April 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 5.10.y] vfio/pci: fix memory leak during D3hot to D0 transition

by Feng Liu

From: Abhishek Sahu <abhsahu(a)nvidia.com> [ Upstream commit eadf88ecf6ac7d6a9f47a76c6055d9a1987a8991 ] If 'vfio_pci_core_device::needs_pm_restore' is set (PCI device does not have No_Soft_Reset bit set in its PMCSR config register), then the current PCI state will be saved locally in 'vfio_pci_core_device::pm_save' during D0->D3hot transition and same will be restored back during D3hot->D0 transition. For saving the PCI state locally, pci_store_saved_state() is being used and the pci_load_and_free_saved_state() will free the allocated memory. But for reset related IOCTLs, vfio driver calls PCI reset-related API's which will internally change the PCI power state back to D0. So, when the guest resumes, then it will get the current state as D0 and it will skip the call to vfio_pci_set_power_state() for changing the power state to D0 explicitly. In this case, the memory pointed by 'pm_save' will never be freed. In a malicious sequence, the state changing to D3hot followed by VFIO_DEVICE_RESET/VFIO_DEVICE_PCI_HOT_RESET can be run in a loop and it can cause an OOM situation. This patch frees the earlier allocated memory first before overwriting 'pm_save' to prevent the mentioned memory leak. Fixes: 51ef3a004b1e ("vfio/pci: Restore device state on PM transition") Signed-off-by: Abhishek Sahu <abhsahu(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220217122107.22434-2-abhsahu@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson(a)redhat.com> [Minor context change fixed] Signed-off-by: Feng Liu <Feng.Liu3(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <Zhe.He(a)windriver.com> --- Verified the build test. --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c index 57ae8b46b836..7835712f730d 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c @@ -299,6 +299,19 @@ int vfio_pci_set_power_state(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, pci_power_t state) if (!ret) { /* D3 might be unsupported via quirk, skip unless in D3 */ if (needs_save && pdev->current_state >= PCI_D3hot) { + /* + * The current PCI state will be saved locally in + * 'pm_save' during the D3hot transition. When the + * device state is changed to D0 again with the current + * function, then pci_store_saved_state() will restore + * the state and will free the memory pointed by + * 'pm_save'. There are few cases where the PCI power + * state can be changed to D0 without the involvement + * of the driver. For these cases, free the earlier + * allocated memory first before overwriting 'pm_save' + * to prevent the memory leak. + */ + kfree(vdev->pm_save); vdev->pm_save = pci_store_saved_state(pdev); } else if (needs_restore) { pci_load_and_free_saved_state(pdev, &vdev->pm_save); -- 2.34.1

4 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 1/1] slab: ensure slab->obj_exts is clear in a newly allocated slab page

by Suren Baghdasaryan

ktest recently reported crashes while running several buffered io tests with __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook() at the top of the crash call stack. The signature indicates an invalid address dereference with low bits of slab->obj_exts being set. The bits were outside of the range used by page_memcg_data_flags and objext_flags and hence were not masked out by slab_obj_exts() when obtaining the pointer stored in slab->obj_exts. The typical crash log looks like this: 00510 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 00510 Mem abort info: 00510 ESR = 0x0000000096000045 00510 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits 00510 SET = 0, FnV = 0 00510 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 00510 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault 00510 Data abort info: 00510 ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000045, ISS2 = 0x00000000 00510 CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 00510 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 00510 user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000104175000 00510 [0000000000000010] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 00510 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000045 [#1] SMP 00510 Modules linked in: 00510 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 7692 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1-ktest-g189e17946605 #19327 NONE 00510 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 00510 pstate: 20001005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 00510 pc : __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0xe0/0x190 00510 lr : __kmalloc_noprof+0x150/0x310 00510 sp : ffffff80c87df6c0 00510 x29: ffffff80c87df6c0 x28: 000000000013d1ff x27: 000000000013d200 00510 x26: ffffff80c87df9e0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001 00510 x23: ffffffc08041953c x22: 000000000000004c x21: ffffff80c0002180 00510 x20: fffffffec3120840 x19: ffffff80c4821000 x18: 0000000000000000 00510 x17: fffffffec3d02f00 x16: fffffffec3d02e00 x15: fffffffec3d00700 00510 x14: fffffffec3d00600 x13: 0000000000000200 x12: 0000000000000006 00510 x11: ffffffc080bb86c0 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffc080201e58 00510 x8 : ffffff80c4821060 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000055555556 00510 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000010 x3 : 0000000000000060 00510 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffffffc080f50cf8 x0 : ffffff80d801d000 00510 Call trace: 00510 __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook+0xe0/0x190 (P) 00510 __kmalloc_noprof+0x150/0x310 00510 __bch2_folio_create+0x5c/0xf8 00510 bch2_folio_create+0x2c/0x40 00510 bch2_readahead+0xc0/0x460 00510 read_pages+0x7c/0x230 00510 page_cache_ra_order+0x244/0x3a8 00510 page_cache_async_ra+0x124/0x170 00510 filemap_readahead.isra.0+0x58/0xa0 00510 filemap_get_pages+0x454/0x7b0 00510 filemap_read+0xdc/0x418 00510 bch2_read_iter+0x100/0x1b0 00510 vfs_read+0x214/0x300 00510 ksys_read+0x6c/0x108 00510 __arm64_sys_read+0x20/0x30 00510 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8 00510 do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8 00510 el0_svc+0x18/0x58 00510 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130 00510 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 00510 Code: d5384100 f9401c01 b9401aa3 b40002e1 (f8227881) 00510 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 00510 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception 00510 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs 00510 Kernel Offset: disabled 00510 CPU features: 0x0000,000000e0,00000410,8240500b 00510 Memory Limit: none Investigation indicates that these bits are already set when we allocate slab page and are not zeroed out after allocation. We are not yet sure why these crashes start happening only recently but regardless of the reason, not initializing a field that gets used later is wrong. Fix it by initializing slab->obj_exts during slab page allocation. Fixes: 21c690a349ba ("mm: introduce slabobj_ext to support slab object extensions") Reported-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet(a)linux.dev> Tested-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet(a)linux.dev> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- mm/slub.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index b46f87662e71..dc9e729e1d26 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -1973,6 +1973,11 @@ static inline void handle_failed_objexts_alloc(unsigned long obj_exts, #define OBJCGS_CLEAR_MASK (__GFP_DMA | __GFP_RECLAIMABLE | \ __GFP_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOFAIL) +static inline void init_slab_obj_exts(struct slab *slab) +{ + slab->obj_exts = 0; +} + int alloc_slab_obj_exts(struct slab *slab, struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfp, bool new_slab) { @@ -2058,6 +2063,10 @@ static inline bool need_slab_obj_ext(void) #else /* CONFIG_SLAB_OBJ_EXT */ +static inline void init_slab_obj_exts(struct slab *slab) +{ +} + static int alloc_slab_obj_exts(struct slab *slab, struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfp, bool new_slab) { @@ -2637,6 +2646,7 @@ static struct slab *allocate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node) slab->objects = oo_objects(oo); slab->inuse = 0; slab->frozen = 0; + init_slab_obj_exts(slab); account_slab(slab, oo_order(oo), s, flags); base-commit: c496b37f9061db039b413c03ccd33506175fe6ec -- 2.49.0.604.gff1f9ca942-goog

4 months, 2 weeks

2
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[PATCH RESEND] brcm80211: fmac: Add error handling for brcmf_usb_dl_writeimage()

by Wentao Liang

The function brcmf_usb_dl_writeimage() calls the function brcmf_usb_dl_cmd() but dose not check its return value. The 'state.state' and the 'state.bytes' are uninitialized if the function brcmf_usb_dl_cmd() fails. It is dangerous to use uninitialized variables in the conditions. Add error handling for brcmf_usb_dl_cmd() to jump to error handling path if the brcmf_usb_dl_cmd() fails and the 'state.state' and the 'state.bytes' are uninitialized. Fixes: 71bb244ba2fd ("brcm80211: fmac: add USB support for bcm43235/6/8 chipsets") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v3.4+ Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c index 50dddac8a2ab..1c97cd777225 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c @@ -901,7 +901,9 @@ brcmf_usb_dl_writeimage(struct brcmf_usbdev_info *devinfo, u8 *fw, int fwlen) } /* 1) Prepare USB boot loader for runtime image */ - brcmf_usb_dl_cmd(devinfo, DL_START, &state, sizeof(state)); + err = brcmf_usb_dl_cmd(devinfo, DL_START, &state, sizeof(state)); + if (err) + goto fail; rdlstate = le32_to_cpu(state.state); rdlbytes = le32_to_cpu(state.bytes); -- 2.42.0.windows.2

4 months, 2 weeks

2
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[PATCH] drm/amdgpu: check a user-provided number of BOs in list

by Denis Arefev

The user can set any value to the variable ‘bo_number’, via the ioctl command DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_BO_LIST. This will affect the arithmetic expression ‘in->bo_number * in->bo_info_size’, which is prone to overflow. Add a valid value check. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 964d0fbf6301 ("drm/amdgpu: Allow to create BO lists in CS ioctl v3") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c index 702f6610d024..dd30d2426ff7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_bo_list.c @@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ int amdgpu_bo_create_list_entry_array(struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_in *in, struct drm_amdgpu_bo_list_entry *info; int r; + if (!in->bo_number || in->bo_number > UINT_MAX / info_size) + return -EINVAL; + info = kvmalloc_array(in->bo_number, info_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!info) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.43.0

4 months, 2 weeks

3
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[PATCH RESEND] fsi/core: fix error handling in fsi_slave_init()

by Ma Ke

Once cdev_device_add() failed, we should use put_device() to decrement reference count for cleanup. Or it could cause memory leak. Although operations in err_free_ida are similar to the operations in callback function fsi_slave_release(), put_device() is a correct handling operation as comments require when cdev_device_add() fails. As comment of device_add() says, 'if device_add() succeeds, you should call device_del() when you want to get rid of it. If device_add() has not succeeded, use only put_device() to drop the reference count'. Found by code review. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 371975b0b075 ("fsi/core: Fix error paths on CFAM init") Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/fsi/fsi-core.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/fsi/fsi-core.c b/drivers/fsi/fsi-core.c index 50e8736039fe..c494fc0bd747 100644 --- a/drivers/fsi/fsi-core.c +++ b/drivers/fsi/fsi-core.c @@ -1084,7 +1084,8 @@ static int fsi_slave_init(struct fsi_master *master, int link, uint8_t id) rc = cdev_device_add(&slave->cdev, &slave->dev); if (rc) { dev_err(&slave->dev, "Error %d creating slave device\n", rc); - goto err_free_ida; + put_device(&slave->dev); + return rc; } /* Now that we have the cdev registered with the core, any fatal @@ -1110,8 +1111,6 @@ static int fsi_slave_init(struct fsi_master *master, int link, uint8_t id) return 0; -err_free_ida: - fsi_free_minor(slave->dev.devt); err_free: of_node_put(slave->dev.of_node); kfree(slave); -- 2.25.1

4 months, 2 weeks

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Regression: mt7921e unable to change power state from d3cold to d0 - 6.12.x broken, past LTS 6.6.x works

by Sergio Callegari

There is a nasty regression wrt mt7921e in the last LTS series (6.12). If your computer crashes or fails to get out of hibernation, then at the next boot the mt7921e wifi does not work, with dmesg reporting that it is unable to change power state from d3cold to d0. The issue is nasty, because rebooting won't help. The only solution that I have found to the issue is booting a 6.6 kernel. With that the wife gets alive again. If, at this point, you boot into 6.12, everything seems to be fine again, until a boot fails and from that moment on you are without wifi. Working around the issue is not very discoverable. On my machine not even a hardware reset (40s of power off button pressed) helped alone, without going through the 6.6 kernel boot. I think the regression was introduced with 6.12 and I remember having no issues with previous kernels, but cannot be 100% sure. Similarly, I do not know if the bug is with the wifi card driver itself or with something related to PM or PCIe. The machine on which I am experiencing the issue is an Asus ROG 14 laptop (2022 edition), with AMD CPU and GPU. Thanks for the attention, Sergio

4 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 5.15.y 2/2] smb: client: fix NULL ptr deref in crypto_aead_setkey()

by jianqi.ren.cn＠windriver.com

From: Paulo Alcantara <pc(a)manguebit.com> commit 4bdec0d1f658f7c98749bd2c5a486e6cfa8565d2 upstream. Neither SMB3.0 or SMB3.02 supports encryption negotiate context, so when SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag is set in the negotiate response, the client uses AES-128-CCM as the default cipher. See MS-SMB2 3.3.5.4. Commit b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption") added a @server->cipher_type check to conditionally call smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(), but that check would always be false as @server->cipher_type is unset for SMB3.02. Fix the following KASAN splat by setting @server->cipher_type for SMB3.02 as well. mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o vers=3.02,seal,... BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000020 by task mount.cifs/1095 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1095 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 6.12.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 crypto_aead_setkey+0x2c/0x130 crypt_message+0x258/0xec0 [cifs] ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50 ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? mark_lock+0xb0/0x6a0 smb3_init_transform_rq+0x352/0x3f0 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 smb_send_rqst+0x144/0x230 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb_send_rqst+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? smb2_setup_request+0x225/0x3a0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_compound_last_callback+0x10/0x10 [cifs] compound_send_recv+0x59b/0x1140 [cifs] ? __pfx_compound_send_recv+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0xf0 cifs_send_recv+0x23/0x30 [cifs] SMB2_tcon+0x3ec/0xb30 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120 ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90 ? _get_xid+0x16/0xd0 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB2_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs] cifs_get_smb_ses+0xcdd/0x10a0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_get_smb_ses+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_tcp_session+0xaa0/0xca0 [cifs] cifs_mount_get_session+0x8a/0x210 [cifs] dfs_mount_share+0x1b0/0x11d0 [cifs] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xf4/0x2a0 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0 ? hlock_class+0x32/0xb0 ? lock_release+0x203/0x5d0 cifs_mount+0xb3/0x3d0 [cifs] ? do_raw_spin_trylock+0xc6/0x120 ? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? lock_acquire+0x3f/0x90 ? find_nls+0x16/0xa0 ? smb3_update_mnt_flags+0x372/0x3b0 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e2/0xc80 [cifs] ? __pfx_vfs_parse_fs_string+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] smb3_get_tree+0x1bf/0x330 [cifs] vfs_get_tree+0x4a/0x160 path_mount+0x3c1/0xfb0 ? kasan_quarantine_put+0xc7/0x1d0 ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x118/0x3e0 ? user_path_at+0x74/0xa0 __x64_sys_mount+0x1a6/0x1e0 ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Cc: Tom Talpey <tom(a)talpey.com> Reported-by: Jianhong Yin <jiyin(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.12 Fixes: b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption") Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> [Commit b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption") fixes CVE-2024-50047 but brings NULL-pointer dereferebce. So commit 4bdec0d1f658 ("smb: client: fix NULL ptr deref in crypto_aead_setkey()") should be backported too.] Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he(a)windriver.com> --- Verified the build test --- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index 2b2c3330ba96..302c08dfb686 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -1028,7 +1028,9 @@ SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses) * SMB3.0 supports only 1 cipher and doesn't have a encryption neg context * Set the cipher type manually. */ - if (server->dialect == SMB30_PROT_ID && (server->capabilities & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION)) + if ((server->dialect == SMB30_PROT_ID || + server->dialect == SMB302_PROT_ID) && + (server->capabilities & SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION)) server->cipher_type = SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_CCM; security_blob = smb2_get_data_area_len(&blob_offset, &blob_length, -- 2.34.1

4 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH 5.15.y 1/2] smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption

by jianqi.ren.cn＠windriver.com

From: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya(a)suse.de> commit b0abcd65ec545701b8793e12bc27dc98042b151a upstream. Doing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a slab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API. Reproducer: # mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt # dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null ... [ 194.196391] ================================================================== [ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899 [ 194.197707] [ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43 [ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs] [ 194.200032] Call Trace: [ 194.200191] <TASK> [ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.201604] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xdf/0x1c0 [ 194.201868] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202128] kasan_report+0xc8/0x150 [ 194.202361] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202616] gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.202863] ghash_update+0x184/0x210 [ 194.203103] shash_ahash_update+0x184/0x2a0 [ 194.203377] ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 [ 194.203651] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.203877] ? crypto_gcm_init_common+0x1ba/0x340 [ 194.204142] gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x10a/0x140 [ 194.204434] crypt_message+0xec1/0x10a0 [cifs] [ 194.206489] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.208507] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209205] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.209925] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.210443] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.211037] decrypt_raw_data+0x15f/0x250 [cifs] [ 194.212906] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs] [ 194.214670] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.215193] smb2_decrypt_offload+0x12a/0x6c0 [cifs] This is because TFM is being used in parallel. Fix this by allocating a new AEAD TFM for async decryption, but keep the existing one for synchronous READ cases (similar to what is done in smb3_calc_signature()). Also remove the calls to aead_request_set_callback() and crypto_wait_req() since it's always going to be a synchronous operation. Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> [In linux-5.15, dec and enc fields are named ccmaesdecrypt and ccmaesencrypt.] Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he(a)windriver.com> --- Verified the build test --- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c index 7bce1ab86c4d..da9305f0b6f5 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c @@ -4541,7 +4541,7 @@ smb2_get_enc_key(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u64 ses_id, int enc, u8 *key) */ static int crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, - struct smb_rqst *rqst, int enc) + struct smb_rqst *rqst, int enc, struct crypto_aead *tfm) { struct smb2_transform_hdr *tr_hdr = (struct smb2_transform_hdr *)rqst[0].rq_iov[0].iov_base; @@ -4552,8 +4552,6 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE]; struct aead_request *req; u8 *iv; - DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); - struct crypto_aead *tfm; unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize); void *creq; @@ -4564,15 +4562,6 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, return rc; } - rc = smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(server); - if (rc) { - cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "%s: crypto alloc failed\n", __func__); - return rc; - } - - tfm = enc ? server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt : - server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt; - if ((server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_CCM) || (server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)) rc = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, SMB3_GCM256_CRYPTKEY_SIZE); @@ -4611,11 +4600,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv); aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len); - aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, - crypto_req_done, &wait); - - rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) - : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait); + rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req); if (!rc && enc) memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE); @@ -4704,7 +4689,7 @@ smb3_init_transform_rq(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, /* fill the 1st iov with a transform header */ fill_transform_hdr(tr_hdr, orig_len, old_rq, server->cipher_type); - rc = crypt_message(server, num_rqst, new_rq, 1); + rc = crypt_message(server, num_rqst, new_rq, 1, server->secmech.ccmaesencrypt); cifs_dbg(FYI, "Encrypt message returned %d\n", rc); if (rc) goto err_free; @@ -4730,8 +4715,9 @@ decrypt_raw_data(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *buf, unsigned int npages, unsigned int page_data_size, bool is_offloaded) { - struct kvec iov[2]; + struct crypto_aead *tfm; struct smb_rqst rqst = {NULL}; + struct kvec iov[2]; int rc; iov[0].iov_base = buf; @@ -4746,9 +4732,31 @@ decrypt_raw_data(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *buf, rqst.rq_pagesz = PAGE_SIZE; rqst.rq_tailsz = (page_data_size % PAGE_SIZE) ? : PAGE_SIZE; - rc = crypt_message(server, 1, &rqst, 0); + if (is_offloaded) { + if ((server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES128_GCM) || + (server->cipher_type == SMB2_ENCRYPTION_AES256_GCM)) + tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0); + else + tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("ccm(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(tfm); + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "%s: Failed alloc decrypt TFM, rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + + return rc; + } + } else { + if (unlikely(!server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt)) + return -EIO; + + tfm = server->secmech.ccmaesdecrypt; + } + + rc = crypt_message(server, 1, &rqst, 0, tfm); cifs_dbg(FYI, "Decrypt message returned %d\n", rc); + if (is_offloaded) + crypto_free_aead(tfm); + if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index bd7aeb4dcacf..2b2c3330ba96 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -1063,6 +1063,12 @@ SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses) else cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "Missing expected negotiate contexts\n"); } + + if (server->cipher_type && !rc) { + rc = smb3_crypto_aead_allocate(server); + if (rc) + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "%s: crypto alloc failed, rc=%d\n", __func__, rc); + } neg_exit: free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp); return rc; -- 2.34.1

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ATTENTION

by SGG ENERGY

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[PATCH RESEND] usb: renesas_usbhs: Add error handling for usbhsf_fifo_select()

by Wentao Liang

In usbhsf_dcp_data_stage_prepare_pop(), the return value of usbhsf_fifo_select() needs to be checked. A proper implementation can be found in usbhsf_dma_try_pop_with_rx_irq(). Add an error check and jump to PIO pop when FIFO selection fails. Fixes: 9e74d601de8a ("usb: gadget: renesas_usbhs: add data/status stage handler") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c index 10607e273879..6cc07ab4782d 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c +++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c @@ -466,6 +466,7 @@ static int usbhsf_dcp_data_stage_prepare_pop(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe; struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe); struct usbhs_fifo *fifo = usbhsf_get_cfifo(priv); + int ret; if (usbhs_pipe_is_busy(pipe)) return 0; @@ -480,10 +481,14 @@ static int usbhsf_dcp_data_stage_prepare_pop(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, usbhs_pipe_sequence_data1(pipe); /* DATA1 */ - usbhsf_fifo_select(pipe, fifo, 0); + ret = usbhsf_fifo_select(pipe, fifo, 0); + if (ret < 0) + goto usbhsf_pio_prepare_pop; + usbhsf_fifo_clear(pipe, fifo); usbhsf_fifo_unselect(pipe, fifo); +usbhsf_pio_prepare_pop: /* * change handler to PIO pop */ -- 2.42.0.windows.2

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