[PATCH 6.6 401/530] apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.

24 Nov 2023

6.6-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen john.johansen@canonical.com
[ Upstream commit 90c436a64a6e20482a9a613c47eb4af2e8a5328e ]
The cred is needed to properly audit some messages, and will be needed
in the future for uid conditional mediation. So pass it through to
where the apparmor_audit_data struct gets defined.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia georgia.garcia@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: John Johansen john.johansen@canonical.com
Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org
---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c         |  11 ++-
 security/apparmor/capability.c         |   5 +-
 security/apparmor/domain.c             |  97 +++++++++++-------
 security/apparmor/file.c               | 131 +++++++++++++++++--------
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h      |   1 +
 security/apparmor/include/capability.h |   3 +-
 security/apparmor/include/file.h       |  17 ++--
 security/apparmor/include/ipc.h        |   4 +-
 security/apparmor/include/mount.h      |  21 ++--
 security/apparmor/include/net.h        |   6 +-
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h     |   9 +-
 security/apparmor/include/resource.h   |   3 +-
 security/apparmor/include/task.h       |   3 +-
 security/apparmor/ipc.c                |  14 ++-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c                |  85 +++++++++-------
 security/apparmor/mount.c              |  85 ++++++++++------
 security/apparmor/net.c                |  17 ++--
 security/apparmor/policy.c             |  33 ++++---
 security/apparmor/resource.c           |  23 +++--
 security/apparmor/task.c               |  31 +++---
 20 files changed, 388 insertions(+), 211 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index bd6a910f65282..261cef4c622fb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
    /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
     * below after unpack
     */
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, mask);
    if (error)
    	goto end_section;
@@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
    /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
     * below after unpack
     */
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns,
+				     AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY);
    if (error)
    	goto out;
@@ -1805,7 +1806,8 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
    int error;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL,
+				     AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
    end_current_label_crit_section(label);
    if (error)
    	return error;
@@ -1854,7 +1856,8 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
    int error;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
+	error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL,
+				     AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY);
    end_current_label_crit_section(label);
    if (error)
    	return error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 58490cca035da..2fb6a2ea0b998 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
/**
  * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
+ * @subj_cread: cred we are testing capability against
  * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL)
  * @cap: capability to be tested
  * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated
@@ -148,12 +149,14 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
  *
  * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
  */
-int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts)
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       int cap, unsigned int opts)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
    int error = 0;
    DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
    ad.common.u.cap = cap;
    error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
    		profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad));
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index f3715cda59c52..543105cf7e334 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
/**
  * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
+ * @cred: cred of task changing domain
  * @to_label: profile to change to  (NOT NULL)
  * @info: message if there is an error
  *
@@ -39,28 +40,34 @@
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
  */
-static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label,
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(const struct cred *to_cred,
+				     struct aa_label *to_label,
    			     const char **info)
 {
    struct task_struct *tracer;
    struct aa_label *tracerl = NULL;
+	const struct cred *tracer_cred = NULL;
+
    int error = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
    tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
-	if (tracer)
+	if (tracer) {
    	/* released below */
    	tracerl = aa_get_task_label(tracer);
-
+		tracer_cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+	}
    /* not ptraced */
    if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl))
    	goto out;
-	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred, tracerl, to_cred, to_label,
+			      PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
out:
    rcu_read_unlock();
    aa_put_label(tracerl);
+	put_cred(tracer_cred);
if (error)
    	*info = "ptrace prevents transition";
@@ -619,7 +626,8 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
    return new;
 }
-static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					   struct aa_profile *profile,
    				   const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
    				   char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
    				   bool *secure_exec)
@@ -709,7 +717,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
    }
audit:
-	aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new,
+	aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name,
+		      target, new,
    	      cond->uid, info, error);
    if (!new || nonewprivs) {
    	aa_put_label(new);
@@ -719,7 +728,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
    return new;
 }
-static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
+static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
    		  bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
    		  char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
    		  bool *secure_exec)
@@ -787,13 +797,15 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
    }
audit:
-	return aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC,
+			     AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname,
    		     NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error);
 }
/* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */
-static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
+static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+				      struct aa_label *label,
    			      struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack,
    			      const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
    			      char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
@@ -810,26 +822,28 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
if (!stack) {
    	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-				profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack,
+				profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack,
    				       bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe));
    	if (error)
    		return ERR_PTR(error);
    	new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
    			aa_get_newest_label(onexec),
-				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
+				profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+						   buffer,
    					   cond, unsafe));
} else {
    	/* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this */
    	error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-				profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, bprm,
+				profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack, bprm,
    				       buffer, cond, unsafe));
    	if (error)
    		return ERR_PTR(error);
    	new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
    			aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec,
    				       GFP_KERNEL),
-				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
+				profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+						   buffer,
    					   cond, unsafe));
    }
@@ -838,7 +852,8 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label,
/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
    error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
    			      AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL,
    			      onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
    			      "failed to build target label", -ENOMEM));
@@ -857,6 +872,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
    struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
    struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
    struct aa_profile *profile;
    char *buffer = NULL;
    const char *info = NULL;
@@ -869,6 +885,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    	file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
    };
+	subj_cred = current_cred();
    ctx = task_ctx(current);
    AA_BUG(!cred_label(bprm->cred));
    AA_BUG(!ctx);
@@ -895,11 +912,12 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */
    if (ctx->onexec)
-		new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
+		new = handle_onexec(subj_cred, label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token,
    			    bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe);
    else
    	new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-				profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer,
+				profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm,
+						   buffer,
    					   &cond, &unsafe));
AA_BUG(!new);
@@ -934,7 +952,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) {
    	/* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */
-		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(bprm->cred, new, &info);
    	if (error)
    		goto audit;
    }
@@ -971,7 +989,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
audit:
    error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+			aa_audit_file(current_cred(), profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
    			      bprm->filename, NULL, new,
    			      vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), info, error));
    aa_put_label(new);
@@ -987,7 +1006,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  *
  * Returns: label for hat transition OR ERR_PTR.  Does NOT return NULL
  */
-static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					 struct aa_profile *profile,
    				 const char *name, bool sibling)
 {
    struct aa_profile *root, *hat = NULL;
@@ -1019,7 +1039,8 @@ static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
    aa_put_profile(root);
audit:
-	aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
+	aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+		      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT,
    	      name, hat ? hat->base.hname : NULL,
    	      hat ? &hat->label : NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
    	      error);
@@ -1035,7 +1056,8 @@ static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *
  * Returns: label for hat transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
  */
-static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
+static struct aa_label *change_hat(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+				   struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
    			   int count, int flags)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile, *root, *hat = NULL;
@@ -1111,7 +1133,8 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
    	 */
    	/* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */
    	if (count > 1 || COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms,
+				      OP_CHANGE_HAT,
    			      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, name, NULL, NULL,
    			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
    	}
@@ -1120,7 +1143,8 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
build:
    new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-				   build_change_hat(profile, name, sibling),
+				   build_change_hat(subj_cred, profile, name,
+						    sibling),
    			   aa_get_label(&profile->label));
    if (!new) {
    	info = "label build failed";
@@ -1150,7 +1174,7 @@ static struct aa_label *change_hat(struct aa_label *label, const char *hats[],
  */
 int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
    struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
    struct aa_label *label, *previous, *new = NULL, *target = NULL;
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -1159,8 +1183,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
    int error = 0;
/* released below */
-	cred = get_current_cred();
-	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+	subj_cred = get_current_cred();
+	label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(subj_cred);
    previous = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
/*
@@ -1180,7 +1204,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
    }
if (count) {
-		new = change_hat(label, hats, count, flags);
+		new = change_hat(subj_cred, label, hats, count, flags);
    	AA_BUG(!new);
    	if (IS_ERR(new)) {
    		error = PTR_ERR(new);
@@ -1189,7 +1213,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
    		goto out;
    	}
-		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info);
+		/* target cred is the same as current except new label */
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, new, &info);
    	if (error)
    		goto fail;
@@ -1242,7 +1267,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
    aa_put_label(new);
    aa_put_label(previous);
    aa_put_label(label);
-	put_cred(cred);
+	put_cred(subj_cred);
return error;
@@ -1252,7 +1277,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
fail:
    fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-		aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+		aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_CHANGE_HAT,
    		      AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, NULL, target,
    		      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
@@ -1261,6 +1286,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags)
static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
+					const struct cred *subj_cred,
    				struct aa_profile *profile,
    				struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
    				u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
@@ -1275,7 +1301,8 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name,
    				     rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
    				     perms);
    if (error)
-		error = aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name,
+		error = aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, perms, op, request,
+				      name,
    			      NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info,
    			      error);
@@ -1304,6 +1331,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
    const char *auditname = fqname;		/* retain leading & if stack */
    bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK;
    struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+	const struct cred *subj_cred = get_current_cred();
    int error = 0;
    char *op;
    u32 request;
@@ -1381,6 +1409,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
     */
    error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
    		change_profile_perms_wrapper(op, auditname,
+						     subj_cred,
    					     profile, target, stack,
    					     request, &perms));
    if (error)
@@ -1391,7 +1420,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
check:
    /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
-	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target, &info);
+	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(subj_cred, target, &info);
    if (error && !fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
    				COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)))
    	goto audit;
@@ -1451,7 +1480,8 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
audit:
    error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+				      profile, &perms, op, request, auditname,
    			      NULL, new ? new : target,
    			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error));
@@ -1459,6 +1489,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
    aa_put_label(new);
    aa_put_label(target);
    aa_put_label(label);
+	put_cred(subj_cred);
return error;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 5bfa70a972071..6fd21324a097f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
    struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
    struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
-	kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
+	kuid_t fsuid = ad->subj_cred ? ad->subj_cred->fsuid : current_fsuid();
    char str[10];
if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
/**
  * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
  * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
  * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
  * @op: operation being mediated
@@ -90,7 +91,8 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error on failure
  */
-int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
    	  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
    	  const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel,
    	  kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
@@ -98,6 +100,7 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
    int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
    DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op);
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
    ad.request = request;
    ad.name = name;
    ad.fs.target = target;
@@ -141,7 +144,21 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
    return aa_audit(type, profile, &ad, file_audit_cb);
 }
-static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+/**
+ * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
+ * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: true if deleted else false
+ */
+static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (d_unlinked(dentry) && d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_nlink == 0)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		     struct aa_label *label,
    	     const struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
    	     const char **name, struct path_cond *cond, u32 request)
 {
@@ -153,7 +170,8 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
    		     labels_profile(label)->disconnected);
    if (error) {
    	fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name,
+			aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+				      profile, &nullperms, op, request, *name,
    			      NULL, NULL, cond->uid, info, error));
    	return error;
    }
@@ -207,9 +225,9 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start,
    return state;
 }
-static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
-			  const char *name, u32 request,
-			  struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
+static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
+			  u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
    		  struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
    struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
@@ -222,12 +240,14 @@ static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
    	     name, cond, perms);
    if (request & ~perms->allow)
    	e = -EACCES;
-	return aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+			     profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
    		     cond->uid, NULL, e);
 }
-static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile,
    		     const struct path *path, char *buffer, u32 request,
    		     struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
    		     struct aa_perms *perms)
@@ -238,18 +258,19 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
    if (profile_unconfined(profile))
    	return 0;
-	error = path_name(op, &profile->label, path,
+	error = path_name(op, subj_cred, &profile->label, path,
    		  flags | profile->path_flags, buffer, &name, cond,
    		  request);
    if (error)
    	return error;
-	return __aa_path_perm(op, profile, name, request, cond, flags,
-			      perms);
+	return __aa_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, name, request, cond,
+			      flags, perms);
 }
/**
  * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
  * @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
  * @label: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
  * @path: path to check permissions of  (NOT NULL)
  * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
@@ -258,7 +279,8 @@ static int profile_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
  */
-int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label,
    	 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
    	 struct path_cond *cond)
 {
@@ -273,8 +295,8 @@ int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
    if (!buffer)
    	return -ENOMEM;
    error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			profile_path_perm(op, profile, path, buffer, request,
-					  cond, flags, &perms));
+			profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile, path, buffer,
+					  request, cond, flags, &perms));
aa_put_buffer(buffer);
@@ -301,7 +323,8 @@ static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
    return true;
 }
-static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile,
    		     const struct path *link, char *buffer,
    		     const struct path *target, char *buffer2,
    		     struct path_cond *cond)
@@ -315,13 +338,15 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
    aa_state_t state;
    int error;
-	error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, link, profile->path_flags,
+	error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, link,
+			  profile->path_flags,
    		  buffer, &lname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
    if (error)
    	goto audit;
/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
-	error = path_name(OP_LINK, &profile->label, target, profile->path_flags,
+	error = path_name(OP_LINK, subj_cred, &profile->label, target,
+			  profile->path_flags,
    		  buffer2, &tname, cond, AA_MAY_LINK);
    if (error)
    	goto audit;
@@ -381,12 +406,14 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
    error = 0;
audit:
-	return aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname,
+	return aa_audit_file(subj_cred,
+			     profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request, lname, tname,
    		     NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
 }
/**
  * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
  * @label: the label being enforced  (NOT NULL)
  * @old_dentry: the target dentry  (NOT NULL)
  * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in  (NOT NULL)
@@ -403,7 +430,8 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *
  * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
  */
-int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
    	 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
    struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
@@ -424,8 +452,8 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
    	goto out;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			profile_path_link(profile, &link, buffer, &target,
-					  buffer2, &cond));
+			profile_path_link(subj_cred, profile, &link, buffer,
+					  &target, buffer2, &cond));
 out:
    aa_put_buffer(buffer);
    aa_put_buffer(buffer2);
@@ -453,7 +481,8 @@ static void update_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *fctx, struct aa_label *label,
    spin_unlock(&fctx->lock);
 }
-static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
    		    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
    		    u32 request, u32 denied, bool in_atomic)
 {
@@ -480,7 +509,8 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
/* check every profile in task label not in current cache */
    error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(flabel, label, profile,
-			profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, buffer,
+			profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred, profile,
+					  &file->f_path, buffer,
    				  request, &cond, flags, &perms));
    if (denied && !error) {
    	/*
@@ -493,12 +523,14 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
    	 */
    	if (label == flabel)
    		error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
-				profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path,
+				profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+						  profile, &file->f_path,
    					  buffer, request, &cond, flags,
    					  &perms));
    	else
    		error = fn_for_each_not_in_set(label, flabel, profile,
-				profile_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path,
+				profile_path_perm(op, subj_cred,
+						  profile, &file->f_path,
    					  buffer, request, &cond, flags,
    					  &perms));
    }
@@ -510,7 +542,8 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
    return error;
 }
-static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
+static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
    		    struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
    		    u32 request, u32 denied)
 {
@@ -524,11 +557,12 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
    	return 0;
/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
-	error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
+	error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock);
    if (denied) {
    	/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
    	/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
-		last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
+		last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, flabel, op,
+						    request, sock));
    }
    if (!error)
    	update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
@@ -539,6 +573,7 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
 /**
  * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
  * @op: operation being checked
+ * @subj_cred: subject cred
  * @label: label being enforced   (NOT NULL)
  * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on  (NOT NULL)
  * @request: requested permissions
@@ -546,7 +581,8 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
  *
  * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
  */
-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
    	 u32 request, bool in_atomic)
 {
    struct aa_file_ctx *fctx;
@@ -582,19 +618,19 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
    /* TODO: label cross check */
if (file->f_path.mnt && path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
-		error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
-					 denied, in_atomic);
+		error = __file_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+					 request, denied, in_atomic);
else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
-		error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
-					 denied);
+		error = __file_sock_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file,
+					 request, denied);
    aa_put_label(flabel);
done:
    return error;
 }
-static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
+static void revalidate_tty(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label)
 {
    struct tty_struct *tty;
    int drop_tty = 0;
@@ -612,8 +648,8 @@ static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
    				     struct tty_file_private, list);
    	file = file_priv->file;
-		if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE,
-				 IN_ATOMIC))
+		if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, subj_cred, label, file,
+				 MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, IN_ATOMIC))
    		drop_tty = 1;
    }
    spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
@@ -623,12 +659,17 @@ static void revalidate_tty(struct aa_label *label)
    	no_tty();
 }
+struct cred_label {
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	struct aa_label *label;
+};
+
 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd)
 {
-	struct aa_label *label = (struct aa_label *)p;
+	struct cred_label *cl = (struct cred_label *)p;
-	if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, label, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file),
-			 IN_ATOMIC))
+	if (aa_file_perm(OP_INHERIT, cl->cred, cl->label, file,
+			 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), IN_ATOMIC))
    	return fd + 1;
    return 0;
 }
@@ -638,13 +679,17 @@ static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned int fd)
 void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files)
 {
    struct aa_label *label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+	struct cred_label cl = {
+		.cred = cred,
+		.label = label,
+	};
    struct file *devnull = NULL;
    unsigned int n;
-	revalidate_tty(label);
+	revalidate_tty(cred, label);
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
-	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, label);
+	n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, &cl);
    if (!n) /* none found? */
    	goto out;
@@ -654,7 +699,7 @@ void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files)
    /* replace all the matching ones with this */
    do {
    	replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
-	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, label)) != 0);
+	} while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, &cl)) != 0);
    if (devnull)
    	fput(devnull);
 out:
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 096f0a04af87f..42d701fec5a6d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
    int type;
    u16 class;
    const char *op;
+	const struct cred *subj_cred;
    struct aa_label *subj_label;
    const char *name;
    const char *info;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
index d420e2d10b31b..d6dcc604ec0cc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ struct aa_caps {
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[];
-int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts);
+int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       int cap, unsigned int opts);
static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
 {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 5be620af33ba0..64dc6d1a7a05c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ struct path_cond {
#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)
-int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
+int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *cred,
+		  struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
    	  const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
    	  const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel, kuid_t ouid,
    	  const char *info, int error);
@@ -119,14 +120,16 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start,
    		const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
    		struct aa_perms *perms);
-int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
-		 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
-		 struct path_cond *cond);
+int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);
-int aa_path_link(struct aa_label *label, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-		 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
+		 struct dentry *new_dentry);
-int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
+int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
    	 u32 request, bool in_atomic);
void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index a1ac6ffb95e9c..74d17052f76bc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
-int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+		  const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+		  int sig);
#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
index a710683b24965..10c76f906a653 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -25,26 +25,33 @@
#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
-int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	       struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
           unsigned long flags, void *data);
-int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    	  const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
-int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    		 unsigned long flags);
-int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    	  const char *old_name);
-int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
    	 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
    	 void *data);
-int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	      struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
-int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
    	 const struct path *new_path);
#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index a336e57864e89..aa8515af677f0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
 int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
    	       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
    	       u32 request, u16 family, int type);
-int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
           int type, int protocol);
 static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
    				struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 }
 int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
-int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request,
    	      struct socket *sock);
int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 545f791cabdae..fa15a5c7febb8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -370,9 +370,12 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
    return profile->audit;
 }
-bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
-bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
-int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns,
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns,
    		 u32 mask);
 bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
 bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
index 961d85d328ea9..ad2c0da8e64fc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ struct aa_rlimit {
 extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[];
int aa_map_resource(int resource);
-int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task,
+int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      struct task_struct *task,
    	      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);
void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index 13437d62c70f4..29ba55107b7d6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
    "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
    "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer,
+		  const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee,
    	  u32 request);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index fd8306399b820..c0d0dbd7b4c4b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
    		FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
-static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *profile,
    		       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
    		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
        !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
    	return 0;
+	ad->subj_cred = cred;
    ad->peer = peer;
    /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
    state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa,
@@ -98,7 +100,9 @@ static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
    return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb);
 }
-int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
+int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender,
+		  const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target,
+		  int sig)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
    DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL);
@@ -106,6 +110,8 @@ int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
    ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig);
    ad.unmappedsig = sig;
    return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
-			profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &ad),
-			profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &ad));
+			     profile_signal_perm(subj_cred, profile, target,
+						 MAY_WRITE, &ad),
+			     profile_signal_perm(target_cred, profile, sender,
+						 MAY_READ, &ad));
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 359fbfbb4a66e..60f95cc4532a8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -116,15 +116,17 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
    				unsigned int mode)
 {
    struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+	const struct cred *cred;
    int error;
+	cred = get_task_cred(child);
+	tracee = cred_label(cred);	/* ref count on cred */
    tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
-	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee,
    		(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
    					  : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
-	aa_put_label(tracee);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
+	put_cred(cred);
return error;
 }
@@ -132,12 +134,15 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
    struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
+	const struct cred *cred;
    int error;
tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
-	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
-	aa_put_label(tracer);
+	cred = get_task_cred(parent);
+	tracer = cred_label(cred);	/* ref count on cred */
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee,
+			      AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
+	put_cred(cred);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
return error;
@@ -188,7 +193,7 @@ static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
    if (!unconfined(label))
-		error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts);
+		error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts);
    aa_put_label(label);
return error;
@@ -211,7 +216,8 @@ static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
    if (!unconfined(label))
-		error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond);
+		error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask,
+				     cond);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
@@ -357,7 +363,8 @@ static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
    if (!unconfined(label))
-		error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+		error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir,
+				     new_dentry);
    end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
@@ -396,23 +403,27 @@ static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_d
    		vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
    		cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
-			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &new_path, 0,
+			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
+					     label, &new_path, 0,
    				     MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
    				     AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
    				     &cond_exchange);
    		if (!error)
-				error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &old_path,
+				error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
+						     label, &old_path,
    					     0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
    					     AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange);
    	}
if (!error)
-			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0,
+			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
+					     label, &old_path, 0,
    				     MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
    				     AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
    				     &cond);
    	if (!error)
-			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path,
+			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
+					     label, &new_path,
    				     0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
    				     AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
@@ -467,7 +478,8 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
    	vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
    	cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
-		error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
+		error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred,
+				     label, &file->f_path, 0,
    			     aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
    	/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
    	fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
@@ -507,7 +519,7 @@ static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask,
    	return -EACCES;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask, in_atomic);
+	error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, in_atomic);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
@@ -585,17 +597,21 @@ static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
    label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
    if (!unconfined(label)) {
    	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
-			error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
+			error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags,
+					   data);
    	else if (flags & MS_BIND)
-			error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
+			error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
+					      dev_name, flags);
    	else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
    			  MS_UNBINDABLE))
-			error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
+			error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label,
+						     path, flags);
    	else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
-			error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
+			error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
+					      dev_name);
    	else
-			error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
-					     flags, data);
+			error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name,
+					     path, type, flags, data);
    }
    __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
@@ -609,7 +625,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
    if (!unconfined(label))
-		error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
+		error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
@@ -623,7 +639,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
label = aa_get_current_label();
    if (!unconfined(label))
-		error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
+		error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path);
    aa_put_label(label);
return error;
@@ -785,7 +801,8 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
    int error = 0;
if (!unconfined(label))
-		error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim);
+		error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task,
+					  resource, new_rlim);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
@@ -794,26 +811,27 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
    		      int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 {
+	const struct cred *tc;
    struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
    int error;
+	tc = get_task_cred(target);
+	tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc);
    if (cred) {
    	/*
    	 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
    	 */
    	cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
-		tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
-		error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
+		error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig);
    	aa_put_label(cl);
-		aa_put_label(tl);
    	return error;
+	} else {
+		cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+		error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig);
+		__end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
    }
-
-	cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
-	error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
    aa_put_label(tl);
-	__end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
+	put_cred(tc);
return error;
 }
@@ -879,7 +897,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
    if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
    	error = af_select(family,
    			  create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
-				  aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+				  aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label,
+					     OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
    				     family, type, protocol));
    end_current_label_crit_section(label);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
index 3830bceff9c8b..2bb77aacc49ae 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/mount.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
/**
  * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
  * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
  * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
  * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -128,7 +129,8 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error on failure
  */
-static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
+static int audit_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		       struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
    	       const char *name, const char *src_name,
    	       const char *type, const char *trans,
    	       unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
@@ -166,6 +168,7 @@ static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
    		return error;
    }
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
    ad.name = name;
    ad.mnt.src_name = src_name;
    ad.mnt.type = type;
@@ -284,6 +287,7 @@ static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
/**
  * match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount
+ * @subj_cred: cred of confined subject
  * @profile: the confining profile
  * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
  * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
@@ -296,7 +300,8 @@ static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
  *
  * Returns: 0 on success else error
  */
-static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static int match_mnt_path_str(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			      struct aa_profile *profile,
    		      const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer,
    		      const char *devname, const char *type,
    		      unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
@@ -337,12 +342,14 @@ static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
    error = 0;
audit:
-	return audit_mount(profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname, type, NULL,
+	return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname,
+			   type, NULL,
    		   flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, error);
 }
/**
  * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
+ * @subj_cred: cred of the subject
  * @profile: the confining profile
  * @path: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
  * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath
@@ -355,7 +362,8 @@ static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *
  * Returns: 0 on success else error
  */
-static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+static int match_mnt(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		     struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
    	     char *buffer, const struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer,
    	     const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data,
    	     bool binary)
@@ -379,11 +387,12 @@ static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
    		devname = ERR_PTR(error);
    }
-	return match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, devname, type, flags,
-				  data, binary, info);
+	return match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, devname,
+				  type, flags, data, binary, info);
 }
-int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_remount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+	       struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
           unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -400,14 +409,16 @@ int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    if (!buffer)
    	return -ENOMEM;
    error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL,
+				  NULL, NULL,
    			  flags, data, binary));
    aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return error;
 }
-int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_bind_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    	  const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -434,8 +445,8 @@ int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    	goto out;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer,
-				  NULL, flags, NULL, false));
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, &old_path,
+				  old_buffer, NULL, flags, NULL, false));
 out:
    aa_put_buffer(buffer);
    aa_put_buffer(old_buffer);
@@ -444,7 +455,8 @@ int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    return error;
 }
-int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_mount_change_type(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			 struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    		 unsigned long flags)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -462,14 +474,16 @@ int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    if (!buffer)
    	return -ENOMEM;
    error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, NULL,
+				  NULL, NULL,
    			  flags, NULL, false));
    aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return error;
 }
-int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
+int aa_move_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		  struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    	  const char *orig_name)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -493,7 +507,8 @@ int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    if (!buffer || !old_buffer)
    	goto out;
    error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer,
+			match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer, &old_path,
+				  old_buffer,
    			  NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false));
 out:
    aa_put_buffer(buffer);
@@ -503,9 +518,9 @@ int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path,
    return error;
 }
-int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
-		 const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
-		 void *data)
+int aa_new_mount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+		 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
    char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
@@ -550,12 +565,14 @@ int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
    		goto out;
    	}
    	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, dev_path, dev_buffer,
+				match_mnt(subj_cred, profile, path, buffer,
+					  dev_path, dev_buffer,
    			  type, flags, data, binary));
    } else {
    	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, dev_name,
-					   type, flags, data, binary, NULL));
+				match_mnt_path_str(subj_cred, profile, path,
+					buffer, dev_name,
+					type, flags, data, binary, NULL));
    }
out:
@@ -567,7 +584,8 @@ int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
    return error;
 }
-static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+static int profile_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
    		  char *buffer)
 {
    struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
@@ -596,11 +614,13 @@ static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
    	error = -EACCES;
audit:
-	return audit_mount(profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
+	return audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+			   NULL, 0, NULL,
    		   AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
 }
-int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+int aa_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	      struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
    char *buffer = NULL;
@@ -615,7 +635,7 @@ int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
    	return -ENOMEM;
error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-			profile_umount(profile, &path, buffer));
+			profile_umount(subj_cred, profile, &path, buffer));
    aa_put_buffer(buffer);
return error;
@@ -625,7 +645,8 @@ int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
  *
  * Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL
  */
-static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
+static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+					struct aa_profile *profile,
    				const struct path *new_path,
    				char *new_buffer,
    				const struct path *old_path,
@@ -670,7 +691,8 @@ static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
    	error = 0;
audit:
-	error = audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, old_name,
+	error = audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
+			    old_name,
    		    NULL, trans_name, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT,
    		    &perms, info, error);
    if (error)
@@ -679,7 +701,8 @@ static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
    return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
 }
-int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
+int aa_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		 const struct path *old_path,
    	 const struct path *new_path)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -697,7 +720,8 @@ int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
    if (!old_buffer || !new_buffer)
    	goto out;
    target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL,
-			build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer,
+			build_pivotroot(subj_cred, profile, new_path,
+					new_buffer,
    				old_path, old_buffer));
    if (!target) {
    	info = "label build failed";
@@ -723,7 +747,8 @@ int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path,
 fail:
    /* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name */
    error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
-			audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, NULL /*new_name */,
+			audit_mount(subj_cred, profile, OP_PIVOTROOT,
+				    NULL /*new_name */,
    			    NULL /* old_name */,
    			    NULL, NULL,
    			    0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index 5e50f80e35db0..704c171232ab4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
    return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
 }
-int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
-	       int type, int protocol)
+int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
    DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
@@ -146,7 +146,9 @@ int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
    				   type));
 }
-static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
+			    const char *op, u32 request,
    		    struct sock *sk)
 {
    struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
@@ -159,6 +161,7 @@ static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
    	struct aa_profile *profile;
    	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
+		ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
    	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
    		    aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk));
    }
@@ -176,21 +179,21 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
    label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
+	error = aa_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sk);
    end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
 }
-int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
-		      struct socket *sock)
+int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
 {
    AA_BUG(!label);
    AA_BUG(!sock);
    AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
-	return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+	return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
 }
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index e5f1ef83b0fda..8a07793ce1032 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -762,21 +762,23 @@ static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *subj_label, const char *op,
 /* don't call out to other LSMs in the stack for apparmor policy admin
  * permissions
  */
-static int policy_ns_capable(struct aa_label *label,
+static int policy_ns_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label,
    		     struct user_namespace *userns, int cap)
 {
    int err;
/* check for MAC_ADMIN cap in cred */
-	err = cap_capable(current_cred(), userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+	err = cap_capable(subj_cred, userns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
    if (!err)
-		err = aa_capable(label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
+		err = aa_capable(subj_cred, label, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
return err;
 }
/**
  * aa_policy_view_capable - check if viewing policy in at @ns is allowed
+ * @subj_cred: cred of subject
  * @label: label that is trying to view policy in ns
  * @ns: namespace being viewed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
  *
@@ -785,9 +787,10 @@ static int policy_ns_capable(struct aa_label *label,
  * If @ns is NULL then the namespace being viewed is assumed to be the
  * tasks current namespace.
  */
-bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+bool aa_policy_view_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
 {
-	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
    struct aa_ns *view_ns = labels_view(label);
    bool root_in_user_ns = uid_eq(current_euid(), make_kuid(user_ns, 0)) ||
    		       in_egroup_p(make_kgid(user_ns, 0));
@@ -804,15 +807,17 @@ bool aa_policy_view_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
    return response;
 }
-bool aa_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
+bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns)
 {
-	struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
-	bool capable = policy_ns_capable(label, user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns = subj_cred->user_ns;
+	bool capable = policy_ns_capable(subj_cred, label, user_ns,
+					 CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0;
AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable);
    AA_DEBUG("policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy);
-	return aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns) && capable &&
+	return aa_policy_view_capable(subj_cred, label, ns) && capable &&
    	!aa_g_lock_policy;
 }
@@ -822,7 +827,7 @@ bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
    bool res;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	res = aa_policy_view_capable(label, ns);
+	res = aa_policy_view_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return res;
@@ -834,7 +839,7 @@ bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
    bool res;
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	res = aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns);
+	res = aa_policy_admin_capable(current_cred(), label, ns);
    __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return res;
@@ -842,13 +847,15 @@ bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns)
/**
  * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
+ * @subj_cred; subjects cred
  * @label: label to check if it can manage policy
  * @ns: namespace being managed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns)
  * @mask: contains the policy manipulation operation being done
  *
  * Returns: 0 if the task is allowed to manipulate policy else error
  */
-int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
+int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+			 struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
 {
    const char *op;
@@ -864,7 +871,7 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask)
    	return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "policy_locked",
    			    -EACCES);
-	if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(label, ns))
+	if (!aa_policy_admin_capable(subj_cred, label, ns))
    	return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "not policy admin",
    			    -EACCES);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 73ba26c646a5e..dcc94c3153d51 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
/**
  * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit
+ * @subj_cred: cred setting the resource
  * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
  * @resource: rlimit being auditing
  * @value: value being set
@@ -52,13 +53,15 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  *
  * Returns: 0 or ad->error else other error code on failure
  */
-static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+static int audit_resource(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
    		  unsigned long value, struct aa_label *peer,
    		  const char *info, int error)
 {
    DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_RLIMITS,
    		  OP_SETRLIMIT);
+	ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
    ad.rlim.rlim = resource;
    ad.rlim.max = value;
    ad.peer = peer;
@@ -82,7 +85,8 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource)
    return rlim_map[resource];
 }
-static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+static int profile_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			     struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
    		     struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
    struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
@@ -92,12 +96,13 @@ static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
    if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max >
        rules->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
    	e = -EACCES;
-	return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, NULL, NULL,
-			      e);
+	return audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max,
+			      NULL, NULL, e);
 }
/**
  * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
+ * @subj_cred: cred setting the limit
  * @label: label confining the task  (NOT NULL)
  * @task: task the resource is being set on
  * @resource: the resource being set
@@ -107,7 +112,8 @@ static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
  *
  * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed
  */
-int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task,
+int aa_task_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      struct task_struct *task,
    	      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -126,14 +132,15 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task,
     */
if (label != peer &&
-	    aa_capable(label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+	    aa_capable(subj_cred, label, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
    	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
-				audit_resource(profile, resource,
+				audit_resource(subj_cred, profile, resource,
    				       new_rlim->rlim_max, peer,
    				       "cap_sys_resource", -EACCES));
    else
    	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
-				profile_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim));
+				profile_setrlimit(subj_cred, profile, resource,
+						  new_rlim));
    aa_put_label(peer);
return error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index 79850e8321420..0d7af707cccdd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -226,14 +226,16 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
/* assumes check for RULE_MEDIATES is already done */
 /* TODO: conditionals */
-static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
-			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
-			     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *profile,
+			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
    struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
    					    typeof(*rules), list);
    struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	ad->subj_cred = cred;
    ad->peer = peer;
    aa_profile_match_label(profile, rules, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
    		       &perms);
@@ -241,7 +243,8 @@ static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
    return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_ptrace_cb);
 }
-static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+static int profile_tracee_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *tracee,
    		       struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
    		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -249,10 +252,11 @@ static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
        !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracee->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
    	return 0;
-	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, ad);
+	return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracee, tracer, request, ad);
 }
-static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+static int profile_tracer_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+			       struct aa_profile *tracer,
    		       struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
    		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
@@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
    	return 0;
if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracer->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
-		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, ad);
+		return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracer, tracee, request, ad);
/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
    if (&tracer->label == tracee)
@@ -269,8 +273,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
    ad->subj_label = &tracer->label;
    ad->peer = tracee;
    ad->request = 0;
-	ad->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
-				    CAP_OPT_NONE);
+	ad->error = aa_capable(cred, &tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+			       CAP_OPT_NONE);
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, ad, audit_ptrace_cb);
 }
@@ -283,7 +287,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
  */
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+int aa_may_ptrace(const struct cred *tracer_cred, struct aa_label *tracer,
+		  const struct cred *tracee_cred, struct aa_label *tracee,
    	  u32 request)
 {
    struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -291,6 +296,8 @@ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
    DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, OP_PTRACE);
return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
-			profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
-			profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+			profile_tracer_perm(tracer_cred, profile, tracee,
+					    request, &sa),
+			profile_tracee_perm(tracee_cred, profile, tracer,
+					    xrequest, &sa));
 }
-- 
2.42.0





    

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[PATCH 6.6 401/530] apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.