On Mon, May 11, 2026 at 03:53:00AM +0000, Greg KH wrote:
Was this tested on any real greybus devices?
No, I do not have access to real Greybus hardware. The issue was identified through code review of drivers/staging/greybus/authentication.c.
The vulnerable paths are:
1. payload_size is used in a subtraction without first verifying payload_size >= sizeof(*response), which can underflow on short responses.
2. The resulting size is passed directly to memcpy() into fixed-size UAPI buffers without validating against CAP_CERTIFICATE_MAX_SIZE or CAP_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE.
A malicious or compromised Greybus endpoint could therefore trigger an out-of-bounds write through an oversized payload.
The fix adds the missing bounds checks before the memcpy() calls, which matches common kernel validation patterns.
If testing on real hardware is required before merging, I am happy to wait.
Thanks, Muhammad Bilal