April 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 0/2] Stable-6.6 backport x86/xen: fix memblock_reserve() usage on PVH

by Jason Andryuk

For stable-6.6. ("x86/xen: fix memblock_reserve() usage on PVH") is the fix, but it depends on ("x86/xen: move xen_reserve_extra_memory()") as a prerequisite. Both need fixups as they predate the removal of the Xen hypercall_page. Roger Pau Monne (2): x86/xen: move xen_reserve_extra_memory() x86/xen: fix memblock_reserve() usage on PVH arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypervisor.h | 5 -- arch/x86/platform/pvh/enlighten.c | 3 - arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pvh.c | 93 +++++++++++++++------------ 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) -- 2.49.0

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 6.1.y] bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks

by jianqi.ren.cn＠windriver.com

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai(a)huawei.com> [ Upstream commit 28ead3eaabc16ecc907cfb71876da028080f6356 ] bpf progs can be attached to kernel functions, and the attached functions can take different parameters or return different return values. If prog attached to one kernel function tail calls prog attached to another kernel function, the ctx access or return value verification could be bypassed. For example, if prog1 is attached to func1 which takes only 1 parameter and prog2 is attached to func2 which takes two parameters. Since verifier assumes the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed based on func2's prototype, verifier allows prog2 to access the second parameter from the bpf ctx passed to it. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from passing its bpf ctx to prog2 via tail call. In this case, the bpf ctx passed to prog2 is constructed from func1 instead of func2, that is, the assumption for ctx access verification is bypassed. Another example, if BPF LSM prog1 is attached to hook file_alloc_security, and BPF LSM prog2 is attached to hook bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known. Verifier knows the return value rules for these two hooks, e.g. it is legal for bpf_lsm_audit_rule_known to return positive number 1, and it is illegal for file_alloc_security to return positive number. So verifier allows prog2 to return positive number 1, but does not allow prog1 to return positive number. The problem is that verifier does not prevent prog1 from calling prog2 via tail call. In this case, prog2's return value 1 will be used as the return value for prog1's hook file_alloc_security. That is, the return value rule is bypassed. This patch adds restriction for tail call to prevent such bypasses. Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719110059.797546-4-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> [Minor conflict resolved due to code context change.] Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he(a)windriver.com> --- Verified the build test --- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 2189c0d18fa7..e9c1338851e3 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ struct bpf_map { * same prog type, JITed flag and xdp_has_frags flag. */ struct { + const struct btf_type *attach_func_proto; spinlock_t lock; enum bpf_prog_type type; bool jited; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 83b416af4da1..c281f5b8705e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -2121,6 +2121,7 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, { enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(fp); bool ret; + struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = fp->aux; if (fp->kprobe_override) return false; @@ -2132,12 +2133,26 @@ bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map, */ map->owner.type = prog_type; map->owner.jited = fp->jited; - map->owner.xdp_has_frags = fp->aux->xdp_has_frags; + map->owner.xdp_has_frags = aux->xdp_has_frags; + map->owner.attach_func_proto = aux->attach_func_proto; ret = true; } else { ret = map->owner.type == prog_type && map->owner.jited == fp->jited && - map->owner.xdp_has_frags == fp->aux->xdp_has_frags; + map->owner.xdp_has_frags == aux->xdp_has_frags; + if (ret && + map->owner.attach_func_proto != aux->attach_func_proto) { + switch (prog_type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS: + ret = false; + break; + default: + break; + } + } } spin_unlock(&map->owner.lock); -- 2.34.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 6.1.y] bpf: avoid holding freeze_mutex during mmap operation

by David Sauerwein

From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit bc27c52eea189e8f7492d40739b7746d67b65beb ] We use map->freeze_mutex to prevent races between map_freeze() and memory mapping BPF map contents with writable permissions. The way we naively do this means we'll hold freeze_mutex for entire duration of all the mm and VMA manipulations, which is completely unnecessary. This can potentially also lead to deadlocks, as reported by syzbot in [0]. So, instead, hold freeze_mutex only during writeability checks, bump (proactively) "write active" count for the map, unlock the mutex and proceed with mmap logic. And only if something went wrong during mmap logic, then undo that "write active" counter increment. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/678dcbc9.050a0220.303755.0066.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: fc9702273e2e ("bpf: Add mmap() support for BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY") Reported-by: syzbot+4dc041c686b7c816a71e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129012246.1515826-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Sauerwein <dssauerw(a)amazon.de> --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 7a4004f09bae..27fdf1b2fc46 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct bpf_map_default_vmops = { static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct bpf_map *map = filp->private_data; - int err; + int err = 0; if (!map->ops->map_mmap || map_value_has_spin_lock(map) || map_value_has_timer(map) || map_value_has_kptrs(map)) @@ -838,7 +838,12 @@ static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) err = -EACCES; goto out; } + bpf_map_write_active_inc(map); } +out: + mutex_unlock(&map->freeze_mutex); + if (err) + return err; /* set default open/close callbacks */ vma->vm_ops = &bpf_map_default_vmops; @@ -849,13 +854,11 @@ static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; err = map->ops->map_mmap(map, vma); - if (err) - goto out; + if (err) { + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) + bpf_map_write_active_dec(map); + } - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE) - bpf_map_write_active_inc(map); -out: - mutex_unlock(&map->freeze_mutex); return err; } -- 2.47.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH v6.13] nfsd: don't ignore the return code of svc_proc_register()

by cel＠kernel.org

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit 930b64ca0c511521f0abdd1d57ce52b2a6e3476b ] Currently, nfsd_proc_stat_init() ignores the return value of svc_proc_register(). If the procfile creation fails, then the kernel will WARN when it tries to remove the entry later. Fix nfsd_proc_stat_init() to return the same type of pointer as svc_proc_register(), and fix up nfsd_net_init() to check that and fail the nfsd_net construction if it occurs. svc_proc_register() can fail if the dentry can't be allocated, or if an identical dentry already exists. The second case is pretty unlikely in the nfsd_net construction codepath, so if this happens, return -ENOMEM. Reported-by: syzbot+e34ad04f27991521104c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/67a47501.050a0220.19061f.05f9.GAE@google.… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 9 ++++++++- fs/nfsd/stats.c | 4 ++-- fs/nfsd/stats.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) I did not have any problem cherry-picking 930b64 onto v6.13.11. This built and ran some simple NFSD tests in my lab. diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c index e83629f39604..2e835e7c107e 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c @@ -2244,8 +2244,14 @@ static __net_init int nfsd_net_init(struct net *net) NFSD_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM); if (retval) goto out_repcache_error; + memset(&nn->nfsd_svcstats, 0, sizeof(nn->nfsd_svcstats)); nn->nfsd_svcstats.program = &nfsd_programs[0]; + if (!nfsd_proc_stat_init(net)) { + retval = -ENOMEM; + goto out_proc_error; + } + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nn->nfsd_versions); i++) nn->nfsd_versions[i] = nfsd_support_version(i); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nn->nfsd4_minorversions); i++) @@ -2255,12 +2261,13 @@ static __net_init int nfsd_net_init(struct net *net) nfsd4_init_leases_net(nn); get_random_bytes(&nn->siphash_key, sizeof(nn->siphash_key)); seqlock_init(&nn->writeverf_lock); - nfsd_proc_stat_init(net); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NFS_LOCALIO) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nn->local_clients); #endif return 0; +out_proc_error: + percpu_counter_destroy_many(nn->counter, NFSD_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM); out_repcache_error: nfsd_idmap_shutdown(net); out_idmap_error: diff --git a/fs/nfsd/stats.c b/fs/nfsd/stats.c index bb22893f1157..f7eaf95e20fc 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/stats.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/stats.c @@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ static int nfsd_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(nfsd); -void nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net) +struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net) { struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id); - svc_proc_register(net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops); + return svc_proc_register(net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops); } void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown(struct net *net) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/stats.h b/fs/nfsd/stats.h index 04aacb6c36e2..e4efb0e4e56d 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/stats.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/stats.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ #include <uapi/linux/nfsd/stats.h> #include <linux/percpu_counter.h> -void nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net); +struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net); void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown(struct net *net); static inline void nfsd_stats_rc_hits_inc(struct nfsd_net *nn) -- 2.47.0

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 5.10.y] bpf: avoid holding freeze_mutex during mmap operation

by David Sauerwein

From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit bc27c52eea189e8f7492d40739b7746d67b65beb ] We use map->freeze_mutex to prevent races between map_freeze() and memory mapping BPF map contents with writable permissions. The way we naively do this means we'll hold freeze_mutex for entire duration of all the mm and VMA manipulations, which is completely unnecessary. This can potentially also lead to deadlocks, as reported by syzbot in [0]. So, instead, hold freeze_mutex only during writeability checks, bump (proactively) "write active" count for the map, unlock the mutex and proceed with mmap logic. And only if something went wrong during mmap logic, then undo that "write active" counter increment. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/678dcbc9.050a0220.303755.0066.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: fc9702273e2e ("bpf: Add mmap() support for BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY") Reported-by: syzbot+4dc041c686b7c816a71e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129012246.1515826-2-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Sauerwein <dssauerw(a)amazon.de> --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 008bb4e5c4dd..dc3d9a111cf1 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct bpf_map_default_vmops = { static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) { struct bpf_map *map = filp->private_data; - int err; + int err = 0; if (!map->ops->map_mmap || map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) return -ENOTSUPP; @@ -671,7 +671,12 @@ static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) err = -EACCES; goto out; } + bpf_map_write_active_inc(map); } +out: + mutex_unlock(&map->freeze_mutex); + if (err) + return err; /* set default open/close callbacks */ vma->vm_ops = &bpf_map_default_vmops; @@ -682,13 +687,11 @@ static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; err = map->ops->map_mmap(map, vma); - if (err) - goto out; + if (err) { + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) + bpf_map_write_active_dec(map); + } - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE) - bpf_map_write_active_inc(map); -out: - mutex_unlock(&map->freeze_mutex); return err; } -- 2.47.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 6.1.y] block: make bio_check_eod work for zero sized devices

by Miguel García

From: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> commit 3eb96946f0be6bf447cbdf219aba22bc42672f92 upstream. This patch is a backport. Since the dawn of time bio_check_eod has a check for a non-zero size of the device. This doesn't really make any sense as we never want to send I/O to a device that's been set to zero size, or never moved out of that. I am a bit surprised we haven't caught this for a long time, but the removal of the extra validation inside of zram caused syzbot to trip over this issue recently. I've added a Fixes tag for that commit, but the issue really goes back way before git history. Fixes: 9fe95babc742 ("zram: remove valid_io_request") Reported-by: syzbot+2aca91e1d3ae43aef10c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Bug: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2aca91e1d3ae43aef10c Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524060538.1593686-1-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> (cherry picked from commit 3eb96946f0be6bf447cbdf219aba22bc42672f92) Signed-off-by: Miguel García <miguelgarciaroman8(a)gmail.com> --- block/blk-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/blk-core.c b/block/blk-core.c index 94941e3ce219..6a66f4f6912f 100644 --- a/block/blk-core.c +++ b/block/blk-core.c @@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static inline int bio_check_eod(struct bio *bio) sector_t maxsector = bdev_nr_sectors(bio->bi_bdev); unsigned int nr_sectors = bio_sectors(bio); - if (nr_sectors && maxsector && + if (nr_sectors && (nr_sectors > maxsector || bio->bi_iter.bi_sector > maxsector - nr_sectors)) { pr_info_ratelimited("%s: attempt to access beyond end of device\n" -- 2.34.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 5.15.y] fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats

by David Sauerwein

From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 7601df8031fd67310af891897ef6cc0df4209305 ] lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call do_task_stat() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, it will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time. Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock to gather the statistics outside of ->siglock protected section, in the likely case this code will run lockless. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240123153357.GA21857@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch(a)google.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Sauerwein <dssauerw(a)amazon.de> --- fs/proc/array.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index c925287a4dc4..2cb01aaa6718 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -462,12 +462,12 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, int permitted; struct mm_struct *mm; unsigned long long start_time; - unsigned long cmin_flt = 0, cmaj_flt = 0; - unsigned long min_flt = 0, maj_flt = 0; - u64 cutime, cstime, utime, stime; - u64 cgtime, gtime; + unsigned long cmin_flt, cmaj_flt, min_flt, maj_flt; + u64 cutime, cstime, cgtime, utime, stime, gtime; unsigned long rsslim = 0; unsigned long flags; + struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; + unsigned int seq = 1; state = *get_task_state(task); vsize = eip = esp = 0; @@ -495,12 +495,8 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, sigemptyset(&sigign); sigemptyset(&sigcatch); - cutime = cstime = 0; - cgtime = gtime = 0; if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) { - struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; - if (sig->tty) { struct pid *pgrp = tty_get_pgrp(sig->tty); tty_pgrp = pid_nr_ns(pgrp, ns); @@ -511,36 +507,45 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, num_threads = get_nr_threads(task); collect_sigign_sigcatch(task, &sigign, &sigcatch); + rsslim = READ_ONCE(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur); + + sid = task_session_nr_ns(task, ns); + ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(task->real_parent, ns); + pgid = task_pgrp_nr_ns(task, ns); + + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + } + + if (permitted && (!whole || num_threads < 2)) + wchan = !task_is_running(task); + + do { + seq++; /* 2 on the 1st/lockless path, otherwise odd */ + flags = read_seqbegin_or_lock_irqsave(&sig->stats_lock, &seq); + cmin_flt = sig->cmin_flt; cmaj_flt = sig->cmaj_flt; cutime = sig->cutime; cstime = sig->cstime; cgtime = sig->cgtime; - rsslim = READ_ONCE(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur); - /* add up live thread stats at the group level */ if (whole) { struct task_struct *t = task; + + min_flt = sig->min_flt; + maj_flt = sig->maj_flt; + gtime = sig->gtime; + + rcu_read_lock(); do { min_flt += t->min_flt; maj_flt += t->maj_flt; gtime += task_gtime(t); } while_each_thread(task, t); - - min_flt += sig->min_flt; - maj_flt += sig->maj_flt; - gtime += sig->gtime; + rcu_read_unlock(); } - - sid = task_session_nr_ns(task, ns); - ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(task->real_parent, ns); - pgid = task_pgrp_nr_ns(task, ns); - - unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); - } - - if (permitted && (!whole || num_threads < 2)) - wchan = !task_is_running(task); + } while (need_seqretry(&sig->stats_lock, seq)); + done_seqretry_irqrestore(&sig->stats_lock, seq, flags); if (whole) { thread_group_cputime_adjusted(task, &utime, &stime); -- 2.47.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 5.10.y] fs/proc: do_task_stat: use sig->stats_lock to gather the threads/children stats

by David Sauerwein

From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 7601df8031fd67310af891897ef6cc0df4209305 ] lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call do_task_stat() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, it will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time. Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock to gather the statistics outside of ->siglock protected section, in the likely case this code will run lockless. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240123153357.GA21857@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch(a)google.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Sauerwein <dssauerw(a)amazon.de> --- fs/proc/array.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 18a4588c35be..8fba6d39e776 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -443,12 +443,12 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, int permitted; struct mm_struct *mm; unsigned long long start_time; - unsigned long cmin_flt = 0, cmaj_flt = 0; - unsigned long min_flt = 0, maj_flt = 0; - u64 cutime, cstime, utime, stime; - u64 cgtime, gtime; + unsigned long cmin_flt, cmaj_flt, min_flt, maj_flt; + u64 cutime, cstime, cgtime, utime, stime, gtime; unsigned long rsslim = 0; unsigned long flags; + struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; + unsigned int seq = 1; state = *get_task_state(task); vsize = eip = esp = 0; @@ -476,12 +476,9 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, sigemptyset(&sigign); sigemptyset(&sigcatch); - cutime = cstime = utime = stime = 0; - cgtime = gtime = 0; + utime = stime = 0; if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) { - struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; - if (sig->tty) { struct pid *pgrp = tty_get_pgrp(sig->tty); tty_pgrp = pid_nr_ns(pgrp, ns); @@ -492,37 +489,48 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, num_threads = get_nr_threads(task); collect_sigign_sigcatch(task, &sigign, &sigcatch); + rsslim = READ_ONCE(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur); + + sid = task_session_nr_ns(task, ns); + ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(task->real_parent, ns); + pgid = task_pgrp_nr_ns(task, ns); + + unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); + } + + if (permitted && (!whole || num_threads < 2)) + wchan = get_wchan(task); + + do { + seq++; /* 2 on the 1st/lockless path, otherwise odd */ + flags = read_seqbegin_or_lock_irqsave(&sig->stats_lock, &seq); + cmin_flt = sig->cmin_flt; cmaj_flt = sig->cmaj_flt; cutime = sig->cutime; cstime = sig->cstime; cgtime = sig->cgtime; - rsslim = READ_ONCE(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur); - /* add up live thread stats at the group level */ if (whole) { struct task_struct *t = task; + + min_flt = sig->min_flt; + maj_flt = sig->maj_flt; + gtime = sig->gtime; + + rcu_read_lock(); do { min_flt += t->min_flt; maj_flt += t->maj_flt; gtime += task_gtime(t); } while_each_thread(task, t); + rcu_read_unlock(); - min_flt += sig->min_flt; - maj_flt += sig->maj_flt; thread_group_cputime_adjusted(task, &utime, &stime); - gtime += sig->gtime; } + } while (need_seqretry(&sig->stats_lock, seq)); + done_seqretry_irqrestore(&sig->stats_lock, seq, flags); - sid = task_session_nr_ns(task, ns); - ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(task->real_parent, ns); - pgid = task_pgrp_nr_ns(task, ns); - - unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags); - } - - if (permitted && (!whole || num_threads < 2)) - wchan = get_wchan(task); if (!whole) { min_flt = task->min_flt; maj_flt = task->maj_flt; -- 2.47.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 5.10.y] powerpc/rtas: Prevent Spectre v1 gadget construction in sys_rtas()

by Cliff Liu

From: Nathan Lynch <nathanl(a)linux.ibm.com> [ Upstream commit 0974d03eb479384466d828d65637814bee6b26d7 ] Smatch warns: arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:1932 __do_sys_rtas() warn: potential spectre issue 'args.args' [r] (local cap) The 'nargs' and 'nret' locals come directly from a user-supplied buffer and are used as indexes into a small stack-based array and as inputs to copy_to_user() after they are subject to bounds checks. Use array_index_nospec() after the bounds checks to clamp these values for speculative execution. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl(a)linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240530-sys_rtas-nargs-nret-v1-1-129acddd4d89@linux.ibm… Signed-off-by: Cliff Liu <donghua.liu(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <Zhe.He(a)windriver.com> --- Verified the powerpc build test. --- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c index 5976a25c6264..a8299981798a 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/completion.h> @@ -1173,6 +1174,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rtas, struct rtas_args __user *, uargs) || nargs + nret > ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)) return -EINVAL; + nargs = array_index_nospec(nargs, ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)); + nret = array_index_nospec(nret, ARRAY_SIZE(args.args) - nargs); + /* Copy in args. */ if (copy_from_user(args.args, uargs->args, nargs * sizeof(rtas_arg_t)) != 0) -- 2.34.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 6.6.y] powerpc/rtas: Prevent Spectre v1 gadget construction in sys_rtas()

by Cliff Liu

From: Nathan Lynch <nathanl(a)linux.ibm.com> [ Upstream commit 0974d03eb479384466d828d65637814bee6b26d7 ] Smatch warns: arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:1932 __do_sys_rtas() warn: potential spectre issue 'args.args' [r] (local cap) The 'nargs' and 'nret' locals come directly from a user-supplied buffer and are used as indexes into a small stack-based array and as inputs to copy_to_user() after they are subject to bounds checks. Use array_index_nospec() after the bounds checks to clamp these values for speculative execution. Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl(a)linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240530-sys_rtas-nargs-nret-v1-1-129acddd4d89@linux.ibm… [Minor context change fixed] Signed-off-by: Cliff Liu <donghua.liu(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <Zhe.He(a)windriver.com> --- Verified the powerpc build test. --- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c index 46b9476d7582..dc294c95da21 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/lockdep.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/reboot.h> @@ -1839,6 +1840,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rtas, struct rtas_args __user *, uargs) || nargs + nret > ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)) return -EINVAL; + nargs = array_index_nospec(nargs, ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)); + nret = array_index_nospec(nret, ARRAY_SIZE(args.args) - nargs); + /* Copy in args. */ if (copy_from_user(args.args, uargs->args, nargs * sizeof(rtas_arg_t)) != 0) -- 2.34.1

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