From: Yuan Chen <chenyuan(a)kylinos.cn>
This patch identifies whether a test item is valid by adding a valid flag to res.
When we test the bpf_cookies/perf_event sub-test item of test_progs, there is a
probability failure of the test item. In fact, this is not a problem, because
the corresponding perf event is not collected. This should not output the test
failure, and it is more reasonable to output SKIP. Therefore, add a valid
identifier to res to distinguish whether the test item is valid, and skip the
test item if it is invalid.
Signed-off-by: Yuan Chen <chenyuan(a)kylinos.cn>
---
.../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_cookie.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
index 070c52c312e5..e5bf4b385501 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_cookie.c
@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static void pe_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
if (!ASSERT_GE(pfd, 0, "perf_fd"))
goto cleanup;
+ skel->bss->res_valid = false;
opts.bpf_cookie = 0x100000;
link = bpf_program__attach_perf_event_opts(skel->progs.handle_pe, pfd, &opts);
if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(link, "link1"))
@@ -463,6 +464,12 @@ static void pe_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
burn_cpu(); /* trigger BPF prog */
+ if (!skel->bss->res_valid) {
+ printf("%s:SKIP:the corresponding perf event was not sampled.\n",
+ __func__);
+ test__skip();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->pe_res, 0x100000, "pe_res1");
/* prevent bpf_link__destroy() closing pfd itself */
@@ -474,6 +481,7 @@ static void pe_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
link = NULL;
kern_sync_rcu();
skel->bss->pe_res = 0;
+ skel->bss->res_valid = false;
opts.bpf_cookie = 0x200000;
link = bpf_program__attach_perf_event_opts(skel->progs.handle_pe, pfd, &opts);
@@ -482,6 +490,13 @@ static void pe_subtest(struct test_bpf_cookie *skel)
burn_cpu(); /* trigger BPF prog */
+ if (!skel->bss->res_valid) {
+ printf("%s:SKIP:the corresponding perf event was not sampled.\n",
+ __func__);
+ test__skip();
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->pe_res, 0x200000, "pe_res2");
cleanup:
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_cookie.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_cookie.c
index c83142b55f47..28d0ae6810d9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_cookie.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_cookie.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
int my_tid;
+bool res_valid;
__u64 kprobe_res;
__u64 kprobe_multi_res;
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ static void update(void *ctx, __u64 *res)
if (my_tid != (u32)bpf_get_current_pid_tgid())
return;
+ res_valid = true;
*res |= bpf_get_attach_cookie(ctx);
}
--
2.46.0
From: Jason Xing <kernelxing(a)tencent.com>
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE is a report flag which passes the
timestamps generated by either SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE or
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE to the userspace all the time.
So let us revise the doc here.
Link: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/66d8c21d3042a_163d93294cb@willemb.c.googlers.co…
Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing(a)tencent.com>
---
previous version
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/66d9b467d02d3_18ac2129427@willemb.c.googlers.co…
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/66d9c3f875b90_18de412948b@willemb.c.googlers.co…
1. cook this as a stand-alone patch (Willem)
2. add Willem's reviewed-by tag since this patch doesn't change
3. move the reference link at the top of S-b tag
---
Documentation/networking/timestamping.rst | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/timestamping.rst b/Documentation/networking/timestamping.rst
index 5e93cd71f99f..9c7773271393 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/timestamping.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/timestamping.rst
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE:
SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE:
Report hardware timestamps as generated by
- SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE when available.
+ SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE or SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_HARDWARE
+ when available.
1.3.3 Timestamp Options
--
2.37.3
When resctrl is built on architectures without __cpuid_count()
support, build fails. resctrl uses __cpuid_count() defined in
kselftest.h.
Even though the problem is seen while building resctrl on aarch64,
this error can be seen on any platform that doesn't support CPUID.
CPUID is a x86/x86-64 feature and code paths with CPUID asm commands
will fail to build on all other architectures.
All others tests call __cpuid_count() do so from x86/x86_64 code paths
when _i386__ or __x86_64__ are defined. resctrl is an exception.
Fix the problem by defining __cpuid_count() only when __i386__ or
__x86_64__ are defined in kselftest.h and changing resctrl to call
__cpuid_count() only when __i386__ or __x86_64__ are defined.
In file included from resctrl.h:24,
from cat_test.c:11:
In function ‘arch_supports_noncont_cat’,
inlined from ‘noncont_cat_run_test’ at cat_test.c:326:6:
../kselftest.h:74:9: error: impossible constraint in ‘asm’
74 | __asm__ __volatile__ ("cpuid\n\t" \
| ^~~~~~~
cat_test.c:304:17: note: in expansion of macro ‘__cpuid_count’
304 | __cpuid_count(0x10, 1, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
../kselftest.h:74:9: error: impossible constraint in ‘asm’
74 | __asm__ __volatile__ ("cpuid\n\t" \
| ^~~~~~~
cat_test.c:306:17: note: in expansion of macro ‘__cpuid_count’
306 | __cpuid_count(0x10, 2, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum(a)collabora.com>
Reported-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kselftest.h | 2 ++
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/cat_test.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest.h
index b8967b6e29d5..e195ec156859 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
#endif
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
/*
* gcc cpuid.h provides __cpuid_count() since v4.4.
* Clang/LLVM cpuid.h provides __cpuid_count() since v3.4.0.
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@
: "=a" (a), "=b" (b), "=c" (c), "=d" (d) \
: "0" (level), "2" (count))
#endif
+#endif /* end arch */
/* define kselftest exit codes */
#define KSFT_PASS 0
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/cat_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/cat_test.c
index 742782438ca3..ae3f0fa5390b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/cat_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/cat_test.c
@@ -290,12 +290,12 @@ static int cat_run_test(const struct resctrl_test *test, const struct user_param
static bool arch_supports_noncont_cat(const struct resctrl_test *test)
{
- unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
-
/* AMD always supports non-contiguous CBM. */
if (get_vendor() == ARCH_AMD)
return true;
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
/* Intel support for non-contiguous CBM needs to be discovered. */
if (!strcmp(test->resource, "L3"))
__cpuid_count(0x10, 1, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ static bool arch_supports_noncont_cat(const struct resctrl_test *test)
return false;
return ((ecx >> 3) & 1);
+#endif /* end arch */
+ return false;
}
static int noncont_cat_run_test(const struct resctrl_test *test,
--
2.40.1
The arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) feature provides support for
hardware protected stacks of return addresses, intended to provide
hardening against return oriented programming (ROP) attacks and to make
it easier to gather call stacks for applications such as profiling.
When GCS is active a secondary stack called the Guarded Control Stack is
maintained, protected with a memory attribute which means that it can
only be written with specific GCS operations. The current GCS pointer
can not be directly written to by userspace. When a BL is executed the
value stored in LR is also pushed onto the GCS, and when a RET is
executed the top of the GCS is popped and compared to LR with a fault
being raised if the values do not match. GCS operations may only be
performed on GCS pages, a data abort is generated if they are not.
The combination of hardware enforcement and lack of extra instructions
in the function entry and exit paths should result in something which
has less overhead and is more difficult to attack than a purely software
implementation like clang's shadow stacks.
This series implements support for use of GCS by userspace, along with
support for use of GCS within KVM guests. It does not enable use of GCS
by either EL1 or EL2, this will be implemented separately. Executables
are started without GCS and must use a prctl() to enable it, it is
expected that this will be done very early in application execution by
the dynamic linker or other startup code. For dynamic linking this will
be done by checking that everything in the executable is marked as GCS
compatible.
x86 has an equivalent feature called shadow stacks, this series depends
on the x86 patches for generic memory management support for the new
guarded/shadow stack page type and shares APIs as much as possible. As
there has been extensive discussion with the wider community around the
ABI for shadow stacks I have as far as practical kept implementation
decisions close to those for x86, anticipating that review would lead to
similar conclusions in the absence of strong reasoning for divergence.
The main divergence I am concious of is that x86 allows shadow stack to
be enabled and disabled repeatedly, freeing the shadow stack for the
thread whenever disabled, while this implementation keeps the GCS
allocated after disable but refuses to reenable it. This is to avoid
races with things actively walking the GCS during a disable, we do
anticipate that some systems will wish to disable GCS at runtime but are
not aware of any demand for subsequently reenabling it.
x86 uses an arch_prctl() to manage enable and disable, since only x86
and S/390 use arch_prctl() a generic prctl() was proposed[1] as part of a
patch set for the equivalent RISC-V Zicfiss feature which I initially
adopted fairly directly but following review feedback has been revised
quite a bit.
We currently maintain the x86 pattern of implicitly allocating a shadow
stack for threads started with shadow stack enabled, there has been some
discussion of removing this support and requiring the use of clone3()
with explicit allocation of shadow stacks instead. I have no strong
feelings either way, implicit allocation is not really consistent with
anything else we do and creates the potential for errors around thread
exit but on the other hand it is existing ABI on x86 and minimises the
changes needed in userspace code.
glibc and bionic changes using this ABI have been implemented and
tested. Headless Android systems have been validated and Ross Burton
has used this code has been used to bring up a Yocto system with GCS
enabed as standard, a test implementation of V8 support has also been
done.
uprobes are not currently supported, missing emulation was identified
late in review.
There is an open issue with support for CRIU, on x86 this required the
ability to set the GCS mode via ptrace. This series supports
configuring mode bits other than enable/disable via ptrace but it needs
to be confirmed if this is sufficient.
It is likely that we could relax some of the barriers added here with
some more targeted placements, this is left for further study.
There is an in process series adding clone3() support for shadow stacks:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240819-clone3-shadow-stack-v9-0-962d74f99464@ke…
Previous versions of this series depended on that, this dependency has
been removed in order to make merging easier.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
---
Changes in v12:
- Clarify and simplify the signal handling code so we work with the
register state.
- When checking for write aborts to shadow stack pages ensure the fault
is a data abort.
- Depend on !UPROBES.
- Comment cleanups.
- Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-0-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org
Changes in v11:
- Remove the dependency on the addition of clone3() support for shadow
stacks, rebasing onto v6.11-rc3.
- Make ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.GCS writeable in KVM.
- Hide GCS registers when GCS is not enabled for KVM guests.
- Require HCRX_EL2.GCSEn if booting at EL1.
- Require that GCSCR_EL1 and GCSCRE0_EL1 be initialised regardless of
if we boot at EL2 or EL1.
- Remove some stray use of bit 63 in signal cap tokens.
- Warn if we see a GCS with VM_SHARED.
- Remove rdundant check for VM_WRITE in fault handling.
- Cleanups and clarifications in the ABI document.
- Clean up and improve documentation of some sync placement.
- Only set the EL0 GCS mode if it's actually changed.
- Various minor fixes and tweaks.
- Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240801-arm64-gcs-v10-0-699e2bd2190b@kernel.org
Changes in v10:
- Fix issues with THP.
- Tighten up requirements for initialising GCSCR*.
- Only generate GCS signal frames for threads using GCS.
- Only context switch EL1 GCS registers if S1PIE is enabled.
- Move context switch of GCSCRE0_EL1 to EL0 context switch.
- Make GCS registers unconditionally visible to userspace.
- Use FHU infrastructure.
- Don't change writability of ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 for KVM.
- Remove unused arguments from alloc_gcs().
- Typo fixes.
- Link to v9: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240625-arm64-gcs-v9-0-0f634469b8f0@kernel.org
Changes in v9:
- Rebase onto v6.10-rc3.
- Restructure and clarify memory management fault handling.
- Fix up basic-gcs for the latest clone3() changes.
- Convert to newly merged KVM ID register based feature configuration.
- Fixes for NV traps.
- Link to v8: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-0-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org
Changes in v8:
- Invalidate signal cap token on stack when consuming.
- Typo and other trivial fixes.
- Don't try to use process_vm_write() on GCS, it intentionally does not
work.
- Fix leak of thread GCSs.
- Rebase onto latest clone3() series.
- Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231122-arm64-gcs-v7-0-201c483bd775@kernel.org
Changes in v7:
- Rebase onto v6.7-rc2 via the clone3() patch series.
- Change the token used to cap the stack during signal handling to be
compatible with GCSPOPM.
- Fix flags for new page types.
- Fold in support for clone3().
- Replace copy_to_user_gcs() with put_user_gcs().
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009-arm64-gcs-v6-0-78e55deaa4dd@kernel.org
Changes in v6:
- Rebase onto v6.6-rc3.
- Add some more gcsb_dsync() barriers following spec clarifications.
- Due to ongoing discussion around clone()/clone3() I've not updated
anything there, the behaviour is the same as on previous versions.
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230822-arm64-gcs-v5-0-9ef181dd6324@kernel.org
Changes in v5:
- Don't map any permissions for user GCSs, we always use EL0 accessors
or use a separate mapping of the page.
- Reduce the standard size of the GCS to RLIMIT_STACK/2.
- Enforce a PAGE_SIZE alignment requirement on map_shadow_stack().
- Clarifications and fixes to documentation.
- More tests.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807-arm64-gcs-v4-0-68cfa37f9069@kernel.org
Changes in v4:
- Implement flags for map_shadow_stack() allowing the cap and end of
stack marker to be enabled independently or not at all.
- Relax size and alignment requirements for map_shadow_stack().
- Add more blurb explaining the advantages of hardware enforcement.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230731-arm64-gcs-v3-0-cddf9f980d98@kernel.org
Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto v6.5-rc4.
- Add a GCS barrier on context switch.
- Add a GCS stress test.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org
Changes in v2:
- Rebase onto v6.5-rc3.
- Rework prctl() interface to allow each bit to be locked independently.
- map_shadow_stack() now places the cap token based on the size
requested by the caller not the actual space allocated.
- Mode changes other than enable via ptrace are now supported.
- Expand test coverage.
- Various smaller fixes and adjustments.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230716-arm64-gcs-v1-0-bf567f93bba6@kernel.org
---
Mark Brown (39):
mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility
prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack
mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags
arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks
arm64/gcs: Document the ABI for Guarded Control Stacks
arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps
arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions
arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs()
arm64/gcs: Provide basic EL2 setup to allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1
arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS)
arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack
mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS
arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack
KVM: arm64: Manage GCS access and registers for guests
arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS
arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap for GCS
arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions
arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts
arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0
arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS
arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface
arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack()
arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers
arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames
arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files
arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS)
kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap
kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests
kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests
kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code
kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled
kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program
kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc
kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking
kselftest/arm64: Add GCS signal tests
kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test
kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests
KVM: selftests: arm64: Add GCS registers to get-reg-list
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +
Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 32 +
Documentation/arch/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 2 +
Documentation/arch/arm64/gcs.rst | 230 +++++++
Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 2 +-
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 21 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 29 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 28 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h | 107 +++
arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 23 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 14 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 7 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 20 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 40 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/vncr_mapping.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 8 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 12 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 23 +
arch/arm64/kernel/pi/idreg-override.c | 2 +
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 88 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 54 ++
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 227 ++++++-
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 11 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/sysreg-sr.h | 49 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 27 +-
arch/arm64/mm/Makefile | 1 +
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 40 ++
arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 252 +++++++
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 9 +-
arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps | 1 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 -
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
include/linux/mm.h | 18 +-
include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h | 4 +
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 22 +
kernel/sys.c | 30 +
mm/Kconfig | 6 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c | 19 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/assembler.h | 15 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/fpsimd-test.S | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/sve-test.S | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/za-test.S | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/fp/zt-test.S | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/.gitignore | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/Makefile | 24 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/asm-offsets.h | 0
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/basic-gcs.c | 357 ++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-locking.c | 200 ++++++
.../selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-stress-thread.S | 311 +++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-stress.c | 530 +++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/gcs-util.h | 100 +++
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/gcs/libc-gcs.c | 728 +++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/signal/.gitignore | 1 +
.../testing/selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals.c | 17 +-
.../testing/selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals.h | 6 +
.../selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.c | 32 +-
.../selftests/arm64/signal/test_signals_utils.h | 39 ++
.../arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_exception_fault.c | 62 ++
.../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_frame.c | 88 +++
.../arm64/signal/testcases/gcs_write_fault.c | 67 ++
.../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.c | 7 +
.../selftests/arm64/signal/testcases/testcases.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/aarch64/get-reg-list.c | 28 +
74 files changed, 4088 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 7c626ce4bae1ac14f60076d00eafe71af30450ba
change-id: 20230303-arm64-gcs-e311ab0d8729
Best regards,
--
Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>