From: Nathan Lynch nathanl@linux.ibm.com
[ Upstream commit b8f3e48834fe8c86b4f21739c6effd160e2c2c19 ]
The error injection facility on pseries VMs allows corruption of arbitrary guest memory, potentially enabling a sufficiently privileged user to disable lockdown or perform other modifications of the running kernel via the rtas syscall.
Block the PAPR error injection facility from being opened or called when locked down.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch nathanl@linux.ibm.com Acked-by: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com (LSM) Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926131643.146502-3-nathanl@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/security.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c index 693133972294..c2540d393f1c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/reboot.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/of_fdt.h> @@ -464,6 +465,9 @@ void rtas_call_unlocked(struct rtas_args *args, int token, int nargs, int nret, va_end(list); }
+static int ibm_open_errinjct_token; +static int ibm_errinjct_token; + int rtas_call(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...) { va_list list; @@ -476,6 +480,16 @@ int rtas_call(int token, int nargs, int nret, int *outputs, ...) if (!rtas.entry || token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) return -1;
+ if (token == ibm_open_errinjct_token || token == ibm_errinjct_token) { + /* + * It would be nicer to not discard the error value + * from security_locked_down(), but callers expect an + * RTAS status, not an errno. + */ + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION)) + return -1; + } + if ((mfmsr() & (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) != (MSR_IR|MSR_DR)) { WARN_ON_ONCE(1); return -1; @@ -1227,6 +1241,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rtas, struct rtas_args __user *, uargs) if (block_rtas_call(token, nargs, &args)) return -EINVAL;
+ if (token == ibm_open_errinjct_token || token == ibm_errinjct_token) { + int err; + + err = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION); + if (err) + return err; + } + /* Need to handle ibm,suspend_me call specially */ if (token == rtas_token("ibm,suspend-me")) {
@@ -1325,7 +1347,8 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void) #ifdef CONFIG_RTAS_ERROR_LOGGING rtas_last_error_token = rtas_token("rtas-last-error"); #endif - + ibm_open_errinjct_token = rtas_token("ibm,open-errinjct"); + ibm_errinjct_token = rtas_token("ibm,errinjct"); rtas_syscall_filter_init(); }
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 7bd0c490703d..0ca55306f1eb 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR, LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER, LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL, + LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_KCORE, LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4b95de24bc8d..11e2c8757275 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION] = "RTAS error injection", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",