From: Thomas Weißschuh thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de

[ Upstream commit 0c7fbae5bc782429c97d68dc40fb126748d7e352 ]

Restricted pointers ("%pK") are only meant to be used when directly printing to a file from task context. Otherwise it can unintentionally expose security sensitive, raw pointer values.

Use regular pointer formatting instead.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250113171731-dc10e3c1-da64-4af0-b767-7c707046... Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller mimu@linux.ibm.com Tested-by: Michael Mueller mimu@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250217-restricted-pointers-s390-v1-2-0e4ace75d8a... Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank frankja@linux.ibm.com Message-ID: 20250217-restricted-pointers-s390-v1-2-0e4ace75d8aa@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c | 8 ++++---- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 10 +++++----- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c b/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c index 5bbaadf75dc64..9c4304d484de7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int handle_validity(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

vcpu->stat.exit_validity++; trace_kvm_s390_intercept_validity(vcpu, viwhy); - KVM_EVENT(3, "validity intercept 0x%x for pid %u (kvm 0x%pK)", viwhy, + KVM_EVENT(3, "validity intercept 0x%x for pid %u (kvm 0x%p)", viwhy, current->pid, vcpu->kvm);

/* do not warn on invalid runtime instrumentation mode */ diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c b/arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c index d4f031e086fc3..ad194055b5599 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c @@ -3158,7 +3158,7 @@ void kvm_s390_gisa_clear(struct kvm *kvm) if (!gi->origin) return; gisa_clear_ipm(gi->origin); - VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%pK cleared", gi->origin); + VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%p cleared", gi->origin); }

void kvm_s390_gisa_init(struct kvm *kvm) @@ -3175,7 +3175,7 @@ void kvm_s390_gisa_init(struct kvm *kvm) gi->timer.function = gisa_vcpu_kicker; memset(gi->origin, 0, sizeof(struct kvm_s390_gisa)); gi->origin->next_alert = (u32)virt_to_phys(gi->origin); - VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%pK initialized", gi->origin); + VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%p initialized", gi->origin); }

void kvm_s390_gisa_enable(struct kvm *kvm) @@ -3216,7 +3216,7 @@ void kvm_s390_gisa_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) process_gib_alert_list(); hrtimer_cancel(&gi->timer); gi->origin = NULL; - VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%pK destroyed", gisa); + VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "gisa 0x%p destroyed", gisa); }

void kvm_s390_gisa_disable(struct kvm *kvm) @@ -3465,7 +3465,7 @@ int __init kvm_s390_gib_init(u8 nisc) } }

- KVM_EVENT(3, "gib 0x%pK (nisc=%d) initialized", gib, gib->nisc); + KVM_EVENT(3, "gib 0x%p (nisc=%d) initialized", gib, gib->nisc); goto out;

out_unreg_gal: diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c index d8080c27d45bd..5b0f1645ac027 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static int kvm_s390_set_mem_control(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *att } mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "SET: max guest address: %lu", new_limit); - VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "New guest asce: 0x%pK", + VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "New guest asce: 0x%p", (void *) kvm->arch.gmap->asce); break; } @@ -3451,7 +3451,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) kvm_s390_gisa_init(kvm); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.pv.need_cleanup); kvm->arch.pv.set_aside = NULL; - KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%pK created by pid %u", kvm, current->pid); + KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%p created by pid %u", kvm, current->pid);

return 0; out_err: @@ -3514,7 +3514,7 @@ void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm) kvm_s390_destroy_adapters(kvm); kvm_s390_clear_float_irqs(kvm); kvm_s390_vsie_destroy(kvm); - KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%pK destroyed", kvm); + KVM_EVENT(3, "vm 0x%p destroyed", kvm); }

/* Section: vcpu related */ @@ -3635,7 +3635,7 @@ static int sca_switch_to_extended(struct kvm *kvm)

free_page((unsigned long)old_sca);

- VM_EVENT(kvm, 2, "Switched to ESCA (0x%pK -> 0x%pK)", + VM_EVENT(kvm, 2, "Switched to ESCA (0x%p -> 0x%p)", old_sca, kvm->arch.sca); return 0; } @@ -4012,7 +4012,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto out_free_sie_block; }

- VM_EVENT(vcpu->kvm, 3, "create cpu %d at 0x%pK, sie block at 0x%pK", + VM_EVENT(vcpu->kvm, 3, "create cpu %d at 0x%p, sie block at 0x%p", vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu, vcpu->arch.sie_block); trace_kvm_s390_create_vcpu(vcpu->vcpu_id, vcpu, vcpu->arch.sie_block);

From: Waiman Long longman@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 6da580ec656a5ed135db2cdf574b47635611a4d7 ]

Currently, we don't allow the creation of a remote partition underneath another local or remote partition. However, it is currently possible to create a new local partition with an existing remote partition underneath it if top_cpuset is the parent. However, the current cpuset code does not set the effective exclusive CPUs correctly to account for those that are taken by the remote partition.

Changing the code to properly account for those remote partition CPUs under all possible circumstances can be complex. It is much easier to not allow such a configuration which is not that useful. So forbid that by making sure that exclusive_cpus mask doesn't overlap with subpartitions_cpus and invalidate the partition if that happens.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/cgroup/cpuset-internal.h | 1 + kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset-internal.h b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset-internal.h index 976a8bc3ff603..383963e28ac69 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset-internal.h +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset-internal.h @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ enum prs_errcode { PERR_CPUSEMPTY, PERR_HKEEPING, PERR_ACCESS, + PERR_REMOTE, };

/* bits in struct cpuset flags field */ diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c index 0f910c828973a..01e1745957534 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static const char * const perr_strings[] = { [PERR_CPUSEMPTY] = "cpuset.cpus and cpuset.cpus.exclusive are empty", [PERR_HKEEPING] = "partition config conflicts with housekeeping setup", [PERR_ACCESS] = "Enable partition not permitted", + [PERR_REMOTE] = "Have remote partition underneath", };

/* @@ -2821,6 +2822,19 @@ static int update_prstate(struct cpuset *cs, int new_prs) goto out; }

+ /* + * We don't support the creation of a new local partition with + * a remote partition underneath it. This unsupported + * setting can happen only if parent is the top_cpuset because + * a remote partition cannot be created underneath an existing + * local or remote partition. + */ + if ((parent == &top_cpuset) && + cpumask_intersects(cs->exclusive_cpus, subpartitions_cpus)) { + err = PERR_REMOTE; + goto out; + } + /* * If parent is valid partition, enable local partiion. * Otherwise, enable a remote partition.

From: Gabriel Shahrouzi gshahrouzi@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 0ba3a4ab76fd3367b9cb680cad70182c896c795c ]

Move the get_ctx(child_ctx) call and the child_event->ctx assignment to occur immediately after the child event is allocated. Ensure that child_event->ctx is non-NULL before any subsequent error path within inherit_event calls free_event(), satisfying the assumptions of the cleanup code.

Details:

There's no clear Fixes tag, because this bug is a side-effect of multiple interacting commits over time (up to 15 years old), not a single regression.

The code initially incremented refcount then assigned context immediately after the child_event was created. Later, an early validity check for child_event was added before the refcount/assignment. Even later, a WARN_ON_ONCE() cleanup check was added, assuming event->ctx is valid if the pmu_ctx is valid. The problem is that the WARN_ON_ONCE() could trigger after the initial check passed but before child_event->ctx was assigned, violating its precondition. The solution is to assign child_event->ctx right after its initial validation. This ensures the context exists for any subsequent checks or cleanup routines, resolving the WARN_ON_ONCE().

To resolve it, defer the refcount update and child_event->ctx assignment directly after child_event->pmu_ctx is set but before checking if the parent event is orphaned. The cleanup routine depends on event->pmu_ctx being non-NULL before it verifies event->ctx is non-NULL. This also maintains the author's original intent of passing in child_ctx to find_get_pmu_context before its refcount/assignment.

[ mingo: Expanded the changelog from another email by Gabriel Shahrouzi. ]

Reported-by: syzbot+ff3aa851d46ab82953a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Gabriel Shahrouzi gshahrouzi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Ravi Bangoria ravi.bangoria@amd.com Cc: Kan Liang kan.liang@linux.intel.com Cc: Oleg Nesterov oleg@redhat.com Cc: Alexander Shishkin alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250405203036.582721-1-gshahrouzi@gmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ff3aa851d46ab82953a3 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 2d2ff7ca95a5b..9b9a89b2c5945 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -13684,6 +13684,9 @@ inherit_event(struct perf_event *parent_event, if (IS_ERR(child_event)) return child_event;

+ get_ctx(child_ctx); + child_event->ctx = child_ctx; + pmu_ctx = find_get_pmu_context(child_event->pmu, child_ctx, child_event); if (IS_ERR(pmu_ctx)) { free_event(child_event); @@ -13706,8 +13709,6 @@ inherit_event(struct perf_event *parent_event, return NULL; }

- get_ctx(child_ctx); - /* * Make the child state follow the state of the parent event, * not its attr.disabled bit. We hold the parent's mutex, @@ -13728,7 +13729,6 @@ inherit_event(struct perf_event *parent_event, local64_set(&hwc->period_left, sample_period); }

- child_event->ctx = child_ctx; child_event->overflow_handler = parent_event->overflow_handler; child_event->overflow_handler_context = parent_event->overflow_handler_context;

From: Uwe Kleine-König u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com

[ Upstream commit 00e53d0f4baedd72196b65f00698b2a5a537dc2b ]

Waveform parameters are supposed to be rounded down to the next value possible for the hardware. However when a requested value is too small, .round_waveform_tohw() is supposed to pick the next bigger value and return 1. Let pwm_set_waveform() behave in the same way.

This creates consistency between pwm_set_waveform_might_sleep() with exact=false and pwm_round_waveform_might_sleep() + pwm_set_waveform_might_sleep() with exact=true.

The PWM_DEBUG rounding check has to be adapted to only trigger if no uprounding happend.

Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com Tested-by: Trevor Gamblin tgamblin@baylibre.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/353dc6ae31be815e41fd3df89c257127ca0d1a09.174384473... Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König ukleinek@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/pwm/core.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pwm/core.c b/drivers/pwm/core.c index 99d0bc6933152..bd79953272405 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/core.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/core.c @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static int __pwm_set_waveform(struct pwm_device *pwm, const struct pwm_ops *ops = chip->ops; char wfhw[WFHWSIZE]; struct pwm_waveform wf_rounded; - int err; + int err, ret_tohw;

BUG_ON(WFHWSIZE < ops->sizeof_wfhw);

@@ -332,16 +332,16 @@ static int __pwm_set_waveform(struct pwm_device *pwm, if (!pwm_wf_valid(wf)) return -EINVAL;

- err = __pwm_round_waveform_tohw(chip, pwm, wf, &wfhw); - if (err) - return err; + ret_tohw = __pwm_round_waveform_tohw(chip, pwm, wf, &wfhw); + if (ret_tohw < 0) + return ret_tohw;

if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PWM_DEBUG) || exact) && wf->period_length_ns) { err = __pwm_round_waveform_fromhw(chip, pwm, &wfhw, &wf_rounded); if (err) return err;

- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PWM_DEBUG) && !pwm_check_rounding(wf, &wf_rounded)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PWM_DEBUG) && ret_tohw == 0 && !pwm_check_rounding(wf, &wf_rounded)) dev_err(&chip->dev, "Wrong rounding: requested %llu/%llu [+%llu], result %llu/%llu [+%llu]\n", wf->duty_length_ns, wf->period_length_ns, wf->duty_offset_ns, wf_rounded.duty_length_ns, wf_rounded.period_length_ns, wf_rounded.duty_offset_ns); @@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ static int __pwm_set_waveform(struct pwm_device *pwm, wf_rounded.duty_length_ns, wf_rounded.period_length_ns, wf_rounded.duty_offset_ns, wf_set.duty_length_ns, wf_set.period_length_ns, wf_set.duty_offset_ns); } - return 0; + + return ret_tohw; }

/**

From: Hannes Reinecke hare@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 9546ad1a9bda7362492114f5866b95b0ac4a100e ]

Scanning for namespaces can take some time, so if the target is reconfigured while the scan is running we may miss a Attached Namespace Attribute Changed AEN.

Check if the NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED bit is set once the scan has finished, and requeue scanning to pick up any missed change.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Keith Busch kbusch@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index e4034cec59237..1b386889242c3 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -4282,6 +4282,10 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_struct *work) nvme_scan_ns_sequential(ctrl); } mutex_unlock(&ctrl->scan_lock); + + /* Requeue if we have missed AENs */ + if (test_bit(NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED, &ctrl->events)) + nvme_queue_scan(ctrl); }

/*

From: Jean-Marc Eurin jmeurin@google.com

[ Upstream commit 7ab4f0e37a0f4207e742a8de69be03984db6ebf0 ]

The end of table checks should be done with the structure size, but 2 of the 3 similar calls use the pointer size.

Signed-off-by: Jean-Marc Eurin jmeurin@google.com Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402001542.2600671-1-jmeurin@google.com [ rjw: Subject edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/acpi/pptt.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/pptt.c b/drivers/acpi/pptt.c index a35dd0e41c270..f73ce6e13065d 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/pptt.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/pptt.c @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int acpi_pptt_leaf_node(struct acpi_table_header *table_hdr, node_entry = ACPI_PTR_DIFF(node, table_hdr); entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr, sizeof(struct acpi_table_pptt)); - proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor *); + proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor);

while ((unsigned long)entry + proc_sz < table_end) { cpu_node = (struct acpi_pptt_processor *)entry; @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static struct acpi_pptt_processor *acpi_find_processor_node(struct acpi_table_he table_end = (unsigned long)table_hdr + table_hdr->length; entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr, sizeof(struct acpi_table_pptt)); - proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor *); + proc_sz = sizeof(struct acpi_pptt_processor);

/* find the processor structure associated with this cpuid */ while ((unsigned long)entry + proc_sz < table_end) {

From: Jay Cornwall jay.cornwall@amd.com

[ Upstream commit 3666ed821832f42baaf25f362680dda603cde732 ]

KIQ invalidate_tlbs request has been seen to marginally exceed the configured 100 ms timeout on systems under load.

All other KIQ requests in the driver use a 10 second timeout. Use a similar timeout implementation on the invalidate_tlbs path.

v2: Poll once before msleep v3: Fix return value

Signed-off-by: Jay Cornwall jay.cornwall@amd.com Cc: Kent Russell kent.russell@amd.com Reviewed-by: Harish Kasiviswanathan Harish.Kasiviswanathan@amd.com Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher alexander.deucher@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h | 1 - drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h index 4653a8d2823a6..d5514b5ac1239 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu.h @@ -352,7 +352,6 @@ enum amdgpu_kiq_irq { AMDGPU_CP_KIQ_IRQ_DRIVER0 = 0, AMDGPU_CP_KIQ_IRQ_LAST }; -#define SRIOV_USEC_TIMEOUT 1200000 /* wait 12 * 100ms for SRIOV */ #define MAX_KIQ_REG_WAIT 5000 /* in usecs, 5ms */ #define MAX_KIQ_REG_BAILOUT_INTERVAL 5 /* in msecs, 5ms */ #define MAX_KIQ_REG_TRY 1000 diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c index 1c19a65e65533..ef74259c448d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gmc.c @@ -678,12 +678,10 @@ int amdgpu_gmc_flush_gpu_tlb_pasid(struct amdgpu_device *adev, uint16_t pasid, uint32_t flush_type, bool all_hub, uint32_t inst) { - u32 usec_timeout = amdgpu_sriov_vf(adev) ? SRIOV_USEC_TIMEOUT : - adev->usec_timeout; struct amdgpu_ring *ring = &adev->gfx.kiq[inst].ring; struct amdgpu_kiq *kiq = &adev->gfx.kiq[inst]; unsigned int ndw; - int r; + int r, cnt = 0; uint32_t seq;

/* @@ -740,10 +738,21 @@ int amdgpu_gmc_flush_gpu_tlb_pasid(struct amdgpu_device *adev, uint16_t pasid,

amdgpu_ring_commit(ring); spin_unlock(&adev->gfx.kiq[inst].ring_lock); - if (amdgpu_fence_wait_polling(ring, seq, usec_timeout) < 1) { + + r = amdgpu_fence_wait_polling(ring, seq, MAX_KIQ_REG_WAIT); + + might_sleep(); + while (r < 1 && cnt++ < MAX_KIQ_REG_TRY && + !amdgpu_reset_pending(adev->reset_domain)) { + msleep(MAX_KIQ_REG_BAILOUT_INTERVAL); + r = amdgpu_fence_wait_polling(ring, seq, MAX_KIQ_REG_WAIT); + } + + if (cnt > MAX_KIQ_REG_TRY) { dev_err(adev->dev, "timeout waiting for kiq fence\n"); r = -ETIME; - } + } else + r = 0; }

error_unlock_reset:

From: Hannes Reinecke hare@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 62baf70c327444338c34703c71aa8cc8e4189bd6 ]

When scanning for new namespaces we might have missed an ANA AEN.

The NVMe base spec (NVMe Base Specification v2.1, Figure 151 'Asynchonous Event Information - Notice': Asymmetric Namespace Access Change) states:

A controller shall not send this even if an Attached Namespace Attribute Changed asynchronous event [...] is sent for the same event.

so we need to re-read the ANA log page after we rescanned the namespace list to update the ANA states of the new namespaces.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Keith Busch kbusch@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index 1b386889242c3..33184d36310d4 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -4286,6 +4286,11 @@ static void nvme_scan_work(struct work_struct *work) /* Requeue if we have missed AENs */ if (test_bit(NVME_AER_NOTICE_NS_CHANGED, &ctrl->events)) nvme_queue_scan(ctrl); +#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH + else + /* Re-read the ANA log page to not miss updates */ + queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->ana_work); +#endif }

/*

From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 9f9cc012c2cbac4833746a0182e06a8eec940d19 ]

In preparation for simplifying INSN_SYSCALL, make validate_unret() terminate control flow on UD2 just like validate_branch() already does.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ce841269e7e28c8b7f32064464a9821034d724ff.174409521... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- tools/objtool/check.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index 9c7e60f71327d..d95abd5396c3f 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -3999,6 +3999,9 @@ static int validate_unret(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn) break; }

+ if (insn->dead_end) + return 0; + if (!next) { WARN_INSN(insn, "teh end!"); return -1;

From: Roger Pau Monne roger.pau@citrix.com

[ Upstream commit 64a66e2c3b3113dc78a6124e14825d68ddc2e188 ]

When running as a PVH dom0 the ACPI tables exposed to Linux are (mostly) the native ones, thus exposing the C and P states, that can lead to attachment of CPU idle and frequency drivers. However the entity in control of the CPU C and P states is Xen, as dom0 doesn't have a full view of the system load, neither has all CPUs assigned and identity pinned.

Like it's done for classic PV guests, prevent Linux from using idle or frequency state drivers when running as a PVH dom0.

On an AMD EPYC 7543P system without this fix a Linux PVH dom0 will keep the host CPUs spinning at 100% even when dom0 is completely idle, as it's attempting to use the acpi_idle driver.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné roger.pau@citrix.com Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk jason.andryuk@amd.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Message-ID: 20250407101842.67228-1-roger.pau@citrix.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c index 0e3d930bcb89e..9d25d9373945c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/cpufreq.h> +#include <linux/cpuidle.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/mm.h>

@@ -123,8 +125,23 @@ static void __init pvh_arch_setup(void) { pvh_reserve_extra_memory();

- if (xen_initial_domain()) + if (xen_initial_domain()) { xen_add_preferred_consoles(); + + /* + * Disable usage of CPU idle and frequency drivers: when + * running as hardware domain the exposed native ACPI tables + * causes idle and/or frequency drivers to attach and + * malfunction. It's Xen the entity that controls the idle and + * frequency states. + * + * For unprivileged domains the exposed ACPI tables are + * fabricated and don't contain such data. + */ + disable_cpuidle(); + disable_cpufreq(); + WARN_ON(xen_set_default_idle()); + } }

void __init xen_pvh_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)

From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit fc9fd3f98423367c79e0bd85a9515df26dc1b3cc ]

write_ibpb() does IBPB, which (among other things) flushes branch type predictions on AMD. If the CPU has SRSO_NO, or if the SRSO mitigation has been disabled, branch type flushing isn't needed, in which case the lighter-weight SBPB can be used.

The 'x86_pred_cmd' variable already keeps track of whether IBPB or SBPB should be used. Use that instead of hardcoding IBPB.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/17c5dcd14b29199b75199d67ff7758de9d9a4928.174414825... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S index b7ea3e8e9eccd..58e3124ee2b42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@

SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb) movl $MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx - movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax + movl _ASM_RIP(x86_pred_cmd), %eax xorl %edx, %edx wrmsr

From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 27ce8299bc1ec6df8306073785ff82b30b3cc5ee ]

User->user Spectre v2 attacks (including RSB) across context switches are already mitigated by IBPB in cond_mitigation(), if enabled globally or if either the prev or the next task has opted in to protection. RSB filling without IBPB serves no purpose for protecting user space, as indirect branches are still vulnerable.

User->kernel RSB attacks are mitigated by eIBRS. In which case the RSB filling on context switch isn't needed, so remove it.

Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Amit Shah amit.shah@amd.com Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov nik.borisov@suse.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/98cdefe42180358efebf78e3b80752850c7a3e1b.174414825... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 589e34c0b70b5..46bddb5bb15ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1578,7 +1578,7 @@ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void) rrsba_disabled = true; }

-static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static void __init spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { /* * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks @@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_ */ switch (mode) { case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: - return; + break;

case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: @@ -1611,18 +1611,21 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_ pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n"); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE); } - return; + break;

case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: - pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n"); + pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB: Filling RSB on context switch and VMEXIT\n"); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); - return; - } + break;

- pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit"); - dump_stack(); + default: + pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation\n"); + dump_stack(); + break; + } }

/* @@ -1854,10 +1857,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) * * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD? */ - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); - pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); - - spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode); + spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(mode);

/* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 90a9e47409131..5bd6c3ba9af7d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -389,9 +389,9 @@ static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next) prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec);

/* - * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch predictor - * when switching between processes. This stops one process from - * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. + * Avoid user->user BTB/RSB poisoning by flushing them when switching + * between processes. This stops one process from doing Spectre-v2 + * attacks on another. * * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the

From: Daniel Wagner wagi@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 70289ae5cac4d3a39575405aaf63330486cea030 ]

Do not leak the tgtport reference when the work is already scheduled.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Wagner wagi@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/nvme/target/fc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fc.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fc.c index a3a6dfe98d6fc..0dfffb3f39b06 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/fc.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fc.c @@ -1103,7 +1103,8 @@ static void nvmet_fc_schedule_delete_assoc(struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc) { nvmet_fc_tgtport_get(assoc->tgtport); - queue_work(nvmet_wq, &assoc->del_work); + if (!queue_work(nvmet_wq, &assoc->del_work)) + nvmet_fc_tgtport_put(assoc->tgtport); }

static bool

From: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 16cb6b0509b65ac89187e9402e0b7a9ddf1765ef ]

Like in UNICODE mode, SMB1 Session Setup Kerberos Request contains oslm and domain strings.

Extract common code into ascii_oslm_strings() and ascii_domain_string() functions (similar to unicode variants) and use these functions in non-UNICODE code path in sess_auth_kerberos().

Decision if non-UNICODE or UNICODE mode is used is based on the SMBFLG2_UNICODE flag in Flags2 packed field, and not based on the capabilities of server. Fix this check too.

Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/smb/client/sess.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/sess.c b/fs/smb/client/sess.c index faa80e7d54a6e..4ca00f14872a3 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/sess.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/sess.c @@ -672,6 +672,22 @@ unicode_oslm_strings(char **pbcc_area, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; }

+static void +ascii_oslm_strings(char **pbcc_area, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + + strcpy(bcc_ptr, "Linux version "); + bcc_ptr += strlen("Linux version "); + strcpy(bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release); + bcc_ptr += strlen(init_utsname()->release) + 1; + + strcpy(bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS); + bcc_ptr += strlen(CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS) + 1; + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + static void unicode_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) { @@ -696,6 +712,25 @@ static void unicode_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; }

+static void ascii_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area; + int len; + + /* copy domain */ + if (ses->domainName != NULL) { + len = strscpy(bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0)) + len = CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN - 1; + bcc_ptr += len; + } /* else we send a null domain name so server will default to its own domain */ + *bcc_ptr = 0; + bcc_ptr++; + + *pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; +} + static void unicode_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) { @@ -741,25 +776,10 @@ static void ascii_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses, *bcc_ptr = 0; bcc_ptr++; /* account for null termination */

- /* copy domain */ - if (ses->domainName != NULL) { - len = strscpy(bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN); - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0)) - len = CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN - 1; - bcc_ptr += len; - } /* else we send a null domain name so server will default to its own domain */ - *bcc_ptr = 0; - bcc_ptr++; - /* BB check for overflow here */

- strcpy(bcc_ptr, "Linux version "); - bcc_ptr += strlen("Linux version "); - strcpy(bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release); - bcc_ptr += strlen(init_utsname()->release) + 1; - - strcpy(bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS); - bcc_ptr += strlen(CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS) + 1; + ascii_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp); + ascii_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);

*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr; } @@ -1562,7 +1582,7 @@ sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data) sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = msg->secblob_len; pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(sess_data->iov[1].iov_len);

- if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) { + if (pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) { /* unicode strings must be word aligned */ if (!IS_ALIGNED(sess_data->iov[0].iov_len + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len, 2)) { *bcc_ptr = 0; @@ -1571,8 +1591,8 @@ sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data) unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp); unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp); } else { - /* BB: is this right? */ - ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp); + ascii_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp); + ascii_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp); }

sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -

From: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit ef86ab131d9127dfbfa8f06e12441d05fdfb090b ]

When reparse point in SMB1 query_path_info() callback was detected then query also for EA $LXDEV. In this EA are stored device major and minor numbers used by WSL CHR and BLK reparse points. Without major and minor numbers, stat() syscall does not work for char and block devices.

Similar code is already in SMB2+ query_path_info() callback function.

Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c index bd791aa54681f..55cceb8229323 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c @@ -597,6 +597,42 @@ static int cifs_query_path_info(const unsigned int xid, CIFSSMBClose(xid, tcon, fid.netfid); }

+#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR + /* + * For WSL CHR and BLK reparse points it is required to fetch + * EA $LXDEV which contains major and minor device numbers. + */ + if (!rc && data->reparse_point) { + struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *ea; + + ea = (struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *)data->wsl.eas; + rc = CIFSSMBQAllEAs(xid, tcon, full_path, SMB2_WSL_XATTR_DEV, + &ea->ea_data[SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN + 1], + SMB2_WSL_XATTR_DEV_SIZE, cifs_sb); + if (rc == SMB2_WSL_XATTR_DEV_SIZE) { + ea->next_entry_offset = cpu_to_le32(0); + ea->flags = 0; + ea->ea_name_length = SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN; + ea->ea_value_length = cpu_to_le16(SMB2_WSL_XATTR_DEV_SIZE); + memcpy(&ea->ea_data[0], SMB2_WSL_XATTR_DEV, SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN + 1); + data->wsl.eas_len = sizeof(*ea) + SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN + 1 + + SMB2_WSL_XATTR_DEV_SIZE; + rc = 0; + } else if (rc >= 0) { + /* It is an error if EA $LXDEV has wrong size. */ + rc = -EINVAL; + } else { + /* + * In all other cases ignore error if fetching + * of EA $LXDEV failed. It is needed only for + * WSL CHR and BLK reparse points and wsl_to_fattr() + * handle the case when EA is missing. + */ + rc = 0; + } + } +#endif + return rc; }

From: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com

[ Upstream commit 280e5a30100578106a4305ce0118e0aa9b866f12 ]

If iommu_device_register() encounters an error, it can end up tearing down already-configured groups and default domains, however this currently still leaves devices hooked up to iommu-dma (and even historically the behaviour in this area was at best inconsistent across architectures/drivers...) Although in the case that an IOMMU is present whose driver has failed to probe, users cannot necessarily expect DMA to work anyway, it's still arguable that we should do our best to put things back as if the IOMMU driver was never there at all, and certainly the potential for crashing in iommu-dma itself is undesirable. Make sure we clean up the dev->dma_iommu flag along with everything else.

Reported-by: Chen-Yu Tsai wenst@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy robin.murphy@arm.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGXv+5HJpTYmQ2h-GD7GjyeYT7bL9EBCvu0mz5LgpzJZtzf... Tested-by: Chen-Yu Tsai wenst@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e788aa927f6d827dd4ea1ed608fada79f2bab030.174428422... Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel jroedel@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c index 599030e1e890b..1c566675281e5 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c @@ -508,6 +508,9 @@ static void iommu_deinit_device(struct device *dev) dev->iommu_group = NULL; module_put(ops->owner); dev_iommu_free(dev); +#ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_DMA + dev->dma_iommu = false; +#endif }

DEFINE_MUTEX(iommu_probe_device_lock);