October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH iwl-net 2/2] idpf: fix idpf_vc_core_init error path

by Pavan Kumar Linga

In an event where the platform running the device control plane is rebooted, reset is detected on the driver. It releases all the resources and waits for the reset to complete. Once the reset is done, it tries to build the resources back. At this time if the device control plane is not yet started, then the driver timeouts on the virtchnl message and retries to establish the mailbox again. In the retry flow, mailbox is deinitialized but the mailbox workqueue is still alive and polling for the mailbox message. This results in accessing the released control queue leading to null-ptr-deref. Fix it by unrolling the work queue cancellation and mailbox deinitialization in the order which they got initialized. Also remove the redundant scheduling of the mailbox task in idpf_vc_core_init. Fixes: 4930fbf419a7 ("idpf: add core init and interrupt request") Fixes: 34c21fa894a1 ("idpf: implement virtchnl transaction manager") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.9+ Reviewed-by: Tarun K Singh <tarun.k.singh(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pavan Kumar Linga <pavan.kumar.linga(a)intel.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c index c3848e10e7db..b4fbb99bfad2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_lib.c @@ -1786,6 +1786,7 @@ static int idpf_init_hard_reset(struct idpf_adapter *adapter) */ err = idpf_vc_core_init(adapter); if (err) { + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&adapter->mbx_task); idpf_deinit_dflt_mbx(adapter); goto unlock_mutex; } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c index 3be883726b87..d77d6c3805e2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c @@ -3017,11 +3017,6 @@ int idpf_vc_core_init(struct idpf_adapter *adapter) goto err_netdev_alloc; } - /* Start the mailbox task before requesting vectors. This will ensure - * vector information response from mailbox is handled - */ - queue_delayed_work(adapter->mbx_wq, &adapter->mbx_task, 0); - queue_delayed_work(adapter->serv_wq, &adapter->serv_task, msecs_to_jiffies(5 * (adapter->pdev->devfn & 0x07))); @@ -3046,7 +3041,6 @@ int idpf_vc_core_init(struct idpf_adapter *adapter) err_intr_req: cancel_delayed_work_sync(&adapter->serv_task); - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&adapter->mbx_task); idpf_vport_params_buf_rel(adapter); err_netdev_alloc: kfree(adapter->vports); @@ -3070,7 +3064,6 @@ int idpf_vc_core_init(struct idpf_adapter *adapter) adapter->state = __IDPF_VER_CHECK; if (adapter->vcxn_mngr) idpf_vc_xn_shutdown(adapter->vcxn_mngr); - idpf_deinit_dflt_mbx(adapter); set_bit(IDPF_HR_DRV_LOAD, adapter->flags); queue_delayed_work(adapter->vc_event_wq, &adapter->vc_event_task, msecs_to_jiffies(task_delay)); -- 2.43.0

8 months, 3 weeks

3
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[PATCH v1] usb: typec: tcpm: restrict SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES_TIMEOUT transitions to non self-powered devices

by Amit Sunil Dhamne

PD3.1 spec ("8.3.3.3.3 PE_SNK_Wait_for_Capabilities State") mandates that the policy engine perform a hard reset when SinkWaitCapTimer expires. Instead the code explicitly does a GET_SOURCE_CAP when the timer expires as part of SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES_TIMEOUT. Due to this the following compliance test failures are reported by the compliance tester (added excerpts from the PD Test Spec): * COMMON.PROC.PD.2#1: The Tester receives a Get_Source_Cap Message from the UUT. This message is valid except the following conditions: [COMMON.PROC.PD.2#1] a. The check fails if the UUT sends this message before the Tester has established an Explicit Contract ... * TEST.PD.PROT.SNK.4: ... 4. The check fails if the UUT does not send a Hard Reset between tTypeCSinkWaitCap min and max. [TEST.PD.PROT.SNK.4#1] The delay is between the VBUS present vSafe5V min and the time of the first bit of Preamble of the Hard Reset sent by the UUT. For the purpose of interoperability, restrict the quirk introduced in https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240523171806.223727-1-sebastian.reichel@colla… to only non self-powered devices as battery powered devices will not have the issue mentioned in that commit. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 122968f8dda8 ("usb: typec: tcpm: avoid resets for missing source capability messages") Reported-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri(a)google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPTae5LAwsVugb0dxuKLHFqncjeZeJ785nkY4Jfd+M-tCj… Signed-off-by: Amit Sunil Dhamne <amitsd(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri(a)google.com> --- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c index d6f2412381cf..c8f467d24fbb 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c @@ -4515,7 +4515,8 @@ static inline enum tcpm_state hard_reset_state(struct tcpm_port *port) return ERROR_RECOVERY; if (port->pwr_role == TYPEC_SOURCE) return SRC_UNATTACHED; - if (port->state == SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES_TIMEOUT) + if (port->state == SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES || + port->state == SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES_TIMEOUT) return SNK_READY; return SNK_UNATTACHED; } @@ -5043,8 +5044,11 @@ static void run_state_machine(struct tcpm_port *port) tcpm_set_state(port, SNK_SOFT_RESET, PD_T_SINK_WAIT_CAP); } else { - tcpm_set_state(port, SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES_TIMEOUT, - PD_T_SINK_WAIT_CAP); + if (!port->self_powered) + upcoming_state = SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES_TIMEOUT; + else + upcoming_state = hard_reset_state(port); + tcpm_set_state(port, upcoming_state, PD_T_SINK_WAIT_CAP); } break; case SNK_WAIT_CAPABILITIES_TIMEOUT: base-commit: c6d9e43954bfa7415a1e9efdb2806ec1d8a8afc8 -- 2.47.0.105.g07ac214952-goog

8 months, 3 weeks

4
3
0 0

[PATCH] nvmet-auth: assign dh_key to NULL after kfree_sensitive

by Vitaliy Shevtsov

ctrl->dh_key might be used across multiple calls to nvmet_setup_dhgroup() for the same controller. So it's better to nullify it after release on error path in order to avoid double free later in nvmet_destroy_auth(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace. Fixes: 7a277c37d352 ("nvmet-auth: Diffie-Hellman key exchange support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vitaliy Shevtsov <v.shevtsov(a)maxima.ru> --- drivers/nvme/target/auth.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c index e900525b7866..7bca64de4a2f 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ int nvmet_setup_dhgroup(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, u8 dhgroup_id) pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d failed to generate private key, err %d\n", __func__, ctrl->cntlid, ret); kfree_sensitive(ctrl->dh_key); + ctrl->dh_key = NULL; return ret; } ctrl->dh_keysize = crypto_kpp_maxsize(ctrl->dh_tfm); -- 2.46.1

8 months, 3 weeks

5
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[PATCH v3] mmc: core: Use GFP_NOIO in ACMD22

by Avri Altman

While reviewing the SDUC series, Adrian made a comment concerning the memory allocation code in mmc_sd_num_wr_blocks() - see [1]. Prevent memory allocations from triggering I/O operations while ACMD22 is in progress. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mmc/3016fd71-885b-4ef9-97ed-46b4b0cb0e35@inte… Suggested-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter(a)intel.com> Fixes: 051913dada04 ("mmc_block: do not DMA to stack") Signed-off-by: Avri Altman <avri.altman(a)wdc.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- Changes since v2: - Fix checkpatch warnings (Adrian) Changes since v1: - Move memalloc_noio_restore around (Adrian) --- drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/block.c b/drivers/mmc/core/block.c index 04f3165cf9ae..a813fd7f39cc 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/core/block.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/core/block.c @@ -995,6 +995,8 @@ static int mmc_sd_num_wr_blocks(struct mmc_card *card, u32 *written_blocks) u32 result; __be32 *blocks; u8 resp_sz = mmc_card_ult_capacity(card) ? 8 : 4; + unsigned int noio_flag; + struct mmc_request mrq = {}; struct mmc_command cmd = {}; struct mmc_data data = {}; @@ -1018,7 +1020,9 @@ static int mmc_sd_num_wr_blocks(struct mmc_card *card, u32 *written_blocks) mrq.cmd = &cmd; mrq.data = &data; + noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save(); blocks = kmalloc(resp_sz, GFP_KERNEL); + memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag); if (!blocks) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.25.1

8 months, 3 weeks

2
1
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[PATCH v7 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Change to bug. v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 78c650ce4c9f..6e52785de9fd 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, sha256_final(&sctx, out); } -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) { struct crypto_kpp *kpp; struct kpp_request *req; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); kpp_request_free(req); @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it * writes the salt */ - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, - chip->auth->salt); + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); out: crypto_free_kpp(kpp); @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } else { /* reset for next use */ auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) */ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + struct tpm2_auth *auth; struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int rc; u32 null_key; + int rc; - if (!auth) { - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); return 0; } + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; /* salt key handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } - out: +err: + kfree(auth); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); @@ -1377,10 +1388,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->auth) - return -ENOMEM; - return rc; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ -- 2.47.0

8 months, 3 weeks

2
4
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[PATCH 4.19] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] [cascardo: keep check for 64MiB size limit] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 60b3f16bb5c7..c35aab9f2447 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -536,6 +536,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + + if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) + return -EFBIG; + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -544,23 +554,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -EFBIG; - if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count); if (length) { @@ -579,6 +581,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

8 months, 3 weeks

1
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[PATCH 5.4] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] [cascardo: keep check for 64MiB size limit] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index e9eaff90cbcc..fd6282fa9c39 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -535,6 +535,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + + if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) + return -EFBIG; + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -543,23 +553,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -EFBIG; - if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count); if (length) { @@ -578,6 +580,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

8 months, 3 weeks

1
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[PATCH 5.10] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index d893c2280f59..7415f49a3d81 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -620,6 +620,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -628,26 +635,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count, &load_state); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy); if (length) { selinux_policy_cancel(fsi->state, &load_state); @@ -655,13 +657,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } selinux_policy_commit(fsi->state, &load_state); - length = count; - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

8 months, 3 weeks

1
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[PATCH 5.15] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index f2f6203e0fff..13be7826ae80 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -619,6 +619,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -627,26 +634,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count, &load_state); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n"); @@ -655,13 +657,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } selinux_policy_commit(fsi->state, &load_state); - length = count; - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

8 months, 3 weeks

1
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[PATCH 6.1] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index a00d19139436..ab804d4ea911 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -621,6 +621,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -629,26 +636,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count, &load_state); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n"); @@ -657,13 +659,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } selinux_policy_commit(fsi->state, &load_state); - length = count; - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

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Linux-stable-mirror October 2024