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Instability in ALL stable and LTS distro kernels (IRQ #16 being disabled, PCIe bus errors, ath10k_pci) in Dell Inspiron 5567

by Bandhan Pramanik

Hello, The following is the original thread, where a bug was reported to the linux-wireless and ath10k mailing lists. The specific bug has been detailed clearly here. https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/690B1DB2-C9DC-4FAD-8063-4CED659B1701… There is also a Bugzilla report by me, which was opened later: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220264 As stated, it is highly encouraged to check out all the logs, especially the line of IRQ #16 in /proc/interrupts. Here is where all the logs are: https://gist.github.com/BandhanPramanik/ddb0cb23eca03ca2ea43a1d832a16180 (these logs are taken from an Arch liveboot) On my daily driver, I found these on my IRQ #16: 16: 173210 0 0 0 IR-IO-APIC 16-fasteoi i2c_designware.0, idma64.0, i801_smbus The fixes stated on the Reddit post for this Wi-Fi card didn't quite work. (But git-cloning the firmware files did give me some more time to have stable internet) This time, I had to go for the GRUB kernel parameters. Right now, I'm using "irqpoll" to curb the errors caused. "intel_iommu=off" did not work, and the Wi-Fi was constantly crashing even then. Did not try out "pci=noaer" this time. If it's of any concern, there is a very weird error in Chromium-based browsers which has only happened after I started using irqpoll. When I Google something, the background of the individual result boxes shows as pure black, while the surrounding space is the usual greyish-blackish, like we see in Dark Mode. Here is a picture of the exact thing I'm experiencing: https://files.catbox.moe/mjew6g.png If you notice anything in my logs/bug reports, please let me know. (Because it seems like Wi-Fi errors are just a red herring, there are some ACPI or PCIe-related errors in the computers of this model - just a naive speculation, though.) Thanking you, Bandhan Pramanik

7 hours, 56 minutes

3
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[PATCH 1/2] netfs: Fix copy-to-cache so that it performs collection with ceph+fscache

by David Howells

The netfs copy-to-cache that is used by Ceph with local caching sets up a new request to write data just read to the cache. The request is started and then left to look after itself whilst the app continues. The request gets notified by the backing fs upon completion of the async DIO write, but then tries to wake up the app because NETFS_RREQ_OFFLOAD_COLLECTION isn't set - but the app isn't waiting there, and so the request just hangs. Fix this by setting NETFS_RREQ_OFFLOAD_COLLECTION which causes the notification from the backing filesystem to put the collection onto a work queue instead. Fixes: e2d46f2ec332 ("netfs: Change the read result collector to only use one work item") Reported-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAKPOu+8z_ijTLHdiCYGU_Uk7yYD=shxyGLwfe-L7AV3DhebS… Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc(a)manguebit.org> cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> cc: Alex Markuze <amarkuze(a)redhat.com> cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> cc: netfs(a)lists.linux.dev cc: ceph-devel(a)vger.kernel.org cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- fs/netfs/read_pgpriv2.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/netfs/read_pgpriv2.c b/fs/netfs/read_pgpriv2.c index 5bbe906a551d..080d2a6a51d9 100644 --- a/fs/netfs/read_pgpriv2.c +++ b/fs/netfs/read_pgpriv2.c @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static struct netfs_io_request *netfs_pgpriv2_begin_copy_to_cache( if (!creq->io_streams[1].avail) goto cancel_put; + __set_bit(NETFS_RREQ_OFFLOAD_COLLECTION, &creq->flags); trace_netfs_write(creq, netfs_write_trace_copy_to_cache); netfs_stat(&netfs_n_wh_copy_to_cache); rreq->copy_to_cache = creq;

9 hours, 20 minutes

2
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[PATCH V6] efi/tpm: Fix the issue where the CC platforms event log header can't be correctly identified

by yangge1116＠126.com

From: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com> Since commit d228814b1913 ("efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms") reuses TPM2 support code for the CC platforms, when launching a TDX virtual machine with coco measurement enabled, the following error log is generated: [Firmware Bug]: Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log Call Trace: efi_config_parse_tables() efi_tpm_eventlog_init() tpm2_calc_event_log_size() __calc_tpm2_event_size() The pcr_idx value in the Intel TDX log header is 1, causing the function __calc_tpm2_event_size() to fail to recognize the log header, ultimately leading to the "Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log" error. Intel misread the spec and wrongly sets pcrIndex to 1 in the header and since they did this, we fear others might, so we're relaxing the header check. There's no danger of this causing problems because we check for the TCG_SPECID_SIG signature as the next thing. Fixes: d228814b1913 ("efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms") Signed-off-by: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- V6: - improve commit message suggested by James V5: - remove the pcr_index check without adding any replacement checks suggested by James and Sathyanarayanan V4: - remove cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT) suggested by Ard V3: - fix build error V2: - limit the fix for CC only suggested by Jarkko and Sathyanarayanan include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h index 891368e..05c0ae5 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -202,8 +202,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *ev event_type = event->event_type; /* Verify that it's the log header */ - if (event_header->pcr_idx != 0 || - event_header->event_type != NO_ACTION || + if (event_header->event_type != NO_ACTION || memcmp(event_header->digest, zero_digest, sizeof(zero_digest))) { size = 0; goto out; -- 2.7.4

11 hours, 20 minutes

1
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[PATCH V5] efi/tpm: Fix the issue where the CC platforms event log header can't be correctly identified

by yangge1116＠126.com

From: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com> Since commit d228814b1913 ("efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms") reuses TPM2 support code for the CC platforms, when launching a TDX virtual machine with coco measurement enabled, the following error log is generated: [Firmware Bug]: Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log Call Trace: efi_config_parse_tables() efi_tpm_eventlog_init() tpm2_calc_event_log_size() __calc_tpm2_event_size() The pcr_idx value in the Intel TDX log header is 1, causing the function __calc_tpm2_event_size() to fail to recognize the log header, ultimately leading to the "Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log" error. According to UEFI Specification 2.10, Section 38.4.1: For TDX, TPM PCR 0 maps to MRTD, so the log header uses TPM PCR 1 instead. To successfully parse the TDX event log header, the check for a pcr_idx value of 0 must be skipped. There's no danger of this causing problems because we check for the TCG_SPECID_SIG signature as the next thing. Link: https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-trust… Fixes: d228814b1913 ("efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms") Signed-off-by: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- V5: - remove the pcr_index check without adding any replacement checks suggested by James and Sathyanarayanan V4: - remove cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT) suggested by Ard V3: - fix build error V2: - limit the fix for CC only suggested by Jarkko and Sathyanarayanan include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h index 891368e..05c0ae5 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -202,8 +202,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *ev event_type = event->event_type; /* Verify that it's the log header */ - if (event_header->pcr_idx != 0 || - event_header->event_type != NO_ACTION || + if (event_header->event_type != NO_ACTION || memcmp(event_header->digest, zero_digest, sizeof(zero_digest))) { size = 0; goto out; -- 2.7.4

11 hours, 21 minutes

3
2
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[PATCH V4] efi/tpm: Fix the issue where the CC platforms event log header can't be correctly identified

by yangge1116＠126.com

From: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com> Since commit d228814b1913 ("efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms") reuses TPM2 support code for the CC platforms, when launching a TDX virtual machine with coco measurement enabled, the following error log is generated: [Firmware Bug]: Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log Call Trace: efi_config_parse_tables() efi_tpm_eventlog_init() tpm2_calc_event_log_size() __calc_tpm2_event_size() The pcr_idx value in the Intel TDX log header is 1, causing the function __calc_tpm2_event_size() to fail to recognize the log header, ultimately leading to the "Failed to parse event in TPM Final Events Log" error. According to UEFI Specification 2.10, Section 38.4.1: For TDX, TPM PCR 0 maps to MRTD, so the log header uses TPM PCR 1 instead. To successfully parse the TDX event log header, the check for a pcr_idx value of 0 must be skipped. According to Table 6 in Section 10.2.1 of the TCG PC Client Specification, the index field does not require the PCR index to be fixed at zero. Therefore, skipping the check for a pcr_idx value of 0 for CC platforms is safe. Link: https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-trust… Link: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05… Fixes: d228814b1913 ("efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms") Signed-off-by: Ge Yang <yangge1116(a)126.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- V4: - remove cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT) suggested by Ard V3: - fix build error V2: - limit the fix for CC only suggested by Jarkko and Sathyanarayanan drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c | 6 +++++- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 8 ++++++-- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c | 13 +++++++++---- drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/linux/efi.h | 4 +++- include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h | 14 +++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c index 37a0580..e9484fd 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm2.c @@ -36,7 +36,11 @@ static size_t calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event, struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header) { - return __calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header, false); + /* + * This function is only used by TPM2 and will not be used by CC. + * Therefore, the argument is_cc_event is set to 0. + */ + return __calc_tpm2_event_size(event, event_header, false, 0); } static void *tpm2_bios_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index e57bff7..954b8f7 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { .esrt = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, .tpm_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, .tpm_final_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, + .cc_final_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, #endif @@ -613,7 +614,7 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = { {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, &efi_rng_seed, "RNG" }, {LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID, &efi.tpm_log, "TPMEventLog" }, {EFI_TCG2_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID, &efi.tpm_final_log, "TPMFinalLog" }, - {EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID, &efi.tpm_final_log, "CCFinalLog" }, + {EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID, &efi.cc_final_log, "CCFinalLog" }, {LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID, &mem_reserve, "MEMRESERVE" }, {LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID, &initrd, "INITRD" }, {EFI_RT_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID, &rt_prop, "RTPROP" }, @@ -752,7 +753,10 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables, if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)) efi_memattr_init(); - efi_tpm_eventlog_init(); + if (efi.tpm_final_log != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) + efi_tcg2_eventlog_init(&efi.tpm_log, &efi.tpm_final_log, 0); + else if (efi.cc_final_log != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) + efi_tcg2_eventlog_init(&efi.tpm_log, &efi.cc_final_log, 1); if (mem_reserve != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { unsigned long prsv = mem_reserve; diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c index a5c6c4f..9728060 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c @@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(void) static void efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(int version, efi_physical_addr_t log_location, efi_physical_addr_t log_last_entry, efi_bool_t truncated, - struct efi_tcg2_final_events_table *final_events_table) + struct efi_tcg2_final_events_table *final_events_table, + bool is_cc_event) { efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID; efi_status_t status; @@ -87,7 +88,8 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(int version, efi_physical_addr_t log_loca last_entry_size = __calc_tpm2_event_size((void *)last_entry_addr, (void *)(long)log_location, - false); + false, + is_cc_event); } else { last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + ((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size; @@ -123,7 +125,8 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(int version, efi_physical_addr_t log_loca header = data + offset + final_events_size; event_size = __calc_tpm2_event_size(header, (void *)(long)log_location, - false); + false, + is_cc_event); /* If calc fails this is a malformed log */ if (!event_size) break; @@ -157,6 +160,7 @@ void efi_retrieve_eventlog(void) efi_tcg2_protocol_t *tpm2 = NULL; efi_bool_t truncated; efi_status_t status; + bool is_cc_event = false; status = efi_bs_call(locate_protocol, &tpm2_guid, NULL, (void **)&tpm2); if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) { @@ -186,11 +190,12 @@ void efi_retrieve_eventlog(void) final_events_table = get_efi_config_table(EFI_CC_FINAL_EVENTS_TABLE_GUID); + is_cc_event = true; } if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location) return; efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(version, log_location, log_last_entry, - truncated, final_events_table); + truncated, final_events_table, is_cc_event); } diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c index cdd4310..d79291d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/tpm.c @@ -16,14 +16,16 @@ int efi_tpm_final_log_size; EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi_tpm_final_log_size); -static int __init tpm2_calc_event_log_size(void *data, int count, void *size_info) +static int __init tpm2_calc_event_log_size(void *data, int count, + void *size_info, bool is_cc_event) { struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *header; u32 event_size, size = 0; while (count > 0) { header = data + size; - event_size = __calc_tpm2_event_size(header, size_info, true); + event_size = __calc_tpm2_event_size(header, size_info, true, + is_cc_event); if (event_size == 0) return -1; size += event_size; @@ -36,7 +38,8 @@ static int __init tpm2_calc_event_log_size(void *data, int count, void *size_inf /* * Reserve the memory associated with the TPM Event Log configuration table. */ -int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void) +int __init efi_tcg2_eventlog_init(unsigned long *log, unsigned long *final_log, + bool is_cc_event) { struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl; struct efi_tcg2_final_events_table *final_tbl; @@ -44,7 +47,7 @@ int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void) int final_tbl_size; int ret = 0; - if (efi.tpm_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { + if (*log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { /* * We can't calculate the size of the final events without the * first entry in the TPM log, so bail here. @@ -52,23 +55,23 @@ int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void) return 0; } - log_tbl = early_memremap(efi.tpm_log, sizeof(*log_tbl)); + log_tbl = early_memremap(*log, sizeof(*log_tbl)); if (!log_tbl) { pr_err("Failed to map TPM Event Log table @ 0x%lx\n", - efi.tpm_log); - efi.tpm_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; + *log); + *log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; return -ENOMEM; } tbl_size = sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_tbl->size; - if (memblock_reserve(efi.tpm_log, tbl_size)) { + if (memblock_reserve(*log, tbl_size)) { pr_err("TPM Event Log memblock reserve fails (0x%lx, 0x%x)\n", - efi.tpm_log, tbl_size); + *log, tbl_size); ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - if (efi.tpm_final_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { + if (*final_log == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { pr_info("TPM Final Events table not present\n"); goto out; } else if (log_tbl->version != EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2) { @@ -76,25 +79,26 @@ int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void) goto out; } - final_tbl = early_memremap(efi.tpm_final_log, sizeof(*final_tbl)); + final_tbl = early_memremap(*final_log, sizeof(*final_tbl)); if (!final_tbl) { pr_err("Failed to map TPM Final Event Log table @ 0x%lx\n", - efi.tpm_final_log); - efi.tpm_final_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; + *final_log); + *final_log = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR; ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } final_tbl_size = 0; if (final_tbl->nr_events != 0) { - void *events = (void *)efi.tpm_final_log + void *events = (void *)*final_log + sizeof(final_tbl->version) + sizeof(final_tbl->nr_events); final_tbl_size = tpm2_calc_event_log_size(events, final_tbl->nr_events, - log_tbl->log); + log_tbl->log, + is_cc_event); } if (final_tbl_size < 0) { @@ -103,7 +107,7 @@ int __init efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void) goto out_calc; } - memblock_reserve(efi.tpm_final_log, + memblock_reserve(*final_log, final_tbl_size + sizeof(*final_tbl)); efi_tpm_final_log_size = final_tbl_size; diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 7d63d1d..71efec0 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ extern struct efi { unsigned long esrt; /* ESRT table */ unsigned long tpm_log; /* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log; /* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ + unsigned long cc_final_log; /* CC Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table; /* MOK variable config table */ unsigned long coco_secret; /* Confidential computing secret table */ unsigned long unaccepted; /* Unaccepted memory table */ @@ -1209,7 +1210,8 @@ struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog { u8 log[]; }; -extern int efi_tpm_eventlog_init(void); +extern int efi_tcg2_eventlog_init(unsigned long *log, unsigned long *final_log, + bool is_cc_event); struct efi_tcg2_final_events_table { u64 version; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h index 891368e..b3380c9 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct tcg_algorithm_info { * @event: Pointer to the event whose size should be calculated * @event_header: Pointer to the initial event containing the digest lengths * @do_mapping: Whether or not the event needs to be mapped + * @is_cc_event: Whether or not the event is from a CC platform * * The TPM2 event log format can contain multiple digests corresponding to * separate PCR banks, and also contains a variable length of the data that @@ -159,7 +160,8 @@ struct tcg_algorithm_info { static __always_inline u32 __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *event, struct tcg_pcr_event *event_header, - bool do_mapping) + bool do_mapping, + bool is_cc_event) { struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *efispecid; struct tcg_event_field *event_field; @@ -201,8 +203,14 @@ static __always_inline u32 __calc_tpm2_event_size(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *ev count = event->count; event_type = event->event_type; - /* Verify that it's the log header */ - if (event_header->pcr_idx != 0 || + /* + * Verify that it's the log header. According to the TCG PC Client + * Specification, when identifying a log header, the check for a + * pcr_idx value of 0 is not required. For CC platforms, skipping + * this check during log header is necessary; otherwise, the CC + * platform's log header may fail to be recognized. + */ + if ((!is_cc_event && event_header->pcr_idx != 0) || event_header->event_type != NO_ACTION || memcmp(event_header->digest, zero_digest, sizeof(zero_digest))) { size = 0; -- 2.7.4

12 hours, 20 minutes

4
3
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[PATCH] kernel/fork: Increase minimum number of allowed threads

by Hauke Mehrtens

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> A modern Linux system creates much more than 20 threads at bootup. When I booted up OpenWrt in qemu the system sometimes failed to boot up when it wanted to create the 419th thread. The VM had 128MB RAM and the calculation in set_max_threads() calculated that max_threads should be set to 419. When the system booted up it tried to notify the user space about every device it created because CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER was set and used. I counted 1299 calles to call_usermodehelper_setup(), all of them try to create a new thread and call the userspace hotplug script in it. This fixes bootup of Linux on systems with low memory. I saw the problem with qemu 10.0.2 using these commands: qemu-system-aarch64 -machine virt -cpu cortex-a57 -nographic Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke(a)hauke-m.de> --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 7966c9a1c163..388299525f3c 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ /* * Minimum number of threads to boot the kernel */ -#define MIN_THREADS 20 +#define MIN_THREADS 600 /* * Maximum number of threads -- 2.50.1

15 hours, 39 minutes

1
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[PATCH] KVM: SEV: Enforce minimum GHCB version requirement for SEV-SNP guests

by Nikunj A Dadhania

Require a minimum GHCB version of 2 when starting SEV-SNP guests through KVM_SEV_INIT2. When a VMM attempts to start an SEV-SNP guest with an incompatible GHCB version (less than 2), reject the request early rather than allowing the guest to start with an incorrect protocol version and fail later. Fixes: 4af663c2f64a ("KVM: SEV: Allow per-guest configuration of GHCB protocol version") Cc: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth(a)amd.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj(a)amd.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index a12e78b67466..91d06fb91ba2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -435,6 +435,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, if (unlikely(sev->active)) return -EINVAL; + if (snp_active && data->ghcb_version && data->ghcb_version < 2) + return -EINVAL; + sev->active = true; sev->es_active = es_active; sev->vmsa_features = data->vmsa_features; -- 2.43.0

17 hours, 3 minutes

3
2
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[PATCH net] hv_netvsc: Switch VF namespace in netvsc_open instead

by Haiyang Zhang

From: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz(a)microsoft.com> The existing code move the VF NIC to new namespace when NETDEV_REGISTER is received on netvsc NIC. During deletion of the namespace, default_device_exit_batch() >> default_device_exit_net() is called. When netvsc NIC is moved back and registered to the default namespace, it automatically brings VF NIC back to the default namespace. This will cause the default_device_exit_net() >> for_each_netdev_safe loop unable to detect the list end, and hit NULL ptr: [ 231.449420] mana 7870:00:00.0 enP30832s1: Moved VF to namespace with: eth0 [ 231.449656] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 231.450246] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 231.450579] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 231.450916] PGD 17b8a8067 P4D 0 [ 231.451163] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 231.451450] CPU: 82 UID: 0 PID: 1394 Comm: kworker/u768:1 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4+ #3 VOLUNTARY [ 231.452042] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024 [ 231.452692] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 231.452947] RIP: 0010:default_device_exit_batch+0x16c/0x3f0 [ 231.453326] Code: c0 0c f5 b3 e8 d5 db fe ff 48 85 c0 74 15 48 c7 c2 f8 fd ca b2 be 10 00 00 00 48 8d 7d c0 e8 7b 77 25 00 49 8b 86 28 01 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 4c 8b 2a 4c 8d 62 f0 49 83 ed 10 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d6 00 [ 231.454294] RSP: 0018:ff75fc7c9bf9fd00 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 231.454610] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 61c8864680b583eb [ 231.455094] RDX: ff1fa9f71462d800 RSI: ff75fc7c9bf9fd38 RDI: 0000000030766564 [ 231.455686] RBP: ff75fc7c9bf9fd78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 231.456126] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ff1fa9f70088e340 [ 231.456621] R13: ff1fa9f70088e340 R14: ffffffffb3f50c20 R15: ff1fa9f7103e6340 [ 231.457161] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1faa6783a08000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 231.457707] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 231.458031] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000179ab2006 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0 [ 231.458434] Call Trace: [ 231.458600] <TASK> [ 231.458777] ops_undo_list+0x100/0x220 [ 231.459015] cleanup_net+0x1b8/0x300 [ 231.459285] process_one_work+0x184/0x340 To fix it, move the VF namespace switching code from the NETDEV_REGISTER event handler to netvsc_open(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4c262801ea60 ("hv_netvsc: Fix VF namespace also in synthetic NIC NETDEV_REGISTER event") Reported-by: Cathy Avery <cavery(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz(a)microsoft.com> --- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 43 ++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c index 42d98e99566e..074ecc346108 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c @@ -135,6 +135,19 @@ static int netvsc_open(struct net_device *net) } if (vf_netdev) { + if (!net_eq(dev_net(net), dev_net(vf_netdev))) { + ret = dev_change_net_namespace(vf_netdev, dev_net(net), + "eth%d"); + if (ret) + netdev_err(vf_netdev, + "Cannot move to same ns as %s: %d\n", + net->name, ret); + else + netdev_info(vf_netdev, + "Moved VF to namespace with: %s\n", + net->name); + } + /* Setting synthetic device up transparently sets * slave as up. If open fails, then slave will be * still be offline (and not used). @@ -2772,31 +2785,6 @@ static struct hv_driver netvsc_drv = { }, }; -/* Set VF's namespace same as the synthetic NIC */ -static void netvsc_event_set_vf_ns(struct net_device *ndev) -{ - struct net_device_context *ndev_ctx = netdev_priv(ndev); - struct net_device *vf_netdev; - int ret; - - vf_netdev = rtnl_dereference(ndev_ctx->vf_netdev); - if (!vf_netdev) - return; - - if (!net_eq(dev_net(ndev), dev_net(vf_netdev))) { - ret = dev_change_net_namespace(vf_netdev, dev_net(ndev), - "eth%d"); - if (ret) - netdev_err(vf_netdev, - "Cannot move to same namespace as %s: %d\n", - ndev->name, ret); - else - netdev_info(vf_netdev, - "Moved VF to namespace with: %s\n", - ndev->name); - } -} - /* * On Hyper-V, every VF interface is matched with a corresponding * synthetic interface. The synthetic interface is presented first @@ -2809,11 +2797,6 @@ static int netvsc_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, struct net_device *event_dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr); int ret = 0; - if (event_dev->netdev_ops == &device_ops && event == NETDEV_REGISTER) { - netvsc_event_set_vf_ns(event_dev); - return NOTIFY_DONE; - } - ret = check_dev_is_matching_vf(event_dev); if (ret != 0) return NOTIFY_DONE; -- 2.34.1

17 hours, 48 minutes

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[PATCH v7 01/12] platform/x86/intel/pmt: fix a crashlog NULL pointer access

by Michael J. Ruhl

Usage of the intel_pmt_read() for binary sysfs, requires a pcidev. The current use of the endpoint value is only valid for telemetry endpoint usage. Without the ep, the crashlog usage causes the following NULL pointer exception: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:intel_pmt_read+0x3b/0x70 [pmt_class] Code: Call Trace: <TASK> ? sysfs_kf_bin_read+0xc0/0xe0 kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xac/0x1a0 vfs_read+0x26d/0x350 ksys_read+0x6b/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1d/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x1bc8/0x1d70 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x110 Augment struct intel_pmt_entry with a pointer to the pcidev to avoid the NULL pointer exception. Reviewed-by: Tejas Upadhyay <tejas.upadhyay(a)intel.com> Fixes: 045a513040cc ("platform/x86/intel/pmt: Use PMT callbacks") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl(a)intel.com> --- drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.c | 3 ++- drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.c index 7233b654bbad..d046e8752173 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ intel_pmt_read(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, if (count > entry->size - off) count = entry->size - off; - count = pmt_telem_read_mmio(entry->ep->pcidev, entry->cb, entry->header.guid, buf, + count = pmt_telem_read_mmio(entry->pcidev, entry->cb, entry->header.guid, buf, entry->base, off, count); return count; @@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static int intel_pmt_populate_entry(struct intel_pmt_entry *entry, return -EINVAL; } + entry->pcidev = pci_dev; entry->guid = header->guid; entry->size = header->size; entry->cb = ivdev->priv_data; diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.h b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.h index b2006d57779d..f6ce80c4e051 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.h +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/pmt/class.h @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ struct intel_pmt_header { struct intel_pmt_entry { struct telem_endpoint *ep; + struct pci_dev *pcidev; struct intel_pmt_header header; struct bin_attribute pmt_bin_attr; struct kobject *kobj; -- 2.50.0

21 hours, 20 minutes

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[PATCH] eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion

by Jann Horn

Ensure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS+1 links. Currently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and does some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don't limit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons: - They don't look upwards in the tree. - If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit 28d82dc1c4ed ("epoll: limit paths"). Essentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just serves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops. A more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph edge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no paths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5 edges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files. As a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500, tested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may have changed with commit 8c44dac8add7 ("eventpoll: Fix priority inversion problem").) To fix it: 1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node, and use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree has already been visited. 2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum depth of an upwards walk. 3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length between epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges. Fixes: 22bacca48a17 ("epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> --- fs/eventpoll.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c index d4dbffdedd08..44648cc09250 100644 --- a/fs/eventpoll.c +++ b/fs/eventpoll.c @@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ struct eventpoll { /* used to optimize loop detection check */ u64 gen; struct hlist_head refs; + u8 loop_check_depth; /* * usage count, used together with epitem->dying to @@ -2142,23 +2143,24 @@ static int ep_poll(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event __user *events, } /** - * ep_loop_check_proc - verify that adding an epoll file inside another - * epoll structure does not violate the constraints, in - * terms of closed loops, or too deep chains (which can - * result in excessive stack usage). + * ep_loop_check_proc - verify that adding an epoll file @ep inside another + * epoll file does not create closed loops, and + * determine the depth of the subtree starting at @ep * * @ep: the &struct eventpoll to be currently checked. * @depth: Current depth of the path being checked. * - * Return: %zero if adding the epoll @file inside current epoll - * structure @ep does not violate the constraints, or %-1 otherwise. + * Return: depth of the subtree, or INT_MAX if we found a loop or went too deep. */ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) { - int error = 0; + int result = 0; struct rb_node *rbp; struct epitem *epi; + if (ep->gen == loop_check_gen) + return ep->loop_check_depth; + mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, depth + 1); ep->gen = loop_check_gen; for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) { @@ -2166,13 +2168,11 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) if (unlikely(is_file_epoll(epi->ffd.file))) { struct eventpoll *ep_tovisit; ep_tovisit = epi->ffd.file->private_data; - if (ep_tovisit->gen == loop_check_gen) - continue; if (ep_tovisit == inserting_into || depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) - error = -1; + result = INT_MAX; else - error = ep_loop_check_proc(ep_tovisit, depth + 1); - if (error != 0) + result = max(result, ep_loop_check_proc(ep_tovisit, depth + 1) + 1); + if (result > EP_MAX_NESTS) break; } else { /* @@ -2186,9 +2186,27 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) list_file(epi->ffd.file); } } + ep->loop_check_depth = result; mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx); - return error; + return result; +} + +/** + * ep_get_upwards_depth_proc - determine depth of @ep when traversed upwards + */ +static int ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) +{ + int result = 0; + struct epitem *epi; + + if (ep->gen == loop_check_gen) + return ep->loop_check_depth; + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(epi, &ep->refs, fllink) + result = max(result, ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(epi->ep, depth + 1) + 1); + ep->gen = loop_check_gen; + ep->loop_check_depth = result; + return result; } /** @@ -2204,8 +2222,22 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) */ static int ep_loop_check(struct eventpoll *ep, struct eventpoll *to) { + int depth, upwards_depth; + inserting_into = ep; - return ep_loop_check_proc(to, 0); + /* + * Check how deep down we can get from @to, and whether it is possible + * to loop up to @ep. + */ + depth = ep_loop_check_proc(to, 0); + if (depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) + return -1; + /* Check how far up we can go from @ep. */ + rcu_read_lock(); + upwards_depth = ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(ep, 0); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return (depth+1+upwards_depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) ? -1 : 0; } static void clear_tfile_check_list(void) --- base-commit: 0ff41df1cb268fc69e703a08a57ee14ae967d0ca change-id: 20250711-epoll-recursion-fix-fb0e336b2aeb -- Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>

22 hours, 7 minutes

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