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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024100103-banish-batboy-00df@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") 592b5fad1677 ("mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()") 183654ce26a5 ("mmap: change do_mas_munmap and do_mas_aligned_munmap() to use vma iterator") 0378c0a0e9e4 ("mm/mmap: remove preallocation from do_mas_align_munmap()") 92fed82047d7 ("mm/mmap: convert brk to use vma iterator") baabcfc93d3b ("mm/mmap: fix typo in comment") c5d5546ea065 ("maple_tree: remove the parameter entry of mas_preallocate") 675eaca1f441 ("mm/mmap: properly unaccount memory on mas_preallocate() failure") 6c28ca6485dd ("mmap: fix do_brk_flags() modifying obviously incorrect VMAs") f5ad5083404b ("mm: do not BUG_ON missing brk mapping, because userspace can unmap it") cc674ab3c018 ("mm/mmap: fix memory leak in mmap_region()") 120b116208a0 ("maple_tree: reorganize testing to restore module testing") a57b70519d1f ("mm/mmap: fix MAP_FIXED address return on VMA merge") 5789151e48ac ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when mas_preallocate() fails") deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") 28c5609fb236 ("mm/mmap: preallocate maple nodes for brk vma expansion") 763ecb035029 ("mm: remove the vma linked list") 8220543df148 ("nommu: remove uses of VMA linked list") 67e7c16764c3 ("mm/mmap: change do_brk_munmap() to use do_mas_align_munmap()") 11f9a21ab655 ("mm/mmap: reorganize munmap to use maple states") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:41:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index d0dfc85b209b..18fddcce03b8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3198,8 +3198,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, flags |= MAP_LOCKED; file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); +out_fput: fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm);

3 days, 23 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024100157-unpeeled-surprise-8138@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") 592b5fad1677 ("mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()") 183654ce26a5 ("mmap: change do_mas_munmap and do_mas_aligned_munmap() to use vma iterator") 0378c0a0e9e4 ("mm/mmap: remove preallocation from do_mas_align_munmap()") 92fed82047d7 ("mm/mmap: convert brk to use vma iterator") baabcfc93d3b ("mm/mmap: fix typo in comment") c5d5546ea065 ("maple_tree: remove the parameter entry of mas_preallocate") 675eaca1f441 ("mm/mmap: properly unaccount memory on mas_preallocate() failure") 6c28ca6485dd ("mmap: fix do_brk_flags() modifying obviously incorrect VMAs") f5ad5083404b ("mm: do not BUG_ON missing brk mapping, because userspace can unmap it") cc674ab3c018 ("mm/mmap: fix memory leak in mmap_region()") 120b116208a0 ("maple_tree: reorganize testing to restore module testing") a57b70519d1f ("mm/mmap: fix MAP_FIXED address return on VMA merge") 5789151e48ac ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when mas_preallocate() fails") deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") 28c5609fb236 ("mm/mmap: preallocate maple nodes for brk vma expansion") 763ecb035029 ("mm: remove the vma linked list") 8220543df148 ("nommu: remove uses of VMA linked list") 67e7c16764c3 ("mm/mmap: change do_brk_munmap() to use do_mas_align_munmap()") 11f9a21ab655 ("mm/mmap: reorganize munmap to use maple states") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:41:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index d0dfc85b209b..18fddcce03b8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3198,8 +3198,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, flags |= MAP_LOCKED; file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); +out_fput: fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm);

3 days, 23 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024100151-evolution-apache-87b3@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") 592b5fad1677 ("mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()") 183654ce26a5 ("mmap: change do_mas_munmap and do_mas_aligned_munmap() to use vma iterator") 0378c0a0e9e4 ("mm/mmap: remove preallocation from do_mas_align_munmap()") 92fed82047d7 ("mm/mmap: convert brk to use vma iterator") baabcfc93d3b ("mm/mmap: fix typo in comment") c5d5546ea065 ("maple_tree: remove the parameter entry of mas_preallocate") 675eaca1f441 ("mm/mmap: properly unaccount memory on mas_preallocate() failure") 6c28ca6485dd ("mmap: fix do_brk_flags() modifying obviously incorrect VMAs") f5ad5083404b ("mm: do not BUG_ON missing brk mapping, because userspace can unmap it") cc674ab3c018 ("mm/mmap: fix memory leak in mmap_region()") 120b116208a0 ("maple_tree: reorganize testing to restore module testing") a57b70519d1f ("mm/mmap: fix MAP_FIXED address return on VMA merge") 5789151e48ac ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when mas_preallocate() fails") deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") 28c5609fb236 ("mm/mmap: preallocate maple nodes for brk vma expansion") 763ecb035029 ("mm: remove the vma linked list") 8220543df148 ("nommu: remove uses of VMA linked list") 67e7c16764c3 ("mm/mmap: change do_brk_munmap() to use do_mas_align_munmap()") 11f9a21ab655 ("mm/mmap: reorganize munmap to use maple states") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:41:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index d0dfc85b209b..18fddcce03b8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3198,8 +3198,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, flags |= MAP_LOCKED; file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); +out_fput: fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm);

3 days, 23 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024100145-gristle-unknotted-af80@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") 592b5fad1677 ("mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()") 183654ce26a5 ("mmap: change do_mas_munmap and do_mas_aligned_munmap() to use vma iterator") 0378c0a0e9e4 ("mm/mmap: remove preallocation from do_mas_align_munmap()") 92fed82047d7 ("mm/mmap: convert brk to use vma iterator") baabcfc93d3b ("mm/mmap: fix typo in comment") c5d5546ea065 ("maple_tree: remove the parameter entry of mas_preallocate") 675eaca1f441 ("mm/mmap: properly unaccount memory on mas_preallocate() failure") 6c28ca6485dd ("mmap: fix do_brk_flags() modifying obviously incorrect VMAs") f5ad5083404b ("mm: do not BUG_ON missing brk mapping, because userspace can unmap it") cc674ab3c018 ("mm/mmap: fix memory leak in mmap_region()") 120b116208a0 ("maple_tree: reorganize testing to restore module testing") a57b70519d1f ("mm/mmap: fix MAP_FIXED address return on VMA merge") 5789151e48ac ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when mas_preallocate() fails") deb0f6562884 ("mm/mmap: undo ->mmap() when arch_validate_flags() fails") 28c5609fb236 ("mm/mmap: preallocate maple nodes for brk vma expansion") 763ecb035029 ("mm: remove the vma linked list") 8220543df148 ("nommu: remove uses of VMA linked list") 67e7c16764c3 ("mm/mmap: change do_brk_munmap() to use do_mas_align_munmap()") 11f9a21ab655 ("mm/mmap: reorganize munmap to use maple states") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:41:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index d0dfc85b209b..18fddcce03b8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3198,8 +3198,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, flags |= MAP_LOCKED; file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); +out_fput: fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm);

3 days, 23 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024100139-mousiness-agreeable-1242@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") 592b5fad1677 ("mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()") 183654ce26a5 ("mmap: change do_mas_munmap and do_mas_aligned_munmap() to use vma iterator") 0378c0a0e9e4 ("mm/mmap: remove preallocation from do_mas_align_munmap()") 92fed82047d7 ("mm/mmap: convert brk to use vma iterator") baabcfc93d3b ("mm/mmap: fix typo in comment") c5d5546ea065 ("maple_tree: remove the parameter entry of mas_preallocate") 675eaca1f441 ("mm/mmap: properly unaccount memory on mas_preallocate() failure") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 17:41:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) Link: https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/42452389 [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index d0dfc85b209b..18fddcce03b8 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3198,8 +3198,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, flags |= MAP_LOCKED; file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); + if (ret) + goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); +out_fput: fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm);

3 days, 23 hours

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[PATCH 1/2] drm/xe/ct: prevent UAF in send_recv()

by Matthew Auld

Ensure we serialize with completion side to prevent UAF with fence going out of scope on the stack, since we have no clue if it will fire after the timeout before we can erase from the xa. Also we have some dependent loads and stores for which we need the correct ordering, and we lack the needed barriers. Fix this by grabbing the ct->lock after the wait, which is also held by the completion side. Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs") Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com> Cc: Badal Nilawar <badal.nilawar(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c index 4b95f75b1546..232eb69bd8e4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_guc_ct.c @@ -903,16 +903,26 @@ static int guc_ct_send_recv(struct xe_guc_ct *ct, const u32 *action, u32 len, } ret = wait_event_timeout(ct->g2h_fence_wq, g2h_fence.done, HZ); + + /* + * Ensure we serialize with completion side to prevent UAF with fence going out of scope on + * the stack, since we have no clue if it will fire after the timeout before we can erase + * from the xa. Also we have some dependent loads and stores below for which we need the + * correct ordering, and we lack the needed barriers. + */ + mutex_lock(&ct->lock); if (!ret) { xe_gt_err(gt, "Timed out wait for G2H, fence %u, action %04x", g2h_fence.seqno, action[0]); xa_erase_irq(&ct->fence_lookup, g2h_fence.seqno); + mutex_unlock(&ct->lock); return -ETIME; } if (g2h_fence.retry) { xe_gt_dbg(gt, "H2G action %#x retrying: reason %#x\n", action[0], g2h_fence.reason); + mutex_unlock(&ct->lock); goto retry; } if (g2h_fence.fail) { @@ -921,7 +931,12 @@ static int guc_ct_send_recv(struct xe_guc_ct *ct, const u32 *action, u32 len, ret = -EIO; } - return ret > 0 ? response_buffer ? g2h_fence.response_len : g2h_fence.response_data : ret; + if (ret > 0) + ret = response_buffer ? g2h_fence.response_len : g2h_fence.response_data; + + mutex_unlock(&ct->lock); + + return ret; } /** -- 2.46.2

4 days

2
2
0 0

[PATCH v2] drm/meson: switch to a managed drm device

by Anastasia Belova

Switch to a managed drm device to cleanup some error handling and make future work easier. Fix dereference of NULL in meson_drv_bind_master by removing drm_dev_put(drm) before meson_encoder_*_remove and component_unbind_all where drm is dereferenced. Co-developed by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.5 Fixes: 6a044642988b ("drm/meson: fix unbind path if HDMI fails to bind") Signed-off-by: Anastasia Belova <abelova(a)astralinux.ru> --- v2: fix commit message and add Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c | 10 +-- drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c | 71 ++++++++++------------ drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.h | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_encoder_cvbs.c | 8 +-- drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_overlay.c | 8 +-- drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_plane.c | 10 +-- 6 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c index d70616da8ce2..e1c0bf3baeea 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_crtc.c @@ -662,13 +662,13 @@ void meson_crtc_irq(struct meson_drm *priv) drm_crtc_handle_vblank(priv->crtc); - spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->drm->event_lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->drm.event_lock, flags); if (meson_crtc->event) { drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(priv->crtc, meson_crtc->event); drm_crtc_vblank_put(priv->crtc); meson_crtc->event = NULL; } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->drm->event_lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->drm.event_lock, flags); } int meson_crtc_create(struct meson_drm *priv) @@ -677,18 +677,18 @@ int meson_crtc_create(struct meson_drm *priv) struct drm_crtc *crtc; int ret; - meson_crtc = devm_kzalloc(priv->drm->dev, sizeof(*meson_crtc), + meson_crtc = devm_kzalloc(priv->drm.dev, sizeof(*meson_crtc), GFP_KERNEL); if (!meson_crtc) return -ENOMEM; meson_crtc->priv = priv; crtc = &meson_crtc->base; - ret = drm_crtc_init_with_planes(priv->drm, crtc, + ret = drm_crtc_init_with_planes(&priv->drm, crtc, priv->primary_plane, NULL, &meson_crtc_funcs, "meson_crtc"); if (ret) { - dev_err(priv->drm->dev, "Failed to init CRTC\n"); + dev_err(priv->drm.dev, "Failed to init CRTC\n"); return ret; } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c index 4bd0baa2a4f5..2e7c2e7c7b82 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.c @@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev); const struct meson_drm_match_data *match; struct meson_drm *priv; - struct drm_device *drm; struct resource *res; void __iomem *regs; int ret, i; @@ -197,17 +196,13 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) if (!match) return -ENODEV; - drm = drm_dev_alloc(&meson_driver, dev); - if (IS_ERR(drm)) - return PTR_ERR(drm); + priv = devm_drm_dev_alloc(dev, &meson_driver, + struct meson_drm, drm); - priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!priv) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto free_drm; - } - drm->dev_private = priv; - priv->drm = drm; + if (IS_ERR(priv)) + return PTR_ERR(priv); + + priv->drm.dev_private = priv; priv->dev = dev; priv->compat = match->compat; priv->afbcd.ops = match->afbcd_ops; @@ -215,7 +210,7 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) regs = devm_platform_ioremap_resource_byname(pdev, "vpu"); if (IS_ERR(regs)) { ret = PTR_ERR(regs); - goto free_drm; + goto remove_encoders; } priv->io_base = regs; @@ -223,13 +218,13 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) res = platform_get_resource_byname(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, "hhi"); if (!res) { ret = -EINVAL; - goto free_drm; + goto remove_encoders; } /* Simply ioremap since it may be a shared register zone */ regs = devm_ioremap(dev, res->start, resource_size(res)); if (!regs) { ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; - goto free_drm; + goto remove_encoders; } priv->hhi = devm_regmap_init_mmio(dev, regs, @@ -237,18 +232,18 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) if (IS_ERR(priv->hhi)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Couldn't create the HHI regmap\n"); ret = PTR_ERR(priv->hhi); - goto free_drm; + goto remove_encoders; } priv->canvas = meson_canvas_get(dev); if (IS_ERR(priv->canvas)) { ret = PTR_ERR(priv->canvas); - goto free_drm; + goto remove_encoders; } ret = meson_canvas_alloc(priv->canvas, &priv->canvas_id_osd1); if (ret) - goto free_drm; + goto remove_encoders; ret = meson_canvas_alloc(priv->canvas, &priv->canvas_id_vd1_0); if (ret) goto free_canvas_osd1; @@ -261,7 +256,7 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) priv->vsync_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); - ret = drm_vblank_init(drm, 1); + ret = drm_vblank_init(&priv->drm, 1); if (ret) goto free_canvas_vd1_2; @@ -284,10 +279,10 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) ret = drmm_mode_config_init(drm); if (ret) goto free_canvas_vd1_2; - drm->mode_config.max_width = 3840; - drm->mode_config.max_height = 2160; - drm->mode_config.funcs = &meson_mode_config_funcs; - drm->mode_config.helper_private = &meson_mode_config_helpers; + priv->drm.mode_config.max_width = 3840; + priv->drm.mode_config.max_height = 2160; + priv->drm.mode_config.funcs = &meson_mode_config_funcs; + priv->drm.mode_config.helper_private = &meson_mode_config_helpers; /* Hardware Initialization */ @@ -308,9 +303,9 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) goto exit_afbcd; if (has_components) { - ret = component_bind_all(dev, drm); + ret = component_bind_all(dev, &priv->drm); if (ret) { - dev_err(drm->dev, "Couldn't bind all components\n"); + dev_err(priv->drm.dev, "Couldn't bind all components\n"); /* Do not try to unbind */ has_components = false; goto exit_afbcd; @@ -339,26 +334,26 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) if (ret) goto exit_afbcd; - ret = request_irq(priv->vsync_irq, meson_irq, 0, drm->driver->name, drm); + ret = request_irq(priv->vsync_irq, meson_irq, 0, priv->drm.driver->name, &priv->drm); if (ret) goto exit_afbcd; - drm_mode_config_reset(drm); + drm_mode_config_reset(&priv->drm); - drm_kms_helper_poll_init(drm); + drm_kms_helper_poll_init(&priv->drm); platform_set_drvdata(pdev, priv); - ret = drm_dev_register(drm, 0); + ret = drm_dev_register(&priv->drm, 0); if (ret) goto uninstall_irq; - drm_fbdev_dma_setup(drm, 32); + drm_fbdev_dma_setup(&priv->drm, 32); return 0; uninstall_irq: - free_irq(priv->vsync_irq, drm); + free_irq(priv->vsync_irq, &priv->drm); exit_afbcd: if (priv->afbcd.ops) priv->afbcd.ops->exit(priv); @@ -370,15 +365,14 @@ static int meson_drv_bind_master(struct device *dev, bool has_components) meson_canvas_free(priv->canvas, priv->canvas_id_vd1_0); free_canvas_osd1: meson_canvas_free(priv->canvas, priv->canvas_id_osd1); -free_drm: - drm_dev_put(drm); +remove_encoders: meson_encoder_dsi_remove(priv); meson_encoder_hdmi_remove(priv); meson_encoder_cvbs_remove(priv); if (has_components) - component_unbind_all(dev, drm); + component_unbind_all(dev, &priv->drm); return ret; } @@ -391,7 +385,7 @@ static int meson_drv_bind(struct device *dev) static void meson_drv_unbind(struct device *dev) { struct meson_drm *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - struct drm_device *drm = priv->drm; + struct drm_device *drm = &priv->drm; if (priv->canvas) { meson_canvas_free(priv->canvas, priv->canvas_id_osd1); @@ -404,7 +398,6 @@ static void meson_drv_unbind(struct device *dev) drm_kms_helper_poll_fini(drm); drm_atomic_helper_shutdown(drm); free_irq(priv->vsync_irq, drm); - drm_dev_put(drm); meson_encoder_dsi_remove(priv); meson_encoder_hdmi_remove(priv); @@ -428,7 +421,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused meson_drv_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) if (!priv) return 0; - return drm_mode_config_helper_suspend(priv->drm); + return drm_mode_config_helper_suspend(&priv->drm); } static int __maybe_unused meson_drv_pm_resume(struct device *dev) @@ -445,7 +438,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused meson_drv_pm_resume(struct device *dev) if (priv->afbcd.ops) priv->afbcd.ops->init(priv); - return drm_mode_config_helper_resume(priv->drm); + return drm_mode_config_helper_resume(&priv->drm); } static void meson_drv_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) @@ -455,8 +448,8 @@ static void meson_drv_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!priv) return; - drm_kms_helper_poll_fini(priv->drm); - drm_atomic_helper_shutdown(priv->drm); + drm_kms_helper_poll_fini(&priv->drm); + drm_atomic_helper_shutdown(&priv->drm); } /* diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.h index 3f9345c14f31..c4c6c810cb20 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_drv.h @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct meson_drm { u8 canvas_id_vd1_1; u8 canvas_id_vd1_2; - struct drm_device *drm; + struct drm_device drm; struct drm_crtc *crtc; struct drm_plane *primary_plane; struct drm_plane *overlay_plane; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_encoder_cvbs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_encoder_cvbs.c index d1191de855d9..ddca22c8c1ff 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_encoder_cvbs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_encoder_cvbs.c @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int meson_encoder_cvbs_get_modes(struct drm_bridge *bridge, for (i = 0; i < MESON_CVBS_MODES_COUNT; ++i) { struct meson_cvbs_mode *meson_mode = &meson_cvbs_modes[i]; - mode = drm_mode_duplicate(priv->drm, &meson_mode->mode); + mode = drm_mode_duplicate(&priv->drm, &meson_mode->mode); if (!mode) { dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to create a new display mode\n"); return 0; @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static const struct drm_bridge_funcs meson_encoder_cvbs_bridge_funcs = { int meson_encoder_cvbs_probe(struct meson_drm *priv) { - struct drm_device *drm = priv->drm; + struct drm_device *drm = &priv->drm; struct meson_encoder_cvbs *meson_encoder_cvbs; struct drm_connector *connector; struct device_node *remote; @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int meson_encoder_cvbs_probe(struct meson_drm *priv) meson_encoder_cvbs->priv = priv; /* Encoder */ - ret = drm_simple_encoder_init(priv->drm, &meson_encoder_cvbs->encoder, + ret = drm_simple_encoder_init(&priv->drm, &meson_encoder_cvbs->encoder, DRM_MODE_ENCODER_TVDAC); if (ret) return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret, @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ int meson_encoder_cvbs_probe(struct meson_drm *priv) } /* Initialize & attach Bridge Connector */ - connector = drm_bridge_connector_init(priv->drm, &meson_encoder_cvbs->encoder); + connector = drm_bridge_connector_init(&priv->drm, &meson_encoder_cvbs->encoder); if (IS_ERR(connector)) return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, PTR_ERR(connector), "Unable to create CVBS bridge connector\n"); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_overlay.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_overlay.c index 7f98de38842b..60ee7f758723 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_overlay.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_overlay.c @@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static void meson_overlay_atomic_update(struct drm_plane *plane, interlace_mode = new_state->crtc->mode.flags & DRM_MODE_FLAG_INTERLACE; - spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->drm->event_lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->drm.event_lock, flags); if ((fb->modifier & DRM_FORMAT_MOD_AMLOGIC_FBC(0, 0)) == DRM_FORMAT_MOD_AMLOGIC_FBC(0, 0)) { @@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ static void meson_overlay_atomic_update(struct drm_plane *plane, priv->viu.vd1_enabled = true; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->drm->event_lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->drm.event_lock, flags); DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n"); } @@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ int meson_overlay_create(struct meson_drm *priv) DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n"); - meson_overlay = devm_kzalloc(priv->drm->dev, sizeof(*meson_overlay), + meson_overlay = devm_kzalloc(priv->drm.dev, sizeof(*meson_overlay), GFP_KERNEL); if (!meson_overlay) return -ENOMEM; @@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ int meson_overlay_create(struct meson_drm *priv) meson_overlay->priv = priv; plane = &meson_overlay->base; - drm_universal_plane_init(priv->drm, plane, 0xFF, + drm_universal_plane_init(&priv->drm, plane, 0xFF, &meson_overlay_funcs, supported_drm_formats, ARRAY_SIZE(supported_drm_formats), diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_plane.c index b43ac61201f3..13be94309bf4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_plane.c @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void meson_plane_atomic_update(struct drm_plane *plane, * Update Buffer * Enable Plane */ - spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->drm->event_lock, flags); + spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->drm.event_lock, flags); /* Check if AFBC decoder is required for this buffer */ if ((meson_vpu_is_compatible(priv, VPU_COMPATIBLE_GXM) || @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void meson_plane_atomic_update(struct drm_plane *plane, priv->viu.osd1_enabled = true; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->drm->event_lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->drm.event_lock, flags); } static void meson_plane_atomic_disable(struct drm_plane *plane, @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int meson_plane_create(struct meson_drm *priv) const uint64_t *format_modifiers = format_modifiers_default; int ret; - meson_plane = devm_kzalloc(priv->drm->dev, sizeof(*meson_plane), + meson_plane = devm_kzalloc(priv->drm.dev, sizeof(*meson_plane), GFP_KERNEL); if (!meson_plane) return -ENOMEM; @@ -549,14 +549,14 @@ int meson_plane_create(struct meson_drm *priv) else if (meson_vpu_is_compatible(priv, VPU_COMPATIBLE_G12A)) format_modifiers = format_modifiers_afbc_g12a; - ret = drm_universal_plane_init(priv->drm, plane, 0xFF, + ret = drm_universal_plane_init(&priv->drm, plane, 0xFF, &meson_plane_funcs, supported_drm_formats, ARRAY_SIZE(supported_drm_formats), format_modifiers, DRM_PLANE_TYPE_PRIMARY, "meson_primary_plane"); if (ret) { - devm_kfree(priv->drm->dev, meson_plane); + devm_kfree(priv->drm.dev, meson_plane); return ret; } -- 2.30.2

4 days, 2 hours

3
5
0 0

[PATCH net 03/10] ice: Fix improper handling of refcount in ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count()

by Tony Nguyen

From: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)outlook.com> This patch addresses an issue with improper reference count handling in the ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count() function. First, the function calls ice_get_vf_by_id(), which increments the reference count of the vf pointer. If the subsequent call to ice_get_vf_vsi() fails, the function currently returns an error without decrementing the reference count of the vf pointer, leading to a reference count leak. The correct behavior, as implemented in this patch, is to decrement the reference count using ice_put_vf(vf) before returning an error when vsi is NULL. Second, the function calls ice_sriov_get_irqs(), which sets vf->first_vector_idx. If this call returns a negative value, indicating an error, the function returns an error without decrementing the reference count of the vf pointer, resulting in another reference count leak. The patch addresses this by adding a call to ice_put_vf(vf) before returning an error when vf->first_vector_idx < 0. This bug was identified by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team. The tool specializes in analyzing reference count operations and identifying potential mismanagement of reference counts. In this case, the tool flagged the missing decrement operation as a potential issue, leading to this patch. Fixes: 4035c72dc1ba ("ice: reconfig host after changing MSI-X on VF") Fixes: 4d38cb44bd32 ("ice: manage VFs MSI-X using resource tracking") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index e34fe2516ccc..c2d6b2a144e9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -1096,8 +1096,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) return -ENOENT; vsi = ice_get_vf_vsi(vf); - if (!vsi) + if (!vsi) { + ice_put_vf(vf); return -ENOENT; + } prev_msix = vf->num_msix; prev_queues = vf->num_vf_qs; @@ -1142,8 +1144,10 @@ int ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count(struct pci_dev *vf_dev, int msix_vec_count) vf->num_msix = prev_msix; vf->num_vf_qs = prev_queues; vf->first_vector_idx = ice_sriov_get_irqs(pf, vf->num_msix); - if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0) + if (vf->first_vector_idx < 0) { + ice_put_vf(vf); return -EINVAL; + } if (needs_rebuild) { ice_vf_reconfig_vsi(vf); -- 2.42.0

4 days, 3 hours

2
1
0 0

[PATCH net 09/10] idpf: use actual mbx receive payload length

by Tony Nguyen

From: Joshua Hay <joshua.a.hay(a)intel.com> When a mailbox message is received, the driver is checking for a non 0 datalen in the controlq descriptor. If it is valid, the payload is attached to the ctlq message to give to the upper layer. However, the payload response size given to the upper layer was taken from the buffer metadata which is _always_ the max buffer size. This meant the API was returning 4K as the payload size for all messages. This went unnoticed since the virtchnl exchange response logic was checking for a response size less than 0 (error), not less than exact size, or not greater than or equal to the max mailbox buffer size (4K). All of these checks will pass in the success case since the size provided is always 4K. However, this breaks anyone that wants to validate the exact response size. Fetch the actual payload length from the value provided in the descriptor data_len field (instead of the buffer metadata). Unfortunately, this means we lose some extra error parsing for variable sized virtchnl responses such as create vport and get ptypes. However, the original checks weren't really helping anyways since the size was _always_ 4K. Fixes: 34c21fa894a1 ("idpf: implement virtchnl transaction manager") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.9+ Signed-off-by: Joshua Hay <joshua.a.hay(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c index 70986e12da28..3c0f97650d72 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ idpf_vc_xn_forward_reply(struct idpf_adapter *adapter, if (ctlq_msg->data_len) { payload = ctlq_msg->ctx.indirect.payload->va; - payload_size = ctlq_msg->ctx.indirect.payload->size; + payload_size = ctlq_msg->data_len; } xn->reply_sz = payload_size; @@ -1295,10 +1295,6 @@ int idpf_send_create_vport_msg(struct idpf_adapter *adapter, err = reply_sz; goto free_vport_params; } - if (reply_sz < IDPF_CTLQ_MAX_BUF_LEN) { - err = -EIO; - goto free_vport_params; - } return 0; @@ -2602,9 +2598,6 @@ int idpf_send_get_rx_ptype_msg(struct idpf_vport *vport) if (reply_sz < 0) return reply_sz; - if (reply_sz < IDPF_CTLQ_MAX_BUF_LEN) - return -EIO; - ptypes_recvd += le16_to_cpu(ptype_info->num_ptypes); if (ptypes_recvd > max_ptype) return -EINVAL; -- 2.42.0

4 days, 8 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH] drm/atomic_helper: Add missing NULL check for drm_plane_helper_funcs.atomic_update

by Lyude Paul

Something I discovered while writing rvkms since some versions of the driver didn't have a filled out atomic_update function - we mention that this callback is "optional", but we don't actually check whether it's NULL or not before calling it. As a result, we'll segfault if it's not filled in. rvkms rvkms.0: [drm:drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_disables] modeset on [ENCODER:36:Virtual-36] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS edk2-20240813-1.fc40 08/13/2024 RIP: 0010:0x0 So, let's fix that. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Fixes: c2fcd274bce5 ("drm: Add atomic/plane helpers") Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.19+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c index 43cdf39019a44..b3c507040c6d6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c @@ -2797,7 +2797,8 @@ void drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes(struct drm_device *dev, funcs->atomic_disable(plane, old_state); } else if (new_plane_state->crtc || disabling) { - funcs->atomic_update(plane, old_state); + if (funcs->atomic_update) + funcs->atomic_update(plane, old_state); if (!disabling && funcs->atomic_enable) { if (drm_atomic_plane_enabling(old_plane_state, new_plane_state)) @@ -2889,7 +2890,8 @@ drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes_on_crtc(struct drm_crtc_state *old_crtc_state) if (disabling && plane_funcs->atomic_disable) { plane_funcs->atomic_disable(plane, old_state); } else if (new_plane_state->crtc || disabling) { - plane_funcs->atomic_update(plane, old_state); + if (plane_funcs->atomic_update) + plane_funcs->atomic_update(plane, old_state); if (!disabling && plane_funcs->atomic_enable) { if (drm_atomic_plane_enabling(old_plane_state, new_plane_state)) base-commit: 22512c3ee0f47faab5def71c4453638923c62522 -- 2.46.1

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