On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 11:47:39PM +0000, Shunbo Shi wrote:
In gb_connection_recv(), the size of the received data is checked against sizeof(struct gb_operation_msg_hdr) and against the message size encoded in the header (msg_size), but msg_size itself is never checked against the header size.
If a peer sends a message whose header claims a size smaller than the header itself (e.g. header.size == 3), the two existing checks both pass (size >= sizeof(header) and size >= msg_size), and the message is dispatched with the undersized msg_size.
In gb_operation_create_incoming(), this leads to an unsigned integer underflow in:
request_size = size - sizeof(struct gb_operation_msg_hdr);
The underflowed request_size then wraps back around in gb_operation_message_alloc():
message_size = payload_size + sizeof(*header);
causing kzalloc() to allocate a buffer that is too small to hold the message header. When the response is later prepared in gb_operation_response_alloc(), reading request_header->operation_id reads past the end of the undersized allocation, triggering a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds report.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/sashiko-outbox-210716@kernel.org/T/ Fixes: d90c25b0a279 ("greybus: let operation layer examine incoming data") Reported-by: syzbot+0b456664585fa81a47f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0b456664585fa81a47f6 Signed-off-by: Shunbo Shi shishunbo@cmss.chinamobile.com
Changes in v3:
- combine the two separate conditions and unify the error message
as suggested by dan. Thanks!
Thanks!
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter error27@gmail.com
regards, dan carpenter