From: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 930b64ca0c511521f0abdd1d57ce52b2a6e3476b ]
Currently, nfsd_proc_stat_init() ignores the return value of
svc_proc_register(). If the procfile creation fails, then the kernel
will WARN when it tries to remove the entry later.
Fix nfsd_proc_stat_init() to return the same type of pointer as
svc_proc_register(), and fix up nfsd_net_init() to check that and fail
the nfsd_net construction if it occurs.
svc_proc_register() can fail if the dentry can't be allocated, or if an
identical dentry already exists. The second case is pretty unlikely in
the nfsd_net construction codepath, so if this happens, return -ENOMEM.
Reported-by: syzbot+e34ad04f27991521104c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/67a47501.050a0220.19061f.05f9.GAE@google.…
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com>
---
fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 9 ++++++++-
fs/nfsd/stats.c | 4 ++--
fs/nfsd/stats.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
I did not have any problem cherry-picking 930b64 onto v6.13.11. This
built and ran some simple NFSD tests in my lab.
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
index e83629f39604..2e835e7c107e 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
@@ -2244,8 +2244,14 @@ static __net_init int nfsd_net_init(struct net *net)
NFSD_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
if (retval)
goto out_repcache_error;
+
memset(&nn->nfsd_svcstats, 0, sizeof(nn->nfsd_svcstats));
nn->nfsd_svcstats.program = &nfsd_programs[0];
+ if (!nfsd_proc_stat_init(net)) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_proc_error;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nn->nfsd_versions); i++)
nn->nfsd_versions[i] = nfsd_support_version(i);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nn->nfsd4_minorversions); i++)
@@ -2255,12 +2261,13 @@ static __net_init int nfsd_net_init(struct net *net)
nfsd4_init_leases_net(nn);
get_random_bytes(&nn->siphash_key, sizeof(nn->siphash_key));
seqlock_init(&nn->writeverf_lock);
- nfsd_proc_stat_init(net);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NFS_LOCALIO)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&nn->local_clients);
#endif
return 0;
+out_proc_error:
+ percpu_counter_destroy_many(nn->counter, NFSD_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
out_repcache_error:
nfsd_idmap_shutdown(net);
out_idmap_error:
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/stats.c b/fs/nfsd/stats.c
index bb22893f1157..f7eaf95e20fc 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/stats.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/stats.c
@@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ static int nfsd_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(nfsd);
-void nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net)
+struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
- svc_proc_register(net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops);
+ return svc_proc_register(net, &nn->nfsd_svcstats, &nfsd_proc_ops);
}
void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown(struct net *net)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/stats.h b/fs/nfsd/stats.h
index 04aacb6c36e2..e4efb0e4e56d 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/stats.h
+++ b/fs/nfsd/stats.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/nfsd/stats.h>
#include <linux/percpu_counter.h>
-void nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net);
+struct proc_dir_entry *nfsd_proc_stat_init(struct net *net);
void nfsd_proc_stat_shutdown(struct net *net);
static inline void nfsd_stats_rc_hits_inc(struct nfsd_net *nn)
--
2.47.0
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bc27c52eea189e8f7492d40739b7746d67b65beb ]
We use map->freeze_mutex to prevent races between map_freeze() and
memory mapping BPF map contents with writable permissions. The way we
naively do this means we'll hold freeze_mutex for entire duration of all
the mm and VMA manipulations, which is completely unnecessary. This can
potentially also lead to deadlocks, as reported by syzbot in [0].
So, instead, hold freeze_mutex only during writeability checks, bump
(proactively) "write active" count for the map, unlock the mutex and
proceed with mmap logic. And only if something went wrong during mmap
logic, then undo that "write active" counter increment.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/678dcbc9.050a0220.303755.0066.GAE@google.com/
Fixes: fc9702273e2e ("bpf: Add mmap() support for BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY")
Reported-by: syzbot+4dc041c686b7c816a71e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250129012246.1515826-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Sauerwein <dssauerw(a)amazon.de>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 008bb4e5c4dd..dc3d9a111cf1 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct bpf_map_default_vmops = {
static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct bpf_map *map = filp->private_data;
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
if (!map->ops->map_mmap || map_value_has_spin_lock(map))
return -ENOTSUPP;
@@ -671,7 +671,12 @@ static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
err = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
+ bpf_map_write_active_inc(map);
}
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&map->freeze_mutex);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
/* set default open/close callbacks */
vma->vm_ops = &bpf_map_default_vmops;
@@ -682,13 +687,11 @@ static int bpf_map_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
err = map->ops->map_mmap(map, vma);
- if (err)
- goto out;
+ if (err) {
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ bpf_map_write_active_dec(map);
+ }
- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)
- bpf_map_write_active_inc(map);
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&map->freeze_mutex);
return err;
}
--
2.47.1
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
commit 3eb96946f0be6bf447cbdf219aba22bc42672f92 upstream.
This patch is a backport.
Since the dawn of time bio_check_eod has a check for a non-zero size of
the device. This doesn't really make any sense as we never want to send
I/O to a device that's been set to zero size, or never moved out of that.
I am a bit surprised we haven't caught this for a long time, but the
removal of the extra validation inside of zram caused syzbot to trip
over this issue recently. I've added a Fixes tag for that commit, but
the issue really goes back way before git history.
Fixes: 9fe95babc742 ("zram: remove valid_io_request")
Reported-by: syzbot+2aca91e1d3ae43aef10c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Bug: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2aca91e1d3ae43aef10c
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524060538.1593686-1-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
(cherry picked from commit 3eb96946f0be6bf447cbdf219aba22bc42672f92)
Signed-off-by: Miguel García <miguelgarciaroman8(a)gmail.com>
---
block/blk-core.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/block/blk-core.c b/block/blk-core.c
index 94941e3ce219..6a66f4f6912f 100644
--- a/block/blk-core.c
+++ b/block/blk-core.c
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static inline int bio_check_eod(struct bio *bio)
sector_t maxsector = bdev_nr_sectors(bio->bi_bdev);
unsigned int nr_sectors = bio_sectors(bio);
- if (nr_sectors && maxsector &&
+ if (nr_sectors &&
(nr_sectors > maxsector ||
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector > maxsector - nr_sectors)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s: attempt to access beyond end of device\n"
--
2.34.1
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