October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 4.19] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] [cascardo: keep check for 64MiB size limit] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 60b3f16bb5c7..c35aab9f2447 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -536,6 +536,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + + if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) + return -EFBIG; + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -544,23 +554,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -EFBIG; - if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count); if (length) { @@ -579,6 +581,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

1 year

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[PATCH 5.4] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] [cascardo: keep check for 64MiB size limit] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index e9eaff90cbcc..fd6282fa9c39 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -535,6 +535,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + + if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) + return -EFBIG; + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -543,23 +553,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -EFBIG; - if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count); if (length) { @@ -578,6 +580,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

1 year

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[PATCH 5.10] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index d893c2280f59..7415f49a3d81 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -620,6 +620,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -628,26 +635,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count, &load_state); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy); if (length) { selinux_policy_cancel(fsi->state, &load_state); @@ -655,13 +657,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } selinux_policy_commit(fsi->state, &load_state); - length = count; - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

1 year

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[PATCH 5.15] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index f2f6203e0fff..13be7826ae80 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -619,6 +619,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -627,26 +634,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count, &load_state); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n"); @@ -655,13 +657,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } selinux_policy_commit(fsi->state, &load_state); - length = count; - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

1 year

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[PATCH 6.1] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index a00d19139436..ab804d4ea911 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -621,6 +621,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -629,26 +636,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count, &load_state); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n"); @@ -657,13 +659,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } selinux_policy_commit(fsi->state, &load_state); - length = count; - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->state->policy_mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

1 year

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[PATCH 6.6] selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()

by Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo

From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> [ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 2c23a5a28608..54bc18e8164b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -582,11 +582,18 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info; + struct selinux_fs_info *fsi; struct selinux_load_state load_state; ssize_t length; void *data = NULL; + /* no partial writes */ + if (*ppos) + return -EINVAL; + /* no empty policies */ + if (!count) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, @@ -594,26 +601,22 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (length) goto out; - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); - if (!data) + if (!data) { + length = -ENOMEM; goto out; - - length = -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) + } + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + length = -EFAULT; goto out; + } length = security_load_policy(data, count, &load_state); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; } - + fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info; length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi, load_state.policy); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to initialize selinuxfs\n"); @@ -622,13 +625,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } selinux_policy_commit(&load_state); - length = count; - audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, "auid=%u ses=%u lsm=selinux res=1", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); + out: mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); vfree(data); -- 2.34.1

1 year

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[PATCH] nfs: Fix KMSAN warning in decode_getfattr_attrs()

by Roberto Sassu

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Fix the following KMSAN warning: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 7651 Comm: cp Tainted: G B Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009) ===================================================== ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in decode_getfattr_attrs+0x2d6d/0x2f90 decode_getfattr_attrs+0x2d6d/0x2f90 decode_getfattr_generic+0x806/0xb00 nfs4_xdr_dec_getattr+0x1de/0x240 rpcauth_unwrap_resp_decode+0xab/0x100 rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0x95/0xc0 call_decode+0x4ff/0xb50 __rpc_execute+0x57b/0x19d0 rpc_execute+0x368/0x5e0 rpc_run_task+0xcfe/0xee0 nfs4_proc_getattr+0x5b5/0x990 __nfs_revalidate_inode+0x477/0xd00 nfs_access_get_cached+0x1021/0x1cc0 nfs_do_access+0x9f/0xae0 nfs_permission+0x1e4/0x8c0 inode_permission+0x356/0x6c0 link_path_walk+0x958/0x1330 path_lookupat+0xce/0x6b0 filename_lookup+0x23e/0x770 vfs_statx+0xe7/0x970 vfs_fstatat+0x1f2/0x2c0 __se_sys_newfstatat+0x67/0x880 __x64_sys_newfstatat+0xbd/0x120 x64_sys_call+0x1826/0x3cf0 do_syscall_64+0xd0/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The KMSAN warning is triggered in decode_getfattr_attrs(), when calling decode_attr_mdsthreshold(). It appears that fattr->mdsthreshold is not initialized. Fix the issue by initializing fattr->mdsthreshold to NULL in nfs_fattr_init(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v3.5.x Fixes: 88034c3d88c2 ("NFSv4.1 mdsthreshold attribute xdr") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfs/inode.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/inode.c b/fs/nfs/inode.c index 542c7d97b235..1e71b029da58 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/nfs/inode.c @@ -1633,6 +1633,7 @@ void nfs_fattr_init(struct nfs_fattr *fattr) fattr->gencount = nfs_inc_attr_generation_counter(); fattr->owner_name = NULL; fattr->group_name = NULL; + fattr->mdsthreshold = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_fattr_init); -- 2.47.0.118.gfd3785337b

1 year

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[PATCH 6.1.y 5.15.y 5.10.y] driver core: bus: Fix double free in driver API bus_register()

by Tomas Krcka

From: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> [ Upstream commit bfa54a793ba77ef696755b66f3ac4ed00c7d1248 ] For bus_register(), any error which happens after kset_register() will cause that @priv are freed twice, fixed by setting @priv with NULL after the first free. Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240727-bus_register_fix-v1-1-fed8dd0dba7a@quici… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tomas Krcka <krckatom(a)amazon.de> --- drivers/base/bus.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/bus.c b/drivers/base/bus.c index 339a9edcde5f..8fae7c700cc9 100644 --- a/drivers/base/bus.c +++ b/drivers/base/bus.c @@ -853,6 +853,8 @@ int bus_register(struct bus_type *bus) bus_remove_file(bus, &bus_attr_uevent); bus_uevent_fail: kset_unregister(&bus->p->subsys); + /* Above kset_unregister() will kfree @priv */ + priv = NULL; out: kfree(bus->p); bus->p = NULL; -- 2.40.1

1 year

2
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[PATCH] KVM: arm64: Don't eagerly teardown the vgic on init error

by Marc Zyngier

As there is very little ordering in the KVM API, userspace can instanciate a half-baked GIC (missing its memory map, for example) at almost any time. This means that, with the right timing, a thread running vcpu-0 can enter the kernel without a GIC configured and get a GIC created behind its back by another thread. Amusingly, it will pick up that GIC and start messing with the data structures without the GIC having been fully initialised. Similarly, a thread running vcpu-1 can enter the kernel, and try to init the GIC that was previously created. Since this GIC isn't properly configured (no memory map), it fails to correctly initialise. And that's the point where we decide to teardown the GIC, freeing all its resources. Behind vcpu-0's back. Things stop pretty abruptly, with a variety of symptoms. Clearly, this isn't good, we should be a bit more careful about this. It is obvious that this guest is not viable, as it is missing some important part of its configuration. So instead of trying to tear bits of it down, let's just mark it as *dead*. It means that any further interaction from userspace will result in -EIO. The memory will be released on the "normal" path, when userspace gives up. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index a0d01c46e4084..b97ada19f06a7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -997,6 +997,9 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_suspend(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static int check_vcpu_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu)) { + if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD, vcpu)) + return -EIO; + if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SLEEP, vcpu)) kvm_vcpu_sleep(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c index e7c53e8af3d16..c4cbf798e71a4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c @@ -536,10 +536,10 @@ int kvm_vgic_map_resources(struct kvm *kvm) out: mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.config_lock); out_slots: - mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); - if (ret) - kvm_vgic_destroy(kvm); + kvm_vm_dead(kvm); + + mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); return ret; } -- 2.39.2

1 year

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E-DEKONT

by Ziraat

İşlemlerinize ilişkin e-dekontlarınız ekte gönderilmiştir. İyi günler dileriz. Bu mail otomatik olarak bilgilendirme amacıyla gönderilmiştir. Lütfen cevaplamayınız. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankası Anonim Şirketi, Finanskent Mahallesi, Finans Caddesi No:44A Ümraniye/İstanbul Ticaret Sicil No:475225-5 Mersis No: 0998006967505633 | www.ziraatbank.com.tr

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Linux-stable-mirror October 2024