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[PATCH 6/8] drm/sysfb: Remove duplicate declarations

by Thomas Zimmermann

Commit 6046b49bafff ("drm/sysfb: Share helpers for integer validation") and commit e8c086880b2b ("drm/sysfb: Share helpers for screen_info validation") added duplicate function declarations. Remove the latter ones. Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Fixes: e8c086880b2b ("drm/sysfb: Share helpers for screen_info validation") Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm(a)redhat.com> Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.16+ --- drivers/gpu/drm/sysfb/drm_sysfb_helper.h | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/sysfb/drm_sysfb_helper.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/sysfb/drm_sysfb_helper.h index da670d7eeb2e..de96bfe7562c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/sysfb/drm_sysfb_helper.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/sysfb/drm_sysfb_helper.h @@ -54,15 +54,6 @@ const struct drm_format_info *drm_sysfb_get_format_si(struct drm_device *dev, const struct screen_info *si); #endif -/* - * Input parsing - */ - -int drm_sysfb_get_validated_int(struct drm_device *dev, const char *name, - u64 value, u32 max); -int drm_sysfb_get_validated_int0(struct drm_device *dev, const char *name, - u64 value, u32 max); - /* * Display modes */ -- 2.52.0

1 day, 14 hours

[PATCH] usb: dwc3: apple: Set USB2 PHY mode before dwc3 init

by Sven Peter

Now that the upstream code has been getting broader test coverage by our users we occasionally see issues with USB2 devices plugged in during boot. Before Linux is running, the USB2 PHY has usually been running in device mode and it turns out that sometimes host->device or device->host transitions don't work. The root cause: If the role inside the USB2 PHY is re-configured when it has already been powered on or when dwc2 has already enabled the ULPI interface the new configuration sometimes doesn't take affect until dwc3 is reset again. Fix this rare issue by configuring the role much earlier. Note that the USB3 PHY does not suffer from this issue and actually requires dwc3 to be up before the correct role can be configured there. Reported-by: James Calligeros <jcalligeros99(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net> Fixes: 0ec946d32ef7 ("usb: dwc3: Add Apple Silicon DWC3 glue layer driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sven Peter <sven(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c index cc47cad232e397ac4498b09165dfdb5bd215ded7..c2ae8eb21d514e5e493d2927bc12908c308dfe19 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c @@ -218,25 +218,31 @@ static int dwc3_apple_core_init(struct dwc3_apple *appledwc) return ret; } -static void dwc3_apple_phy_set_mode(struct dwc3_apple *appledwc, enum phy_mode mode) -{ - lockdep_assert_held(&appledwc->lock); - - /* - * This platform requires SUSPHY to be enabled here already in order to properly configure - * the PHY and switch dwc3's PIPE interface to USB3 PHY. - */ - dwc3_enable_susphy(&appledwc->dwc, true); - phy_set_mode(appledwc->dwc.usb2_generic_phy[0], mode); - phy_set_mode(appledwc->dwc.usb3_generic_phy[0], mode); -} - static int dwc3_apple_init(struct dwc3_apple *appledwc, enum dwc3_apple_state state) { int ret, ret_reset; lockdep_assert_held(&appledwc->lock); + /* + * The USB2 PHY on this platform must be configured for host or device mode while it is + * still powered off and before dwc3 tries to access it. Otherwise, the new configuration + * will sometimes only take affect after the *next* time dwc3 is brought up which causes + * the connected device to just not work. + * The USB3 PHY must be configured later after dwc3 has already been initialized. + */ + switch (state) { + case DWC3_APPLE_HOST: + phy_set_mode(appledwc->dwc.usb2_generic_phy[0], PHY_MODE_USB_HOST); + break; + case DWC3_APPLE_DEVICE: + phy_set_mode(appledwc->dwc.usb2_generic_phy[0], PHY_MODE_USB_DEVICE); + break; + default: + /* Unreachable unless there's a bug in this driver */ + return -EINVAL; + } + ret = reset_control_deassert(appledwc->reset); if (ret) { dev_err(appledwc->dev, "Failed to deassert reset, err=%d\n", ret); @@ -257,7 +263,13 @@ static int dwc3_apple_init(struct dwc3_apple *appledwc, enum dwc3_apple_state st case DWC3_APPLE_HOST: appledwc->dwc.dr_mode = USB_DR_MODE_HOST; dwc3_apple_set_ptrcap(appledwc, DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST); - dwc3_apple_phy_set_mode(appledwc, PHY_MODE_USB_HOST); + /* + * This platform requires SUSPHY to be enabled here already in order to properly + * configure the PHY and switch dwc3's PIPE interface to USB3 PHY. The USB2 PHY + * has already been configured to the correct mode earlier. + */ + dwc3_enable_susphy(&appledwc->dwc, true); + phy_set_mode(appledwc->dwc.usb3_generic_phy[0], PHY_MODE_USB_HOST); ret = dwc3_host_init(&appledwc->dwc); if (ret) { dev_err(appledwc->dev, "Failed to initialize host, ret=%d\n", ret); @@ -268,7 +280,13 @@ static int dwc3_apple_init(struct dwc3_apple *appledwc, enum dwc3_apple_state st case DWC3_APPLE_DEVICE: appledwc->dwc.dr_mode = USB_DR_MODE_PERIPHERAL; dwc3_apple_set_ptrcap(appledwc, DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE); - dwc3_apple_phy_set_mode(appledwc, PHY_MODE_USB_DEVICE); + /* + * This platform requires SUSPHY to be enabled here already in order to properly + * configure the PHY and switch dwc3's PIPE interface to USB3 PHY. The USB2 PHY + * has already been configured to the correct mode earlier. + */ + dwc3_enable_susphy(&appledwc->dwc, true); + phy_set_mode(appledwc->dwc.usb3_generic_phy[0], PHY_MODE_USB_DEVICE); ret = dwc3_gadget_init(&appledwc->dwc); if (ret) { dev_err(appledwc->dev, "Failed to initialize gadget, ret=%d\n", ret); --- base-commit: 8f0b4cce4481fb22653697cced8d0d04027cb1e8 change-id: 20260108-dwc3-apple-usb2phy-fix-cf1d26018dd0 Best regards, -- Sven Peter <sven(a)kernel.org>

1 day, 14 hours

[PATCH v2 v5.10.y] bpf, sockmap: Don't let sock_map_{close,destroy,unhash} call itself

by HarinadhD

From: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub(a)cloudflare.com> [ Upstream commit 5b4a79ba65a1ab479903fff2e604865d229b70a9 ] sock_map proto callbacks should never call themselves by design. Protect against bugs like [1] and break out of the recursive loop to avoid a stack overflow in favor of a resource leak. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/ Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub(a)cloudflare.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230113-sockmap-fix-v2-1-1e0ee7ac2f90@cloudflare… Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [Harinadh: Modified to apply on v5.10.y ] Signed-off-by: Harinadh Dommaraju <Harinadh.Dommaraju(a)broadcom.com> --- net/core/sock_map.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 3a9e0046a780..438bbef5ff75 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -1558,15 +1558,16 @@ void sock_map_unhash(struct sock *sk) psock = sk_psock(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) { rcu_read_unlock(); - if (sk->sk_prot->unhash) - sk->sk_prot->unhash(sk); - return; + saved_unhash = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->unhash; + } else { + saved_unhash = psock->saved_unhash; + sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); + rcu_read_unlock(); } - - saved_unhash = psock->saved_unhash; - sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - saved_unhash(sk); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_unhash == sock_map_unhash)) + return; + if (saved_unhash) + saved_unhash(sk); } void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk) @@ -1578,16 +1579,17 @@ void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk) psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) { rcu_read_unlock(); - if (sk->sk_prot->destroy) - sk->sk_prot->destroy(sk); - return; + saved_destroy = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->destroy; + } else { + saved_destroy = psock->saved_destroy; + sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + sk_psock_put(sk, psock); } - - saved_destroy = psock->saved_destroy; - sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - sk_psock_put(sk, psock); - saved_destroy(sk); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_destroy == sock_map_destroy)) + return; + if (saved_destroy) + saved_destroy(sk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sock_map_destroy); @@ -1602,13 +1604,18 @@ void sock_map_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) if (unlikely(!psock)) { rcu_read_unlock(); release_sock(sk); - return sk->sk_prot->close(sk, timeout); + saved_close = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->close; + } else { + saved_close = psock->saved_close; + sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + release_sock(sk); } - - saved_close = psock->saved_close; - sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - release_sock(sk); + /* Make sure we do not recurse. This is a bug. + * Leak the socket instead of crashing on a stack overflow. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_close == sock_map_close)) + return; saved_close(sk, timeout); } -- 2.43.7

1 day, 14 hours

[PATCH] usb: dwc3: apple: Ignore USB role switches to the active role

by Janne Grunau

Ignore USB role switches if dwc3-apple is already in the desired state. The USB-C port controller on M2 and M1/M2 Pro/Max/Ultra devices issues additional interrupts which result in USB role switches to the already active role. Ignore these USB role switches to ensure the USB-C port controller and dwc3-apple are always in a consistent state. This matches the behaviour in __dwc3_set_mode() in core.c. Fixes detecting USB 2.0 and 3.x devices on the affected systems. The reset caused by the additional role switch appears to leave the USB devices in a state which prevents detection when the phy and dwc3 is brought back up again. Fixes: 0ec946d32ef7 ("usb: dwc3: Add Apple Silicon DWC3 glue layer driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c index cc47cad232e397ac4498b09165dfdb5bd215ded7..35eadd1fa08049829ba40651a96eb122ed55460f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-apple.c @@ -339,6 +339,22 @@ static int dwc3_usb_role_switch_set(struct usb_role_switch *sw, enum usb_role ro guard(mutex)(&appledwc->lock); + /* + * Skip role switches if appledwc is already in the desired state. The + * USB-C port controller on M2 and M1/M2 Pro/Max/Ultra devices issues + * additional interrupts which results in usb_role_switch_set_role() + * calls with the current role. + * Ignore those calls here to ensure the USB-C port controller and + * appledwc are in a consistent state. + * This matches the behaviour in __dwc3_set_mode(). + * Do no handle USB_ROLE_NONE for DWC3_APPLE_NO_CABLE and + * DWC3_APPLE_PROBE_PENDING since that is no-op anyway. + */ + if (appledwc->state == DWC3_APPLE_HOST && role == USB_ROLE_HOST) + return 0; + if (appledwc->state == DWC3_APPLE_DEVICE && role == USB_ROLE_DEVICE) + return 0; + /* * We need to tear all of dwc3 down and re-initialize it every time a cable is * connected or disconnected or when the mode changes. See the documentation for enum --- base-commit: 8f0b4cce4481fb22653697cced8d0d04027cb1e8 change-id: 20260109-apple-dwc3-role-switch-1b684f73860c Best regards, -- Janne Grunau <j(a)jannau.net>

1 day, 14 hours

[PATCH v5.10] scsi: core: ufs: Fix a hang in the error handler

by Shivani Agarwal

From: Sanjeev Yadav <sanjeev.y(a)mediatek.com> [ Upstream commit 8a3514d348de87a9d5e2ac00fbac4faae0b97996 ] ufshcd_err_handling_prepare() calls ufshcd_rpm_get_sync(). The latter function can only succeed if UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS is not set because resuming involves submitting a SCSI command and ufshcd_queuecommand() returns SCSI_MLQUEUE_HOST_BUSY if UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS is set. Fix this hang by setting UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS after ufshcd_rpm_get_sync() has been called instead of before. Backtrace: __switch_to+0x174/0x338 __schedule+0x600/0x9e4 schedule+0x7c/0xe8 schedule_timeout+0xa4/0x1c8 io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70 wait_for_common_io+0xa8/0x160 //waiting on START_STOP wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x10/0x20 blk_execute_rq+0xe4/0x1e4 scsi_execute_cmd+0x108/0x244 ufshcd_set_dev_pwr_mode+0xe8/0x250 __ufshcd_wl_resume+0x94/0x354 ufshcd_wl_runtime_resume+0x3c/0x174 scsi_runtime_resume+0x64/0xa4 rpm_resume+0x15c/0xa1c __pm_runtime_resume+0x4c/0x90 // Runtime resume ongoing ufshcd_err_handler+0x1a0/0xd08 process_one_work+0x174/0x808 worker_thread+0x15c/0x490 kthread+0xf4/0x1ec ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Sanjeev Yadav <sanjeev.y(a)mediatek.com> [ bvanassche: rewrote patch description ] Fixes: 62694735ca95 ("[SCSI] ufs: Add runtime PM support for UFS host controller driver") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250523201409.1676055-1-bvanassche@acm.org Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <peter.wang(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [Shivani: Modified to apply on 5.10.y] Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal(a)broadcom.com> --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 54e7d96bf..c1f232472 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -5766,10 +5766,12 @@ static void ufshcd_err_handler(struct work_struct *work) spin_unlock_irqrestore(hba->host->host_lock, flags); return; } - ufshcd_set_eh_in_progress(hba); spin_unlock_irqrestore(hba->host->host_lock, flags); + ufshcd_err_handling_prepare(hba); + spin_lock_irqsave(hba->host->host_lock, flags); + ufshcd_set_eh_in_progress(hba); ufshcd_scsi_block_requests(hba); /* * A full reset and restore might have happened after preparation -- 2.40.4

1 day, 14 hours

[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix out of range indexing in name_size

by Jarkko Sakkinen

[ Upstream commit 6e9722e9a7bfe1bbad649937c811076acf86e1fd ] 'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID, which could lead into memory corruption at worst. Address the issue by only processing known values and returning -EINVAL for unrecognized values. Make also 'tpm_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible so that errors are detected before causing any spurious TPM traffic. End also the authorization session on failure in both of the functions, as the session state would be then by definition corrupted. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 +++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 134 +++++++++++++++------- include/linux/tpm.h | 13 ++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 29 ++++- 4 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index dfdcbd009720..74764eae9f10 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -250,7 +250,11 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -265,8 +269,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -324,7 +334,12 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return err; + } + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index cf0b83154044..d020b74ed23c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -144,16 +144,23 @@ struct tpm2_auth { /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + default: + pr_warn("tpm: unsupported name algorithm: 0x%04x\n", hash_alg); + return -EINVAL; + } } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +168,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int ret; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -173,8 +181,13 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset += val; /* name */ val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (val != ret) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -221,46 +234,72 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. + * + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + goto err; + } } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + if (name) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n", + handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + ret = name_size(name); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); + } +#endif + return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -578,11 +617,9 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * encryption key and encrypts the first parameter of the command * buffer with it. * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. + * Ends the authorization session on failure. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -592,10 +629,13 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 *hmac = NULL; u32 attrs; u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sha256_state sctx; + struct sha256_ctx sctx; + int ret; - if (!auth) - return; + if (!auth) { + ret = -EIO; + goto err; + } /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -604,9 +644,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "command 0x%08x not found\n", cc); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -620,9 +662,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -653,12 +695,14 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -690,8 +734,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + ret = name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -712,6 +759,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) sha256_update(&sctx, &auth->attrs, 1); tpm2_hmac_final(&sctx, auth->session_key, sizeof(auth->session_key) + auth->passphrase_len, hmac); + return 0; + +err: + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index a3d8305e88a5..9472e13f33c2 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -521,8 +521,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -569,10 +569,13 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf) + +static inline int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm_buf *buf) { + return 0; } + static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 024be262702f..10d1201a33e4 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +334,10 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -444,7 +450,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -456,7 +465,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -506,7 +518,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) + goto out; if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -531,7 +545,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc > 0) -- 2.52.0

1 day, 15 hours

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122907-stream-lasso-ba6e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From bda1cbf73c6e241267c286427f2ed52b5735d872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 15:38:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] tpm2-sessions: Fix tpm2_read_public range checks tpm2_read_public() has some rudimentary range checks but the function does not ensure that the response buffer has enough bytes for the full TPMT_HA payload. Re-implement the function with necessary checks and validation, and return name and name size for all handle types back to the caller. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index be4a9c7f2e1a..34e3599f094f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -11,8 +11,11 @@ * used by the kernel internally. */ +#include "linux/dev_printk.h" +#include "linux/tpm.h" #include "tpm.h" #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> static bool disable_pcr_integrity; module_param(disable_pcr_integrity, bool, 0444); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 385014dbca39..3f389e2f6f58 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -163,53 +163,61 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name) } } -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name) { - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - int ret; - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - ret = name_size(&buf->data[offset]); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - - if (val != ret) - return -EINVAL; - - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ + int rc, name_size_alg; struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; + + if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE && + mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32)); + return sizeof(u32); + } rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); if (rc) return rc; tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "TPM2_ReadPublic"); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); + } - return rc; + /* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */ + offset += tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + + /* + * Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of + * TPMT_HA (the extra four bytes). + */ + if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(&buf, &offset); + name_size_alg = name_size(&buf.data[offset]); + + if (name_size_alg < 0) + return name_size_alg; + + if (rc != name_size_alg) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(&buf)) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return -EIO; + } + + memcpy(name, &buf.data[offset], rc); + return name_size_alg; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ @@ -243,6 +251,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; + u16 name_size_alg; int slot; int ret; #endif @@ -273,8 +282,10 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { if (!name) { ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - if (ret) + if (ret < 0) goto err; + + name_size_alg = ret; } } else { if (name) { @@ -286,13 +297,8 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) { - ret = name_size(name); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, ret); - } + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg); #endif return 0;

1 day, 15 hours

[PATCH] pinctrl: meson: amlogic-a4: mark the GPIO controller as sleeping

by Bartosz Golaszewski

The GPIO controller is configured as non-sleeping but it uses generic pinctrl helpers which use a mutex for synchronization. This will cause lockdep splats when used together with shared GPIOs going through the GPIO shared proxy driver. Fixes: 6e9be3abb78c ("pinctrl: Add driver support for Amlogic SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl(a)googlemail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFBinCAc7CO8gfNQakCu3LfkYXuyTd2iRpMRm8EKXSL0mw… Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c b/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c index d9e3a8d5932a..ded7b218e2ec 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-amlogic-a4.c @@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static const struct gpio_chip aml_gpio_template = { .direction_input = aml_gpio_direction_input, .direction_output = aml_gpio_direction_output, .get_direction = aml_gpio_get_direction, - .can_sleep = false, + .can_sleep = true, }; static void init_bank_register_bit(struct aml_pinctrl *info, -- 2.47.3

1 day, 15 hours

[PATCH] leds: led-class: Only Add LED to leds_list when it is fully ready

by Hans de Goede

Before this change the LED was added to leds_list before led_init_core() gets called adding it the list before led_classdev.set_brightness_work gets initialized. This leaves a window where led_trigger_register() of a LED's default trigger will call led_trigger_set() which calls led_set_brightness() which in turn will end up queueing the *uninitialized* led_classdev.set_brightness_work. This race gets hit by the lenovo-thinkpad-t14s EC driver which registers 2 LEDs with a default trigger provided by snd_ctl_led.ko in quick succession. The first led_classdev_register() causes an async modprobe of snd_ctl_led to run and that async modprobe manages to exactly hit the window where the second LED is on the leds_list without led_init_core() being called for it, resulting in: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 5608 at kernel/workqueue.c:4234 __flush_work+0x344/0x390 Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2S01F0B/21N2S01F0B, BIOS N42ET93W (2.23 ) 09/01/2025 ... Call trace: __flush_work+0x344/0x390 (P) flush_work+0x2c/0x50 led_trigger_set+0x1c8/0x340 led_trigger_register+0x17c/0x1c0 led_trigger_register_simple+0x84/0xe8 snd_ctl_led_init+0x40/0xf88 [snd_ctl_led] do_one_initcall+0x5c/0x318 do_init_module+0x9c/0x2b8 load_module+0x7e0/0x998 Close the race window by moving the adding of the LED to leds_list to after the led_init_core() call. Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sre(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- Note no Fixes tag as this problem has been around for a long long time, so I could not really find a good commit for the Fixes tag. --- drivers/leds/led-class.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/leds/led-class.c b/drivers/leds/led-class.c index f3faf37f9a08..6b9fa060c3a1 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/led-class.c +++ b/drivers/leds/led-class.c @@ -560,11 +560,6 @@ int led_classdev_register_ext(struct device *parent, #ifdef CONFIG_LEDS_BRIGHTNESS_HW_CHANGED led_cdev->brightness_hw_changed = -1; #endif - /* add to the list of leds */ - down_write(&leds_list_lock); - list_add_tail(&led_cdev->node, &leds_list); - up_write(&leds_list_lock); - if (!led_cdev->max_brightness) led_cdev->max_brightness = LED_FULL; @@ -574,6 +569,11 @@ int led_classdev_register_ext(struct device *parent, led_init_core(led_cdev); + /* add to the list of leds */ + down_write(&leds_list_lock); + list_add_tail(&led_cdev->node, &leds_list); + up_write(&leds_list_lock); + #ifdef CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGERS led_trigger_set_default(led_cdev); #endif -- 2.52.0

1 day, 15 hours

[PATCH can v2] can: gs_usb: gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak

by Marc Kleine-Budde

In gs_can_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to the parent->rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(), the URB is processed and resubmitted. In gs_can_close() the URBs are freed by calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(parent->rx_submitted). However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors the URB before the close function is called. This means that once an in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not released in gs_can_close(). Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback() to the parent->rx_submitted anchor. Fixes: d08e973a77d1 ("can: gs_usb: Added support for the GS_USB CAN devices") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> --- Changes in v2: - correct "Fixes" tag - add stable(a)v.k.o on Cc - Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20251225-gs_usb-fix-memory-leak-v1-1-a7b09e70d01d@… --- drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c index a0233e550a5a..d093babbc320 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c @@ -751,6 +751,8 @@ static void gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb) hf, parent->hf_size_rx, gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback, parent); + usb_anchor_urb(urb, &parent->rx_submitted); + rc = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC); /* USB failure take down all interfaces */ --- base-commit: 1806d210e5a8f431ad4711766ae4a333d407d972 change-id: 20251225-gs_usb-fix-memory-leak-062c24898cc9 Best regards, -- Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>

1 day, 15 hours

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