'available_events' is actually not required by
'test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc' and its Existence has been tested in
'test.d/00basic/basic4.tc'.
So the require of 'available_events' can be dropped and then we can add
'instance' flag to test 'test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc' for instance.
Test result show as below:
# ./ftracetest test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc
=== Ftrace unit tests ===
[1] event tracing - enable/disable with top level files [PASS]
[2] (instance) event tracing - enable/disable with top level files [PASS]
# of passed: 2
# of failed: 0
# of unresolved: 0
# of untested: 0
# of unsupported: 0
# of xfailed: 0
# of undefined(test bug): 0
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc b/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc
index 93c10ea42a68..8b8e1aea985b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/event/toplevel-enable.tc
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/sh
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
# description: event tracing - enable/disable with top level files
-# requires: available_events set_event events/enable
+# requires: set_event events/enable
+# flags: instance
do_reset() {
echo > set_event
--
2.25.1
This is part of an effort to improve detection of regressions impacting
device probe on all platforms. The recently merged DT kselftest [3]
detects probe issues for all devices described statically in the DT.
That leaves out devices discovered at run-time from discoverable buses.
This is where this test comes in. All of the devices that are connected
through discoverable buses (ie USB and PCI), and which are internal and
therefore always present, can be described based on their position in
the system topology in a per-platform YAML file so they can be checked
for. The test will check that the device has been instantiated and bound
to a driver.
Patch 1 introduces the test. Patch 2 and 3 add the device definitions
for the google,spherion machine (Acer Chromebook 514) and XPS 13 as
examples.
This is the output from the test running on Spherion:
TAP version 13
Using board file: boards/google,spherion.yaml
1..8
ok 1 /usb2-controller(a)11200000/1.4.1/camera.device
ok 2 /usb2-controller(a)11200000/1.4.1/camera.0.driver
ok 3 /usb2-controller(a)11200000/1.4.1/camera.1.driver
ok 4 /usb2-controller(a)11200000/1.4.2/bluetooth.device
ok 5 /usb2-controller(a)11200000/1.4.2/bluetooth.0.driver
ok 6 /usb2-controller(a)11200000/1.4.2/bluetooth.1.driver
ok 7 /pci-controller(a)11230000/0.0/0.0/wifi.device
ok 8 /pci-controller(a)11230000/0.0/0.0/wifi.driver
Totals: pass:8 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230828211424.2964562-1-nfraprado@collabora.co…
Changes in v4:
- Dropped RFC tag
- Fixed 'busses' misspelling
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231227123643.52348-1-nfraprado@collabora.com
Changes in v3:
- Reverted approach of encoding stable device reference in test file
from device match fields (from modalias) back to HW topology (from v1)
- Changed board file description to YAML
- Rewrote test script in python to handle YAML and support x86 platforms
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231127233558.868365-1-nfraprado@collabora.com
Changes in v2:
- Changed approach of encoding stable device reference in test file from
HW topology to device match fields (the ones from modalias)
- Better documented test format
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231024211818.365844-1-nfraprado@collabora.com
---
Nícolas F. R. A. Prado (3):
kselftest: Add test to verify probe of devices from discoverable buses
kselftest: devices: Add sample board file for google,spherion
kselftest: devices: Add sample board file for XPS 13 9300
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/devices/Makefile | 4 +
.../devices/boards/Dell Inc.,XPS 13 9300.yaml | 40 +++
.../selftests/devices/boards/google,spherion.yaml | 50 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/devices/ksft.py | 90 ++++++
.../selftests/devices/test_discoverable_devices.py | 318 +++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 503 insertions(+)
---
base-commit: 6613476e225e090cc9aad49be7fa504e290dd33d
change-id: 20240122-discoverable-devs-ksft-9d501e312688
Best regards,
--
Nícolas F. R. A. Prado <nfraprado(a)collabora.com>
The checksum_32 code was originally written to only handle 2-byte
aligned buffers, but was later extended to support arbitrary alignment.
However, the non-PPro variant doesn't apply the carry before jumping to
the 2- or 4-byte aligned versions, which clear CF.
This causes the new checksum_kunit test to fail, as it runs with a large
number of different possible alignments and both with and without
carries.
For example:
./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --arch i386 --kconfig_add CONFIG_M486=y checksum
Gives:
KTAP version 1
# Subtest: checksum
1..3
ok 1 test_csum_fixed_random_inputs
# test_csum_all_carry_inputs: ASSERTION FAILED at lib/checksum_kunit.c:267
Expected result == expec, but
result == 65281 (0xff01)
expec == 65280 (0xff00)
not ok 2 test_csum_all_carry_inputs
# test_csum_no_carry_inputs: ASSERTION FAILED at lib/checksum_kunit.c:314
Expected result == expec, but
result == 65535 (0xffff)
expec == 65534 (0xfffe)
not ok 3 test_csum_no_carry_inputs
With this patch, it passes.
KTAP version 1
# Subtest: checksum
1..3
ok 1 test_csum_fixed_random_inputs
ok 2 test_csum_all_carry_inputs
ok 3 test_csum_no_carry_inputs
I also tested it on a real 486DX2, with the same results.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow(a)google.com>
---
Re-sending this from [1]. While there's an argument that the whole
32-bit checksum code could do with rewriting, it's:
(a) worth fixing before someone takes the time to rewrite it, and
(b) worth any future rewrite starting from a point where the tests pass
I don't think there should be any downside to this fix: it only affects
ancient computers, and adds a single instruction which isn't in a loop.
Cheers,
-- David
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230704083206.693155-2-davidgow@google.com/
---
arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
index 68f7fa3e1322..a5123b29b403 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(csum_partial)
jl 8f
movzbl (%esi), %ebx
adcl %ebx, %eax
+ adcl $0, %eax
roll $8, %eax
inc %esi
testl $2, %esi
--
2.45.2.1089.g2a221341d9-goog
This introduces signal->exec_bprm, which is used to
fix the case when at least one of the sibling threads
is traced, and therefore the trace process may dead-lock
in ptrace_attach, but de_thread will need to wait for the
tracer to continue execution.
The solution is to detect this situation and allow
ptrace_attach to continue by temporarily releasing the
cred_guard_mutex, while de_thread() is still waiting for
traced zombies to be eventually released by the tracer.
In the case of the thread group leader we only have to wait
for the thread to become a zombie, which may also need
co-operation from the tracer due to PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT.
When a tracer wants to ptrace_attach a task that already
is in execve, we simply retry the ptrace_may_access
check while temporarily installing the new credentials
and dumpability which are about to be used after execve
completes. If the ptrace_attach happens on a thread that
is a sibling-thread of the thread doing execve, it is
sufficient to check against the old credentials, as this
thread will be waited for, before the new credentials are
installed.
Other threads die quickly since the cred_guard_mutex is
released, but a deadly signal is already pending. In case
the mutex_lock_killable misses the signal, the non-zero
current->signal->exec_bprm makes sure they release the
mutex immediately and return with -ERESTARTNOINTR.
This means there is no API change, unlike the previous
version of this patch which was discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b6537ae6-31b1-5c50-f32b-8b8332ace882@hotmail.d…
See tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
for a test case that gets fixed by this change.
Note that since the test case was originally designed to
test the ptrace_attach returning an error in this situation,
the test expectation needed to be adjusted, to allow the
API to succeed at the first attempt.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger(a)hotmail.de>
---
fs/exec.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++-------
fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++
include/linux/cred.h | 1 +
include/linux/sched/signal.h | 18 ++++++
kernel/cred.c | 28 +++++++--
kernel/ptrace.c | 32 +++++++++++
kernel/seccomp.c | 12 +++-
tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c | 23 +++++---
8 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
v10: Changes to previous version, make the PTRACE_ATTACH
retun -EAGAIN, instead of execve return -ERESTARTSYS.
Added some lessions learned to the description.
v11: Check old and new credentials in PTRACE_ATTACH again without
changing the API.
Note: I got actually one response from an automatic checker to the v11 patch,
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202107121344.wu68hEPF-lkp@intel.com/
which is complaining about:
>> kernel/ptrace.c:425:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct cred const *old_cred @@ got struct cred const [noderef] __rcu *real_cred @@
417 struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm;
418 const struct cred *old_cred;
419 struct mm_struct *old_mm;
420
421 retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
422 if (retval)
423 goto unlock_creds;
424 task_lock(task);
> 425 old_cred = task->real_cred;
v12: Essentially identical to v11.
- Fixed a minor merge conflict in linux v5.17, and fixed the
above mentioned nit by adding __rcu to the declaration.
- re-tested the patch with all linux versions from v5.11 to v6.6
v10 was an alternative approach which did imply an API change.
But I would prefer to avoid such an API change.
The difficult part is getting the right dumpability flags assigned
before de_thread starts, hope you like this version.
If not, the v10 is of course also acceptable.
Thanks
Bernd.
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 2f2b0acec4f0..902d3b230485 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1041,11 +1041,13 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm)
return 0;
}
-static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
+ struct task_struct *t = tsk;
+ bool unsafe_execve_in_progress = false;
if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
goto no_thread_group;
@@ -1068,6 +1070,19 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk))
sig->notify_count--;
+ while_each_thread(tsk, t) {
+ if (unlikely(t->ptrace)
+ && (t != tsk->group_leader || !t->exit_state))
+ unsafe_execve_in_progress = true;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(lock);
+ sig->exec_bprm = bprm;
+ mutex_unlock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ spin_lock_irq(lock);
+ }
+
while (sig->notify_count) {
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
@@ -1158,6 +1173,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
release_task(leader);
}
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ sig->exec_bprm = NULL;
+ }
+
sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
@@ -1169,6 +1189,11 @@ static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0;
killed:
+ if (unlikely(unsafe_execve_in_progress)) {
+ mutex_lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
+ sig->exec_bprm = NULL;
+ }
+
/* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
sig->group_exec_task = NULL;
@@ -1253,6 +1278,24 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
return retval;
+ /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
+ would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
+ if (bprm->have_execfd)
+ would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
+
+ /*
+ * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
+ * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
+ * bprm->secureexec instead.
+ */
+ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
+ is_dumpability_changed(current_cred(), bprm->cred) ||
+ !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
+ gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
+ set_dumpable(bprm->mm, suid_dumpable);
+ else
+ set_dumpable(bprm->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+
/*
* Ensure all future errors are fatal.
*/
@@ -1261,7 +1304,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
/*
* Make this the only thread in the thread group.
*/
- retval = de_thread(me);
+ retval = de_thread(me, bprm);
if (retval)
goto out;
@@ -1284,11 +1327,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
if (retval)
goto out;
- /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
- would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
- if (bprm->have_execfd)
- would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
-
/*
* Release all of the old mmap stuff
*/
@@ -1350,18 +1388,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
- /*
- * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
- * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
- * bprm->secureexec instead.
- */
- if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
- !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
- gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
- set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
- else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
-
perf_event_exec();
__set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
@@ -1480,6 +1506,11 @@ static int prepare_bprm_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ }
+
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
if (likely(bprm->cred))
return 0;
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ffd54617c354..0da9adfadb48 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2788,6 +2788,12 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
if (rv < 0)
goto out_free;
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ rv = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
rv = security_setprocattr(PROC_I(inode)->op.lsm,
file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, page,
count);
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index f923528d5cc4..b01e309f5686 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
+extern bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index 0014d3adaf84..14df7073a0a8 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -234,9 +234,27 @@ struct signal_struct {
struct mm_struct *oom_mm; /* recorded mm when the thread group got
* killed by the oom killer */
+ struct linux_binprm *exec_bprm; /* Used to check ptrace_may_access
+ * against new credentials while
+ * de_thread is waiting for other
+ * traced threads to terminate.
+ * Set while de_thread is executing.
+ * The cred_guard_mutex is released
+ * after de_thread() has called
+ * zap_other_threads(), therefore
+ * a fatal signal is guaranteed to be
+ * already pending in the unlikely
+ * event, that
+ * current->signal->exec_bprm happens
+ * to be non-zero after the
+ * cred_guard_mutex was acquired.
+ */
+
struct mutex cred_guard_mutex; /* guard against foreign influences on
* credential calculations
* (notably. ptrace)
+ * Held while execve runs, except when
+ * a sibling thread is being traced.
* Deprecated do not use in new code.
* Use exec_update_lock instead.
*/
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 98cb4eca23fb..586cb6c7cf6b 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -433,6 +433,28 @@ static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
return false;
}
+/**
+ * is_dumpability_changed - Will changing creds from old to new
+ * affect the dumpability in commit_creds?
+ *
+ * Return: false - dumpability will not be changed in commit_creds.
+ * Return: true - dumpability will be changed to non-dumpable.
+ *
+ * @old: The old credentials
+ * @new: The new credentials
+ */
+bool is_dumpability_changed(const struct cred *old, const struct cred *new)
+{
+ if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
+ !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
+ !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
+ !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
+ !cred_cap_issubset(old, new))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
* @new: The credentials to be assigned
@@ -467,11 +489,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
/* dumpability changes */
- if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
- !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
- !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
- !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
- !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
+ if (is_dumpability_changed(old, new)) {
if (task->mm)
set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
task->pdeath_signal = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 443057bee87c..eb1c450bb7d7 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -435,6 +436,28 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
if (retval)
goto unlock_creds;
+ if (unlikely(task->in_execve)) {
+ struct linux_binprm *bprm = task->signal->exec_bprm;
+ const struct cred __rcu *old_cred;
+ struct mm_struct *old_mm;
+
+ retval = down_write_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
+ if (retval)
+ goto unlock_creds;
+ task_lock(task);
+ old_cred = task->real_cred;
+ old_mm = task->mm;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, bprm->cred);
+ task->mm = bprm->mm;
+ retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, old_cred);
+ task->mm = old_mm;
+ task_unlock(task);
+ up_write(&task->signal->exec_update_lock);
+ if (retval)
+ goto unlock_creds;
+ }
+
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
@@ -508,6 +531,14 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ return -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+ }
+
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Are we already being traced? */
if (!current->ptrace) {
@@ -523,6 +554,7 @@ static int ptrace_traceme(void)
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 255999ba9190..b29bbfa0b044 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1955,9 +1955,15 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
* Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
* while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
*/
- if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
- mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
- goto out_put_fd;
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
+ if (mutex_lock_killable(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ goto out_put_fd;
+
+ if (unlikely(current->signal->exec_bprm)) {
+ mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+ goto out_put_fd;
+ }
+ }
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
index 4db327b44586..3b7d81fb99bb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ptrace/vmaccess.c
@@ -39,8 +39,15 @@ TEST(vmaccess)
f = open(mm, O_RDONLY);
ASSERT_GE(f, 0);
close(f);
- f = kill(pid, SIGCONT);
- ASSERT_EQ(f, 0);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, -1);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(f, pid);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(f, pid);
+ f = waitpid(-1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(f, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, ECHILD);
}
TEST(attach)
@@ -57,22 +64,24 @@ TEST(attach)
sleep(1);
k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
- ASSERT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);
- ASSERT_EQ(k, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, WNOHANG);
ASSERT_NE(k, -1);
ASSERT_NE(k, 0);
ASSERT_NE(k, pid);
ASSERT_EQ(WIFEXITED(s), 1);
ASSERT_EQ(WEXITSTATUS(s), 0);
- sleep(1);
- k = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
+ k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
+ ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGTRAP);
+ k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L);
ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
ASSERT_EQ(WIFSTOPPED(s), 1);
ASSERT_EQ(WSTOPSIG(s), SIGSTOP);
- k = ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0L, 0L);
+ k = ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0L, 0L);
ASSERT_EQ(k, 0);
k = waitpid(-1, &s, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(k, pid);
--
2.39.2
The MBM (Memory Bandwidth Monitoring) and MBA (Memory Bandwidth Allocation)
features are not enabled for AMD systems. The reason was lack of perf
counters to compare the resctrl test results.
Starting with the commit
25e56847821f ("perf/x86/amd/uncore: Add memory controller support"), AMD
now supports the UMC (Unified Memory Controller) perf events. These events
can be used to compare the test results.
This series adds the support to detect the UMC events and enable MBM/MBA
tests for AMD systems.
v3:
Note: Based the series on top of latest kselftests/master
1613e604df0cd359cf2a7fbd9be7a0bcfacfabd0 (tag: v6.10-rc1).
Also applied the patches from the series
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240531131142.1716-1-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.inte…
Separated the fix patch.
Renamed the imc to just mc to make it generic.
Changed the search string "uncore_imc_" and "amd_umc_"
Changes related rebase to latest kselftest tree.
v2: Changes.
a. Rebased on top of tip/master (Apr 25, 2024)
b. Addressed Ilpo comments except the one about close call.
It seems more clear to keep READ and WRITE separate.
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8e4badb7-6cc5-61f1-e041-d902209a90d5@linux.int…
c. Used ksft_perror call when applicable.
d. Added vendor check for non contiguous CBM check.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1708637563.git.babu.moger@amd.com/
Babu Moger (4):
selftests/resctrl: Rename variables and functions to generic names
selftests/resctrl: Pass sysfs controller name of the vendor
selftests/resctrl: Add support for MBM and MBA tests on AMD
selftests/resctrl: Enable MBA/MBA tests on AMD
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/mba_test.c | 25 +-
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/mbm_test.c | 23 +-
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/resctrl.h | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/resctrl_val.c | 305 ++++++++++--------
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/resctrlfs.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 166 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)google.com>
Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their
execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting
it differently.
However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all
executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified
boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass
and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm
process created a memfd to share the content with an external process,
however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code
and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind.
On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s
seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then
execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's
use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].
To address those above, this set of patches add following:
1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit.
3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of
X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then
memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new
LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy.
Change history:
v7:
- patch 2/6: remove #ifdef and MAX_PATH (memfd_test.c).
- patch 3/6: check capability (CAP_SYS_ADMIN) from userns instead of
global ns (pid_sysctl.h). Add a tab (pid_namespace.h).
- patch 5/6: remove #ifdef (memfd_test.c)
- patch 6/6: remove unneeded security_move_mount(security.c).
v6:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221206150233.1963717-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- Address comment and move "#ifdef CONFIG_" from .c file to pid_sysctl.h
v5:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221206152358.1966099-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- Pass vm.memfd_noexec from current ns to child ns.
- Fix build issue detected by kernel test robot.
- Add missing security.c
v3:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221202013404.163143-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- Address API design comments in v2.
- Let memfd_create() to set X bit at creation time.
- A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control behavior of X bit.
- A new security hook in memfd_create().
v2:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220805222126.142525-1-jeffxu@google.com/
- address comments in V1.
- add sysctl (vm.mfd_noexec) to set the default file permissions of
memfd_create to be non-executable.
v1:https://lwn.net/Articles/890096/
[1] https://crbug.com/1305411
[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=type%3Dbug-security%20me…
[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/781013/
Daniel Verkamp (2):
mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC
selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC
Jeff Xu (4):
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC
mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd
selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC
mm/memfd: security hook for memfd_create
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 19 ++
include/linux/security.h | 6 +
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 4 +
kernel/pid_namespace.c | 5 +
kernel/pid_sysctl.h | 59 ++++
mm/memfd.c | 61 +++-
mm/shmem.c | 6 +
security/security.c | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/fuse_test.c | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++++-
13 files changed, 510 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 kernel/pid_sysctl.h
base-commit: eb7081409f94a9a8608593d0fb63a1aa3d6f95d8
--
2.39.0.rc1.256.g54fd8350bd-goog
This series introduces a new VIOMMU infrastructure and related ioctls.
IOMMUFD has been using the HWPT infrastructure for all cases, including a
nested IO page table support. Yet, there're limitations for an HWPT-based
structure to support some advanced HW-accelerated features, such as CMDQV
on NVIDIA Grace, and HW-accelerated vIOMMU on AMD. Even for a multi-IOMMU
environment, it is not straightforward for nested HWPTs to share the same
parent HWPT (stage-2 IO pagetable), with the HWPT infrastructure alone.
The new VIOMMU object is an additional layer, between the nested HWPT and
its parent HWPT, to give to both the IOMMUFD core and an IOMMU driver an
additional structure to support HW-accelerated feature:
----------------------------
---------------- | | paging_hwpt0 |
| hwpt_nested0 |--->| viommu0 ------------------
---------------- | | HW-accel feats |
----------------------------
On a multi-IOMMU system, the VIOMMU object can be instanced to the number
of vIOMMUs in a guest VM, while holding the same parent HWPT to share the
stage-2 IO pagetable. Each VIOMMU then just need to only allocate its own
VMID to attach the shared stage-2 IO pagetable to the physical IOMMU:
----------------------------
---------------- | | paging_hwpt0 |
| hwpt_nested0 |--->| viommu0 ------------------
---------------- | | VMID0 |
----------------------------
----------------------------
---------------- | | paging_hwpt0 |
| hwpt_nested1 |--->| viommu1 ------------------
---------------- | | VMID1 |
----------------------------
As an initial part-1, add ioctls to support a VIOMMU-based invalidation:
IOMMUFD_CMD_VIOMMU_ALLOC to allocate a VIOMMU object
IOMMUFD_CMD_VIOMMU_SET/UNSET_VDEV_ID to set/clear device's virtual ID
(Resue IOMMUFD_CMD_HWPT_INVALIDATE for a VIOMMU object to flush cache
by a given driver data)
Worth noting that the VDEV_ID is for a per-VIOMMU device list for drivers
to look up the device's physical instance from its virtual ID in a VM. It
is essential for a VIOMMU-based invalidation where the request contains a
device's virtual ID for its device cache flush, e.g. ATC invalidation.
As for the implementation of the series, add an IOMMU_VIOMMU_TYPE_DEFAULT
type for a core-allocated-core-managed VIOMMU object, allowing drivers to
simply hook a default viommu ops for viommu-based invalidation alone. And
provide some viommu helpers to drivers for VDEV_ID translation and parent
domain lookup. Add VIOMMU invalidation support to ARM SMMUv3 driver for a
real world use case. This adds supports of arm-smmuv-v3's CMDQ_OP_ATC_INV
and CMDQ_OP_CFGI_CD/ALL commands, supplementing HWPT-based invalidations.
In the future, drivers will also be able to choose a driver-managed type
to hold its own structure by adding a new type to enum iommu_viommu_type.
More VIOMMU-based structures and ioctls will be introduced in part-2/3 to
support a driver-managed VIOMMU, e.g. VQUEUE object for a HW accelerated
queue, VIRQ (or VEVENT) object for IRQ injections. Although we repurposed
the VIOMMU object from an earlier RFC discussion, for a referece:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1712978212.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com/
This series is on Github:
https://github.com/nicolinc/iommufd/commits/iommufd_viommu_p1-v2
Paring QEMU branch for testing:
https://github.com/nicolinc/qemu/commits/wip/for_iommufd_viommu_p1-v2
Changelog
v2
* Limited vdev_id to one per idev
* Added a rw_sem to protect the vdev_id list
* Reworked driver-level APIs with proper lockings
* Added a new viommu_api file for IOMMUFD_DRIVER config
* Dropped useless iommu_dev point from the viommu structure
* Added missing index numnbers to new types in the uAPI header
* Dropped IOMMU_VIOMMU_INVALIDATE uAPI; Instead, reuse the HWPT one
* Reworked mock_viommu_cache_invalidate() using the new iommu helper
* Reordered details of set/unset_vdev_id handlers for proper lockings
* Added arm_smmu_cache_invalidate_user patch from Jason's nesting series
v1
https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1723061377.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com/
Thanks!
Nicolin
Jason Gunthorpe (3):
iommu: Add iommu_copy_struct_from_full_user_array helper
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Allow ATS for IOMMU_DOMAIN_NESTED
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Update comments about ATS and bypass
Nicolin Chen (16):
iommufd: Reorder struct forward declarations
iommufd/viommu: Add IOMMUFD_OBJ_VIOMMU and IOMMU_VIOMMU_ALLOC ioctl
iommu: Pass in a viommu pointer to domain_alloc_user op
iommufd: Allow pt_id to carry viommu_id for IOMMU_HWPT_ALLOC
iommufd/selftest: Add IOMMU_VIOMMU_ALLOC test coverage
iommufd/viommu: Add IOMMU_VIOMMU_SET/UNSET_VDEV_ID ioctl
iommufd/selftest: Add IOMMU_VIOMMU_SET/UNSET_VDEV_ID test coverage
iommufd/viommu: Add cache_invalidate for IOMMU_VIOMMU_TYPE_DEFAULT
iommufd: Allow hwpt_id to carry viommu_id for IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE
iommufd/viommu: Add vdev_id helpers for IOMMU drivers
iommufd/selftest: Add mock_viommu_invalidate_user op
iommufd/selftest: Add IOMMU_TEST_OP_DEV_CHECK_CACHE test command
iommufd/selftest: Add VIOMMU coverage for IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE ioctl
iommufd/viommu: Add iommufd_viommu_to_parent_domain helper
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Add arm_smmu_cache_invalidate_user
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Add arm_smmu_viommu_cache_invalidate
drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 1 +
drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/arm-smmu-v3.c | 218 ++++++++++++++-
drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/arm-smmu-v3.h | 3 +
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 1 +
drivers/iommu/iommufd/Makefile | 5 +-
drivers/iommu/iommufd/device.c | 12 +
drivers/iommu/iommufd/hw_pagetable.c | 59 +++-
drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h | 37 +++
drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_test.h | 30 ++
drivers/iommu/iommufd/main.c | 12 +
drivers/iommu/iommufd/selftest.c | 101 ++++++-
drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c | 196 +++++++++++++
drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu_api.c | 53 ++++
include/linux/iommu.h | 56 +++-
include/linux/iommufd.h | 51 +++-
include/uapi/linux/iommufd.h | 117 +++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd.c | 259 +++++++++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd_utils.h | 126 +++++++++
18 files changed, 1299 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu.c
create mode 100644 drivers/iommu/iommufd/viommu_api.c
--
2.43.0
Hello,
This patchset builds upon the code at
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230718234512.1690985-1-seanjc@google.com/T/.
This code is available at
https://github.com/googleprodkernel/linux-cc/tree/kvm-gmem-link-migrate-rfc….
In guest_mem v11, a split file/inode model was proposed, where memslot
bindings belong to the file and pages belong to the inode. This model
lends itself well to having different VMs use separate files pointing
to the same inode.
This RFC proposes an ioctl, KVM_LINK_GUEST_MEMFD, that takes a VM and
a gmem fd, and returns another gmem fd referencing a different file
and associated with VM. This RFC also includes an update to
KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM to migrate memory context
(slot->arch.lpage_info and kvm->mem_attr_array) from source to
destination vm, intra-host.
Intended usage of the two ioctls:
1. Source VM’s fd is passed to destination VM via unix sockets
2. Destination VM uses new ioctl KVM_LINK_GUEST_MEMFD to link source
VM’s fd to a new fd.
3. Destination VM will pass new fds to KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION,
which will bind the new file, pointing to the same inode that the
source VM’s file points to, to memslots
4. Use KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM to move kvm->mem_attr_array
and slot->arch.lpage_info to the destination VM.
5. Run the destination VM as per normal
Some other approaches considered were:
+ Using the linkat() syscall, but that requires a mount/directory for
a source fd to be linked to
+ Using the dup() syscall, but that only duplicates the fd, and both
fds point to the same file
---
Ackerley Tng (11):
KVM: guest_mem: Refactor out kvm_gmem_alloc_file()
KVM: guest_mem: Add ioctl KVM_LINK_GUEST_MEMFD
KVM: selftests: Add tests for KVM_LINK_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl
KVM: selftests: Test transferring private memory to another VM
KVM: x86: Refactor sev's flag migration_in_progress to kvm struct
KVM: x86: Refactor common code out of sev.c
KVM: x86: Refactor common migration preparation code out of
sev_vm_move_enc_context_from
KVM: x86: Let moving encryption context be configurable
KVM: x86: Handle moving of memory context for intra-host migration
KVM: selftests: Generalize migration functions from
sev_migrate_tests.c
KVM: selftests: Add tests for migration of private mem
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 85 ++-----
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 6 +
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 18 ++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 8 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 42 ++++
.../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 31 +++
.../kvm/x86_64/private_mem_migrate_tests.c | 93 ++++++++
.../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_migrate_tests.c | 48 ++--
virt/kvm/guest_mem.c | 151 ++++++++++--
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 10 +
virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h | 7 +
15 files changed, 596 insertions(+), 132 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/private_mem_migrate_tests.c
--
2.41.0.640.ga95def55d0-goog