From: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com
commit c2f0ad4fc089cff81cef6a13d04b399980ecbfcc upstream.
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines.
This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will.deacon@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org --- arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 75363d723262..fc11c50af558 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs); static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) { current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs; + + /* + * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding + * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation. + */ + dsb(nsh); + isb(); }
#define segment_eq(a, b) ((a) == (b))