ unsigned long penalty_jiffies;
+ u64 max_overage = 0;
- if (likely(!nr_pages))
- return;
+ do {
+ unsigned long usage, high;
+ u64 overage;
+
+ usage = page_counter_read(&memcg->memory);
+ high = READ_ONCE(memcg->high);
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent division by 0 in overage calculation by acting as if
+ * it was a threshold of 1 page
+ */
+ high = max(high, 1UL);
+
+ overage = usage - high;
+ overage <<= MEMCG_DELAY_PRECISION_SHIFT;
+ overage = div64_u64(overage, high);
+
+ if (overage > max_overage)
+ max_overage = overage;
+ } while ((memcg = parent_mem_cgroup(memcg)) &&
+ !mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg));
- memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(current->mm);
- reclaim_high(memcg, nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
- current->memcg_nr_pages_over_high = 0;
+ if (!max_overage)
+ return 0;
/*
- * memory.high is breached and reclaim is unable to keep up. Throttle
- * allocators proactively to slow down excessive growth.
- *
* We use overage compared to memory.high to calculate the number of
* jiffies to sleep (penalty_jiffies). Ideally this value should be
* fairly lenient on small overages, and increasingly harsh when the
@@ -2326,24 +2339,9 @@ void mem_cgroup_handle_over_high(void)
* its crazy behaviour, so we exponentially increase the delay based on
* overage amount.
*/
-
- usage = page_counter_read(&memcg->memory);
- high = READ_ONCE(memcg->high);
-
- if (usage <= high)
- goto out;
-
- /*
- * Prevent division by 0 in overage calculation by acting as if it was a
- * threshold of 1 page
- */
- clamped_high = max(high, 1UL);
-
- overage = div64_u64((u64)(usage - high) << MEMCG_DELAY_PRECISION_SHIFT,
- clamped_high);
-
- penalty_jiffies = ((u64)overage * overage * HZ)
- >> (MEMCG_DELAY_PRECISION_SHIFT + MEMCG_DELAY_SCALING_SHIFT);
+ penalty_jiffies = max_overage * max_overage * HZ;
+ penalty_jiffies >>= MEMCG_DELAY_PRECISION_SHIFT;
+ penalty_jiffies >>= MEMCG_DELAY_SCALING_SHIFT;
/*
* Factor in the task's own contribution to the overage, such that four
@@ -2360,7 +2358,32 @@ void mem_cgroup_handle_over_high(void)
* application moving forwards and also permit diagnostics, albeit
* extremely slowly.
*/
- penalty_jiffies = min(penalty_jiffies, MEMCG_MAX_HIGH_DELAY_JIFFIES);
+ return min(penalty_jiffies, MEMCG_MAX_HIGH_DELAY_JIFFIES);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Scheduled by try_charge() to be executed from the userland return path
+ * and reclaims memory over the high limit.
+ */
+void mem_cgroup_handle_over_high(void)
+{
+ unsigned long penalty_jiffies;
+ unsigned long pflags;
+ unsigned int nr_pages = current->memcg_nr_pages_over_high;
+ struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
+
+ if (likely(!nr_pages))
+ return;
+
+ memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(current->mm);
+ reclaim_high(memcg, nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL);
+ current->memcg_nr_pages_over_high = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * memory.high is breached and reclaim is unable to keep up. Throttle
+ * allocators proactively to slow down excessive growth.
+ */
+ penalty_jiffies = calculate_high_delay(memcg, nr_pages);
/*
* Don't sleep if the amount of jiffies this memcg owes us is so low
_
From: Chris Down <chris(a)chrisdown.name>
Subject: mm, memcg: fix corruption on 64-bit divisor in memory.high throttling
0e4b01df8659 had a bunch of fixups to use the right division method.
However, it seems that after all that it still wasn't right -- div_u64
takes a 32-bit divisor.
The headroom is still large (2^32 pages), so on mundane systems you won't
hit this, but this should definitely be fixed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/80780887060514967d414b3cd91f9a316a16ab98.158403614…
Fixes: 0e4b01df8659 ("mm, memcg: throttle allocators when failing reclaim over memory.high")
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <chris(a)chrisdown.name>
Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro(a)fb.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [5.4.x+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c~mm-memcg-fix-corruption-on-64-bit-divisor-in-memoryhigh-throttling
+++ a/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ void mem_cgroup_handle_over_high(void)
*/
clamped_high = max(high, 1UL);
- overage = div_u64((u64)(usage - high) << MEMCG_DELAY_PRECISION_SHIFT,
+ overage = div64_u64((u64)(usage - high) << MEMCG_DELAY_PRECISION_SHIFT,
clamped_high);
penalty_jiffies = ((u64)overage * overage * HZ)
_
From: Chunguang Xu <brookxu(a)tencent.com>
Subject: memcg: fix NULL pointer dereference in __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event
An eventfd monitors multiple memory thresholds of the cgroup, closes them,
the kernel deletes all events related to this eventfd. Before all events
are deleted, another eventfd monitors the memory threshold of this cgroup,
leading to a crash:
[135.675108] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
[135.675350] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[135.675579] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[135.675816] PGD 800000033058e067 P4D 800000033058e067 PUD 3355ce067 PMD 0
[135.676080] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
[135.676332] CPU: 2 PID: 14012 Comm: kworker/2:6 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4 #3
[135.676610] Hardware name: LENOVO 20AWS01K00/20AWS01K00, BIOS GLET70WW (2.24 ) 05/21/2014
[135.676909] Workqueue: events memcg_event_remove
[135.677192] RIP: 0010:__mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0xb3/0x190
[135.677825] RSP: 0018:ffffb47e01c4fe18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[135.678186] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8bb223a8a000 RCX: 0000000000000001
[135.678548] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8bb22fb83540 RDI: 0000000000000001
[135.678912] RBP: ffffb47e01c4fe48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000010
[135.679287] R10: 000000000000000c R11: 071c71c71c71c71c R12: ffff8bb226aba880
[135.679670] R13: ffff8bb223a8a480 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[135.680066] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8bb242680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[135.680475] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[135.680894] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 000000032c29c003 CR4: 00000000001606e0
[135.681325] Call Trace:
[135.681763]� memcg_event_remove+0x32/0x90
[135.682209]� process_one_work+0x172/0x380
[135.682657]� worker_thread+0x49/0x3f0
[135.683111]� kthread+0xf8/0x130
[135.683570]� ? max_active_store+0x80/0x80
[135.684034]� ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
[135.684506]� ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[135.689733] CR2: 0000000000000004
We can reproduce this problem in the following ways:
1. We create a new cgroup subdirectory and a new eventfd, and then we
monitor multiple memory thresholds of the cgroup through this eventfd.
2. closing this eventfd, and __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event ()
will be called multiple times to delete all events related to this
eventfd.
The first time __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() is called, the kernel
will clear all items related to this eventfd in thresholds-> primary.Since
there is currently only one eventfd, thresholds-> primary becomes empty,
so the kernel will set thresholds-> primary and hresholds-> spare to NULL.
If at this time, the user creates a new eventfd and monitor the memory
threshold of this cgroup, kernel will re-initialize thresholds-> primary.
Then when __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event () is called for the second
time, because thresholds-> primary is not empty, the system will access
thresholds-> spare, but thresholds-> spare is NULL, which will trigger a
crash.
In general, the longer it takes to delete all events related to this
eventfd, the easier it is to trigger this problem.
The solution is to check whether the thresholds associated with the
eventfd has been cleared when deleting the event. If so, we do nothing.
[akpm(a)linux-foundation.org: fix comment, per Kirill]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/077a6f67-aefa-4591-efec-f2f3af2b0b02@gmail.com
Fixes: 907860ed381a ("cgroups: make cftype.unregister_event() void-returning")
Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu <brookxu(a)tencent.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memcontrol.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memcontrol.c~memcg-fix-null-pointer-dereference-in-__mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event
+++ a/mm/memcontrol.c
@@ -4027,7 +4027,7 @@ static void __mem_cgroup_usage_unregiste
struct mem_cgroup_thresholds *thresholds;
struct mem_cgroup_threshold_ary *new;
unsigned long usage;
- int i, j, size;
+ int i, j, size, entries;
mutex_lock(&memcg->thresholds_lock);
@@ -4047,14 +4047,20 @@ static void __mem_cgroup_usage_unregiste
__mem_cgroup_threshold(memcg, type == _MEMSWAP);
/* Calculate new number of threshold */
- size = 0;
+ size = entries = 0;
for (i = 0; i < thresholds->primary->size; i++) {
if (thresholds->primary->entries[i].eventfd != eventfd)
size++;
+ else
+ entries++;
}
new = thresholds->spare;
+ /* If no items related to eventfd have been cleared, nothing to do */
+ if (!entries)
+ goto unlock;
+
/* Set thresholds array to NULL if we don't have thresholds */
if (!size) {
kfree(new);
_
This fixes a deadlock in the tracer when tracing a multi-threaded
application that calls execve while more than one thread are running.
I observed that when running strace on the gcc test suite, it always
blocks after a while, when expect calls execve, because other threads
have to be terminated. They send ptrace events, but the strace is no
longer able to respond, since it is blocked in vm_access.
The deadlock is always happening when strace needs to access the
tracees process mmap, while another thread in the tracee starts to
execve a child process, but that cannot continue until the
PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT is handled and the WIFEXITED event is received:
strace D 0 30614 30584 0x00000000
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3ce/0x6e0
schedule+0x5c/0xd0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x20
__mutex_lock.isra.13+0x1ec/0x520
__mutex_lock_killable_slowpath+0x13/0x20
mutex_lock_killable+0x28/0x30
mm_access+0x27/0xa0
process_vm_rw_core.isra.3+0xff/0x550
process_vm_rw+0xdd/0xf0
__x64_sys_process_vm_readv+0x31/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
expect D 0 31933 30876 0x80004003
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3ce/0x6e0
schedule+0x5c/0xd0
flush_old_exec+0xc4/0x770
load_elf_binary+0x35a/0x16c0
search_binary_handler+0x97/0x1d0
__do_execve_file.isra.40+0x5d4/0x8a0
__x64_sys_execve+0x49/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The proposed solution is to have a second mutex that is
used in mm_access, so it is allowed to continue while the
dying threads are not yet terminated.
I also took the opportunity to improve the documentation
of prepare_creds, which is obviously out of sync.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger(a)hotmail.de>
---
Documentation/security/credentials.rst | 18 ++++++------
fs/exec.c | 9 ++++++
include/linux/binfmts.h | 6 +++-
include/linux/sched/signal.h | 1 +
init/init_task.c | 1 +
kernel/cred.c | 2 +-
kernel/fork.c | 5 ++--
mm/process_vm_access.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile | 4 +--
tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
v2: adds a test case which passes when this patch is applied.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
index 282e79f..c98e0a8 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/credentials.rst
@@ -437,9 +437,13 @@ new set of credentials by calling::
struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
-this locks current->cred_replace_mutex and then allocates and constructs a
-duplicate of the current process's credentials, returning with the mutex still
-held if successful. It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory).
+this allocates and constructs a duplicate of the current process's credentials.
+It returns NULL if not successful (out of memory).
+
+If called from __do_execve_file, the mutex current->signal->cred_guard_mutex
+is acquired before this function gets called, and the mutex
+current->signal->cred_change_mutex is acquired later, while the credentials
+and the process mmap are actually changed.
The mutex prevents ``ptrace()`` from altering the ptrace state of a process
while security checks on credentials construction and changing is taking place
@@ -466,9 +470,8 @@ by calling::
This will alter various aspects of the credentials and the process, giving the
LSM a chance to do likewise, then it will use ``rcu_assign_pointer()`` to
-actually commit the new credentials to ``current->cred``, it will release
-``current->cred_replace_mutex`` to allow ``ptrace()`` to take place, and it
-will notify the scheduler and others of the changes.
+actually commit the new credentials to ``current->cred``, and it will notify
+the scheduler and others of the changes.
This function is guaranteed to return 0, so that it can be tail-called at the
end of such functions as ``sys_setresuid()``.
@@ -486,8 +489,7 @@ invoked::
void abort_creds(struct cred *new);
-This releases the lock on ``current->cred_replace_mutex`` that
-``prepare_creds()`` got and then releases the new credentials.
+This releases the new credentials.
A typical credentials alteration function would look something like this::
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 74d88da..a6884e4 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1266,6 +1266,12 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
goto out;
+ retval = mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_change_mutex);
+ if (retval)
+ goto out;
+
+ bprm->called_flush_old_exec = 1;
+
/*
* Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
* not visibile until then. This also enables the update
@@ -1420,6 +1426,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
free_arg_pages(bprm);
if (bprm->cred) {
+ if (bprm->called_flush_old_exec)
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_change_mutex);
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
abort_creds(bprm->cred);
}
@@ -1469,6 +1477,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
*/
security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_change_mutex);
mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index b40fc63..2e1318b 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ struct linux_binprm {
* exec has happened. Used to sanitize execution environment
* and to set AT_SECURE auxv for glibc.
*/
- secureexec:1;
+ secureexec:1,
+ /*
+ * Set by flush_old_exec, when the cred_change_mutex is taken.
+ */
+ called_flush_old_exec:1;
#ifdef __alpha__
unsigned int taso:1;
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index 8805025..37eeabe 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ struct signal_struct {
struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
* credential calculations
* (notably. ptrace) */
+ struct mutex cred_change_mutex; /* guard against credentials change */
} __randomize_layout;
/*
diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c
index 9e5cbe5..6cd9a0f 100644
--- a/init/init_task.c
+++ b/init/init_task.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
.multiprocess = HLIST_HEAD_INIT,
.rlim = INIT_RLIMITS,
.cred_guard_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.cred_guard_mutex),
+ .cred_change_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.cred_change_mutex),
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
.posix_timers = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_signals.posix_timers),
.cputimer = {
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 809a985..e4c78de 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
*
* Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
*
- * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex.
+ * Does not take, and does not return holding ->cred_guard_mutex.
*/
struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
{
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 0808095..0395154 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
- err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_change_mutex);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
@@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
mmput(mm);
mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
- mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_change_mutex);
return mm;
}
@@ -1594,6 +1594,7 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
sig->oom_score_adj_min = current->signal->oom_score_adj_min;
mutex_init(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ mutex_init(&sig->cred_change_mutex);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c
index 357aa7b..b3e6eb5 100644
--- a/mm/process_vm_access.c
+++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static ssize_t process_vm_rw_core(pid_t pid, struct iov_iter *iter,
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
rc = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
/*
- * Explicitly map EACCES to EPERM as EPERM is a more a
+ * Explicitly map EACCES to EPERM as EPERM is a more
* appropriate error code for process_vw_readv/writev
*/
if (rc == -EACCES)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile
index c0b7f89..2f1f532 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
-CFLAGS += -iquote../../../../include/uapi -Wall
+CFLAGS += -std=c99 -pthread -iquote../../../../include/uapi -Wall
-TEST_GEN_PROGS := get_syscall_info peeksiginfo
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := get_syscall_info peeksiginfo vmaccess
include ../lib.mk
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef08c9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger(a)hotmail.de>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Check whether /proc/$pid/mem can be accessed without causing deadlocks
+ * when de_thread is blocked with ->cred_guard_mutex held.
+ */
+
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+
+static void *thread(void *arg)
+{
+ ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0, 0);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+TEST(vmaccess)
+{
+ int f, pid = fork();
+ char mm[64];
+
+ if (!pid) {
+ pthread_t pt;
+ pthread_create(&pt, NULL, thread, NULL);
+ pthread_join(pt, NULL);
+ execlp("true", "true", NULL);
+ }
+
+ sleep(1);
+ sprintf(mm, "/proc/%d/mem", pid);
+ f = open(mm, O_RDONLY);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, f)
+ close(f);
+ /* this is not fixed! ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0,0); */
+ f = kill(pid, SIGCONT);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, f);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
1.9.1
Hi,
we now have a script that identifies patches in stable releases which were
later fixed upstream, but the fix was not applied to the respective stable
releases. We identify such patches based on Fixes: tags in the upstream
kernel.
Example: Upstream commit c54c7374ff4 ("drm/dp_mst: Skip validating ports
during destruction, just ref") was applied to v4.4.y as commit 05d994f68019.
It was later reverted upstream with commit 9765635b307, but the revert has
(at least not yet) found its way into v4.4.y.
This is an easy example, where the revert should (or at least I think it
should) be applied to v4.4.y (and possibly to later kernels - I didn't check).
A more tricky patch is commit 3ef240eaff36 ("futex: Prevent exit livelock")
in v5.4.y, which was later fixed upstream with commit 51bfb1d11d6 ("futex:
Fix kernel-doc notation warning"). I am not entirely sure what to do with
that, given that it only fixes documentation (though that may of course also
be valuable).
How should we handle this ? Would it be ok to send half-automated requests
to the stable mailing list, for example with basic test results ?
Thanks,
Guenter