From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org
commit 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd upstream.
Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo cascardo@canonical.com [ bp: Adjust for the fact that vmexit is in inline assembly ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh surajjs@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal suleiman@google.com --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +- 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 23126290185d..0181091abf49 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS ( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */ -/* FREE! ( 7*32+13) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT ( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 3e1d2389c00d..8bce4004aab2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static __always_inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f", __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)), - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT) "910:" : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : : "memory" ); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 022b9f31333f..525623aa2dcb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1278,16 +1278,69 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/* - * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill - * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent - * issues: + * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a + * context switch. In general there are two types of RSB attacks + * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced. * - * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+ - * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB". When the RSB is empty, + * speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor, + * which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry. + * + * AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB, + * regardless of the state of the RSB. + * + * When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack + * scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation + * properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to + * protect against this type of attack. + * + * The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling. + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev', + * 'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB + * entry. + * + * The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and + * eIBRS. + * + * The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires + * RSB clearing. + * + * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context + * switches. + * + * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD? */ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+ /* + * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks + * after vmexit: + * + * 1) RSB underflow + * + * 2) Poisoned RSB entry + * + * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing + * the RSB. + * + * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch + * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared + * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike + * user-space-poisoned RSB entries. + * + * eIBRS, on the other hand, has RSB-poisoning protections, so it + * doesn't need RSB clearing after vmexit. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS)) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); + /* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index babb1e5a4dfa..30f0d55c8b2d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -11018,8 +11018,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit! * - * For retpoline, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB entries - * and (in some cases) RSB underflow. + * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB + * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow. * * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't * need the RSB filling sequence. But it does need to be enabled