Fix typos in comments in pidfd_info_test.c
Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/pidfd/pidfd_info_test.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/pidfd/pidfd_info_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/pidfd/pidfd_info_test.c
index 1758a1b0457b..53cb429f5fa0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/pidfd/pidfd_info_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/pidfd/pidfd_info_test.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static void *pidfd_info_pause_thread(void *arg)
close(ipc_socket);
- /* Sleep untill we're killed. */
+ /* Sleep until we're killed. */
pause();
return NULL;
}
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ TEST_F(pidfd_info, thread_group_exec)
EXPECT_EQ(sys_pidfd_send_signal(pidfd_leader, SIGKILL, NULL, 0), 0);
/*
- * Afte the exec we're dealing with an empty thread-group so now
+ * After the exec we're dealing with an empty thread-group so now
* we must see an exit notification on the thread-specific pidfd
* for the thread-group leader as there's no subthread that can
* revive the struct pid.
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ TEST_F(pidfd_info, thread_group_exec_thread)
EXPECT_EQ(sys_pidfd_send_signal(pidfd_leader, SIGKILL, NULL, 0), 0);
/*
- * Afte the exec we're dealing with an empty thread-group so now
+ * After the exec we're dealing with an empty thread-group so now
* we must see an exit notification on the thread-specific pidfd
* for the thread-group leader as there's no subthread that can
* revive the struct pid.
--
2.45.2
Cover three recent cases:
1. missing ops locking for the lowers during netdev_sync_lower_features
2. missing locking for dev_set_promiscuity (plus netdev_ops_assert_locked
with a comment on why/when it's needed)
3. rcu lock during team_change_rx_flags
Verified that each one triggers when the respective fix is reverted.
Not sure about the placement, but since it all relies on teaming,
added to the teaming directory.
One ugly bit is that I add NETIF_F_LRO to netdevsim; there is no way
to trigger netdev_sync_lower_features without it.
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <stfomichev(a)gmail.com>
---
v2: fix cleanup and wrong exit code (Jakub)
---
drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c | 2 +
net/core/dev.c | 10 ++-
.../selftests/drivers/net/team/Makefile | 2 +-
.../testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/config | 1 +
.../selftests/drivers/net/team/propagation.sh | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/propagation.sh
diff --git a/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c b/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c
index 0e0321a7ddd7..3bd1f8cffee8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c
@@ -879,11 +879,13 @@ static void nsim_setup(struct net_device *dev)
NETIF_F_SG |
NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
NETIF_F_HW_CSUM |
+ NETIF_F_LRO |
NETIF_F_TSO;
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_HW_TC |
NETIF_F_SG |
NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
NETIF_F_HW_CSUM |
+ NETIF_F_LRO |
NETIF_F_TSO;
dev->max_mtu = ETH_MAX_MTU;
dev->xdp_features = NETDEV_XDP_ACT_HW_OFFLOAD;
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 0d891634c692..4debd4b8e0f5 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -9188,8 +9188,16 @@ static int __dev_set_promiscuity(struct net_device *dev, int inc, bool notify)
dev_change_rx_flags(dev, IFF_PROMISC);
}
- if (notify)
+ if (notify) {
+ /* The ops lock is only required to ensure consistent locking
+ * for `NETDEV_CHANGE` notifiers. This function is sometimes
+ * called without the lock, even for devices that are ops
+ * locked, such as in `dev_uc_sync_multiple` when using
+ * bonding or teaming.
+ */
+ netdev_ops_assert_locked(dev);
__dev_notify_flags(dev, old_flags, IFF_PROMISC, 0, NULL);
+ }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/Makefile
index 2d5a76d99181..eaf6938f100e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
# Makefile for net selftests
-TEST_PROGS := dev_addr_lists.sh
+TEST_PROGS := dev_addr_lists.sh propagation.sh
TEST_INCLUDES := \
../bonding/lag_lib.sh \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/config b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/config
index b5e3a3aad4bf..636b3525b679 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/config
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
CONFIG_DUMMY=y
CONFIG_IPV6=y
CONFIG_MACVLAN=y
+CONFIG_NETDEVSIM=m
CONFIG_NET_TEAM=y
CONFIG_NET_TEAM_MODE_LOADBALANCE=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/propagation.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/propagation.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..4bea75b79878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/team/propagation.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+set -e
+
+NSIM_LRO_ID=$((256 + RANDOM % 256))
+NSIM_LRO_SYS=/sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim$NSIM_LRO_ID
+
+NSIM_DEV_SYS_NEW=/sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
+NSIM_DEV_SYS_DEL=/sys/bus/netdevsim/del_device
+
+cleanup()
+{
+ set +e
+ ip link del dummyteam &>/dev/null
+ ip link del team0 &>/dev/null
+ echo $NSIM_LRO_ID > $NSIM_DEV_SYS_DEL
+ modprobe -r netdevsim
+}
+
+# Trigger LRO propagation to the lower.
+# https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/aBvOpkIoxcr9PfDg@mini-arch/
+team_lro()
+{
+ # using netdevsim because it supports NETIF_F_LRO
+ NSIM_LRO_NAME=$(find $NSIM_LRO_SYS/net -maxdepth 1 -type d ! \
+ -path $NSIM_LRO_SYS/net -exec basename {} \;)
+
+ ip link add name team0 type team
+ ip link set $NSIM_LRO_NAME down
+ ip link set dev $NSIM_LRO_NAME master team0
+ ip link set team0 up
+ ethtool -K team0 large-receive-offload off
+
+ ip link del team0
+}
+
+# Trigger promisc propagation to the lower during IFLA_MASTER.
+# https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250506032328.3003050-1-sdf@fomichev.me/
+team_promisc()
+{
+ ip link add name dummyteam type dummy
+ ip link add name team0 type team
+ ip link set dummyteam down
+ ip link set team0 promisc on
+ ip link set dev dummyteam master team0
+ ip link set team0 up
+
+ ip link del team0
+ ip link del dummyteam
+}
+
+# Trigger promisc propagation to the lower via netif_change_flags (aka
+# ndo_change_rx_flags).
+# https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250514220319.3505158-1-stfomichev@gmail.co…
+team_change_flags()
+{
+ ip link add name dummyteam type dummy
+ ip link add name team0 type team
+ ip link set dummyteam down
+ ip link set dev dummyteam master team0
+ ip link set team0 up
+ ip link set team0 promisc on
+
+ # Make sure we can add more L2 addresses without any issues.
+ ip link add link team0 address 00:00:00:00:00:01 team0.1 type macvlan
+ ip link set team0.1 up
+
+ ip link del team0.1
+ ip link del team0
+ ip link del dummyteam
+}
+
+trap cleanup EXIT
+modprobe netdevsim || :
+echo $NSIM_LRO_ID > $NSIM_DEV_SYS_NEW
+udevadm settle
+team_lro
+team_promisc
+team_change_flags
--
2.49.0
Fix "withouth" to "without"
Fix "instaces" to "instances"
Signed-off-by: Sumanth Gavini <sumanth.gavini(a)yahoo.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/srv6_end_flavors_test.sh | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/srv6_end_flavors_test.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/srv6_end_flavors_test.sh
index 50563443a4ad..318487eda671 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/srv6_end_flavors_test.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/srv6_end_flavors_test.sh
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ __get_srv6_rtcfg_id()
# Given the description of a router <id:op> as an input, the function returns
# the <op> token which represents the operation (e.g. End behavior with or
-# withouth flavors) configured for the node.
+# without flavors) configured for the node.
# Note that when the operation represents an End behavior with a list of
# flavors, the output is the ordered version of that list.
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ setup_rt_local_sids()
# all SIDs start with a common locator. Routes and SRv6 Endpoint
- # behavior instaces are grouped together in the 'localsid' table.
+ # behavior instances are grouped together in the 'localsid' table.
ip -netns "${nsname}" -6 rule \
add to "${LOCATOR_SERVICE}::/16" \
lookup "${LOCALSID_TABLE_ID}" prio 999
--
2.43.0
Basics and overview
===================
Software with larger attack surfaces (e.g. network facing apps like databases,
browsers or apps relying on browser runtimes) suffer from memory corruption
issues which can be utilized by attackers to bend control flow of the program
to eventually gain control (by making their payload executable). Attackers are
able to perform such attacks by leveraging call-sites which rely on indirect
calls or return sites which rely on obtaining return address from stack memory.
To mitigate such attacks, risc-v extension zicfilp enforces that all indirect
calls must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad` else cpu will raise software
check exception (a new cpu exception cause code on riscv).
Similarly for return flow, risc-v extension zicfiss extends architecture with
- `sspush` instruction to push return address on a shadow stack
- `sspopchk` instruction to pop return address from shadow stack
and compare with input operand (i.e. return address on stack)
- `sspopchk` to raise software check exception if comparision above
was a mismatch
- Protection mechanism using which shadow stack is not writeable via
regular store instructions
More information an details can be found at extensions github repo [1].
Equivalent to landing pad (zicfilp) on x86 is `ENDBRANCH` instruction in Intel
CET [3] and branch target identification (BTI) [4] on arm.
Similarly x86's Intel CET has shadow stack [5] and arm64 has guarded control
stack (GCS) [6] which are very similar to risc-v's zicfiss shadow stack.
x86 and arm64 support for user mode shadow stack is already in mainline.
Kernel awareness for user control flow integrity
================================================
This series picks up Samuel Holland's envcfg changes [2] as well. So if those are
being applied independently, they should be removed from this series.
Enabling:
In order to maintain compatibility and not break anything in user mode, kernel
doesn't enable control flow integrity cpu extensions on binary by default.
Instead exposes a prctl interface to enable, disable and lock the shadow stack
or landing pad feature for a task. This allows userspace (loader) to enumerate
if all objects in its address space are compiled with shadow stack and landing
pad support and accordingly enable the feature. Additionally if a subsequent
`dlopen` happens on a library, user mode can take a decision again to disable
the feature (if incoming library is not compiled with support) OR terminate the
task (if user mode policy is strict to have all objects in address space to be
compiled with control flow integirty cpu feature). prctl to enable shadow stack
results in allocating shadow stack from virtual memory and activating for user
address space. x86 and arm64 are also following same direction due to similar
reason(s).
clone/fork:
On clone and fork, cfi state for task is inherited by child. Shadow stack is
part of virtual memory and is a writeable memory from kernel perspective
(writeable via a restricted set of instructions aka shadow stack instructions)
Thus kernel changes ensure that this memory is converted into read-only when
fork/clone happens and COWed when fault is taken due to sspush, sspopchk or
ssamoswap. In case `CLONE_VM` is specified and shadow stack is to be enabled,
kernel will automatically allocate a shadow stack for that clone call.
map_shadow_stack:
x86 introduced `map_shadow_stack` system call to allow user space to explicitly
map shadow stack memory in its address space. It is useful to allocate shadow
for different contexts managed by a single thread (green threads or contexts)
risc-v implements this system call as well.
signal management:
If shadow stack is enabled for a task, kernel performs an asynchronous control
flow diversion to deliver the signal and eventually expects userspace to issue
sigreturn so that original execution can be resumed. Even though resume context
is prepared by kernel, it is in user space memory and is subject to memory
corruption and corruption bugs can be utilized by attacker in this race window
to perform arbitrary sigreturn and eventually bypass cfi mechanism.
Another issue is how to ensure that cfi related state on sigcontext area is not
trampled by legacy apps or apps compiled with old kernel headers.
In order to mitigate control-flow hijacting, kernel prepares a token and place
it on shadow stack before signal delivery and places address of token in
sigcontext structure. During sigreturn, kernel obtains address of token from
sigcontext struture, reads token from shadow stack and validates it and only
then allow sigreturn to succeed. Compatiblity issue is solved by adopting
dynamic sigcontext management introduced for vector extension. This series
re-factor the code little bit to allow future sigcontext management easy (as
proposed by Andy Chiu from SiFive)
config and compilation:
Introduce a new risc-v config option `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting this
config option picks the kernel support for user control flow integrity. This
optin is presented only if toolchain has shadow stack and landing pad support.
And is on purpose guarded by toolchain support. Reason being that eventually
vDSO also needs to be compiled in with shadow stack and landing pad support.
vDSO compile patches are not included as of now because landing pad labeling
scheme is yet to settle for usermode runtime.
To get more information on kernel interactions with respect to
zicfilp and zicfiss, patch series adds documentation for
`zicfilp` and `zicfiss` in following:
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst
How to test this series
=======================
Toolchain
---------
$ git clone git@github.com:sifive/riscv-gnu-toolchain.git -b cfi-dev
$ riscv-gnu-toolchain/configure --prefix=<path-to-where-to-build> --with-arch=rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss --enable-linux --disable-gdb --with-extra-multilib-test="rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss-lp64d:-static"
$ make -j$(nproc)
Qemu
----
Get the lastest qemu
$ cd qemu
$ mkdir build
$ cd build
$ ../configure --target-list=riscv64-softmmu
$ make -j$(nproc)
Opensbi
-------
$ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/opensbi.git -b v6_cfi_spec_split_opensbi
$ make CROSS_COMPILE=<your riscv toolchain> -j$(nproc) PLATFORM=generic
Linux
-----
Running defconfig is fine. CFI is enabled by default if the toolchain
supports it.
$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) defconfig
$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc)
In case you're building your own rootfs using toolchain, please make sure you
pick following patch to ensure that vDSO compiled with lpad and shadow stack.
"arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad"
Branch where above patch can be picked
https://github.com/deepak0414/linux-riscv-cfi/tree/vdso_user_cfi_v6.12-rc1
Running
-------
Modify your qemu command to have:
-bios <path-to-cfi-opensbi>/build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_dynamic.bin
-cpu rv64,zicfilp=true,zicfiss=true,zimop=true,zcmop=true
vDSO related Opens (in the flux)
=================================
I am listing these opens for laying out plan and what to expect in future
patch sets. And of course for the sake of discussion.
Shadow stack and landing pad enabling in vDSO
----------------------------------------------
vDSO must have shadow stack and landing pad support compiled in for task
to have shadow stack and landing pad support. This patch series doesn't
enable that (yet). Enabling shadow stack support in vDSO should be
straight forward (intend to do that in next versions of patch set). Enabling
landing pad support in vDSO requires some collaboration with toolchain folks
to follow a single label scheme for all object binaries. This is necessary to
ensure that all indirect call-sites are setting correct label and target landing
pads are decorated with same label scheme.
How many vDSOs
---------------
Shadow stack instructions are carved out of zimop (may be operations) and if CPU
doesn't implement zimop, they're illegal instructions. Kernel could be running on
a CPU which may or may not implement zimop. And thus kernel will have to carry 2
different vDSOs and expose the appropriate one depending on whether CPU implements
zimop or not.
References
==========
[1] - https://github.com/riscv/riscv-cfi
[2] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240814081126.956287-1-samuel.holland@sifive.c…
[3] - https://lwn.net/Articles/889475/
[4] - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109576/0100/Branch-Target-Identific…
[5] - https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/catc17-i…
[6] - https://lwn.net/Articles/940403/
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com>
To: x86(a)kernel.org
To: H. Peter Anvin <hpa(a)zytor.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
To: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)oracle.com>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
To: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley(a)sifive.com>
To: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer(a)dabbelt.com>
To: Albert Ou <aou(a)eecs.berkeley.edu>
To: Conor Dooley <conor(a)kernel.org>
To: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org>
To: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt(a)kernel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com>
To: Eric Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com>
To: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net>
To: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
To: Conor Dooley <conor+dt(a)kernel.org>
To: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
To: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor(a)gmail.com>
To: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng(a)gmail.com>
To: Gary Guo <gary(a)garyguo.net>
To: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com>
To: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me>
To: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)kernel.org>
To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>
To: Trevor Gross <tmgross(a)umich.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm(a)kvack.org
Cc: linux-riscv(a)lists.infradead.org
Cc: devicetree(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: alistair.francis(a)wdc.com
Cc: richard.henderson(a)linaro.org
Cc: jim.shu(a)sifive.com
Cc: andybnac(a)gmail.com
Cc: kito.cheng(a)sifive.com
Cc: charlie(a)rivosinc.com
Cc: atishp(a)rivosinc.com
Cc: evan(a)rivosinc.com
Cc: cleger(a)rivosinc.com
Cc: alexghiti(a)rivosinc.com
Cc: samitolvanen(a)google.com
Cc: broonie(a)kernel.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com
Cc: rust-for-linux(a)vger.kernel.org
changelog
---------
v15:
- Toolchain has been updated to include `-fcf-protection` flag. This
exists for x86 as well. Updated kernel patches to compile vDSO and
selftest to compile with `fcf-protection=full` flag.
- selecting CONFIG_RISCV_USERCFI selects CONFIG_RISCV_SBI.
- Patch to enable shadow stack for kernel wasn't hidden behind
CONFIG_RISCV_USERCFI and CONFIG_RISCV_SBI. fixed that.
v14:
- rebased on top of palmer/sbi-v3. Thus dropped clement's FWFT patches
Updated RISCV_ISA_EXT_XXXX in hwcap and hwprobe constants.
- Took Radim's suggestions on bitfields.
- Placed cfi_state at the end of thread_info block so that current situation
is not disturbed with respect to member fields of thread_info in single
cacheline.
v13:
- cpu_supports_shadow_stack/cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr uses
riscv_has_extension_unlikely()
- uses nops(count) to create nop slide
- RISCV_ACQUIRE_BARRIER is not needed in `amo_user_shstk`. Removed it
- changed ternaries to simply use implicit casting to convert to bool.
- kernel command line allows to disable zicfilp and zicfiss independently.
updated kernel-parameters.txt.
- ptrace user abi for cfi uses bitmasks instead of bitfields. Added ptrace
kselftest.
- cosmetic and grammatical changes to documentation.
v12:
- It seems like I had accidently squashed arch agnostic indirect branch
tracking prctl and riscv implementation of those prctls. Split them again.
- set_shstk_status/set_indir_lp_status perform CSR writes only when CPU
support is available. As suggested by Zong Li.
- Some minor clean up in kselftests as suggested by Zong Li.
v11:
- patch "arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad" was unconditionally
selecting `_zicfilp` for vDSO compile. fixed that. Changed `lpad 1` to
to `lpad 0`.
v10:
- dropped "mm: helper `is_shadow_stack_vma` to check shadow stack vma". This patch
is not that interesting to this patch series for risc-v. There are instances in
arch directories where VM_SHADOW_STACK flag is anyways used. Dropping this patch
to expedite merging in riscv tree.
- Took suggestions from `Clement` on "riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration" to
validate presence of cfi based on config.
- Added a patch for vDSO to have `lpad 0`. I had omitted this earlier to make sure
we add single vdso object with cfi enabled. But a vdso object with scheme of
zero labeled landing pad is least common denominator and should work with all
objects of zero labeled as well as function-signature labeled objects.
v9:
- rebased on master (39a803b754d5 fix braino in "9p: fix ->rename_sem exclusion")
- dropped "mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK" (master has it from arm64/gcs)
- dropped "prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack" (master has it from arm64/gcs)
v8:
- rebased on palmer/for-next
- dropped samuel holland's `envcfg` context switch patches.
they are in parlmer/for-next
v7:
- Removed "riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv"
Instead using `deactivate_mm` flow to clean up.
see here for more context
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908203655.543765-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.…
- Changed the header include in `kselftest`. Hopefully this fixes compile
issue faced by Zong Li at SiFive.
- Cleaned up an orphaned change to `mm/mmap.c` in below patch
"riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE"
- Lock interfaces for shadow stack and indirect branch tracking expect arg == 0
Any future evolution of this interface should accordingly define how arg should
be setup.
- `mm/map.c` has an instance of using `VM_SHADOW_STACK`. Fixed it to use helper
`is_shadow_stack_vma`.
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008-v5_user_cfi_series-v6-0-60d9fe073f37@riv…
v6:
- Picked up Samuel Holland's changes as is with `envcfg` placed in
`thread` instead of `thread_info`
- fixed unaligned newline escapes in kselftest
- cleaned up messages in kselftest and included test output in commit message
- fixed a bug in clone path reported by Zong Li
- fixed a build issue if CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V is not selected
(this was introduced due to re-factoring signal context
management code)
v5:
- rebased on v6.12-rc1
- Fixed schema related issues in device tree file
- Fixed some of the documentation related issues in zicfilp/ss.rst
(style issues and added index)
- added `SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER` so that implementation can define base
of shadow stack.
- Fixed warnings on definitions added in usercfi.h when
CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is not selected.
- Adopted context header based signal handling as proposed by Andy Chiu
- Added support for enabling kernel mode access to shadow stack using
FWFT
(https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-sbi-doc/blob/master/src/ext-firmware…)
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-v5_user_cfi_series-v1-0-3ba65b6e550f@riv…
(Note: I had an issue in my workflow due to which version number wasn't
picked up correctly while sending out patches)
v4:
- rebased on 6.11-rc6
- envcfg: Converged with Samuel Holland's patches for envcfg management on per-
thread basis.
- vma_is_shadow_stack is renamed to is_vma_shadow_stack
- picked up Mark Brown's `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` patch
- signal context: using extended context management to maintain compatibility.
- fixed `-Wmissing-prototypes` compiler warnings for prctl functions
- Documentation fixes and amending typos.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240912231650.3740732-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
v3:
- envcfg
logic to pick up base envcfg had a bug where `ENVCFG_CBZE` could have been
picked on per task basis, even though CPU didn't implement it. Fixed in
this series.
- dt-bindings
As suggested, split into separate commit. fixed the messaging that spec is
in public review
- arch_is_shadow_stack change
arch_is_shadow_stack changed to vma_is_shadow_stack
- hwprobe
zicfiss / zicfilp if present will get enumerated in hwprobe
- selftests
As suggested, added object and binary filenames to .gitignore
Selftest binary anyways need to be compiled with cfi enabled compiler which
will make sure that landing pad and shadow stack are enabled. Thus removed
separate enable/disable tests. Cleaned up tests a bit.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240403234054.2020347-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
v2:
- Using config `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`, kernel support for riscv control flow
integrity for user mode programs can be compiled in the kernel.
- Enabling of control flow integrity for user programs is left to user runtime
- This patch series introduces arch agnostic `prctls` to enable shadow stack
and indirect branch tracking. And implements them on riscv.
---
Changes in v15:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v14: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250429-v5_user_cfi_series-v14-0-5239410d012a@ri…
Changes in v14:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v13: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250424-v5_user_cfi_series-v13-0-971437de586a@ri…
Changes in v13:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v12: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250314-v5_user_cfi_series-v12-0-e51202b53138@ri…
Changes in v12:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310-v5_user_cfi_series-v11-0-86b36cbfb910@ri…
Changes in v11:
- changelog posted just below cover letter
- Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250210-v5_user_cfi_series-v10-0-163dcfa31c60@ri…
---
Andy Chiu (1):
riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext
Deepak Gupta (25):
mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv
dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml)
riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration
riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions
riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit
riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE
riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte
riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs
riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack
riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall
riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone
riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls
prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking
riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls
riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception
riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal
riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register
riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files
riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe
riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi
riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call
riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support
riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking
riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv
kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi
Jim Shu (1):
arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +
Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 2 +
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 115 +++++
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 179 +++++++
.../devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 14 +
arch/riscv/Kconfig | 21 +
arch/riscv/Makefile | 5 +-
arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h | 44 ++
arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 16 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h | 25 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 7 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 30 +-
arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 95 ++++
arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h | 3 +
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 34 ++
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 8 +
arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +
arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 33 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 27 +
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 26 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 95 ++++
arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 148 +++++-
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 +
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c | 10 +
arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 43 ++
arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 545 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile | 6 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S | 4 +
arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +-
arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c | 17 +
include/linux/cpu.h | 4 +
include/linux/mm.h | 7 +
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 27 +
kernel/sys.c | 30 ++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile | 10 +
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h | 82 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c | 173 +++++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c | 385 +++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h | 27 +
54 files changed, 2338 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 4181f8ad7a1061efed0219951d608d4988302af7
change-id: 20240930-v5_user_cfi_series-3dc332f8f5b2
--
- debug
Problem
=======
When host APEI is unable to claim synchronous external abort (SEA)
during stage-2 guest abort, today KVM directly injects an async SError
into the VCPU then resumes it. The injected SError usually results in
unpleasant guest kernel panic.
One of the major situation of guest SEA is when VCPU consumes recoverable
uncorrected memory error (UER), which is not uncommon at all in modern
datacenter servers with large amounts of physical memory. Although SError
and guest panic is sufficient to stop the propagation of corrupted memory
there is still room to recover from memory UER in a more graceful manner.
Proposed Solution
=================
Alternatively KVM can replay the SEA to the faulting VCPU, via existing
KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS API. If the memory poison consumption or the fault
that cause SEA is not from guest kernel, the blast radius can be limited
to the consuming or faulting guest userspace process, so the VM can keep
running.
In addition, instead of doing under the hood without involving userspace,
there are benefits to redirect the SEA to VMM:
- VM customers care about the disruptions caused by memory errors, and
VMM usually has the responsibility to start the process of notifying
the customers of memory error events in their VMs. For example some
cloud provider emits a critical log in their observability UI [1], and
provides playbook for customers on how to mitigate disruptions to
their workloads.
- VMM can protect future memory error consumption or faults by unmapping
the poisoned pages from stage-2 page table with KVM userfault [2],
which is more performant than splitting the memslot that contains
the poisoned guest pages.
- VMM can keep track SEA events in the VM. When VMM thinks the status
on the host or the VM is bad enough, e.g. number of distinct SEAs
exceeds a threshold, it can restart the VM on another healthy host.
- Behavior parity with x86 architecture. When machine check exception
(MCE) is caused by VCPU, kernel or KVM signals userspace SIGBUS to
let VMM either recover from the MCE, or terminate itself with VM.
The prior RFC proposes to implement SIGBUS on arm64 as well, but
Marc preferred VCPU exit over signal [3]. However, implementation
aside, returning SEA to VMM is on par with returning MCE to VMM.
Once SEA is redirected to VMM, among other actions, VMM is encouraged
to inject external aborts into the faulting VCPU, which is already
supported by KVM on arm64, although not fully supported by
KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS but complemented in this patchset.
New UAPIs
=========
This patchset introduces following userspace-visiable changes to empower
VMM to control what happens next for guest SEA:
- KVM_CAP_ARM_SEA_TO_USER. If userspace enables this new capability at VM
creation, KVM will not inject SError while taking SEA, but VM exit to
userspace.
- KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA. This is the VM exit reason VMM gets. The details
about the SEA is provided in arm_sea as much as possible, including
ESR value at EL2, if guest virtual and physical addresses (GPA and GVA)
are available and the values if available.
- KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_IABT. VMM today can inject external data abort
to VCPU via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS API. However, in case of instruction
abort, VMM cannot inject it via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS.
KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_IABT is just a natural extend to
KVM_CAP_ARM_INJECT_EXT_DABT that tells VMM KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS now
supports external instruction abort.
Patchset utilizes commit 26fbdf369227 ("KVM: arm64: Don't translate
FAR if invalid/unsafe") from [4], available already in kvmarm/next.
[4] makes KVM safely do address translation for HPFAR_EL2, including at
the event of SEA, and indicate if HPFAR_EL2 is valid in NS bit.
This patchset depends on [4] to tell userspace if GPA is valid and
its value if valid.
Patchset is based on commit 68ec8b4e84446 ("Merge branch
kvm-arm64/pkvm-6.16 into kvmarm-master/next")
[1] https://cloud.google.com/solutions/sap/docs/manage-host-errors
[2] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1757/attachments/1442/3073/LPC_%2…
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/86pljbqqh0.wl-maz@kernel.org
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/174369514508.3034362.13165690020799838042.b4-ty…
Jiaqi Yan (5):
KVM: arm64: VM exit to userspace to handle SEA
KVM: arm64: Set FnV for VCPU when FAR_EL2 is invalid
KVM: selftests: Test for KVM_EXIT_ARM_SEA and KVM_CAP_ARM_SEA_TO_USER
KVM: selftests: Test for KVM_CAP_INJECT_EXT_IABT
Documentation: kvm: new uAPI for handling SEA
Raghavendra Rao Ananta (1):
KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to inject external instruction aborts
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 120 ++++++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 12 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ras.h | 21 +-
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 3 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile | 3 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 +
arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 13 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c | 3 +
arch/arm64/kvm/kvm_ras.c | 54 +++
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 12 +-
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 12 +
tools/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 2 +
.../testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/inject_iabt.c | 100 ++++++
.../testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/sea_to_user.c | 324 ++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 1 +
17 files changed, 654 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/kvm_ras.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/inject_iabt.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/arm64/sea_to_user.c
--
2.49.0.967.g6a0df3ecc3-goog
Here is a series from Geliang, adding mptcp_subflow bpf_iter support.
We are working on extending MPTCP with BPF, e.g. to control the path
manager -- in charge of the creation, deletion, and announcements of
subflows (paths) -- and the packet scheduler -- in charge of selecting
which available path the next data will be sent to. These extensions
need to iterate over the list of subflows attached to an MPTCP
connection, and do some specific actions via some new kfunc that will be
added later on.
This preparation work is split in different patches:
- Patch 1: register some "basic" MPTCP kfunc.
- Patch 2: add mptcp_subflow bpf_iter support. Note that previous
versions of this single patch have already been shared to the
BPF mailing list. The changelog has been kept with a comment,
but the version number has been reset to avoid confusions.
- Patch 3: add more MPTCP endpoints in the selftests, in order to create
more than 2 subflows.
- Patch 4: add a very simple test validating mptcp_subflow bpf_iter
support. This test could be written without the new bpf_iter,
but it is there only to make sure this specific feature works
as expected.
- Patch 5: a small fix to drop an unused parameter in the selftests.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>
---
Changes in v3:
- Previous patches 1, 2 and 5 were no longer needed. (Martin)
- Patch 2: Switch to 'struct sock' and drop unneeded checks. (Martin)
- Patch 4: Adapt the test accordingly.
- Patch 5: New small fix for the selftests.
- Examples and questions for BPF maintainers have been added in Patch 2.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219-bpf-next-net-mptcp-bpf_iter-subflows-v2-…
Changes in v2:
- Patches 1-2: new ones.
- Patch 3: remove two kfunc, more restrictions. (Martin)
- Patch 4: add BUILD_BUG_ON(), more restrictions. (Martin)
- Patch 7: adaptations due to modifications in patches 1-4.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241108-bpf-next-net-mptcp-bpf_iter-subflows-v1-…
---
Geliang Tang (5):
bpf: Register mptcp common kfunc set
bpf: Add mptcp_subflow bpf_iter
selftests/bpf: More endpoints for endpoint_init
selftests/bpf: Add mptcp_subflow bpf_iter subtest
selftests/bpf: Drop cgroup_fd of run_mptcpify
net/mptcp/bpf.c | 87 +++++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_experimental.h | 8 ++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mptcp.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mptcp_bpf.h | 4 +
.../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mptcp_bpf_iters.c | 59 +++++++++
5 files changed, 282 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: dad704ebe38642cd405e15b9c51263356391355c
change-id: 20241108-bpf-next-net-mptcp-bpf_iter-subflows-027f6d87770e
Best regards,
--
Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org>