The patch below does not apply to the 5.5-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From b8fdef311a0bd9223f10754f94fdcf1a594a3457 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 20:44:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] arm64: Always force a branch protection mode when the
compiler has one
Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by
default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying
branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having
some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more
serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to
userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself. In that case our
switching of keys for userspace can affect the kernel unexpectedly, causing
pointer authentication instructions in the kernel to corrupt addresses.
To ensure that we get consistent and reliable behaviour always explicitly
initialise the branch protection mode, ensuring that the kernel is built
the same way regardless of the compiler defaults.
Fixes: 7503197562567 (arm64: add basic pointer authentication support)
Reported-by: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy(a)arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
[catalin.marinas(a)arm.com: remove Kconfig option in favour of Makefile check]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index f15f92ba53e6..85e4149cc5d5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ stack_protector_prepare: prepare0
include/generated/asm-offsets.h))
endif
+# Ensure that if the compiler supports branch protection we default it
+# off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection.
+branch-prot-flags-y += $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none)
+
ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y)
branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all
branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pac-ret+leaf
@@ -73,9 +77,10 @@ branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) := -mbranch-protection=pa
# we pass it only to the assembler. This option is utilized only in case of non
# integrated assemblers.
branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_AS_HAS_PAC) += -Wa,-march=armv8.3-a
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y)
endif
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y)
+
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y)
KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -mbig-endian
CHECKFLAGS += -D__AARCH64EB__
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 3f142b6a7b573bde6cff926f246da05652c61eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila(a)nxp.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:46:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: caam - update xts sector size for large input length
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Since in the software implementation of XTS-AES there is
no notion of sector every input length is processed the same way.
CAAM implementation has the notion of sector which causes different
results between the software implementation and the one in CAAM
for input lengths bigger than 512 bytes.
Increase sector size to maximum value on 16 bits.
Fixes: c6415a6016bf ("crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta(a)nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
index 6171a8118b5a..d6c58184bb57 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
@@ -1524,7 +1524,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_shdsc_skcipher_decap);
*/
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata)
{
- __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(512);
+ /*
+ * Set sector size to a big value, practically disabling
+ * sector size segmentation in xts implementation. We cannot
+ * take full advantage of this HW feature with existing
+ * crypto API / dm-crypt SW architecture.
+ */
+ __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(BIT(15));
u32 *key_jump_cmd;
init_sh_desc(desc, HDR_SHARE_SERIAL | HDR_SAVECTX);
@@ -1577,7 +1583,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap);
*/
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata)
{
- __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(512);
+ /*
+ * Set sector size to a big value, practically disabling
+ * sector size segmentation in xts implementation. We cannot
+ * take full advantage of this HW feature with existing
+ * crypto API / dm-crypt SW architecture.
+ */
+ __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(BIT(15));
u32 *key_jump_cmd;
init_sh_desc(desc, HDR_SHARE_SERIAL | HDR_SAVECTX);
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 3f142b6a7b573bde6cff926f246da05652c61eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila(a)nxp.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:46:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: caam - update xts sector size for large input length
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Since in the software implementation of XTS-AES there is
no notion of sector every input length is processed the same way.
CAAM implementation has the notion of sector which causes different
results between the software implementation and the one in CAAM
for input lengths bigger than 512 bytes.
Increase sector size to maximum value on 16 bits.
Fixes: c6415a6016bf ("crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta(a)nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
index 6171a8118b5a..d6c58184bb57 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
@@ -1524,7 +1524,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_shdsc_skcipher_decap);
*/
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata)
{
- __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(512);
+ /*
+ * Set sector size to a big value, practically disabling
+ * sector size segmentation in xts implementation. We cannot
+ * take full advantage of this HW feature with existing
+ * crypto API / dm-crypt SW architecture.
+ */
+ __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(BIT(15));
u32 *key_jump_cmd;
init_sh_desc(desc, HDR_SHARE_SERIAL | HDR_SAVECTX);
@@ -1577,7 +1583,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap);
*/
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata)
{
- __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(512);
+ /*
+ * Set sector size to a big value, practically disabling
+ * sector size segmentation in xts implementation. We cannot
+ * take full advantage of this HW feature with existing
+ * crypto API / dm-crypt SW architecture.
+ */
+ __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(BIT(15));
u32 *key_jump_cmd;
init_sh_desc(desc, HDR_SHARE_SERIAL | HDR_SAVECTX);
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 3f142b6a7b573bde6cff926f246da05652c61eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila(a)nxp.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:46:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: caam - update xts sector size for large input length
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Since in the software implementation of XTS-AES there is
no notion of sector every input length is processed the same way.
CAAM implementation has the notion of sector which causes different
results between the software implementation and the one in CAAM
for input lengths bigger than 512 bytes.
Increase sector size to maximum value on 16 bits.
Fixes: c6415a6016bf ("crypto: caam - add support for acipher xts(aes)")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta(a)nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
index 6171a8118b5a..d6c58184bb57 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_desc.c
@@ -1524,7 +1524,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_shdsc_skcipher_decap);
*/
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata)
{
- __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(512);
+ /*
+ * Set sector size to a big value, practically disabling
+ * sector size segmentation in xts implementation. We cannot
+ * take full advantage of this HW feature with existing
+ * crypto API / dm-crypt SW architecture.
+ */
+ __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(BIT(15));
u32 *key_jump_cmd;
init_sh_desc(desc, HDR_SHARE_SERIAL | HDR_SAVECTX);
@@ -1577,7 +1583,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_encap);
*/
void cnstr_shdsc_xts_skcipher_decap(u32 * const desc, struct alginfo *cdata)
{
- __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(512);
+ /*
+ * Set sector size to a big value, practically disabling
+ * sector size segmentation in xts implementation. We cannot
+ * take full advantage of this HW feature with existing
+ * crypto API / dm-crypt SW architecture.
+ */
+ __be64 sector_size = cpu_to_be64(BIT(15));
u32 *key_jump_cmd;
init_sh_desc(desc, HDR_SHARE_SERIAL | HDR_SAVECTX);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From bd40b17ca49d7d110adf456e647701ce74de2241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy(a)infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 05:07:55 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] XArray: Fix xa_find_next for large multi-index entries
Coverity pointed out that xas_sibling() was shifting xa_offset without
promoting it to an unsigned long first, so the shift could cause an
overflow and we'd get the wrong answer. The fix is obvious, and the
new test-case provokes UBSAN to report an error:
runtime error: shift exponent 60 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
Fixes: 19c30f4dd092 ("XArray: Fix xa_find_after with multi-index entries")
Reported-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
diff --git a/lib/test_xarray.c b/lib/test_xarray.c
index 55c14e8c8859..8c7d7a8468b8 100644
--- a/lib/test_xarray.c
+++ b/lib/test_xarray.c
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
static unsigned int tests_run;
static unsigned int tests_passed;
+static const unsigned int order_limit =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XARRAY_MULTI) ? BITS_PER_LONG : 1;
+
#ifndef XA_DEBUG
# ifdef __KERNEL__
void xa_dump(const struct xarray *xa) { }
@@ -959,6 +962,20 @@ static noinline void check_multi_find_2(struct xarray *xa)
}
}
+static noinline void check_multi_find_3(struct xarray *xa)
+{
+ unsigned int order;
+
+ for (order = 5; order < order_limit; order++) {
+ unsigned long index = 1UL << (order - 5);
+
+ XA_BUG_ON(xa, !xa_empty(xa));
+ xa_store_order(xa, 0, order - 4, xa_mk_index(0), GFP_KERNEL);
+ XA_BUG_ON(xa, xa_find_after(xa, &index, ULONG_MAX, XA_PRESENT));
+ xa_erase_index(xa, 0);
+ }
+}
+
static noinline void check_find_1(struct xarray *xa)
{
unsigned long i, j, k;
@@ -1081,6 +1098,7 @@ static noinline void check_find(struct xarray *xa)
for (i = 2; i < 10; i++)
check_multi_find_1(xa, i);
check_multi_find_2(xa);
+ check_multi_find_3(xa);
}
/* See find_swap_entry() in mm/shmem.c */
diff --git a/lib/xarray.c b/lib/xarray.c
index 1d9fab7db8da..acd1fad2e862 100644
--- a/lib/xarray.c
+++ b/lib/xarray.c
@@ -1839,7 +1839,8 @@ static bool xas_sibling(struct xa_state *xas)
if (!node)
return false;
mask = (XA_CHUNK_SIZE << node->shift) - 1;
- return (xas->xa_index & mask) > (xas->xa_offset << node->shift);
+ return (xas->xa_index & mask) >
+ ((unsigned long)xas->xa_offset << node->shift);
}
/**
The patch below does not apply to the 5.5-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From bd40b17ca49d7d110adf456e647701ce74de2241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy(a)infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 05:07:55 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] XArray: Fix xa_find_next for large multi-index entries
Coverity pointed out that xas_sibling() was shifting xa_offset without
promoting it to an unsigned long first, so the shift could cause an
overflow and we'd get the wrong answer. The fix is obvious, and the
new test-case provokes UBSAN to report an error:
runtime error: shift exponent 60 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
Fixes: 19c30f4dd092 ("XArray: Fix xa_find_after with multi-index entries")
Reported-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
diff --git a/lib/test_xarray.c b/lib/test_xarray.c
index 55c14e8c8859..8c7d7a8468b8 100644
--- a/lib/test_xarray.c
+++ b/lib/test_xarray.c
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
static unsigned int tests_run;
static unsigned int tests_passed;
+static const unsigned int order_limit =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XARRAY_MULTI) ? BITS_PER_LONG : 1;
+
#ifndef XA_DEBUG
# ifdef __KERNEL__
void xa_dump(const struct xarray *xa) { }
@@ -959,6 +962,20 @@ static noinline void check_multi_find_2(struct xarray *xa)
}
}
+static noinline void check_multi_find_3(struct xarray *xa)
+{
+ unsigned int order;
+
+ for (order = 5; order < order_limit; order++) {
+ unsigned long index = 1UL << (order - 5);
+
+ XA_BUG_ON(xa, !xa_empty(xa));
+ xa_store_order(xa, 0, order - 4, xa_mk_index(0), GFP_KERNEL);
+ XA_BUG_ON(xa, xa_find_after(xa, &index, ULONG_MAX, XA_PRESENT));
+ xa_erase_index(xa, 0);
+ }
+}
+
static noinline void check_find_1(struct xarray *xa)
{
unsigned long i, j, k;
@@ -1081,6 +1098,7 @@ static noinline void check_find(struct xarray *xa)
for (i = 2; i < 10; i++)
check_multi_find_1(xa, i);
check_multi_find_2(xa);
+ check_multi_find_3(xa);
}
/* See find_swap_entry() in mm/shmem.c */
diff --git a/lib/xarray.c b/lib/xarray.c
index 1d9fab7db8da..acd1fad2e862 100644
--- a/lib/xarray.c
+++ b/lib/xarray.c
@@ -1839,7 +1839,8 @@ static bool xas_sibling(struct xa_state *xas)
if (!node)
return false;
mask = (XA_CHUNK_SIZE << node->shift) - 1;
- return (xas->xa_index & mask) > (xas->xa_offset << node->shift);
+ return (xas->xa_index & mask) >
+ ((unsigned long)xas->xa_offset << node->shift);
}
/**
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From b8fdd090376a7a46d17db316638fe54b965c2fb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bob Liu <bob.liu(a)oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2020 21:22:45 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] dm zoned: remove duplicate nr_rnd_zones increase in
dmz_init_zone()
zmd->nr_rnd_zones was increased twice by mistake. The other place it
is increased in dmz_init_zone() is the only one needed:
1131 zmd->nr_useable_zones++;
1132 if (dmz_is_rnd(zone)) {
1133 zmd->nr_rnd_zones++;
^^^
Fixes: 3b1a94c88b79 ("dm zoned: drive-managed zoned block device target")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal(a)wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c b/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
index 516c7b671d25..369de15c4e80 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
@@ -1109,7 +1109,6 @@ static int dmz_init_zone(struct blk_zone *blkz, unsigned int idx, void *data)
switch (blkz->type) {
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL:
set_bit(DMZ_RND, &zone->flags);
- zmd->nr_rnd_zones++;
break;
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_SEQWRITE_REQ:
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_SEQWRITE_PREF:
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From b8fdd090376a7a46d17db316638fe54b965c2fb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bob Liu <bob.liu(a)oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2020 21:22:45 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] dm zoned: remove duplicate nr_rnd_zones increase in
dmz_init_zone()
zmd->nr_rnd_zones was increased twice by mistake. The other place it
is increased in dmz_init_zone() is the only one needed:
1131 zmd->nr_useable_zones++;
1132 if (dmz_is_rnd(zone)) {
1133 zmd->nr_rnd_zones++;
^^^
Fixes: 3b1a94c88b79 ("dm zoned: drive-managed zoned block device target")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu(a)oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal(a)wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c b/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
index 516c7b671d25..369de15c4e80 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
@@ -1109,7 +1109,6 @@ static int dmz_init_zone(struct blk_zone *blkz, unsigned int idx, void *data)
switch (blkz->type) {
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL:
set_bit(DMZ_RND, &zone->flags);
- zmd->nr_rnd_zones++;
break;
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_SEQWRITE_REQ:
case BLK_ZONE_TYPE_SEQWRITE_PREF:
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19.y-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From cc41f11a21a51d6869d71e525a7264c748d7c0d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sreekanth Reddy <sreekanth.reddy(a)broadcom.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 05:52:43 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mpt3sas: Fix kernel panic observed on soft HBA unplug
Generic protection fault type kernel panic is observed when user performs
soft (ordered) HBA unplug operation while IOs are running on drives
connected to HBA.
When user performs ordered HBA removal operation, the kernel calls PCI
device's .remove() call back function where driver is flushing out all the
outstanding SCSI IO commands with DID_NO_CONNECT host byte and also unmaps
sg buffers allocated for these IO commands.
However, in the ordered HBA removal case (unlike of real HBA hot removal),
HBA device is still alive and hence HBA hardware is performing the DMA
operations to those buffers on the system memory which are already unmapped
while flushing out the outstanding SCSI IO commands and this leads to
kernel panic.
Don't flush out the outstanding IOs from .remove() path in case of ordered
removal since HBA will be still alive in this case and it can complete the
outstanding IOs. Flush out the outstanding IOs only in case of 'physical
HBA hot unplug' where there won't be any communication with the HBA.
During shutdown also it is possible that HBA hardware can perform DMA
operations on those outstanding IO buffers which are completed with
DID_NO_CONNECT by the driver from .shutdown(). So same above fix is applied
in shutdown path as well.
It is safe to drop the outstanding commands when HBA is inaccessible such
as when permanent PCI failure happens, when HBA is in non-operational
state, or when someone does a real HBA hot unplug operation. Since driver
knows that HBA is inaccessible during these cases, it is safe to drop the
outstanding commands instead of waiting for SCSI error recovery to kick in
and clear these outstanding commands.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1585302763-23007-1-git-send-email-sreekanth.reddy…
Fixes: c666d3be99c0 ("scsi: mpt3sas: wait for and flush running commands on shutdown/unload")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org #v4.14.174+
Signed-off-by: Sreekanth Reddy <sreekanth.reddy(a)broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com>
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c
index 778d5e6ce385..04a40afe60e3 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c
@@ -9908,8 +9908,8 @@ static void scsih_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
ioc->remove_host = 1;
- mpt3sas_wait_for_commands_to_complete(ioc);
- _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
+ if (!pci_device_is_present(pdev))
+ _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
_scsih_fw_event_cleanup_queue(ioc);
@@ -9992,8 +9992,8 @@ scsih_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)
ioc->remove_host = 1;
- mpt3sas_wait_for_commands_to_complete(ioc);
- _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
+ if (!pci_device_is_present(pdev))
+ _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
_scsih_fw_event_cleanup_queue(ioc);
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14.y-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From cc41f11a21a51d6869d71e525a7264c748d7c0d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sreekanth Reddy <sreekanth.reddy(a)broadcom.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 05:52:43 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: mpt3sas: Fix kernel panic observed on soft HBA unplug
Generic protection fault type kernel panic is observed when user performs
soft (ordered) HBA unplug operation while IOs are running on drives
connected to HBA.
When user performs ordered HBA removal operation, the kernel calls PCI
device's .remove() call back function where driver is flushing out all the
outstanding SCSI IO commands with DID_NO_CONNECT host byte and also unmaps
sg buffers allocated for these IO commands.
However, in the ordered HBA removal case (unlike of real HBA hot removal),
HBA device is still alive and hence HBA hardware is performing the DMA
operations to those buffers on the system memory which are already unmapped
while flushing out the outstanding SCSI IO commands and this leads to
kernel panic.
Don't flush out the outstanding IOs from .remove() path in case of ordered
removal since HBA will be still alive in this case and it can complete the
outstanding IOs. Flush out the outstanding IOs only in case of 'physical
HBA hot unplug' where there won't be any communication with the HBA.
During shutdown also it is possible that HBA hardware can perform DMA
operations on those outstanding IO buffers which are completed with
DID_NO_CONNECT by the driver from .shutdown(). So same above fix is applied
in shutdown path as well.
It is safe to drop the outstanding commands when HBA is inaccessible such
as when permanent PCI failure happens, when HBA is in non-operational
state, or when someone does a real HBA hot unplug operation. Since driver
knows that HBA is inaccessible during these cases, it is safe to drop the
outstanding commands instead of waiting for SCSI error recovery to kick in
and clear these outstanding commands.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1585302763-23007-1-git-send-email-sreekanth.reddy…
Fixes: c666d3be99c0 ("scsi: mpt3sas: wait for and flush running commands on shutdown/unload")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org #v4.14.174+
Signed-off-by: Sreekanth Reddy <sreekanth.reddy(a)broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com>
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c
index 778d5e6ce385..04a40afe60e3 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c
@@ -9908,8 +9908,8 @@ static void scsih_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
ioc->remove_host = 1;
- mpt3sas_wait_for_commands_to_complete(ioc);
- _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
+ if (!pci_device_is_present(pdev))
+ _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
_scsih_fw_event_cleanup_queue(ioc);
@@ -9992,8 +9992,8 @@ scsih_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)
ioc->remove_host = 1;
- mpt3sas_wait_for_commands_to_complete(ioc);
- _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
+ if (!pci_device_is_present(pdev))
+ _scsih_flush_running_cmds(ioc);
_scsih_fw_event_cleanup_queue(ioc);