June 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 1/2] scsi: core: Introduce the BLIST_SKIP_IO_HINTS flag

by Bart Van Assche

Prepare for skipping reading the IO hints VPD page for USB storage devices. Cc: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Joao Machado <jocrismachado(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com> Cc: Christian Heusel <christian(a)heusel.eu> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4f53138fffc2 ("scsi: sd: Translate data lifetime information") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> --- drivers/scsi/sd.c | 4 ++++ include/scsi/scsi_devinfo.h | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sd.c b/drivers/scsi/sd.c index 3a43e2209751..fcf3d7730466 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/sd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sd.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include <scsi/scsi_cmnd.h> #include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h> #include <scsi/scsi_device.h> +#include <scsi/scsi_devinfo.h> #include <scsi/scsi_driver.h> #include <scsi/scsi_eh.h> #include <scsi/scsi_host.h> @@ -3117,6 +3118,9 @@ static void sd_read_io_hints(struct scsi_disk *sdkp, unsigned char *buffer) struct scsi_mode_data data; int res; + if (sdp->sdev_bflags & BLIST_SKIP_IO_HINTS) + return; + res = scsi_mode_sense(sdp, /*dbd=*/0x8, /*modepage=*/0x0a, /*subpage=*/0x05, buffer, SD_BUF_SIZE, SD_TIMEOUT, sdkp->max_retries, &data, &sshdr); diff --git a/include/scsi/scsi_devinfo.h b/include/scsi/scsi_devinfo.h index 6b548dc2c496..fa8721e49dec 100644 --- a/include/scsi/scsi_devinfo.h +++ b/include/scsi/scsi_devinfo.h @@ -69,8 +69,10 @@ #define BLIST_RETRY_ITF ((__force blist_flags_t)(1ULL << 32)) /* Always retry ABORTED_COMMAND with ASC 0xc1 */ #define BLIST_RETRY_ASC_C1 ((__force blist_flags_t)(1ULL << 33)) +/* Do not read the I/O hints mode page */ +#define BLIST_SKIP_IO_HINTS ((__force blist_flags_t)(1ULL << 34)) -#define __BLIST_LAST_USED BLIST_RETRY_ASC_C1 +#define __BLIST_LAST_USED BLIST_SKIP_IO_HINTS #define __BLIST_HIGH_UNUSED (~(__BLIST_LAST_USED | \ (__force blist_flags_t) \

1 year

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[PATCH] f2fs: fix to force buffered IO on inline_data inode

by Chao Yu

It will return all zero data when DIO reading from inline_data inode, it is because f2fs_iomap_begin() assign iomap->type w/ IOMAP_HOLE incorrectly for this case. We can let iomap framework handle inline data via assigning iomap->type and iomap->inline_data correctly, however, it will be a little bit complicated when handling race case in between direct IO and buffered IO. So, let's force to use buffered IO to fix this issue. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua(a)oppo.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/file.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c index db6236f27852..e038910ad1e5 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/file.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c @@ -851,6 +851,8 @@ static bool f2fs_force_buffered_io(struct inode *inode, int rw) return true; if (f2fs_compressed_file(inode)) return true; + if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) + return true; /* disallow direct IO if any of devices has unaligned blksize */ if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi) && !sbi->aligned_blksize) -- 2.40.1

1 year

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[PATCH] f2fs: fix to don't dirty inode for readonly filesystem

by Chao Yu

syzbot reports f2fs bug as below: kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:933! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1576/0x1590 fs/f2fs/inode.c:933 Call Trace: evict+0x2a4/0x620 fs/inode.c:664 dispose_list fs/inode.c:697 [inline] evict_inodes+0x5f8/0x690 fs/inode.c:747 generic_shutdown_super+0x9d/0x2c0 fs/super.c:675 kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1667 kill_f2fs_super+0x303/0x3b0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4894 deactivate_locked_super+0xc1/0x130 fs/super.c:484 cleanup_mnt+0x426/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1256 task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180 ptrace_notify+0x2cd/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2399 ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:411 [inline] ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:473 [inline] syscall_exit_work kernel/entry/common.c:251 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:278 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x15c/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:88 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b The root cause is: - do_sys_open - f2fs_lookup - __f2fs_find_entry - f2fs_i_depth_write - f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync - f2fs_dirty_inode - set_inode_flag(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE) - umount - kill_f2fs_super - kill_block_super - generic_shutdown_super - sync_filesystem : sb is readonly, skip sync_filesystem() - evict_inodes - iput - f2fs_evict_inode - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)) : trigger kernel panic When we try to repair i_current_depth in readonly filesystem, let's skip dirty inode to avoid panic in later f2fs_evict_inode(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+31e4659a3fe953aec2f4(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/000000000000e890bc0609a55cff@googl… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 8f2b9f62ef73..64cda1d77fe5 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ void f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync(struct inode *inode, bool sync) if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NEW_INODE)) return; + if (f2fs_readonly(F2FS_I_SB(inode)->sb)) + return; + if (f2fs_inode_dirtied(inode, sync)) return; -- 2.40.1

1 year

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[PATCH] f2fs: fix return value of f2fs_convert_inline_inode()

by Chao Yu

If device is readonly, make f2fs_convert_inline_inode() return EROFS instead of zero, otherwise it may trigger panic during writeback of inline inode's dirty page as below: f2fs_write_single_data_page+0xbb6/0x1e90 fs/f2fs/data.c:2888 f2fs_write_cache_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3187 [inline] __f2fs_write_data_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3342 [inline] f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1efe/0x3a90 fs/f2fs/data.c:3369 do_writepages+0x359/0x870 mm/page-writeback.c:2634 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x125/0x180 mm/filemap.c:397 __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:430 [inline] file_write_and_wait_range+0x1aa/0x290 mm/filemap.c:788 f2fs_do_sync_file+0x68a/0x1ae0 fs/f2fs/file.c:276 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2806 [inline] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x7bd/0x24e0 fs/f2fs/file.c:4977 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2114 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0xa72/0xc90 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+848062ba19c8782ca5c8(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/000000000000d103ce06174d7ec3@googl… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/inline.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inline.c b/fs/f2fs/inline.c index 0203c3baabb6..1fba5728be70 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c @@ -221,8 +221,10 @@ int f2fs_convert_inline_inode(struct inode *inode) struct page *ipage, *page; int err = 0; - if (!f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) || - f2fs_hw_is_readonly(sbi) || f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb)) + if (f2fs_hw_is_readonly(sbi) || f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb)) + return -EROFS; + + if (!f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) return 0; err = f2fs_dquot_initialize(inode); -- 2.40.1

1 year

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Re: [PATCH net] net: fix __dst_negative_advice() race

by Lee Jones

On Tue, 28 May 2024, Eric Dumazet wrote: > __dst_negative_advice() does not enforce proper RCU rules when > sk->dst_cache must be cleared, leading to possible UAF. > > RCU rules are that we must first clear sk->sk_dst_cache, > then call dst_release(old_dst). > > Note that sk_dst_reset(sk) is implementing this protocol correctly, > while __dst_negative_advice() uses the wrong order. > > Given that ip6_negative_advice() has special logic > against RTF_CACHE, this means each of the three ->negative_advice() > existing methods must perform the sk_dst_reset() themselves. > > Note the check against NULL dst is centralized in > __dst_negative_advice(), there is no need to duplicate > it in various callbacks. > > Many thanks to Clement Lecigne for tracking this issue. > > This old bug became visible after the blamed commit, using UDP sockets. > > Fixes: a87cb3e48ee8 ("net: Facility to report route quality of connected sockets") > Reported-by: Clement Lecigne <clecigne(a)google.com> > Diagnosed-by: Clement Lecigne <clecigne(a)google.com> > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> > Cc: Tom Herbert <tom(a)herbertland.com> > --- > include/net/dst_ops.h | 2 +- > include/net/sock.h | 13 +++---------- > net/ipv4/route.c | 22 ++++++++-------------- > net/ipv6/route.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- > net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 11 +++-------- > 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) Could we have this patch in all Stable branches please? Upstream commit: Fixes: 92f1655aa2b2 ("net: fix __dst_negative_advice() race") -- Lee Jones [李琼斯]

1 year

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061235-hatchet-upriver-8fa7@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 0a960ba49869 ("proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tyler Hicks (Microsoft)" <code(a)tyhicks.com> Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 19:56:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The following commits loosened the permissions of /proc/<PID>/fdinfo/ directory, as well as the files within it, from 0500 to 0555 while also introducing a PTRACE_MODE_READ check between the current task and <PID>'s task: - commit 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") - commit 1927e498aee1 ("procfs: prevent unprivileged processes accessing fdinfo dir") Before those changes, inode based system calls like inotify_add_watch(2) would fail when the current task didn't have sufficient read permissions: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0500, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This matches the documented behavior in the inotify_add_watch(2) man page: ERRORS EACCES Read access to the given file is not permitted. After those changes, inotify_add_watch(2) started succeeding despite the current task not having PTRACE_MODE_READ privileges on the target task: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = 1757 openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This change in behavior broke .NET prior to v7. See the github link below for the v7 commit that inadvertently/quietly (?) fixed .NET after the kernel changes mentioned above. Return to the old behavior by moving the PTRACE_MODE_READ check out of the file .open operation and into the inode .permission operation: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] Reported-by: Kevin Parsons (Microsoft) <parsonskev(a)gmail.com> Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/commit/89e5469ac591b82d38510fe7de98346cce… Link: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/75379065/start-self-contained-net6-buil… Fixes: 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh(a)google.com> Cc: Hardik Garg <hargar(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Allen Pais <apais(a)linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks (Microsoft) <code(a)tyhicks.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501005646.745089-1-code@tyhicks.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 6e72e5ad42bc..f4b1c8b42a51 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -74,7 +74,18 @@ static int seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) +static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); +} + +/** + * Shared /proc/pid/fdinfo and /proc/pid/fdinfo/fd permission helper to ensure + * that the current task has PTRACE_MODE_READ in addition to the normal + * POSIX-like checks. + */ +static int proc_fdinfo_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, + int mask) { bool allowed = false; struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -88,18 +99,13 @@ static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) if (!allowed) return -EACCES; - return 0; + return generic_permission(idmap, inode, mask); } -static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); -} +static const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations = { + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, +}; static const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_file_operations = { .open = seq_fdinfo_open, @@ -388,6 +394,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, ei = PROC_I(inode); ei->fd = data->fd; + inode->i_op = &proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations; tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, 0); @@ -407,23 +415,13 @@ static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) proc_fdinfo_instantiate); } -static int proc_open_fdinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return 0; -} - const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = { .lookup = proc_lookupfdinfo, + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, .setattr = proc_setattr, }; const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = { - .open = proc_open_fdinfo, .read = generic_read_dir, .iterate_shared = proc_readfdinfo, .llseek = generic_file_llseek,

1 year

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061233-cacti-revered-a821@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 0a960ba49869 ("proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tyler Hicks (Microsoft)" <code(a)tyhicks.com> Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 19:56:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The following commits loosened the permissions of /proc/<PID>/fdinfo/ directory, as well as the files within it, from 0500 to 0555 while also introducing a PTRACE_MODE_READ check between the current task and <PID>'s task: - commit 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") - commit 1927e498aee1 ("procfs: prevent unprivileged processes accessing fdinfo dir") Before those changes, inode based system calls like inotify_add_watch(2) would fail when the current task didn't have sufficient read permissions: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0500, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This matches the documented behavior in the inotify_add_watch(2) man page: ERRORS EACCES Read access to the given file is not permitted. After those changes, inotify_add_watch(2) started succeeding despite the current task not having PTRACE_MODE_READ privileges on the target task: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = 1757 openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This change in behavior broke .NET prior to v7. See the github link below for the v7 commit that inadvertently/quietly (?) fixed .NET after the kernel changes mentioned above. Return to the old behavior by moving the PTRACE_MODE_READ check out of the file .open operation and into the inode .permission operation: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] Reported-by: Kevin Parsons (Microsoft) <parsonskev(a)gmail.com> Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/commit/89e5469ac591b82d38510fe7de98346cce… Link: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/75379065/start-self-contained-net6-buil… Fixes: 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh(a)google.com> Cc: Hardik Garg <hargar(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Allen Pais <apais(a)linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks (Microsoft) <code(a)tyhicks.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501005646.745089-1-code@tyhicks.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 6e72e5ad42bc..f4b1c8b42a51 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -74,7 +74,18 @@ static int seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) +static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); +} + +/** + * Shared /proc/pid/fdinfo and /proc/pid/fdinfo/fd permission helper to ensure + * that the current task has PTRACE_MODE_READ in addition to the normal + * POSIX-like checks. + */ +static int proc_fdinfo_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, + int mask) { bool allowed = false; struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -88,18 +99,13 @@ static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) if (!allowed) return -EACCES; - return 0; + return generic_permission(idmap, inode, mask); } -static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); -} +static const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations = { + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, +}; static const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_file_operations = { .open = seq_fdinfo_open, @@ -388,6 +394,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, ei = PROC_I(inode); ei->fd = data->fd; + inode->i_op = &proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations; tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, 0); @@ -407,23 +415,13 @@ static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) proc_fdinfo_instantiate); } -static int proc_open_fdinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return 0; -} - const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = { .lookup = proc_lookupfdinfo, + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, .setattr = proc_setattr, }; const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = { - .open = proc_open_fdinfo, .read = generic_read_dir, .iterate_shared = proc_readfdinfo, .llseek = generic_file_llseek,

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[PATCH v2 net] bnx2x: Fix multiple UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds

by Ghadi Elie Rahme

Fix UBSAN warnings that occur when using a system with 32 physical cpu cores or more, or when the user defines a number of Ethernet queues greater than or equal to FP_SB_MAX_E1x using the num_queues module parameter. The value of the maximum number of Ethernet queues should be limited to FP_SB_MAX_E1x in case FCOE is disabled or to [FP_SB_MAX_E1x-1] if enabled to avoid out of bounds reads and writes. Stack traces: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_stats.c:1529:11 index 20 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]' CPU: 12 PID: 858 Comm: systemd-network Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic #202405052133 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/21/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xcb/0x110 bnx2x_prep_fw_stats_req+0x2e1/0x310 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_init+0x156/0x320 [bnx2x] bnx2x_post_irq_nic_init+0x81/0x1a0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_nic_load+0x8e8/0x19e0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_open+0x16b/0x290 [bnx2x] __dev_open+0x10e/0x1d0 RIP: 0033:0x736223927a0a Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc0bb2ada8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000583df50f9c78 RCX: 0000736223927a0a RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000583df50ee510 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000583df50d4940 R08: 00007ffc0bb2adb0 R09: 0000000000000080 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000583df5103ae0 R13: 000000000000035a R14: 0000583df50f9c30 R15: 0000583ddddddf00 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_stats.c:1546:11 index 28 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]' CPU: 12 PID: 858 Comm: systemd-network Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic #202405052133 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/21/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xcb/0x110 bnx2x_prep_fw_stats_req+0x2fd/0x310 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_init+0x156/0x320 [bnx2x] bnx2x_post_irq_nic_init+0x81/0x1a0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_nic_load+0x8e8/0x19e0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_open+0x16b/0x290 [bnx2x] __dev_open+0x10e/0x1d0 RIP: 0033:0x736223927a0a Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc0bb2ada8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000583df50f9c78 RCX: 0000736223927a0a RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000583df50ee510 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000583df50d4940 R08: 00007ffc0bb2adb0 R09: 0000000000000080 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000583df5103ae0 R13: 000000000000035a R14: 0000583df50f9c30 R15: 0000583ddddddf00 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_sriov.c:1895:8 index 29 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]' CPU: 13 PID: 163 Comm: kworker/u96:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic #202405052133 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/21/2019 Workqueue: bnx2x bnx2x_sp_task [bnx2x] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xcb/0x110 bnx2x_iov_adjust_stats_req+0x3c4/0x3d0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_storm_stats_post.part.0+0x4a/0x330 [bnx2x] ? bnx2x_hw_stats_post+0x231/0x250 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_start+0x44/0x70 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_handle+0x149/0x350 [bnx2x] bnx2x_attn_int_asserted+0x998/0x9b0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_sp_task+0x491/0x5c0 [bnx2x] process_one_work+0x18d/0x3f0 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 7d0445d66a76 ("bnx2x: clamp num_queues to prevent passing a negative value") Signed-off-by: Ghadi Elie Rahme <ghadi.rahme(a)canonical.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- Changes since v1: * Fix checkpatch complaints: - Wrapped commit message to comply with 75 character limit - Added space before ( in if condition drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c index a8e07e51418f..c895dd680cf8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c @@ -66,7 +66,12 @@ static int bnx2x_calc_num_queues(struct bnx2x *bp) if (is_kdump_kernel()) nq = 1; - nq = clamp(nq, 1, BNX2X_MAX_QUEUES(bp)); + int max_nq = FP_SB_MAX_E1x - 1; + + if (NO_FCOE(bp)) + max_nq = FP_SB_MAX_E1x; + + nq = clamp(nq, 1, max_nq); return nq; } -- 2.43.0

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061242-cosmetics-bronco-9d06@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: f592cc579474 ("soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request") 778279f4f5e4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: allow loading as a module") d6815c5c43d4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: Add debugfs dumping file") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:55:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte aligned addresses associated with it. These control voltage, enable state, mode, and in legacy targets, voltage headroom. The current in-flight request checking logic looks for exact address matches. Requests for different addresses of the same RPMh resource as thus not detected as in-flight. Add new cmd-db API cmd_db_match_resource_addr() to enhance the in-flight request check for VRM requests by ignoring the address offset. This ensures that only one request is allowed to be in-flight for a given VRM resource. This is needed to avoid scenarios where request commands are carried out by RPMh hardware out-of-order leading to LDO regulator over-current protection triggering. Fixes: 658628e7ef78 ("drivers: qcom: rpmh-rsc: add RPMH controller for QCOM SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Elliot Berman <quic_eberman(a)quicinc.com> # sm8650-qrd Signed-off-by: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215-rpmh-rsc-fixes-v4-1-9cbddfcba05b@quicinc… Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c index c344107bc36c..b4e613c34a5c 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -17,6 +21,8 @@ #define MAX_SLV_ID 8 #define SLAVE_ID_MASK 0x7 #define SLAVE_ID_SHIFT 16 +#define SLAVE_ID(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 16), addr) +#define VRM_ADDR(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 4), addr) /** * struct entry_header: header for each entry in cmddb @@ -220,6 +226,30 @@ const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *id, size_t *len) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_read_aux_data); +/** + * cmd_db_match_resource_addr() - Compare if both Resource addresses are same + * + * @addr1: Resource address to compare + * @addr2: Resource address to compare + * + * Return: true if two addresses refer to the same resource, false otherwise + */ +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ + /* + * Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte + * aligned addresses associated with it. Ignore the offset to check + * for VRM requests. + */ + if (addr1 == addr2) + return true; + else if (SLAVE_ID(addr1) == CMD_DB_HW_VRM && VRM_ADDR(addr1) == VRM_ADDR(addr2)) + return true; + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_match_resource_addr); + /** * cmd_db_read_slave_id - Get the slave ID for a given resource address * diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c index c4c7aad957e6..561d8037b50a 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "%s " fmt, KBUILD_MODNAME @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ static int check_for_req_inflight(struct rsc_drv *drv, struct tcs_group *tcs, for_each_set_bit(j, &curr_enabled, MAX_CMDS_PER_TCS) { addr = read_tcs_cmd(drv, drv->regs[RSC_DRV_CMD_ADDR], i, j); for (k = 0; k < msg->num_cmds; k++) { - if (addr == msg->cmds[k].addr) + if (cmd_db_match_resource_addr(msg->cmds[k].addr, addr)) return -EBUSY; } } diff --git a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h index c8bb56e6852a..47a6cab75e63 100644 --- a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h +++ b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ #ifndef __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ #define __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ @@ -21,6 +24,8 @@ u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id); const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len); +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2); + enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id); int cmd_db_ready(void); @@ -31,6 +36,9 @@ static inline u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id) static inline const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len) { return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); } +static inline bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ return false; } + static inline enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id) { return -ENODEV; }

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061241-obscurity-phonics-bd3b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: f592cc579474 ("soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request") 778279f4f5e4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: allow loading as a module") d6815c5c43d4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: Add debugfs dumping file") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:55:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte aligned addresses associated with it. These control voltage, enable state, mode, and in legacy targets, voltage headroom. The current in-flight request checking logic looks for exact address matches. Requests for different addresses of the same RPMh resource as thus not detected as in-flight. Add new cmd-db API cmd_db_match_resource_addr() to enhance the in-flight request check for VRM requests by ignoring the address offset. This ensures that only one request is allowed to be in-flight for a given VRM resource. This is needed to avoid scenarios where request commands are carried out by RPMh hardware out-of-order leading to LDO regulator over-current protection triggering. Fixes: 658628e7ef78 ("drivers: qcom: rpmh-rsc: add RPMH controller for QCOM SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Elliot Berman <quic_eberman(a)quicinc.com> # sm8650-qrd Signed-off-by: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215-rpmh-rsc-fixes-v4-1-9cbddfcba05b@quicinc… Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c index c344107bc36c..b4e613c34a5c 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -17,6 +21,8 @@ #define MAX_SLV_ID 8 #define SLAVE_ID_MASK 0x7 #define SLAVE_ID_SHIFT 16 +#define SLAVE_ID(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 16), addr) +#define VRM_ADDR(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 4), addr) /** * struct entry_header: header for each entry in cmddb @@ -220,6 +226,30 @@ const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *id, size_t *len) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_read_aux_data); +/** + * cmd_db_match_resource_addr() - Compare if both Resource addresses are same + * + * @addr1: Resource address to compare + * @addr2: Resource address to compare + * + * Return: true if two addresses refer to the same resource, false otherwise + */ +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ + /* + * Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte + * aligned addresses associated with it. Ignore the offset to check + * for VRM requests. + */ + if (addr1 == addr2) + return true; + else if (SLAVE_ID(addr1) == CMD_DB_HW_VRM && VRM_ADDR(addr1) == VRM_ADDR(addr2)) + return true; + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_match_resource_addr); + /** * cmd_db_read_slave_id - Get the slave ID for a given resource address * diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c index c4c7aad957e6..561d8037b50a 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "%s " fmt, KBUILD_MODNAME @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ static int check_for_req_inflight(struct rsc_drv *drv, struct tcs_group *tcs, for_each_set_bit(j, &curr_enabled, MAX_CMDS_PER_TCS) { addr = read_tcs_cmd(drv, drv->regs[RSC_DRV_CMD_ADDR], i, j); for (k = 0; k < msg->num_cmds; k++) { - if (addr == msg->cmds[k].addr) + if (cmd_db_match_resource_addr(msg->cmds[k].addr, addr)) return -EBUSY; } } diff --git a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h index c8bb56e6852a..47a6cab75e63 100644 --- a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h +++ b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ #ifndef __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ #define __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ @@ -21,6 +24,8 @@ u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id); const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len); +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2); + enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id); int cmd_db_ready(void); @@ -31,6 +36,9 @@ static inline u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id) static inline const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len) { return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); } +static inline bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ return false; } + static inline enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id) { return -ENODEV; }

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Linux-stable-mirror June 2024