[PATCH 6.6 399/530] apparmor: combine common_audit_data and apparmor_audit_data

6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: John Johansen john.johansen@canonical.com

[ Upstream commit bd7bd201ca46c211c3ab251ca9854787d1331a2f ]

Everywhere where common_audit_data is used apparmor audit_data is also used. We can simplify the code and drop the use of the aad macro everywhere by combining the two structures.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia georgia.garcia@canonical.com Signed-off-by: John Johansen john.johansen@canonical.com Stable-dep-of: 157a3537d6bc ("apparmor: Fix regression in mount mediation") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- security/apparmor/audit.c | 70 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/apparmor/capability.c | 24 +++++------ security/apparmor/file.c | 68 +++++++++++++++--------------- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 34 ++++++++------- security/apparmor/include/net.h | 13 +++--- security/apparmor/include/perms.h | 4 +- security/apparmor/ipc.c | 39 ++++++++--------- security/apparmor/lib.c | 47 +++++++++++---------- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 +++--- security/apparmor/mount.c | 41 +++++++++--------- security/apparmor/net.c | 44 +++++++++---------- security/apparmor/policy.c | 19 +++++---- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 29 ++++++------- security/apparmor/resource.c | 23 +++++----- security/apparmor/task.c | 35 ++++++++-------- 15 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 245 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index a3db0f8bd4f85..06ad6a8fcce18 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -85,37 +85,36 @@ static const char *const aa_class_names[] = { /** * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function. * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL) - * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) * - * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa + * Record common AppArmor audit data from @va */ -static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) +static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { - struct common_audit_data *sa = ca; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);

if (aa_g_audit_header) { audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor="%s"", - aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]); + aa_audit_type[ad->type]); }

- if (aad(sa)->op) { - audit_log_format(ab, " operation="%s"", aad(sa)->op); - } + if (ad->op) + audit_log_format(ab, " operation="%s"", ad->op);

- if (aad(sa)->class) + if (ad->class) audit_log_format(ab, " class="%s"", - aad(sa)->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? - aa_class_names[aad(sa)->class] : + ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? + aa_class_names[ad->class] : "unknown");

- if (aad(sa)->info) { - audit_log_format(ab, " info="%s"", aad(sa)->info); - if (aad(sa)->error) - audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", aad(sa)->error); + if (ad->info) { + audit_log_format(ab, " info="%s"", ad->info); + if (ad->error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error); }

- if (aad(sa)->label) { - struct aa_label *label = aad(sa)->label; + if (ad->label) { + struct aa_label *label = ad->label;

if (label_isprofile(label)) { struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label); @@ -134,43 +133,44 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) } }

- if (aad(sa)->name) { + if (ad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name); } }

/** * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem * @type: audit type for the message - * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL) + * @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) */ -void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { - aad(sa)->type = type; - common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb); + ad->type = type; + common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb); }

/** * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem * @type: audit type for the message * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL) - * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL) + * @ad: audit event (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) * * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags * * Returns: error on failure */ -int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { AA_BUG(!profile);

if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { - if (likely(!aad(sa)->error)) { + if (likely(!ad->error)) { if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; @@ -182,24 +182,24 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED)) - return aad(sa)->error; + return ad->error;

if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;

- aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; + ad->label = &profile->label;

- aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb);

- if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, - sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ? - sa->u.tsk : current); + ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && + ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current);

- if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) - return complain_error(aad(sa)->error); + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(ad->error);

- return aad(sa)->error; + return ad->error; }

struct aa_audit_rule { diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 326a51838ef28..58490cca035da 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)

/** * audit_caps - audit a capability - * @sa: audit data + * @as: audit data * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability tested * @error: error code returned by test @@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching * and duplicate message elimination. * - * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure + * Returns: 0 or ad->error on success, error code on failure */ -static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, +static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, struct audit_cache *ent; int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;

- aad(sa)->error = error; + ad->error = error;

if (likely(!error)) { /* test if auditing is being forced */ @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, } put_cpu_var(audit_cache);

- return aa_audit(type, profile, sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(type, profile, ad, audit_cb); }

/** @@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) * @cap: capability to test if allowed * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated - * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) + * @ad: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) * * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM */ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, - unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) + unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); @@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it * should be optional. */ - aad(sa)->info = "optional: no audit"; + ad->info = "optional: no audit"; }

- return audit_caps(sa, profile, cap, error); + return audit_caps(ad, profile, cap, error); }

/** @@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);

- sa.u.cap = cap; + ad.common.u.cap = cap; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad));

return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 698b124e649f6..9ea95fa18e7d5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -44,33 +44,34 @@ static u32 map_mask_to_chr_mask(u32 mask) static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); char str[10];

- if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, - map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->request)); + map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->request)); audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="%s"", str); } - if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (ad->denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { aa_perm_mask_to_str(str, sizeof(str), aa_file_perm_chrs, - map_mask_to_chr_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + map_mask_to_chr_mask(ad->denied)); audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="%s"", str); } - if (aad(sa)->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid)); audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", - from_kuid(&init_user_ns, aad(sa)->fs.ouid)); + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, ad->fs.ouid)); }

- if (aad(sa)->peer) { + if (ad->peer) { audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer, FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS, GFP_KERNEL); - } else if (aad(sa)->fs.target) { + } else if (ad->fs.target) { audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->fs.target); } }

@@ -95,50 +96,49 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) { int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op); - - sa.u.tsk = NULL; - aad(&sa)->request = request; - aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->fs.target = target; - aad(&sa)->peer = tlabel; - aad(&sa)->fs.ouid = ouid; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; - sa.u.tsk = NULL; - - if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) { + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_FILE, op); + + ad.request = request; + ad.name = name; + ad.fs.target = target; + ad.peer = tlabel; + ad.fs.ouid = ouid; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error; + ad.common.u.tsk = NULL; + + if (likely(!ad.error)) { u32 mask = perms->audit;

if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) mask = 0xffff;

/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ - aad(&sa)->request &= mask; + ad.request &= mask;

- if (likely(!aad(&sa)->request)) + if (likely(!ad.request)) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; } else { /* only report permissions that were denied */ - aad(&sa)->request = aad(&sa)->request & ~perms->allow; - AA_BUG(!aad(&sa)->request); + ad.request = ad.request & ~perms->allow; + AA_BUG(!ad.request);

- if (aad(&sa)->request & perms->kill) + if (ad.request & perms->kill) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;

/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ - if ((aad(&sa)->request & perms->quiet) && + if ((ad.request & perms->quiet) && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) - aad(&sa)->request &= ~perms->quiet; + ad.request &= ~perms->quiet;

- if (!aad(&sa)->request) - return aad(&sa)->error; + if (!ad.request) + return ad.error; }

- aad(&sa)->denied = aad(&sa)->request & ~perms->allow; - return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, file_audit_cb); + ad.denied = ad.request & ~perms->allow; + return aa_audit(type, profile, &ad, file_audit_cb); }

static int path_name(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index c328f07f11cd8..85931ec94e916 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -152,33 +152,35 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { unsigned long flags; } mnt; }; + + struct common_audit_data common; };

/* macros for dealing with apparmor_audit_data structure */ -#define aad(SA) ((SA)->apparmor_audit_data) +#define aad(SA) (container_of(SA, struct apparmor_audit_data, common)) +#define aad_of_va(VA) aad((struct common_audit_data *)(VA)) + #define DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, T, C, X) \ /* TODO: cleanup audit init so we don't need _aad = {0,} */ \ - struct apparmor_audit_data NAME ## _aad = { \ + struct apparmor_audit_data NAME = { \ .class = (C), \ .op = (X), \ - }; \ - struct common_audit_data NAME = \ - { \ - .type = (T), \ - .u.tsk = NULL, \ - }; \ - NAME.apparmor_audit_data = &(NAME ## _aad) - -void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, + .common.type = (T), \ + .common.u.tsk = NULL, \ + .common.apparmor_audit_data = &NAME, \ + }; + +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)); -int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));

-#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, SA, CB) \ +#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, AD, CB) \ ({ \ - aad((SA))->error = (ERROR); \ - aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (SA), (CB)); \ - aad((SA))->error; \ + (AD)->error = (ERROR); \ + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (AD), (CB)); \ + (AD)->error; \ })

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h index 6fa440b5daed8..a336e57864e89 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx { LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \ AA_CLASS_NET, \ OP); \ - NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \ - aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P) + NAME.common.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ + NAME.net.type = (T); \ + NAME.net.protocol = (P)

#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ @@ -90,16 +90,17 @@ struct aa_secmark { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];

void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family, int type); int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol); static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct common_audit_data *sa, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, struct sock *sk) { - return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family, + return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, request, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type); } int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index 797a7a00644d2..83534df8939fd 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, int type, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms); int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, u32 request, int type, u32 *deny, - struct common_audit_data *sa); + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad); int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, - u32 request, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)); #endif /* __AA_PERM_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 5acde746775f7..f198b8d620a4f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -52,31 +52,32 @@ static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask) static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

- if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="%s"", - audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request)); - if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_signal_mask(ad->request)); + if (ad->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="%s"", - audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + audit_signal_mask(ad->denied)); } } - if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN) + if (ad->signal == SIGUNKNOWN) audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)", - aad(sa)->unmappedsig); - else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME) - audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]); + ad->unmappedsig); + else if (ad->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME) + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[ad->signal]); else audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", - aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE); + ad->signal - SIGRT_BASE); audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); }

static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); @@ -87,24 +88,24 @@ static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) return 0;

- aad(sa)->peer = peer; + ad->peer = peer; /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */ state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], - aad(sa)->signal); + ad->signal); aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb); }

int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL, OP_SIGNAL);

- aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig); - aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig; + ad.signal = map_signal_num(sig); + ad.unmappedsig = sig; return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile, - profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa), - profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa)); + profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &ad), + profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &ad)); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 8e1073477c096..d6b2750fd72e4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -144,10 +144,10 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name, void aa_info_message(const char *str) { if (audit_enabled) { - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL);

- aad(&sa)->info = str; - aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL); + ad.info = str; + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &ad, NULL); } printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str); } @@ -282,21 +282,22 @@ void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, static void aa_audit_perms_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

- if (aad(sa)->request) { + if (ad->request) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, aa_file_perm_chrs, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, aa_file_perm_chrs, PERMS_CHRS_MASK, aa_file_perm_names, PERMS_NAMES_MASK); } - if (aad(sa)->denied) { + if (ad->denied) { audit_log_format(ab, "denied_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, aa_file_perm_chrs, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, aa_file_perm_chrs, PERMS_CHRS_MASK, aa_file_perm_names, PERMS_NAMES_MASK); } audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); }

@@ -350,21 +351,21 @@ void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, /* currently unused */ int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, u32 request, int type, u32 *deny, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); struct aa_perms perms;

- aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; - aad(sa)->peer = &target->label; - aad(sa)->request = request; + ad->label = &profile->label; + ad->peer = &target->label; + ad->request = request;

aa_profile_match_label(profile, rules, &target->label, type, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); *deny |= request & perms.deny; - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, aa_audit_perms_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, aa_audit_perms_cb); }

/** @@ -372,7 +373,7 @@ int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, * @profile: profile being checked * @perms: perms computed for the request * @request: requested perms - * @sa: initialized audit structure (MAY BE NULL if not auditing) + * @ad: initialized audit structure (MAY BE NULL if not auditing) * @cb: callback fn for type specific fields (MAY BE NULL) * * Returns: 0 if permission else error code @@ -385,7 +386,7 @@ int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, * with a positive value. */ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, - u32 request, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { int type, error; @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, if (likely(!denied)) { /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ request &= perms->audit; - if (!request || !sa) + if (!request || !ad) return 0;

type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; @@ -413,16 +414,16 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, error = -ENOENT;

denied &= ~perms->quiet; - if (!sa || !denied) + if (!ad || !denied) return error; }

- if (sa) { - aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; - aad(sa)->request = request; - aad(sa)->denied = denied; - aad(sa)->error = error; - aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); + if (ad) { + ad->label = &profile->label; + ad->request = request; + ad->denied = denied; + ad->error = error; + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); }

if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 108eccc5ada58..fd7852a4737c7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; size_t arg_size; int error; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);

if (size == 0) @@ -722,11 +722,11 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, return error;

fail: - aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - aad(&sa)->info = name; - aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL; - aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); - end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label); + ad.label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + ad.info = name; + ad.error = error = -EINVAL; + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL); + end_current_label_crit_section(ad.label); goto out; }

diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c index cdfa430ae2161..3830bceff9c8b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/mount.c +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -86,27 +86,28 @@ static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags) static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

- if (aad(sa)->mnt.type) { + if (ad->mnt.type) { audit_log_format(ab, " fstype="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.type); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.type); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.src_name) { + if (ad->mnt.src_name) { audit_log_format(ab, " srcname="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.src_name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.src_name); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.trans) { + if (ad->mnt.trans) { audit_log_format(ab, " trans="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.trans); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.trans); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.flags) { + if (ad->mnt.flags) { audit_log_format(ab, " flags=""); - audit_mnt_flags(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.flags); + audit_mnt_flags(ab, ad->mnt.flags); audit_log_format(ab, """); } - if (aad(sa)->mnt.data) { + if (ad->mnt.data) { audit_log_format(ab, " options="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.data); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->mnt.data); } }

@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, struct aa_perms *perms, const char *info, int error) { int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_MOUNT, op); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_MOUNT, op);

if (likely(!error)) { u32 mask = perms->audit; @@ -165,17 +166,17 @@ static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, return error; }

- aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->mnt.src_name = src_name; - aad(&sa)->mnt.type = type; - aad(&sa)->mnt.trans = trans; - aad(&sa)->mnt.flags = flags; + ad.name = name; + ad.mnt.src_name = src_name; + ad.mnt.type = type; + ad.mnt.trans = trans; + ad.mnt.flags = flags; if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA)) - aad(&sa)->mnt.data = data; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; + ad.mnt.data = data; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error;

- return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &ad, audit_cb); }

/** diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c index 788be1609a865..0c7304cd479c5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) audit_log_format(ab, " family="%s"", @@ -78,35 +79,36 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) else audit_log_format(ab, " family="unknown(%d)"", sa->u.net->family); - if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) + if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type]) audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="%s"", - sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); + sock_type_names[ad->net.type]); else audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="unknown(%d)"", - aad(sa)->net.type); - audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); + ad->net.type); + audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol);

- if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0, net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);

- if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0, + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0, net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); } } - if (aad(sa)->peer) { + if (ad->peer) { audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } }

/* Generic af perm */ -int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, - u32 request, u16 family, int type) +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family, + int type) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); @@ -130,17 +132,17 @@ int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);

- return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb); }

int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);

return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family, + aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family, type)); }

@@ -155,10 +157,10 @@ static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,

if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);

error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk)); + aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk)); }

return error; @@ -214,7 +216,7 @@ static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark) }

static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { int i, ret; struct aa_perms perms = { }; @@ -245,17 +247,17 @@ static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,

aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);

- return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb); }

int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request, u32 secid, const struct sock *sk) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);

return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid, - &sa)); + &ad)); } #endif diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index b9aaaac84d8a2..9a7dbe64f102b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -723,10 +723,11 @@ static int replacement_allowed(struct aa_profile *profile, int noreplace, static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

- if (aad(sa)->iface.ns) { + if (ad->iface.ns) { audit_log_format(ab, " ns="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->iface.ns); } }

@@ -745,15 +746,15 @@ static int audit_policy(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, const char *ns_name, const char *name, const char *info, int error) { - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, op); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, op);

- aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name; - aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; - aad(&sa)->label = label; + ad.iface.ns = ns_name; + ad.name = name; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error; + ad.label = label;

- aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, audit_cb); + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &ad, audit_cb);

return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index b49201306753c..dbc83455d900e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -34,17 +34,18 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

- if (aad(sa)->iface.ns) { + if (ad->iface.ns) { audit_log_format(ab, " ns="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->iface.ns); } - if (aad(sa)->name) { + if (ad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name); } - if (aad(sa)->iface.pos) - audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", aad(sa)->iface.pos); + if (ad->iface.pos) + audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", ad->iface.pos); }

/** @@ -63,18 +64,18 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *ns_name, int error) { struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(aa_current_raw_label()); - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, NULL); if (e) - aad(&sa)->iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; - aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name; + ad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; + ad.iface.ns = ns_name; if (new) - aad(&sa)->name = new->base.hname; + ad.name = new->base.hname; else - aad(&sa)->name = name; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; + ad.name = name; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error;

- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &ad, audit_cb); }

void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision) diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index 2bebc5d9e7411..b6b5e1bfe9a26 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -30,12 +30,13 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_rlimit[] = { static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu", - rlim_names[aad(sa)->rlim.rlim], aad(sa)->rlim.max); - if (aad(sa)->peer) { + rlim_names[ad->rlim.rlim], ad->rlim.max); + if (ad->peer) { audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } } @@ -49,22 +50,22 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * @info: info being auditing * @error: error value * - * Returns: 0 or sa->error else other error code on failure + * Returns: 0 or ad->error else other error code on failure */ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, unsigned long value, struct aa_label *peer, const char *info, int error) { - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_RLIMITS, + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_RLIMITS, OP_SETRLIMIT);

- aad(&sa)->rlim.rlim = resource; - aad(&sa)->rlim.max = value; - aad(&sa)->peer = peer; - aad(&sa)->info = info; - aad(&sa)->error = error; + ad.rlim.rlim = resource; + ad.rlim.max = value; + ad.peer = peer; + ad.info = info; + ad.error = error;

- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, &ad, audit_cb); }

/** diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c index 84d16a29bfcbc..8bd1f212215c4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/task.c +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c @@ -208,18 +208,19 @@ static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask) static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);

- if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + if (ad->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="%s"", - audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request)); + audit_ptrace_mask(ad->request));

- if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + if (ad->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="%s"", - audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + audit_ptrace_mask(ad->denied)); } } audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); - aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->label), ad->peer, FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); }

@@ -227,51 +228,51 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) /* TODO: conditionals */ static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); struct aa_perms perms = { };

- aad(sa)->peer = peer; + ad->peer = peer; aa_profile_match_label(profile, rules, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_ptrace_cb); }

static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee, struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) || !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracee->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) return 0;

- return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa); + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, ad); }

static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { if (profile_unconfined(tracer)) return 0;

if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracer->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) - return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa); + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, ad);

/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ if (&tracer->label == tracee) return 0;

- aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; - aad(sa)->peer = tracee; - aad(sa)->request = 0; - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + ad->label = &tracer->label; + ad->peer = tracee; + ad->request = 0; + ad->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE);

- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, ad, audit_ptrace_cb); }

/**