From: Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com

commit a23dd544debcda4ee4a549ec7de59e85c3c8345c upstream.

Looks like there are still cases when "space_left - frag1bytes" can legitimately exceed PAGE_SIZE. Ensure that xdr->end always remains within the current encode buffer.

Reported-by: Bruce Fields bfields@fieldses.org Reported-by: Zorro Lang zlang@redhat.com Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216151 Fixes: 6c254bf3b637 ("SUNRPC: Fix the calculation of xdr->end in xdr_get_next_encode_buffer()") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/sunrpc/xdr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sunrpc/xdr.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xdr.c @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static __be32 *xdr_get_next_encode_buffe */ xdr->p = (void *)p + frag2bytes; space_left = xdr->buf->buflen - xdr->buf->len; - if (space_left - nbytes >= PAGE_SIZE) + if (space_left - frag1bytes >= PAGE_SIZE) xdr->end = (void *)p + PAGE_SIZE; else xdr->end = (void *)p + space_left - frag1bytes;

From: Jose Alonso joalonsof@gmail.com

commit f8ebb3ac881b17712e1d5967c97ab1806b16d3d6 upstream.

This patch corrects packet receiving in ax88179_rx_fixup.

- problem observed: ifconfig shows allways a lot of 'RX Errors' while packets are received normally.

This occurs because ax88179_rx_fixup does not recognise properly the usb urb received. The packets are normally processed and at the end, the code exits with 'return 0', generating RX Errors. (pkt_cnt==-2 and ptk_hdr over field rx_hdr trying to identify another packet there)

This is a usb urb received by "tcpdump -i usbmon2 -X" on a little-endian CPU: 0x0000: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ^ packet 1 start (pkt_len = 0x05ec) ^^^^ IP alignment pseudo header ^ ethernet packet start last byte ethernet packet v padding (8-bytes aligned) vvvv vvvv 0x05e0: c92d d444 1420 8a69 83dd 272f e82b 9811 0x05f0: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ... ^ packet 2 0x0be0: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ... 0x1130: 9d41 9171 8a38 0ec5 eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 ... 0x1720: 8cfc 15ff 5e4c e85c eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 ... 0x1d10: ecfa 2a3a 19ab c78c eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 ... 0x2070: eeee f8e3 3b19 87a0 94de 80e3 daac 0800 ... ^ packet 7 0x2120: 7c88 4ca5 5c57 7dcc 0d34 7577 f778 7e0a 0x2130: f032 e093 7489 0740 3008 ec05 0000 0080 ====1==== ====2==== hdr_off ^ pkt_len = 0x05ec ^^^^ AX_RXHDR_*=0x00830 ^^^^ ^ pkt_len = 0 ^^^^ AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR=0x80000000 ^^^^ ^ 0x2140: 3008 ec05 0000 0080 3008 5805 0000 0080 0x2150: 3008 ec05 0000 0080 3008 ec05 0000 0080 0x2160: 3008 5803 0000 0080 3008 c800 0000 0080 ===11==== ===12==== ===13==== ===14==== 0x2170: 0000 0000 0e00 3821 ^^^^ ^^^^ rx_hdr ^^^^ pkt_cnt=14 ^^^^ hdr_off=0x2138 ^^^^ ^^^^ padding

The dump shows that pkt_cnt is the number of entrys in the per-packet metadata. It is "2 * packet count". Each packet have two entrys. The first have a valid value (pkt_len and AX_RXHDR_*) and the second have a dummy-header 0x80000000 (pkt_len=0 with AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR). Why exists dummy-header for each packet?!? My guess is that this was done probably to align the entry for each packet to 64-bits and maintain compatibility with old firmware. There is also a padding (0x00000000) before the rx_hdr to align the end of rx_hdr to 64-bit. Note that packets have a alignment of 64-bits (8-bytes).

This patch assumes that the dummy-header and the last padding are optional. So it preserves semantics and recognises the same valid packets as the current code.

This patch was made using only the dumpfile information and tested with only one device: 0b95:1790 ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88179 Gigabit Ethernet

Fixes: 57bc3d3ae8c1 ("net: usb: ax88179_178a: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup") Fixes: e2ca90c276e1 ("ax88179_178a: ASIX AX88179_178A USB 3.0/2.0 to gigabit ethernet adapter driver") Signed-off-by: Jose Alonso joalonsof@gmail.com Acked-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6970bb04bf67598af4d316eaeb1792040b18cfd.camel@gma... Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c @@ -1373,6 +1373,42 @@ static int ax88179_rx_fixup(struct usbne * are bundled into this buffer and where we can find an array of * per-packet metadata (which contains elements encoded into u16). */ + + /* SKB contents for current firmware: + * <packet 1> <padding> + * ... + * <packet N> <padding> + * <per-packet metadata entry 1> <dummy header> + * ... + * <per-packet metadata entry N> <dummy header> + * <padding2> <rx_hdr> + * + * where: + * <packet N> contains pkt_len bytes: + * 2 bytes of IP alignment pseudo header + * packet received + * <per-packet metadata entry N> contains 4 bytes: + * pkt_len and fields AX_RXHDR_* + * <padding> 0-7 bytes to terminate at + * 8 bytes boundary (64-bit). + * <padding2> 4 bytes to make rx_hdr terminate at + * 8 bytes boundary (64-bit) + * <dummy-header> contains 4 bytes: + * pkt_len=0 and AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR + * <rx-hdr> contains 4 bytes: + * pkt_cnt and hdr_off (offset of + * <per-packet metadata entry 1>) + * + * pkt_cnt is number of entrys in the per-packet metadata. + * In current firmware there is 2 entrys per packet. + * The first points to the packet and the + * second is a dummy header. + * This was done probably to align fields in 64-bit and + * maintain compatibility with old firmware. + * This code assumes that <dummy header> and <padding2> are + * optional. + */ + if (skb->len < 4) return 0; skb_trim(skb, skb->len - 4); @@ -1387,51 +1423,66 @@ static int ax88179_rx_fixup(struct usbne /* Make sure that the bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB * (and in front of the counter at the end). */ - if (pkt_cnt * 2 + hdr_off > skb->len) + if (pkt_cnt * 4 + hdr_off > skb->len) return 0; pkt_hdr = (u32 *)(skb->data + hdr_off);

/* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ skb_trim(skb, hdr_off);

- for (; ; pkt_cnt--, pkt_hdr++) { + for (; pkt_cnt > 0; pkt_cnt--, pkt_hdr++) { + u16 pkt_len_plus_padd; u16 pkt_len;

le32_to_cpus(pkt_hdr); pkt_len = (*pkt_hdr >> 16) & 0x1fff; + pkt_len_plus_padd = (pkt_len + 7) & 0xfff8;

- if (pkt_len > skb->len) + /* Skip dummy header used for alignment + */ + if (pkt_len == 0) + continue; + + if (pkt_len_plus_padd > skb->len) return 0;

/* Check CRC or runt packet */ - if (((*pkt_hdr & (AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR | AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) == 0) && - pkt_len >= 2 + ETH_HLEN) { - bool last = (pkt_cnt == 0); - - if (last) { - ax_skb = skb; - } else { - ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!ax_skb) - return 0; - } - ax_skb->len = pkt_len; - /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ - skb_pull(ax_skb, 2); - skb_set_tail_pointer(ax_skb, ax_skb->len); - ax_skb->truesize = pkt_len + sizeof(struct sk_buff); - ax88179_rx_checksum(ax_skb, pkt_hdr); + if ((*pkt_hdr & (AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR | AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) || + pkt_len < 2 + ETH_HLEN) { + dev->net->stats.rx_errors++; + skb_pull(skb, pkt_len_plus_padd); + continue; + }

- if (last) - return 1; + /* last packet */ + if (pkt_len_plus_padd == skb->len) { + skb_trim(skb, pkt_len);

- usbnet_skb_return(dev, ax_skb); + /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ + skb_pull(skb, 2); + + skb->truesize = SKB_TRUESIZE(pkt_len_plus_padd); + ax88179_rx_checksum(skb, pkt_hdr); + return 1; }

- /* Trim this packet away from the SKB */ - if (!skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8)) + ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ax_skb) return 0; + skb_trim(ax_skb, pkt_len); + + /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ + skb_pull(ax_skb, 2); + + skb->truesize = pkt_len_plus_padd + + SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct sk_buff)); + ax88179_rx_checksum(ax_skb, pkt_hdr); + usbnet_skb_return(dev, ax_skb); + + skb_pull(skb, pkt_len_plus_padd); } + + return 0; }

static struct sk_buff *

From: Oliver Neukum oneukum@suse.com

commit e65af5403e462ccd7dff6a045a886c64da598c2e upstream.

usbnet provides some helper functions that are also used in the context of reset() operations. During a reset the other drivers on a device are unable to operate. As that can be block drivers, a driver for another interface cannot use paging in its memory allocations without risking a deadlock. Use GFP_NOIO in the helpers.

Fixes: 877bd862f32b8 ("usbnet: introduce usbnet 3 command helpers") Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum oneukum@suse.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628093517.7469-1-oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c @@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static int __usbnet_read_cmd(struct usbn cmd, reqtype, value, index, size);

if (size) { - buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO); if (!buf) goto out; } @@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ static int __usbnet_write_cmd(struct usb cmd, reqtype, value, index, size);

if (data) { - buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); + buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_NOIO); if (!buf) goto out; } else {

From: Jason Wang jasowang@redhat.com

commit 11a37eb66812ce6a06b79223ad530eb0e1d7294d upstream.

We currently depend on probe() calling virtio_device_ready() - which happens after netdev registration. Since ndo_open() can be called immediately after register_netdev, this means there exists a race between ndo_open() and virtio_device_ready(): the driver may start to use the device (e.g. TX) before DRIVER_OK which violates the spec.

Fix this by switching to use register_netdevice() and protect the virtio_device_ready() with rtnl_lock() to make sure ndo_open() can only be called after virtio_device_ready().

Fixes: 0d2e1a2926b18 ("caif_virtio: Introduce caif over virtio") Signed-off-by: Jason Wang jasowang@redhat.com Message-Id: 20220620051115.3142-3-jasowang@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin mst@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c +++ b/drivers/net/caif/caif_virtio.c @@ -727,13 +727,21 @@ static int cfv_probe(struct virtio_devic /* Carrier is off until netdevice is opened */ netif_carrier_off(netdev);

+ /* serialize netdev register + virtio_device_ready() with ndo_open() */ + rtnl_lock(); + /* register Netdev */ - err = register_netdev(netdev); + err = register_netdevice(netdev); if (err) { + rtnl_unlock(); dev_err(&vdev->dev, "Unable to register netdev (%d)\n", err); goto err; }

+ virtio_device_ready(vdev); + + rtnl_unlock(); + debugfs_init(cfv);

return 0;

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

commit ab84db251c04d38b8dc7ee86e13d4050bedb1c88 upstream.

syzbot has two reports involving the same root cause.

bond_alb_initialize() must not set bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled if a memory allocation error is detected.

Report 1:

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 0 PID: 12276 Comm: kworker/u4:10 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-syzkaller-00132-g3b89b511ea0c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:rlb_clear_slave+0x10e/0x690 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:393 Code: 8e fc 83 fb ff 0f 84 74 02 00 00 e8 cc 2a 8e fc 48 8b 44 24 08 89 dd 48 c1 e5 06 4c 8d 34 28 49 8d 7e 14 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 14 20 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 RSP: 0018:ffffc90018a8f678 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88803375bb00 RSI: ffffffff84ec4ac4 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8880ac889000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88815a668c80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005597077e10b0 CR3: 0000000026668000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bond_alb_deinit_slave+0x43c/0x6b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1663 __bond_release_one.cold+0x383/0xd53 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2370 bond_slave_netdev_event drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3778 [inline] bond_netdev_event+0x993/0xad0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:3889 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:87 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1945 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1983 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1997 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many+0x948/0x18b0 net/core/dev.c:10839 default_device_exit_batch+0x449/0x590 net/core/dev.c:11333 ops_exit_list+0x125/0x170 net/core/net_namespace.c:167 cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb00 net/core/net_namespace.c:594 process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:302 </TASK>

Report 2:

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 1 PID: 5206 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-12108-g58f9d52ff689 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:rlb_req_update_slave_clients+0x109/0x2f0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:502 Code: 5d 18 8f fc 41 80 3e 00 0f 85 a5 01 00 00 89 d8 48 c1 e0 06 49 03 84 24 68 01 00 00 48 8d 78 30 49 89 c7 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 2a 00 0f 85 98 01 00 00 4d 39 6f 30 75 83 e8 22 18 8f fc 49 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000300ee80 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90016c11000 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffffffff84eb6bf3 RDI: 0000000000000030 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888027c80c80 R13: ffff88807d7ff800 R14: ffffed1004f901bd R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6f46c58700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 00000000516cc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> alb_fasten_mac_swap+0x886/0xa80 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1070 bond_alb_handle_active_change+0x624/0x1050 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1765 bond_change_active_slave+0xfa1/0x29b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1173 bond_select_active_slave+0x23f/0xa50 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1253 bond_enslave+0x3b34/0x53b0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:2159 do_set_master+0x1c8/0x220 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2577 rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3380 [inline] __rtnl_newlink+0x13ac/0x17e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3580 rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3593 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43a/0xc90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6089 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x543/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x917/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6eb/0x810 net/socket.c:2492 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2546 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x132/0x220 net/socket.c:2582 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f6f45a89109 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f6f46c58168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6f45b9c030 RCX: 00007f6f45a89109 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f6f45ae308d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffed99029af R14: 00007f6f46c58300 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK>

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Cc: Jay Vosburgh j.vosburgh@gmail.com Cc: Veaceslav Falico vfalico@gmail.com Cc: Andy Gospodarek andy@greyhouse.net Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh jay.vosburgh@canonical.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627102813.126264-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c @@ -1264,12 +1264,12 @@ int bond_alb_initialize(struct bonding * return res;

if (rlb_enabled) { - bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled = 1; res = rlb_initialize(bond); if (res) { tlb_deinitialize(bond); return res; } + bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled = 1; } else { bond->alb_info.rlb_enabled = 0; }

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org

commit 5a478a653b4cca148d5c89832f007ec0809d7e6d upstream.

The irq_of_parse_and_map() returns 0 on failure, not a negative ERRNO.

Reported-by: Lv Ruyi lv.ruyi@zte.com.cn Fixes: caf6e49bf6d0 ("NFC: nfcmrvl: add spi driver") Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627124048.296253-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro... Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c | 6 +++--- drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/i2c.c @@ -186,9 +186,9 @@ static int nfcmrvl_i2c_parse_dt(struct d pdata->irq_polarity = IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING;

ret = irq_of_parse_and_map(node, 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_err("Unable to get irq, error: %d\n", ret); - return ret; + if (!ret) { + pr_err("Unable to get irq\n"); + return -EINVAL; } pdata->irq = ret;

--- a/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/spi.c @@ -130,9 +130,9 @@ static int nfcmrvl_spi_parse_dt(struct d }

ret = irq_of_parse_and_map(node, 0); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_err("Unable to get irq, error: %d\n", ret); - return ret; + if (!ret) { + pr_err("Unable to get irq\n"); + return -EINVAL; } pdata->irq = ret;

From: Demi Marie Obenour demi@invisiblethingslab.com

commit dbe97cff7dd9f0f75c524afdd55ad46be3d15295 upstream.

unmap_grant_pages() currently waits for the pages to no longer be used. In https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/7481, this lead to a deadlock against i915: i915 was waiting for gntdev's MMU notifier to finish, while gntdev was waiting for i915 to free its pages. I also believe this is responsible for various deadlocks I have experienced in the past.

Avoid these problems by making unmap_grant_pages async. This requires making it return void, as any errors will not be available when the function returns. Fortunately, the only use of the return value is a WARN_ON(), which can be replaced by a WARN_ON when the error is detected. Additionally, a failed call will not prevent further calls from being made, but this is harmless.

Because unmap_grant_pages is now async, the grant handle will be sent to INVALID_GRANT_HANDLE too late to prevent multiple unmaps of the same handle. Instead, a separate bool array is allocated for this purpose. This wastes memory, but stuffing this information in padding bytes is too fragile. Furthermore, it is necessary to grab a reference to the map before making the asynchronous call, and release the reference when the call returns.

It is also necessary to guard against reentrancy in gntdev_map_put(), and to handle the case where userspace tries to map a mapping whose contents have not all been freed yet.

Fixes: 745282256c75 ("xen/gntdev: safely unmap grants in case they are still in use") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour demi@invisiblethingslab.com Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622022726.2538-1-demi@invisiblethingslab.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/xen/gntdev.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c +++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(limit, "Maximum number

static atomic_t pages_mapped = ATOMIC_INIT(0);

+/* True in PV mode, false otherwise */ static int use_ptemod; #define populate_freeable_maps use_ptemod

@@ -92,11 +93,16 @@ struct grant_map { struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *unmap_ops; struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *kmap_ops; struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref *kunmap_ops; + bool *being_removed; struct page **pages; unsigned long pages_vm_start; + /* Number of live grants */ + atomic_t live_grants; + /* Needed to avoid allocation in unmap_grant_pages */ + struct gntab_unmap_queue_data unmap_data; };

-static int unmap_grant_pages(struct grant_map *map, int offset, int pages); +static void unmap_grant_pages(struct grant_map *map, int offset, int pages);

/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */

@@ -127,6 +133,7 @@ static void gntdev_free_map(struct grant kfree(map->unmap_ops); kfree(map->kmap_ops); kfree(map->kunmap_ops); + kfree(map->being_removed); kfree(map); }

@@ -145,12 +152,15 @@ static struct grant_map *gntdev_alloc_ma add->kmap_ops = kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->kmap_ops[0]), GFP_KERNEL); add->kunmap_ops = kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->kunmap_ops[0]), GFP_KERNEL); add->pages = kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->pages[0]), GFP_KERNEL); + add->being_removed = + kcalloc(count, sizeof(add->being_removed[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (NULL == add->grants || NULL == add->map_ops || NULL == add->unmap_ops || NULL == add->kmap_ops || NULL == add->kunmap_ops || - NULL == add->pages) + NULL == add->pages || + NULL == add->being_removed) goto err;

if (gnttab_alloc_pages(count, add->pages)) @@ -215,6 +225,34 @@ static void gntdev_put_map(struct gntdev return;

atomic_sub(map->count, &pages_mapped); + if (map->pages && !use_ptemod) { + /* + * Increment the reference count. This ensures that the + * subsequent call to unmap_grant_pages() will not wind up + * re-entering itself. It *can* wind up calling + * gntdev_put_map() recursively, but such calls will be with a + * reference count greater than 1, so they will return before + * this code is reached. The recursion depth is thus limited to + * 1. + */ + atomic_set(&map->users, 1); + + /* + * Unmap the grants. This may or may not be asynchronous, so it + * is possible that the reference count is 1 on return, but it + * could also be greater than 1. + */ + unmap_grant_pages(map, 0, map->count); + + /* Check if the memory now needs to be freed */ + if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&map->users)) + return; + + /* + * All pages have been returned to the hypervisor, so free the + * map. + */ + }

if (map->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_SEND_EVENT) { notify_remote_via_evtchn(map->notify.event); @@ -272,6 +310,7 @@ static int set_grant_ptes_as_special(pte

static int map_grant_pages(struct grant_map *map) { + size_t alloced = 0; int i, err = 0;

if (!use_ptemod) { @@ -320,85 +359,107 @@ static int map_grant_pages(struct grant_ map->pages, map->count);

for (i = 0; i < map->count; i++) { - if (map->map_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) + if (map->map_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) { map->unmap_ops[i].handle = map->map_ops[i].handle; - else if (!err) + if (!use_ptemod) + alloced++; + } else if (!err) err = -EINVAL;

if (map->flags & GNTMAP_device_map) map->unmap_ops[i].dev_bus_addr = map->map_ops[i].dev_bus_addr;

if (use_ptemod) { - if (map->kmap_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) + if (map->kmap_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) { + if (map->map_ops[i].status == GNTST_okay) + alloced++; map->kunmap_ops[i].handle = map->kmap_ops[i].handle; - else if (!err) + } else if (!err) err = -EINVAL; } } + atomic_add(alloced, &map->live_grants); return err; }

-static int __unmap_grant_pages(struct grant_map *map, int offset, int pages) +static void __unmap_grant_pages_done(int result, + struct gntab_unmap_queue_data *data) { - int i, err = 0; - struct gntab_unmap_queue_data unmap_data; + unsigned int i; + struct grant_map *map = data->data; + unsigned int offset = data->unmap_ops - map->unmap_ops; + + for (i = 0; i < data->count; i++) { + WARN_ON(map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status); + pr_debug("unmap handle=%d st=%d\n", + map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle, + map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status); + map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle = -1; + } + /* + * Decrease the live-grant counter. This must happen after the loop to + * prevent premature reuse of the grants by gnttab_mmap(). + */ + atomic_sub(data->count, &map->live_grants); + + /* Release reference taken by unmap_grant_pages */ + gntdev_put_map(NULL, map); +}

+static void __unmap_grant_pages(struct grant_map *map, int offset, int pages) +{ if (map->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE) { int pgno = (map->notify.addr >> PAGE_SHIFT); + if (pgno >= offset && pgno < offset + pages) { /* No need for kmap, pages are in lowmem */ uint8_t *tmp = pfn_to_kaddr(page_to_pfn(map->pages[pgno])); + tmp[map->notify.addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1)] = 0; map->notify.flags &= ~UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE; } }

- unmap_data.unmap_ops = map->unmap_ops + offset; - unmap_data.kunmap_ops = use_ptemod ? map->kunmap_ops + offset : NULL; - unmap_data.pages = map->pages + offset; - unmap_data.count = pages; + map->unmap_data.unmap_ops = map->unmap_ops + offset; + map->unmap_data.kunmap_ops = use_ptemod ? map->kunmap_ops + offset : NULL; + map->unmap_data.pages = map->pages + offset; + map->unmap_data.count = pages; + map->unmap_data.done = __unmap_grant_pages_done; + map->unmap_data.data = map; + atomic_inc(&map->users); /* to keep map alive during async call below */

- err = gnttab_unmap_refs_sync(&unmap_data); - if (err) - return err; - - for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) { - if (map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status) - err = -EINVAL; - pr_debug("unmap handle=%d st=%d\n", - map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle, - map->unmap_ops[offset+i].status); - map->unmap_ops[offset+i].handle = -1; - } - return err; + gnttab_unmap_refs_async(&map->unmap_data); }

-static int unmap_grant_pages(struct grant_map *map, int offset, int pages) +static void unmap_grant_pages(struct grant_map *map, int offset, int pages) { - int range, err = 0; + int range; + + if (atomic_read(&map->live_grants) == 0) + return; /* Nothing to do */

pr_debug("unmap %d+%d [%d+%d]\n", map->index, map->count, offset, pages);

/* It is possible the requested range will have a "hole" where we * already unmapped some of the grants. Only unmap valid ranges. */ - while (pages && !err) { - while (pages && map->unmap_ops[offset].handle == -1) { + while (pages) { + while (pages && map->being_removed[offset]) { offset++; pages--; } range = 0; while (range < pages) { - if (map->unmap_ops[offset+range].handle == -1) + if (map->being_removed[offset + range]) break; + map->being_removed[offset + range] = true; range++; } - err = __unmap_grant_pages(map, offset, range); + if (range) + __unmap_grant_pages(map, offset, range); offset += range; pages -= range; } - - return err; }

/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ @@ -454,7 +515,6 @@ static void unmap_if_in_range(struct gra unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { unsigned long mstart, mend; - int err;

if (!map->vma) return; @@ -468,10 +528,9 @@ static void unmap_if_in_range(struct gra map->index, map->count, map->vma->vm_start, map->vma->vm_end, start, end, mstart, mend); - err = unmap_grant_pages(map, + unmap_grant_pages(map, (mstart - map->vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT, (mend - mstart) >> PAGE_SHIFT); - WARN_ON(err); }

static void mn_invl_range_start(struct mmu_notifier *mn, @@ -503,7 +562,6 @@ static void mn_release(struct mmu_notifi { struct gntdev_priv *priv = container_of(mn, struct gntdev_priv, mn); struct grant_map *map; - int err;

mutex_lock(&priv->lock); list_for_each_entry(map, &priv->maps, next) { @@ -512,8 +570,7 @@ static void mn_release(struct mmu_notifi pr_debug("map %d+%d (%lx %lx)\n", map->index, map->count, map->vma->vm_start, map->vma->vm_end); - err = unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); - WARN_ON(err); + unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); } list_for_each_entry(map, &priv->freeable_maps, next) { if (!map->vma) @@ -521,8 +578,7 @@ static void mn_release(struct mmu_notifi pr_debug("map %d+%d (%lx %lx)\n", map->index, map->count, map->vma->vm_start, map->vma->vm_end); - err = unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); - WARN_ON(err); + unmap_grant_pages(map, /* offset */ 0, map->count); } mutex_unlock(&priv->lock); } @@ -1012,6 +1068,10 @@ static int gntdev_mmap(struct file *flip goto unlock_out; }

+ if (atomic_read(&map->live_grants)) { + err = -EAGAIN; + goto unlock_out; + } atomic_inc(&map->users);

vma->vm_ops = &gntdev_vmops;

From: Doug Berger opendmb@gmail.com

commit 7c97bc0128b2eecc703106112679a69d446d1a12 upstream.

The pause settings reported by the PHY should also be applied to the GMII port status override otherwise the switch will not generate pause frames towards the link partner despite the advertisement saying otherwise.

Fixes: 246d7f773c13 ("net: dsa: add Broadcom SF2 switch driver") Signed-off-by: Doug Berger opendmb@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623030204.1966851-1-f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c @@ -671,6 +671,11 @@ force_link: reg |= LINK_STS; if (phydev->duplex == DUPLEX_FULL) reg |= DUPLX_MODE; + if (phydev->pause) { + if (phydev->asym_pause) + reg |= TXFLOW_CNTL; + reg |= RXFLOW_CNTL; + }

core_writel(priv, reg, CORE_STS_OVERRIDE_GMIIP_PORT(port));

From: katrinzhou katrinzhou@tencent.com

commit adabdd8f6acabc0c3fdbba2e7f5a2edd9c5ef22d upstream.

When kcalloc fails, ipip6_tunnel_get_prl() should return -ENOMEM. Move the position of label "out" to return correctly.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value") Fixes: 300aaeeaab5f ("[IPV6] SIT: Add SIOCGETPRL ioctl to get/dump PRL.") Signed-off-by: katrinzhou katrinzhou@tencent.com Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazetedumazet@google.com Reviewed-by: David Ahern dsahern@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628035030.1039171-1-zys.zljxml@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/ipv6/sit.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/sit.c +++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c @@ -308,8 +308,6 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct i kcalloc(cmax, sizeof(*kp), GFP_KERNEL) : NULL;

- rcu_read_lock(); - ca = min(t->prl_count, cmax);

if (!kp) { @@ -325,7 +323,7 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct i } }

- c = 0; + rcu_read_lock(); for_each_prl_rcu(t->prl) { if (c >= cmax) break; @@ -337,7 +335,7 @@ static int ipip6_tunnel_get_prl(struct i if (kprl.addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) break; } -out: + rcu_read_unlock();

len = sizeof(*kp) * c; @@ -346,7 +344,7 @@ out: ret = -EFAULT;

kfree(kp); - +out: return ret; }

From: Roger Pau Monne roger.pau@citrix.com

commit 2f446ffe9d737e9a844b97887919c4fda18246e7 upstream.

When allocating pages to be used for shared communication with the backend always zero them, this avoids leaking unintended data present on the pages.

This is CVE-2022-26365, part of XSA-403.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné roger.pau@citrix.com Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich jbeulich@suse.com Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c +++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static int fill_grant_buffer(struct blkf goto out_of_memory;

if (info->feature_persistent) { - granted_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO); + granted_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO); if (!granted_page) { kfree(gnt_list_entry); goto out_of_memory; @@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ static int setup_blkring(struct xenbus_d for (i = 0; i < info->nr_ring_pages; i++) rinfo->ring_ref[i] = GRANT_INVALID_REF;

- sring = alloc_pages_exact(ring_size, GFP_NOIO); + sring = alloc_pages_exact(ring_size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO); if (!sring) { xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, -ENOMEM, "allocating shared ring"); return -ENOMEM; @@ -2311,7 +2311,8 @@ static int blkfront_setup_indirect(struc

BUG_ON(!list_empty(&rinfo->indirect_pages)); for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { - struct page *indirect_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO); + struct page *indirect_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO | + __GFP_ZERO); if (!indirect_page) goto out_of_memory; list_add(&indirect_page->lru, &rinfo->indirect_pages);

From: Roger Pau Monne roger.pau@citrix.com

commit 4491001c2e0fa69efbb748c96ec96b100a5cdb7e upstream.

Bounce all data on the skbs to be transmitted into zeroed pages if the backend is untrusted. This avoids leaking data present in the pages shared with the backend but not part of the skb fragments. This requires introducing a new helper in order to allocate skbs with a size multiple of XEN_PAGE_SIZE so we don't leak contiguous data on the granted pages.

Reporting whether the backend is to be trusted can be done using a module parameter, or from the xenstore frontend path as set by the toolstack when adding the device.

This is CVE-2022-33741, part of XSA-403.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné roger.pau@citrix.com Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ module_param_named(max_queues, xennet_ma MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_queues, "Maximum number of queues per virtual interface");

+static bool __read_mostly xennet_trusted = true; +module_param_named(trusted, xennet_trusted, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(trusted, "Is the backend trusted"); + #define XENNET_TIMEOUT (5 * HZ)

static const struct ethtool_ops xennet_ethtool_ops; @@ -162,6 +166,9 @@ struct netfront_info { /* Is device behaving sane? */ bool broken;

+ /* Should skbs be bounced into a zeroed buffer? */ + bool bounce; + atomic_t rx_gso_checksum_fixup; };

@@ -591,6 +598,34 @@ static void xennet_mark_tx_pending(struc queue->tx_link[i] = TX_PENDING; }

+struct sk_buff *bounce_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + unsigned int headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); + /* Align size to allocate full pages and avoid contiguous data leaks */ + unsigned int size = ALIGN(skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len, + XEN_PAGE_SIZE); + struct sk_buff *n = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_ZERO); + + if (!n) + return NULL; + + if (!IS_ALIGNED((uintptr_t)n->head, XEN_PAGE_SIZE)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "misaligned skb allocated\n"); + kfree_skb(n); + return NULL; + } + + /* Set the data pointer */ + skb_reserve(n, headerlen); + /* Set the tail pointer and length */ + skb_put(n, skb->len); + + BUG_ON(skb_copy_bits(skb, -headerlen, n->head, headerlen + skb->len)); + + skb_copy_header(n, skb); + return n; +} + #define MAX_XEN_SKB_FRAGS (65536 / XEN_PAGE_SIZE + 1)

static int xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) @@ -643,9 +678,13 @@ static int xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_b

/* The first req should be at least ETH_HLEN size or the packet will be * dropped by netback. + * + * If the backend is not trusted bounce all data to zeroed pages to + * avoid exposing contiguous data on the granted page not belonging to + * the skb. */ - if (unlikely(PAGE_SIZE - offset < ETH_HLEN)) { - nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (np->bounce || unlikely(PAGE_SIZE - offset < ETH_HLEN)) { + nskb = bounce_skb(skb); if (!nskb) goto drop; dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); @@ -1962,9 +2001,16 @@ static int talk_to_netback(struct xenbus unsigned int max_queues = 0; struct netfront_queue *queue = NULL; unsigned int num_queues = 1; + unsigned int trusted;

info->netdev->irq = 0;

+ /* Check if backend is trusted. */ + err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, dev->nodename, "trusted", "%u", &trusted); + if (err < 0) + trusted = 1; + info->bounce = !xennet_trusted || !trusted; + /* Check if backend supports multiple queues */ err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, info->xbdev->otherend, "multi-queue-max-queues", "%u", &max_queues); @@ -2129,6 +2175,9 @@ static int xennet_connect(struct net_dev err = talk_to_netback(np->xbdev, np); if (err) return err; + if (np->bounce) + dev_info(&np->xbdev->dev, + "bouncing transmitted data to zeroed pages\n");

/* talk_to_netback() sets the correct number of queues */ num_queues = dev->real_num_tx_queues;

From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com

commit b75cd218274e01d026dc5240e86fdeb44bbed0c8 upstream.

During the PV driver life cycle the mappings are added to the RB-tree by set_foreign_p2m_mapping(), which is called from gnttab_map_refs() and are removed by clear_foreign_p2m_mapping() which is called from gnttab_unmap_refs(). As both functions end up calling __set_phys_to_machine_multi() which updates the RB-tree, this function can be called concurrently.

There is already a "p2m_lock" to protect against concurrent accesses, but the problem is that the first read of "phys_to_mach.rb_node" in __set_phys_to_machine_multi() is not covered by it, so this might lead to the incorrect mappings update (removing in our case) in RB-tree.

In my environment the related issue happens rarely and only when PV net backend is running, the xen_add_phys_to_mach_entry() claims that it cannot add new pfn <-> mfn mapping to the tree since it is already exists which results in a failure when mapping foreign pages.

But there might be other bad consequences related to the non-protected root reads such use-after-free, etc.

While at it, also fix the similar usage in __pfn_to_mfn(), so initialize "struct rb_node *n" with the "p2m_lock" held in both functions to avoid possible bad consequences.

This is CVE-2022-33744 / XSA-406.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini sstabellini@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm/xen/p2m.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c +++ b/arch/arm/xen/p2m.c @@ -61,11 +61,12 @@ out:

unsigned long __pfn_to_mfn(unsigned long pfn) { - struct rb_node *n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; + struct rb_node *n; struct xen_p2m_entry *entry; unsigned long irqflags;

read_lock_irqsave(&p2m_lock, irqflags); + n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; while (n) { entry = rb_entry(n, struct xen_p2m_entry, rbnode_phys); if (entry->pfn <= pfn && @@ -151,10 +152,11 @@ bool __set_phys_to_machine_multi(unsigne int rc; unsigned long irqflags; struct xen_p2m_entry *p2m_entry; - struct rb_node *n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; + struct rb_node *n;

if (mfn == INVALID_P2M_ENTRY) { write_lock_irqsave(&p2m_lock, irqflags); + n = phys_to_mach.rb_node; while (n) { p2m_entry = rb_entry(n, struct xen_p2m_entry, rbnode_phys); if (p2m_entry->pfn <= pfn &&

From: Daniele Palmas dnlplm@gmail.com

commit b4e467c82f8c12af78b6f6fa5730cb7dea7af1b4 upstream.

Added support for Telit LE910Cx 0x1260 and 0x1261 compositions.

Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas dnlplm@gmail.com Acked-by: Bjørn Mork bjorn@mork.no Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Cc: Fabio Porcedda fabio.porcedda@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -932,6 +932,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1101, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 dual modem */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1201, 2)}, /* Telit LE920, LE920A4 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1260, 2)}, /* Telit LE910Cx */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1261, 2)}, /* Telit LE910Cx */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1900, 1)}, /* Telit LN940 series */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1c9e, 0x9801, 3)}, /* Telewell TW-3G HSPA+ */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1c9e, 0x9803, 4)}, /* Telewell TW-3G HSPA+ */

From: Carlo Lobrano c.lobrano@gmail.com

commit 8d17a33b076d24aa4861f336a125c888fb918605 upstream.

This patch adds support for Telit LN920 0x1060 composition

0x1060: tty, adb, rmnet, tty, tty, tty, tty

Signed-off-by: Carlo Lobrano c.lobrano@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Cc: Fabio Porcedda fabio.porcedda@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -928,6 +928,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1031, 3)}, /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1040, 2)}, /* Telit LE922A */ {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1050, 2)}, /* Telit FN980 */ + {QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1060, 2)}, /* Telit LN920 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1100, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1101, 3)}, /* Telit ME910 dual modem */ {QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1200, 5)}, /* Telit LE920 */