In gb_connection_recv(), the size of the received data is checked against sizeof(struct gb_operation_msg_hdr) and against the message size encoded in the header (msg_size), but msg_size itself is never checked against the header size.
If a peer sends a message whose header claims a size smaller than the header itself (e.g. header.size == 3), the two existing checks both pass (size >= sizeof(header) and size >= msg_size), and the message is dispatched with the undersized msg_size.
In gb_operation_create_incoming(), this leads to an unsigned integer underflow in:
request_size = size - sizeof(struct gb_operation_msg_hdr);
The underflowed request_size then wraps back around in gb_operation_message_alloc():
message_size = payload_size + sizeof(*header);
causing kzalloc() to allocate a buffer that is too small to hold the message header. When the response is later prepared in gb_operation_response_alloc(), reading request_header->operation_id reads past the end of the undersized allocation, triggering a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds report. When header.size is zero, kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR and the same read dereferences an invalid address.
Verify msg_size >= sizeof(header) in gb_connection_recv() so that the "Caller has made sure we at least have a message header" assumption in gb_operation_create_incoming() actually holds.
Fixes: d90c25b0a279 ("greybus: let operation layer examine incoming data") Reported-by: syzbot+0b456664585fa81a47f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0b456664585fa81a47f6 Signed-off-by: Shunbo Shi shishunbo@cmss.chinamobile.com --- drivers/greybus/operation.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/greybus/operation.c b/drivers/greybus/operation.c index 7e12ffb2dd60..da53c0e026f0 100644 --- a/drivers/greybus/operation.c +++ b/drivers/greybus/operation.c @@ -1047,6 +1047,13 @@ void gb_connection_recv(struct gb_connection *connection, /* Use memcpy as data may be unaligned */ memcpy(&header, data, sizeof(header)); msg_size = le16_to_cpu(header.size); + if (msg_size < sizeof(header)) { + dev_err_ratelimited(dev, + "%s: invalid message header size (%zu < %zu)\n", + connection->name, msg_size, + sizeof(header)); + return; + } if (size < msg_size) { dev_err_ratelimited(dev, "%s: incomplete message 0x%04x of type 0x%02x received (%zu < %zu)\n",