Recently, I reviewed a patch on the mm/kselftest mailing list about a
test which had obvious type mismatch fix in it. It was strange why that
wasn't caught during development and when patch was accepted. This led
me to discover that those extra compiler options to catch these warnings
aren't being used. When I added them, I found tens of warnings in just
mm suite.
In this series, I'm fixing those warnings in a few files. More fixes
would be sent later.
Muhammad Usama Anjum (4):
selftests/mm: thp_settings: remove const from return type
selftests/mm: pagemap_ioctl: Fix types mismatches shown by compiler
options
selftests/mm: mseal_test: remove unused variables
selftests/mm: mremap_test: Remove unused variable and type mismatches
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mremap_test.c | 15 +--
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c | 8 +-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c | 108 +++++++++++----------
tools/testing/selftests/mm/thp_settings.c | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/thp_settings.h | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/vm_util.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
--
2.39.5
Recently, I reviewed a patch on the mm/kselftest mailing list about a
test which had obvious type mismatch fix in it. It was strange why that
wasn't caught during development and when patch was accepted. This led
me to discover that those extra compiler options to catch these warnings
aren't being used. When I added them, I found tens of warnings in just
mm suite.
In this series, I'm fixing those warnings in a few files. More fixes
would be sent later.
Muhammad Usama Anjum (4):
selftests/mm: thp_settings: remove const from return type
selftests/mm: pagemap_ioctl: Fix types mismatches shown by compiler
options
selftests/mm: mseal_test: remove unused variables
selftests/mm: mremap_test: Remove unused variable and type mismatches
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mremap_test.c | 15 +--
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c | 8 +-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c | 108 +++++++++++----------
tools/testing/selftests/mm/thp_settings.c | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/thp_settings.h | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/vm_util.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
--
2.39.5
This is the 12th version of the patchset.
Hopefully there are no major flaws that will require more resendings.
I am sure we'll have plenty of time to polish up all bells and whistles
:-)
@Sergey, at the end I think I took in all your suggested changes, maybe
with some adaptations.
Notable changes from v11:
* move 'select' entries in Kconfig from patch 1 to where those deps are
used
* mark mailing list as subscribers-only in MAINTAINERS file
* check iface validity against net_device_ops instead of ndo_start_xmit
* drop DRV_ defines in favour of literals
* use "ovpn" literal instead of OVPN_FAMILY_NAME in code that is not
netlink related
* delete all peers on ifdown (new del-peer reason added accordingly)
* don't allow adding new peers if iface is down
* clarified uniqueness of IDs in netlink spec
* renamed ovpn_struct to ovpn_priv
* removed packet.h and moved content to proto.h
* fixed overhead/head_room calculation
* dropped unused ovpn_priv.dev_list member
* ensured all defines are prefixed with OVPN_
* kept carrier on only for MP mode
* carrier in P2P mode goes on/off when peer is added/deleted
* dropped skb_protocol_to_family() in favour of checking skb->protocol
directly
* dropped ovpn_priv.peers.lock in favour of ovpn_priv.lock
* dropped error message in case of packet with unknown ID
* dropped sanity check in udp socket attach function
* made ovpn_peer_skb_to_sockaddr() return sockaddr len to simplify code
* dropped __must_hold() in favour of lockdep_assert_held()
* with TCP patch ovpn_socket now holds reference to ovpn_priv (UDP) or
ovpn_peer (TCP) to prevent use-after-free of peer in TCP code and to
force cleanup code to wait for TCP scheduled work
* ovpn_peer release refactored in two steps to allow implementing
previous point (reference to socket is now dropped in first step,
instead of kref callback)
* dropped all mentions of __func__ in messages
* moved introduction of UDP_ENCAP_OVPNINUDP from patch 1 to related patch
* properly update vpn and link statistics at right time instead of same
spot
* properly checked skb head size before accessing ipv6 header in
ovpn_ip_check_protocol()
* merged ovpn_peer_update_local_endpoint() and ovpn_peer_float()
* properly locked peer collection when rehashing upon peer float
* used netdev_name() when possible for printing iface name
* destroyed dst_cache only upon final peer release
* used bitfield APIs for opcode parsing and creation
* dropped struct ovpn_nonce_tail in favour of using u8[] directly
* added comment about skb_reset_network_header() placement
* added locking around peer->bind modifications
* added TCP out_queue to stash data skbs when socket is owned by user
(to be sent out upon sock release)
* added call to barrier() in TCP socket release
* fixed hlist nulls lookup by adding loop restart
* used WRITE/READ_ONCE with last_recv/sent
* stopped counting keepalive msgs as dropped packets
* improved ovpn_nl_peer_precheck() to account for mixed v4mapped IPv6
* rehash peer after PEER_SET only in MP mode
addresses
* added iface teardown check to kselftest script
* Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241029-b4-ovpn-v11-0-de4698c73a25@openvpn.net
Please note that some patches were already reviewed by Andre Lunn,
Donald Hunter and Shuah Khan. They have retained the Reviewed-by tag
since no major code modification has happened since the review.
Patch
The latest code can also be found at:
https://github.com/OpenVPN/linux-kernel-ovpn
Thanks a lot!
Best Regards,
Antonio Quartulli
OpenVPN Inc.
---
Antonio Quartulli (22):
net: introduce OpenVPN Data Channel Offload (ovpn)
ovpn: add basic netlink support
ovpn: add basic interface creation/destruction/management routines
ovpn: keep carrier always on for MP interfaces
ovpn: introduce the ovpn_peer object
ovpn: introduce the ovpn_socket object
ovpn: implement basic TX path (UDP)
ovpn: implement basic RX path (UDP)
ovpn: implement packet processing
ovpn: store tunnel and transport statistics
ovpn: implement TCP transport
ovpn: implement multi-peer support
ovpn: implement peer lookup logic
ovpn: implement keepalive mechanism
ovpn: add support for updating local UDP endpoint
ovpn: add support for peer floating
ovpn: implement peer add/get/dump/delete via netlink
ovpn: implement key add/get/del/swap via netlink
ovpn: kill key and notify userspace in case of IV exhaustion
ovpn: notify userspace when a peer is deleted
ovpn: add basic ethtool support
testing/selftests: add test tool and scripts for ovpn module
Documentation/netlink/specs/ovpn.yaml | 368 +++
MAINTAINERS | 11 +
drivers/net/Kconfig | 14 +
drivers/net/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/net/ovpn/Makefile | 22 +
drivers/net/ovpn/bind.c | 55 +
drivers/net/ovpn/bind.h | 101 +
drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.c | 211 ++
drivers/net/ovpn/crypto.h | 145 ++
drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.c | 383 ++++
drivers/net/ovpn/crypto_aead.h | 33 +
drivers/net/ovpn/io.c | 446 ++++
drivers/net/ovpn/io.h | 34 +
drivers/net/ovpn/main.c | 339 +++
drivers/net/ovpn/main.h | 14 +
drivers/net/ovpn/netlink-gen.c | 212 ++
drivers/net/ovpn/netlink-gen.h | 41 +
drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c | 1178 ++++++++++
drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.h | 18 +
drivers/net/ovpn/ovpnstruct.h | 57 +
drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c | 1278 +++++++++++
drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h | 163 ++
drivers/net/ovpn/pktid.c | 129 ++
drivers/net/ovpn/pktid.h | 87 +
drivers/net/ovpn/proto.h | 118 +
drivers/net/ovpn/skb.h | 58 +
drivers/net/ovpn/socket.c | 180 ++
drivers/net/ovpn/socket.h | 55 +
drivers/net/ovpn/stats.c | 21 +
drivers/net/ovpn/stats.h | 47 +
drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c | 579 +++++
drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.h | 33 +
drivers/net/ovpn/udp.c | 397 ++++
drivers/net/ovpn/udp.h | 23 +
include/uapi/linux/if_link.h | 15 +
include/uapi/linux/ovpn.h | 110 +
include/uapi/linux/udp.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/Makefile | 17 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/config | 10 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/data64.key | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/ovpn-cli.c | 2370 ++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/tcp_peers.txt | 5 +
.../testing/selftests/net/ovpn/test-chachapoly.sh | 9 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/test-float.sh | 9 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/test-tcp.sh | 9 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/test.sh | 182 ++
tools/testing/selftests/net/ovpn/udp_peers.txt | 5 +
49 files changed, 9601 insertions(+)
---
base-commit: 65ae975e97d5aab3ee9dc5ec701b12090572ed43
change-id: 20241002-b4-ovpn-eeee35c694a2
Best regards,
--
Antonio Quartulli <antonio(a)openvpn.net>
When using svcr_in to check ZA and Streaming Mode, we should make sure
that the value in x2 is correct, otherwise it may trigger an Illegal
instruction if FEAT_SVE and !FEAT_SME.
Fixes: 43e3f85523e4 ("kselftest/arm64: Add SME support to syscall ABI test")
Signed-off-by: Weizhao Ouyang <o451686892(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/syscall-abi-asm.S | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/syscall-abi-asm.S b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/syscall-abi-asm.S
index df3230fdac39..98cde4f37abf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/syscall-abi-asm.S
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/syscall-abi-asm.S
@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ do_syscall:
stp x27, x28, [sp, #96]
// Set SVCR if we're doing SME
- cbz x1, 1f
adrp x2, svcr_in
ldr x2, [x2, :lo12:svcr_in]
+ cbz x1, 1f
msr S3_3_C4_C2_2, x2
1:
--
2.45.2
Add PKEY_UNRESTRICTED macro to mman.h and use it in selftests.
For context, this change will also allow for more consistent update of the
Glibc manual which in turn will help with introducing memory protection
keys on AArch64 targets.
Applies to fac04efc5c79 (tag: v6.13-rc2).
Note that I couldn't build ppc tests so I would appreciate if someone
could check the 3rd patch. Thank you!
Signed-off-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev(a)arm.com>
---
Changes in v4:
- Removed change to tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h as it is not
necessary.
Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241028090715.509527-1-yury.khrustalev@arm.com/
Changes in v3:
- Replaced previously missed 0-s tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c
- Replaced previously missed 0-s in tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c
Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arch/20241027170006.464252-2-yury.khrustalev@…
Changes in v2:
- Update tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h as well
- Add usages of the new macro to selftests.
Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arch/20241022120128.359652-1-yury.khrustalev@…
---
Yury Khrustalev (3):
mm/pkey: Add PKEY_UNRESTRICTED macro
selftests/mm: Use PKEY_UNRESTRICTED macro
selftests/powerpc: Use PKEY_UNRESTRICTED macro
include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c | 6 +++---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-helpers.h | 3 ++-
tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey_sighandler_tests.c | 4 ++--
tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/pkeys.h | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/pkey_exec_prot.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/mm/pkey_siginfo.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/core-pkey.c | 6 +++---
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-pkey.c | 6 +++---
10 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--
2.39.5
Basics and overview
===================
Software with larger attack surfaces (e.g. network facing apps like databases,
browsers or apps relying on browser runtimes) suffer from memory corruption
issues which can be utilized by attackers to bend control flow of the program
to eventually gain control (by making their payload executable). Attackers are
able to perform such attacks by leveraging call-sites which rely on indirect
calls or return sites which rely on obtaining return address from stack memory.
To mitigate such attacks, risc-v extension zicfilp enforces that all indirect
calls must land on a landing pad instruction `lpad` else cpu will raise software
check exception (a new cpu exception cause code on riscv).
Similarly for return flow, risc-v extension zicfiss extends architecture with
- `sspush` instruction to push return address on a shadow stack
- `sspopchk` instruction to pop return address from shadow stack
and compare with input operand (i.e. return address on stack)
- `sspopchk` to raise software check exception if comparision above
was a mismatch
- Protection mechanism using which shadow stack is not writeable via
regular store instructions
More information an details can be found at extensions github repo [1].
Equivalent to landing pad (zicfilp) on x86 is `ENDBRANCH` instruction in Intel
CET [3] and branch target identification (BTI) [4] on arm.
Similarly x86's Intel CET has shadow stack [5] and arm64 has guarded control
stack (GCS) [6] which are very similar to risc-v's zicfiss shadow stack.
x86 already supports shadow stack for user mode and arm64 support for GCS in
usermode [7] is in -next.
Kernel awareness for user control flow integrity
================================================
This series picks up Samuel Holland's envcfg changes [2] as well. So if those are
being applied independently, they should be removed from this series.
Enabling:
In order to maintain compatibility and not break anything in user mode, kernel
doesn't enable control flow integrity cpu extensions on binary by default.
Instead exposes a prctl interface to enable, disable and lock the shadow stack
or landing pad feature for a task. This allows userspace (loader) to enumerate
if all objects in its address space are compiled with shadow stack and landing
pad support and accordingly enable the feature. Additionally if a subsequent
`dlopen` happens on a library, user mode can take a decision again to disable
the feature (if incoming library is not compiled with support) OR terminate the
task (if user mode policy is strict to have all objects in address space to be
compiled with control flow integirty cpu feature). prctl to enable shadow stack
results in allocating shadow stack from virtual memory and activating for user
address space. x86 and arm64 are also following same direction due to similar
reason(s).
clone/fork:
On clone and fork, cfi state for task is inherited by child. Shadow stack is
part of virtual memory and is a writeable memory from kernel perspective
(writeable via a restricted set of instructions aka shadow stack instructions)
Thus kernel changes ensure that this memory is converted into read-only when
fork/clone happens and COWed when fault is taken due to sspush, sspopchk or
ssamoswap. In case `CLONE_VM` is specified and shadow stack is to be enabled,
kernel will automatically allocate a shadow stack for that clone call.
map_shadow_stack:
x86 introduced `map_shadow_stack` system call to allow user space to explicitly
map shadow stack memory in its address space. It is useful to allocate shadow
for different contexts managed by a single thread (green threads or contexts)
risc-v implements this system call as well.
signal management:
If shadow stack is enabled for a task, kernel performs an asynchronous control
flow diversion to deliver the signal and eventually expects userspace to issue
sigreturn so that original execution can be resumed. Even though resume context
is prepared by kernel, it is in user space memory and is subject to memory
corruption and corruption bugs can be utilized by attacker in this race window
to perform arbitrary sigreturn and eventually bypass cfi mechanism.
Another issue is how to ensure that cfi related state on sigcontext area is not
trampled by legacy apps or apps compiled with old kernel headers.
In order to mitigate control-flow hijacting, kernel prepares a token and place
it on shadow stack before signal delivery and places address of token in
sigcontext structure. During sigreturn, kernel obtains address of token from
sigcontext struture, reads token from shadow stack and validates it and only
then allow sigreturn to succeed. Compatiblity issue is solved by adopting
dynamic sigcontext management introduced for vector extension. This series
re-factor the code little bit to allow future sigcontext management easy (as
proposed by Andy Chiu from SiFive)
config and compilation:
Introduce a new risc-v config option `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting this
config option picks the kernel support for user control flow integrity. This
optin is presented only if toolchain has shadow stack and landing pad support.
And is on purpose guarded by toolchain support. Reason being that eventually
vDSO also needs to be compiled in with shadow stack and landing pad support.
vDSO compile patches are not included as of now because landing pad labeling
scheme is yet to settle for usermode runtime.
To get more information on kernel interactions with respect to
zicfilp and zicfiss, patch series adds documentation for
`zicfilp` and `zicfiss` in following:
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst
How to test this series
=======================
Toolchain
---------
$ git clone git@github.com:sifive/riscv-gnu-toolchain.git -b cfi-dev
$ riscv-gnu-toolchain/configure --prefix=<path-to-where-to-build> --with-arch=rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss --enable-linux --disable-gdb --with-extra-multilib-test="rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss-lp64d:-static"
$ make -j$(nproc)
Qemu
----
$ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/qemu.git -b zicfilp_zicfiss_ratified_master_july11
$ cd qemu
$ mkdir build
$ cd build
$ ../configure --target-list=riscv64-softmmu
$ make -j$(nproc)
Opensbi
-------
$ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/opensbi.git -b v6_cfi_spec_split_opensbi
$ make CROSS_COMPILE=<your riscv toolchain> -j$(nproc) PLATFORM=generic
Linux
-----
Running defconfig is fine. CFI is enabled by default if the toolchain
supports it.
$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) defconfig
$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc)
Branch where user cfi enabling patches are maintained
https://github.com/deepak0414/linux-riscv-cfi/tree/vdso_user_cfi_v6.12-rc1
In case you're building your own rootfs using toolchain, please make sure you
pick following patch to ensure that vDSO compiled with lpad and shadow stack.
"arch/riscv: compile vdso with landing pad"
Running
-------
Modify your qemu command to have:
-bios <path-to-cfi-opensbi>/build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_dynamic.bin
-cpu rv64,zicfilp=true,zicfiss=true,zimop=true,zcmop=true
vDSO related Opens (in the flux)
=================================
I am listing these opens for laying out plan and what to expect in future
patch sets. And of course for the sake of discussion.
Shadow stack and landing pad enabling in vDSO
----------------------------------------------
vDSO must have shadow stack and landing pad support compiled in for task
to have shadow stack and landing pad support. This patch series doesn't
enable that (yet). Enabling shadow stack support in vDSO should be
straight forward (intend to do that in next versions of patch set). Enabling
landing pad support in vDSO requires some collaboration with toolchain folks
to follow a single label scheme for all object binaries. This is necessary to
ensure that all indirect call-sites are setting correct label and target landing
pads are decorated with same label scheme.
How many vDSOs
---------------
Shadow stack instructions are carved out of zimop (may be operations) and if CPU
doesn't implement zimop, they're illegal instructions. Kernel could be running on
a CPU which may or may not implement zimop. And thus kernel will have to carry 2
different vDSOs and expose the appropriate one depending on whether CPU implements
zimop or not.
References
==========
[1] - https://github.com/riscv/riscv-cfi
[2] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240814081126.956287-1-samuel.holland@sifive.c…
[3] - https://lwn.net/Articles/889475/
[4] - https://developer.arm.com/documentation/109576/0100/Branch-Target-Identific…
[5] - https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/catc17-i…
[6] - https://lwn.net/Articles/940403/
[7] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-0-222b78d87eee@kernel.or…
---
changelog
---------
v7:
- Removed "riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv"
Instead using `deactivate_mm` flow to clean up.
see here for more context
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908203655.543765-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.…
- Changed the header include in `kselftest`. Hopefully this fixes compile
issue faced by Zong Li at SiFive.
- Cleaned up an orphaned change to `mm/mmap.c` in below patch
"riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE"
- Lock interfaces for shadow stack and indirect branch tracking expect arg == 0
Any future evolution of this interface should accordingly define how arg should
be setup.
- `mm/map.c` has an instance of using `VM_SHADOW_STACK`. Fixed it to use helper
`is_shadow_stack_vma`.
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008-v5_user_cfi_series-v6-0-60d9fe073f37@riv…
v6:
- Picked up Samuel Holland's changes as is with `envcfg` placed in
`thread` instead of `thread_info`
- fixed unaligned newline escapes in kselftest
- cleaned up messages in kselftest and included test output in commit message
- fixed a bug in clone path reported by Zong Li
- fixed a build issue if CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V is not selected
(this was introduced due to re-factoring signal context
management code)
v5:
- rebased on v6.12-rc1
- Fixed schema related issues in device tree file
- Fixed some of the documentation related issues in zicfilp/ss.rst
(style issues and added index)
- added `SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER` so that implementation can define base
of shadow stack.
- Fixed warnings on definitions added in usercfi.h when
CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is not selected.
- Adopted context header based signal handling as proposed by Andy Chiu
- Added support for enabling kernel mode access to shadow stack using
FWFT
(https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-sbi-doc/blob/master/src/ext-firmware…)
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241001-v5_user_cfi_series-v1-0-3ba65b6e550f@riv…
(Note: I had an issue in my workflow due to which version number wasn't
picked up correctly while sending out patches)
v4:
- rebased on 6.11-rc6
- envcfg: Converged with Samuel Holland's patches for envcfg management on per-
thread basis.
- vma_is_shadow_stack is renamed to is_vma_shadow_stack
- picked up Mark Brown's `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` patch
- signal context: using extended context management to maintain compatibility.
- fixed `-Wmissing-prototypes` compiler warnings for prctl functions
- Documentation fixes and amending typos.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240912231650.3740732-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
v3:
- envcfg
logic to pick up base envcfg had a bug where `ENVCFG_CBZE` could have been
picked on per task basis, even though CPU didn't implement it. Fixed in
this series.
- dt-bindings
As suggested, split into separate commit. fixed the messaging that spec is
in public review
- arch_is_shadow_stack change
arch_is_shadow_stack changed to vma_is_shadow_stack
- hwprobe
zicfiss / zicfilp if present will get enumerated in hwprobe
- selftests
As suggested, added object and binary filenames to .gitignore
Selftest binary anyways need to be compiled with cfi enabled compiler which
will make sure that landing pad and shadow stack are enabled. Thus removed
separate enable/disable tests. Cleaned up tests a bit.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240403234054.2020347-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
v2:
- Using config `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`, kernel support for riscv control flow
integrity for user mode programs can be compiled in the kernel.
- Enabling of control flow integrity for user programs is left to user runtime
- This patch series introduces arch agnostic `prctls` to enable shadow stack
and indirect branch tracking. And implements them on riscv.
---
Andy Chiu (1):
riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext
Clément Léger (1):
riscv: Add Firmware Feature SBI extensions definitions
Deepak Gupta (25):
mm: helper `is_shadow_stack_vma` to check shadow stack vma
dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml)
riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration
riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions
riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit
riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE
riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte
riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs
riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack
riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall
riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone
prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking
riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls
riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls
riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception
riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal
riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register
riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files
riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe
riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call
riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi
riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support
riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking
riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv
kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi
Mark Brown (2):
mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack
Samuel Holland (3):
riscv: Enable cbo.zero only when all harts support Zicboz
riscv: Add support for per-thread envcfg CSR values
riscv: Call riscv_user_isa_enable() only on the boot hart
Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 2 +
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 115 +++++
Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 176 +++++++
.../devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 14 +
arch/riscv/Kconfig | 20 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 15 +-
arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 16 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h | 24 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 7 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 30 +-
arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h | 3 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h | 27 ++
arch/riscv/include/asm/switch_to.h | 8 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 +
arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 89 ++++
arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h | 3 +
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 +
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 22 +
arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 8 +
arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 13 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 31 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 12 +
arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 26 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 83 ++++
arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 140 +++++-
arch/riscv/kernel/smpboot.c | 2 -
arch/riscv/kernel/suspend.c | 4 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 +
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c | 10 +
arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 42 ++
arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 526 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +-
arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c | 17 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 2 +-
include/linux/cpu.h | 4 +
include/linux/mm.h | 5 +-
include/uapi/asm-generic/mman.h | 4 +
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 48 ++
kernel/sys.c | 60 +++
mm/Kconfig | 6 +
mm/gup.c | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
mm/vma.h | 10 +-
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile | 10 +
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h | 84 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c | 78 +++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c | 373 +++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h | 37 ++
57 files changed, 2191 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 7d9923ee3960bdbfaa7f3a4e0ac2364e770c46ff
change-id: 20240930-v5_user_cfi_series-3dc332f8f5b2
--
- debug
The word 'accross' is wrong, so fix it.
Signed-off-by: Zhu Jun <zhujun2(a)cmss.chinamobile.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket.c
index 404a2ce75..221270cee 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/psock_tpacket.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
*
* Datapath:
* Open a pair of packet sockets and send resp. receive an a priori known
- * packet pattern accross the sockets and check if it was received resp.
+ * packet pattern across the sockets and check if it was received resp.
* sent correctly. Fanout in combination with RX_RING is currently not
* tested here.
*
--
2.17.1
Danielle Ratson writes:
Currently, the sharedbuffer test fails sometimes because it is reading a
maximum occupancy that is larger than expected on some different cases.
This is happening because the test assumes that the packet it is sending
is the only packet being passed to the device.
In addition, some duplications on one hand, and redundant test cases on
the other hand, were found in the test.
Add egress filters on h1 and h2 that will guarantee that the packets in
the buffer are sent in the test, and remove the redundant test cases.
Danielle Ratson (3):
selftests: mlxsw: sharedbuffer: Remove h1 ingress test case
selftests: mlxsw: sharedbuffer: Remove duplicate test cases
selftests: mlxsw: sharedbuffer: Ensure no extra packets are counted
.../drivers/net/mlxsw/sharedbuffer.sh | 55 ++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--
2.47.0
Hi all,
This patch series continues the work to migrate the script tests into
prog_tests.
test_xdp_meta.sh uses the BPF programs defined in progs/test_xdp_meta.c
to do a simple XDP/TC functional test that checks the metadata
allocation performed by the bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() helper.
This is already partly covered by two tests under prog_tests/:
- xdp_context_test_run.c uses bpf_prog_test_run_opts() to verify the
validity of the xdp_md context after a call to bpf_xdp_adjust_meta()
- xdp_metadata.c ensures that these meta-data can be exchanged through
an AF_XDP socket.
However test_xdp_meta.sh also verifies that the meta-data initialized
in the struct xdp_md is forwarded to the struct __sk_buff used by BPF
programs at 'TC level'. To cover this, I add a test case in
xdp_context_test_run.c that uses the same BPF programs from
progs/test_xdp_meta.c.
---
Bastien Curutchet (2):
selftests/bpf: test_xdp_meta: Rename BPF sections
selftests/bpf: Migrate test_xdp_meta.sh into xdp_context_test_run.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile | 1 -
.../bpf/prog_tests/xdp_context_test_run.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_xdp_meta.c | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_xdp_meta.sh | 58 ---------------
4 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 6849a3de3507a490fb0788c9bafbb2f29a904f05
change-id: 20241203-xdp_meta-868307cd0e03
Best regards,
--
Bastien Curutchet (eBPF Foundation) <bastien.curutchet(a)bootlin.com>
When compiling the pointer masking tests with -Wall this warning
is present:
pointer_masking.c: In function ‘test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl’:
pointer_masking.c:203:9: warning: ignoring return value of ‘pwrite’
declared with attribute ‘warn_unused_result’ [-Wunused-result]
203 | pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0); |
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ pointer_masking.c:208:9: warning:
ignoring return value of ‘pwrite’ declared with attribute
‘warn_unused_result’ [-Wunused-result]
208 | pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
I came across this on riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc (Ubuntu
11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04).
Fix this by checking that the number of bytes written equal the expected
number of bytes written.
Fixes: 7470b5afd150 ("riscv: selftests: Add a pointer masking test")
Signed-off-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie(a)rivosinc.com>
---
Changes in v4:
- Skip sysctl_enabled test if first pwrite failed
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241205-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-v3-1-…
Changes in v3:
- Fix sysctl enabled test case (Drew/Alex)
- Move pwrite err condition into goto (Drew)
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-v2-1-…
Changes in v2:
- I had ret != 2 for testing, I changed it to be ret != 1.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-v1-1-…
---
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
index dee41b7ee3e3..759445d5f265 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ static void test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl(void)
{
char value;
int fd;
+ int ret;
+ char *err_pwrite_msg = "failed to write to /proc/sys/abi/tagged_addr_disabled\n";
ksft_print_msg("Testing tagged address ABI sysctl\n");
@@ -200,18 +202,32 @@ static void test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl(void)
}
value = '1';
- pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ ret = pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ ksft_test_result_skip(err_pwrite_msg);
+ goto err_pwrite;
+ }
+
ksft_test_result(set_tagged_addr_ctrl(min_pmlen, true) == -EINVAL,
"sysctl disabled\n");
value = '0';
- pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ ret = pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto err_pwrite;
+
ksft_test_result(set_tagged_addr_ctrl(min_pmlen, true) == 0,
"sysctl enabled\n");
set_tagged_addr_ctrl(0, false);
close(fd);
+
+ return;
+
+err_pwrite:
+ close(fd);
+ ksft_test_result_fail(err_pwrite_msg);
}
static void test_tagged_addr_abi_pmlen(int pmlen)
---
base-commit: 40384c840ea1944d7c5a392e8975ed088ecf0b37
change-id: 20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-3860e4f35429
--
- Charlie
Add ip_link_set_addr(), ip_link_set_up(), ip_addr_add() and ip_route_add()
to the suite of helpers that automatically schedule a corresponding
cleanup.
When setting a new MAC, one needs to remember the old address first. Move
mac_get() from forwarding/ to that end.
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com>
---
Notes:
CC: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
CC: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)nvidia.com>
CC: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com>
CC: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
CC: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org
tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 7 ----
tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
index 7337f398f9cc..1fd40bada694 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
@@ -932,13 +932,6 @@ packets_rate()
echo $(((t1 - t0) / interval))
}
-mac_get()
-{
- local if_name=$1
-
- ip -j link show dev $if_name | jq -r '.[]["address"]'
-}
-
ether_addr_to_u64()
{
local addr="$1"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh
index 5ea6537acd2b..2cd5c743b2d9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh
@@ -435,6 +435,13 @@ xfail_on_veth()
fi
}
+mac_get()
+{
+ local if_name=$1
+
+ ip -j link show dev $if_name | jq -r '.[]["address"]'
+}
+
kill_process()
{
local pid=$1; shift
@@ -459,3 +466,35 @@ ip_link_set_master()
ip link set dev "$member" master "$master"
defer ip link set dev "$member" nomaster
}
+
+ip_link_set_addr()
+{
+ local name=$1; shift
+ local addr=$1; shift
+
+ local old_addr=$(mac_get "$name")
+ ip link set dev "$name" address "$addr"
+ defer ip link set dev "$name" address "$old_addr"
+}
+
+ip_link_set_up()
+{
+ local name=$1; shift
+
+ ip link set dev "$name" up
+ defer ip link set dev "$name" down
+}
+
+ip_addr_add()
+{
+ local name=$1; shift
+
+ ip addr add dev "$name" "$@"
+ defer ip addr del dev "$name" "$@"
+}
+
+ip_route_add()
+{
+ ip route add "$@"
+ defer ip route del "$@"
+}
--
2.47.0
This series is a follow-up to v1[1], aimed at making the watchdog selftest
more suitable for CI environments. Currently, in non-interactive setups,
the watchdog kselftest can only run with oneshot parameters, preventing the
testing of the WDIOC_KEEPALIVE ioctl since the ping loop is only
interrupted by SIGINT.
The first patch adds a new -c option to limit the number of watchdog pings,
allowing the test to be optionally finite. The second patch updates the
test output to conform to KTAP.
The default behavior remains unchanged: without the -c option, the
keep_alive() loop continues indefinitely until interrupted by SIGINT.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240506111359.224579-1-laura.nao@collabora.com/
Changes in v2:
- The keep_alive() loop remains infinite by default
- Introduced keep_alive_res variable to track the WDIOC_KEEPALIVE ioctl return code for user reporting
Laura Nao (2):
selftests/watchdog: add -c option to limit the ping loop
selftests/watchdog: convert the test output to KTAP format
.../selftests/watchdog/watchdog-test.c | 169 +++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 103 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
--
2.30.2
Currently, user needs to manually enable transmit hardware timestamp
feature of certain Ethernet drivers, e.g. stmmac and igc drivers, through
following command after running the xdp_hw_metadata app.
sudo hwstamp_ctl -i eth0 -t 1
To simplify the step test of xdp_hw_metadata, set tx_type to HWTSTAMP_TX_ON
to enable hardware timestamping for all outgoing packets, so that user no
longer need to execute hwstamp_ctl command.
Signed-off-by: Song Yoong Siang <yoong.siang.song(a)intel.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)fomichev.me>
---
v1: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20241204115715.3148412…
v1->v2 changelog:
- Add detail in commit msg on why HWTSTAMP_TX_ON is needed (Stanislav).
- Separate the patch into two, current one submit to bpf-next,
another one submit to bpf.
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdp_hw_metadata.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdp_hw_metadata.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdp_hw_metadata.c
index 06266aad2f99..96c65500f4b4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdp_hw_metadata.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdp_hw_metadata.c
@@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ static void hwtstamp_enable(const char *ifname)
{
struct hwtstamp_config cfg = {
.rx_filter = HWTSTAMP_FILTER_ALL,
+ .tx_type = HWTSTAMP_TX_ON,
};
hwtstamp_ioctl(SIOCGHWTSTAMP, ifname, &saved_hwtstamp_cfg);
--
2.34.1
When compiling the pointer masking tests with -Wall this warning
is present:
pointer_masking.c: In function ‘test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl’:
pointer_masking.c:203:9: warning: ignoring return value of ‘pwrite’
declared with attribute ‘warn_unused_result’ [-Wunused-result]
203 | pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0); |
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ pointer_masking.c:208:9: warning:
ignoring return value of ‘pwrite’ declared with attribute
‘warn_unused_result’ [-Wunused-result]
208 | pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
I came across this on riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc (Ubuntu
11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04).
Fix this by checking that the number of bytes written equal the expected
number of bytes written.
Fixes: 7470b5afd150 ("riscv: selftests: Add a pointer masking test")
Signed-off-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie(a)rivosinc.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- I had ret != 2 for testing, I changed it to be ret != 1.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-v1-1-…
---
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
index dee41b7ee3e3..229d85ccff50 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static void test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl(void)
{
char value;
int fd;
+ int ret;
ksft_print_msg("Testing tagged address ABI sysctl\n");
@@ -200,14 +201,24 @@ static void test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl(void)
}
value = '1';
- pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ ret = pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ ksft_test_result_fail("Write to /proc/sys/abi/tagged_addr_disabled failed.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
ksft_test_result(set_tagged_addr_ctrl(min_pmlen, true) == -EINVAL,
"sysctl disabled\n");
value = '0';
- pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
- ksft_test_result(set_tagged_addr_ctrl(min_pmlen, true) == 0,
- "sysctl enabled\n");
+ ret = pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ ksft_test_result_fail("Write to /proc/sys/abi/tagged_addr_disabled failed.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ksft_test_result(set_tagged_addr_ctrl(min_pmlen, true) == -EINVAL,
+ "sysctl disabled\n");
set_tagged_addr_ctrl(0, false);
---
base-commit: 40384c840ea1944d7c5a392e8975ed088ecf0b37
change-id: 20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-3860e4f35429
--
- Charlie
When compiling the pointer masking tests with -Wall this warning
is present:
pointer_masking.c: In function ‘test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl’:
pointer_masking.c:203:9: warning: ignoring return value of ‘pwrite’
declared with attribute ‘warn_unused_result’ [-Wunused-result]
203 | pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0); |
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ pointer_masking.c:208:9: warning:
ignoring return value of ‘pwrite’ declared with attribute
‘warn_unused_result’ [-Wunused-result]
208 | pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
I came across this on riscv64-linux-gnu-gcc (Ubuntu
11.4.0-1ubuntu1~22.04).
Fix this by checking that the number of bytes written equal the expected
number of bytes written.
Fixes: 7470b5afd150 ("riscv: selftests: Add a pointer masking test")
Signed-off-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie(a)rivosinc.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Fix sysctl enabled test case (Drew/Alex)
- Move pwrite err condition into goto (Drew)
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-v2-1-…
Changes in v2:
- I had ret != 2 for testing, I changed it to be ret != 1.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-v1-1-…
---
tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
index dee41b7ee3e3..2367b24a2b4e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/abi/pointer_masking.c
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static void test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl(void)
{
char value;
int fd;
+ int ret;
ksft_print_msg("Testing tagged address ABI sysctl\n");
@@ -200,18 +201,30 @@ static void test_tagged_addr_abi_sysctl(void)
}
value = '1';
- pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ ret = pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto err_pwrite;
+
ksft_test_result(set_tagged_addr_ctrl(min_pmlen, true) == -EINVAL,
"sysctl disabled\n");
value = '0';
- pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ ret = pwrite(fd, &value, 1, 0);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto err_pwrite;
+
ksft_test_result(set_tagged_addr_ctrl(min_pmlen, true) == 0,
"sysctl enabled\n");
set_tagged_addr_ctrl(0, false);
close(fd);
+
+ return;
+
+err_pwrite:
+ close(fd);
+ ksft_test_result_fail("failed to write to /proc/sys/abi/tagged_addr_disabled\n");
}
static void test_tagged_addr_abi_pmlen(int pmlen)
---
base-commit: 40384c840ea1944d7c5a392e8975ed088ecf0b37
change-id: 20241204-fix_warnings_pointer_masking_tests-3860e4f35429
--
- Charlie
The sysctl tests for vm.memfd_noexec rely on the kernel to support PID
namespaces (i.e. the kernel is built with CONFIG_PID_NS=y). If the
kernel the test runs on does not support PID namespaces, the first
sysctl test will fail when attempting to spawn a new thread in a new
PID namespace, abort the test, preventing the remaining tests from
being run.
This is not desirable, as not all kernels need PID namespaces, but can
still use the other features provided by memfd. Therefore, only run the
sysctl tests if the kernel supports PID namespaces. Otherwise, skip
those tests and emit an informative message to let the user know why
the sysctl tests are not being run.
Fixes: 11f75a01448f ("selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.6+
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Isaac J. Manjarres <isaacmanjarres(a)google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
index 95af2d78fd31..0a0b55516028 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/memfd.h>
#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
@@ -1557,6 +1558,11 @@ static void test_share_fork(char *banner, char *b_suffix)
close(fd);
}
+static bool pid_ns_supported(void)
+{
+ return access("/proc/self/ns/pid", F_OK) == 0;
+}
+
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t pid;
@@ -1591,8 +1597,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
test_seal_grow();
test_seal_resize();
- test_sysctl_simple();
- test_sysctl_nested();
+ if (pid_ns_supported()) {
+ test_sysctl_simple();
+ test_sysctl_nested();
+ } else {
+ printf("PID namespaces are not supported; skipping sysctl tests\n");
+ }
test_share_dup("SHARE-DUP", "");
test_share_mmap("SHARE-MMAP", "");
--
2.47.0.338.g60cca15819-goog
When we fork anonymous pages, apply a guard page then remove it, the
previous CoW mapping is cleared.
This might not be obvious to an outside observer without taking some time
to think about how the overall process functions, so document that this is
the case through a test, which also usefully asserts that the behaviour is
as we expect.
This is grouped with other, more important, fork tests that ensure that
guard pages are correctly propagated on fork.
Fix a typo in a nearby comment at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/mm/guard-pages.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/guard-pages.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/guard-pages.c
index 7cdf815d0d63..d8f8dee9ebbd 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/guard-pages.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/guard-pages.c
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ TEST_F(guard_pages, fork)
MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
ASSERT_NE(ptr, MAP_FAILED);
- /* Establish guard apges in the first 5 pages. */
+ /* Establish guard pages in the first 5 pages. */
ASSERT_EQ(madvise(ptr, 5 * page_size, MADV_GUARD_INSTALL), 0);
pid = fork();
@@ -1029,6 +1029,77 @@ TEST_F(guard_pages, fork)
ASSERT_EQ(munmap(ptr, 10 * page_size), 0);
}
+/*
+ * Assert expected behaviour after we fork populated ranges of anonymous memory
+ * and then guard and unguard the range.
+ */
+TEST_F(guard_pages, fork_cow)
+{
+ const unsigned long page_size = self->page_size;
+ char *ptr;
+ pid_t pid;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Map 10 pages. */
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, 10 * page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ ASSERT_NE(ptr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+ /* Populate range. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10 * page_size; i++) {
+ char chr = 'a' + (i % 26);
+
+ ptr[i] = chr;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_NE(pid, -1);
+ if (!pid) {
+ /* This is the child process now. */
+
+ /* Ensure the range is as expected. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10 * page_size; i++) {
+ char expected = 'a' + (i % 26);
+ char actual = ptr[i];
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(actual, expected);
+ }
+
+ /* Establish guard pages across the whole range. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(madvise(ptr, 10 * page_size, MADV_GUARD_INSTALL), 0);
+ /* Remove it. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(madvise(ptr, 10 * page_size, MADV_GUARD_REMOVE), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * By removing the guard pages, the page tables will be
+ * cleared. Assert that we are looking at the zero page now.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10 * page_size; i++) {
+ char actual = ptr[i];
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(actual, '\0');
+ }
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /* Parent process. */
+
+ /* Parent simply waits on child. */
+ waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+
+ /* Ensure the range is unchanged in parent anon range. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10 * page_size; i++) {
+ char expected = 'a' + (i % 26);
+ char actual = ptr[i];
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(actual, expected);
+ }
+
+ /* Cleanup. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(munmap(ptr, 10 * page_size), 0);
+}
+
/*
* Assert that forking a process with VMAs that do have VM_WIPEONFORK set
* behave as expected.
--
2.47.1
In 'NOFENTRY_ARGS' test case for syntax check, any offset X of
`vfs_read+X` except function entry offset (0) fits the criterion,
even if that offset is not at instruction boundary, as the parser
comes before probing. But with "ENDBR64" instruction on x86, offset
4 is treated as function entry. So, X can't be 4 as well. Thus, 8
was used as offset for the test case. On 64-bit powerpc though, any
offset <= 16 can be considered function entry depending on build
configuration (see arch_kprobe_on_func_entry() for implementation
details). So, use `vfs_read+20` to accommodate that scenario too.
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini(a)linux.ibm.com>
---
Changes in v2:
* Use 20 as offset for all arches.
.../selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_syntax_errors.tc | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_syntax_errors.tc b/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_syntax_errors.tc
index a16c6a6f6055..8f1c58f0c239 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_syntax_errors.tc
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/kprobe/kprobe_syntax_errors.tc
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ check_error 'p vfs_read $arg* ^$arg*' # DOUBLE_ARGS
if !grep -q 'kernel return probes support:' README; then
check_error 'r vfs_read ^$arg*' # NOFENTRY_ARGS
fi
-check_error 'p vfs_read+8 ^$arg*' # NOFENTRY_ARGS
+check_error 'p vfs_read+20 ^$arg*' # NOFENTRY_ARGS
check_error 'p vfs_read ^hoge' # NO_BTFARG
check_error 'p kfree ^$arg10' # NO_BTFARG (exceed the number of parameters)
check_error 'r kfree ^$retval' # NO_RETVAL
--
2.47.0
`MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` should remove the executable bits and set `F_SEAL_EXEC`
to prevent further modifications to the executable bits as per the comment
in the uapi header file:
not executable and sealed to prevent changing to executable
However, commit 105ff5339f498a ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC")
that introduced this feature made it so that `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` unsets
`F_SEAL_SEAL`, essentially acting as a superset of `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`.
Nothing implies that it should be so, and indeed up until the second version
of the of the patchset[0] that introduced `MFD_EXEC` and `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`,
`F_SEAL_SEAL` was not removed, however, it was changed in the third revision
of the patchset[1] without a clear explanation.
This behaviour is surprising for application developers, there is no
documentation that would reveal that `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` has the additional
effect of `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`. Additionally, combined with `vm.memfd_noexec=2`
it has the effect of making all memfds initially sealable.
So do not remove `F_SEAL_SEAL` when `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` is requested,
thereby returning to the pre-Linux 6.3 behaviour of only allowing
sealing when `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` is specified.
Now, this is technically a uapi break. However, the damage is expected
to be minimal. To trigger user visible change, a program has to do the
following steps:
- create memfd:
- with `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`,
- without `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`;
- try to add seals / check the seals.
But that seems unlikely to happen intentionally since this change
essentially reverts the kernel's behaviour to that of Linux <6.3,
so if a program worked correctly on those older kernels, it will
likely work correctly after this change.
I have used Debian Code Search and GitHub to try to find potential
breakages, and I could only find a single one. dbus-broker's
memfd_create() wrapper is aware of this implicit `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`
behaviour, and tries to work around it[2]. This workaround will
break. Luckily, this only affects the test suite, it does not affect
the normal operations of dbus-broker. There is a PR with a fix[3].
I also carried out a smoke test by building a kernel with this change
and booting an Arch Linux system into GNOME and Plasma sessions.
There was also a previous attempt to address this peculiarity by
introducing a new flag[4].
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220805222126.142525-3-jeffxu@google.com/
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221202013404.163143-3-jeffxu@google.com/
[2]: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/blob/9eb0b7e5826fc76cad7b025bc46f267d4a…
[3]: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/pull/366
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230714114753.170814-1-david@readahead.eu/
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn(a)protonmail.com>
---
* v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240611231409.3899809-1-jeffxu@chromium.o…
* v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240524033933.135049-1-jeffxu@google.com/
* v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240513191544.94754-1-pobrn@protonmail.co…
This fourth version returns to removing the inconsistency as opposed to documenting
its existence, with the same code change as v1 but with a somewhat extended commit
message. This is sent because I believe it is worth at least a try; it can be easily
reverted if bigger application breakages are discovered than initially imagined.
---
mm/memfd.c | 9 ++++-----
tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 7d8d3ab3fa37..8b7f6afee21d 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -356,12 +356,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
inode->i_mode &= ~0111;
file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
- if (file_seals) {
- *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
+ if (file_seals)
*file_seals |= F_SEAL_EXEC;
- }
- } else if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) {
- /* MFD_EXEC and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING are set */
+ }
+
+ if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) {
file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
if (file_seals)
*file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
index 95af2d78fd31..7b78329f65b6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ static void test_noexec_seal(void)
mfd_def_size,
MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
- mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
+ mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_EXEC);
mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
close(fd);
}
--
2.45.2
Currently, sendmmsg is implemented in udpgso_bench_tx.c,
but it is not called by any test script.
This patch adds a test for sendmmsg in udpgso_bench.sh.
This allows for basic API testing and benchmarking
comparisons with GSO.
Signed-off-by: Kenjiro Nakayama <nakayamakenjiro(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh
index 640bc43452fa..88fa1d53ba2b 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ run_udp() {
echo "udp"
run_in_netns ${args}
+ echo "udp sendmmsg"
+ run_in_netns ${args} -m
+
echo "udp gso"
run_in_netns ${args} -S 0
--
2.39.3 (Apple Git-146)
If fopen succeeds, the fscanf function is called to read the data.
Regardless of whether fscanf is successful, you need to run
fclose(proc) to prevent memory leaks.
Signed-off-by: liujing <liujing(a)cmss.chinamobile.com>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/timens/procfs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/timens/procfs.c
index 1833ca97eb24..e47844a73c31 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/timens/procfs.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/timens/procfs.c
@@ -79,9 +79,11 @@ static int read_proc_uptime(struct timespec *uptime)
if (fscanf(proc, "%lu.%02lu", &up_sec, &up_nsec) != 2) {
if (errno) {
pr_perror("fscanf");
+ fclose(proc);
return -errno;
}
pr_err("failed to parse /proc/uptime");
+ fclose(proc);
return -1;
}
fclose(proc);
--
2.27.0
After using the fopen function successfully, you need to call
fclose to close the file before finally returning.
Signed-off-by: liujing <liujing(a)cmss.chinamobile.com>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/set-process-name.c b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/set-process-name.c
index 562f707ba771..7be7afff0cd2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/set-process-name.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/prctl/set-process-name.c
@@ -66,9 +66,12 @@ int check_name(void)
return -EIO;
fscanf(fptr, "%s", output);
- if (ferror(fptr))
+ if (ferror(fptr)) {
+ fclose(fptr);
return -EIO;
+ }
+ fclose(fptr);
int res = prctl(PR_GET_NAME, name, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (res < 0)
--
2.27.0
Commit f803bcf9208a ("selftests/bpf: Prevent client connect before
server bind in test_tc_tunnel.sh") added code that waits for the
netcat server to start before the netcat client attempts to connect to
it. However, not all calls to 'server_listen' were guarded.
This patch adds the existing 'wait_for_port' guard after the remaining
call to 'server_listen'.
Fixes: f803bcf9208a ("selftests/bpf: Prevent client connect before server bind in test_tc_tunnel.sh")
Signed-off-by: Marco Leogrande <leogrande(a)google.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_tc_tunnel.sh | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_tc_tunnel.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_tc_tunnel.sh
index 7989ec6084545..cb55a908bb0d7 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_tc_tunnel.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_tc_tunnel.sh
@@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ else
client_connect
verify_data
server_listen
+ wait_for_port ${port} ${netcat_opt}
fi
# serverside, use BPF for decap
--
2.47.0.338.g60cca15819-goog
The current implementation of netconsole sends all log messages in
parallel, which can lead to an intermixed and interleaved output on the
receiving side. This makes it challenging to demultiplex the messages
and attribute them to their originating CPUs.
As a result, users and developers often struggle to effectively analyze
and debug the parallel log output received through netconsole.
Example of a message got from produciton hosts:
------------[ cut here ]------------
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1613668 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0x5e/0xe0
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 4139916 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x7d/0xe0
Modules linked in: bpf_preload(E) vhost_net(E) tun(E) vhost(E)
This series of patches introduces a new feature to the netconsole
subsystem that allows the automatic population of the CPU number in the
userdata field for each log message. This enhancement provides several
benefits:
* Improved demultiplexing of parallel log output: When multiple CPUs are
sending messages concurrently, the added CPU number in the userdata
makes it easier to differentiate and attribute the messages to their
originating CPUs.
* Better visibility into message sources: The CPU number information
gives users and developers more insight into which specific CPU a
particular log message came from, which can be valuable for debugging
and analysis.
The changes in this series are as follows:
Patch "Ensure dynamic_netconsole_mutex is held during userdata update"
Add a lockdep assert to make sure dynamic_netconsole_mutex is held when
calling update_userdata().
Patch "netconsole: Add option to auto-populate CPU number in userdata"
Adds a new option to enable automatic CPU number population in the
netconsole userdata Provides a new "populate_cpu_nr" sysfs attribute to
control this feature
Patch "netconsole: selftest: test CPU number auto-population"
Expands the existing netconsole selftest to verify the CPU number
auto-population functionality Ensures the received netconsole messages
contain the expected "cpu=" entry in the userdata
Patch "netconsole: docs: Add documentation for CPU number auto-population"
Updates the netconsole documentation to explain the new CPU number
auto-population feature Provides instructions on how to enable and use
the feature
I believe these changes will be a valuable addition to the netconsole
subsystem, enhancing its usefulness for kernel developers and users.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>
---
Breno Leitao (4):
netconsole: Ensure dynamic_netconsole_mutex is held during userdata update
netconsole: Add option to auto-populate CPU number in userdata
netconsole: docs: Add documentation for CPU number auto-population
netconsole: selftest: Validate CPU number auto-population in userdata
Documentation/networking/netconsole.rst | 44 +++++++++++++++
drivers/net/netconsole.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/drivers/net/netcons_basic.sh | 18 +++++++
3 files changed, 125 insertions(+)
---
base-commit: a58f00ed24b849d449f7134fd5d86f07090fe2f5
change-id: 20241108-netcon_cpu-ce3917e88f4b
Best regards,
--
Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>
Changes v6:
- Rebase onto latest kselftests-next.
- Looking at the two patches with a fresh eye decided to make a split
along the lines of:
- Patch 1/2 contains all of the code that relates to SNC mode
detection and checking that detection's reliability.
- Patch 2/2 contains checking kernel support for SNC and
modifying the messages at the end of affected tests.
Changes v5:
- Tests are skipped if snc_unreliable was set.
- Moved resctrlfs.c changes from patch 2/2 to 1/2.
- Removed CAT changes since it's not impacted by SNC in the selftest.
- Updated various comments.
- Fixed a bunch of minor issues pointed out in the review.
Changes v4:
- Printing SNC warnings at the start of every test.
- Printing SNC warnings at the end of every relevant test.
- Remove global snc_mode variable, consolidate snc detection functions
into one.
- Correct minor mistakes.
Changes v3:
- Reworked patch 2.
- Changed minor things in patch 1 like function name and made
corrections to the patch message.
Changes v2:
- Removed patches 2 and 3 since now this part will be supported by the
kernel.
Sub-Numa Clustering (SNC) allows splitting CPU cores, caches and memory
into multiple NUMA nodes. When enabled, NUMA-aware applications can
achieve better performance on bigger server platforms.
SNC support in the kernel was merged into x86/cache [1]. With SNC enabled
and kernel support in place all the tests will function normally (aside
from effective cache size). There might be a problem when SNC is enabled
but the system is still using an older kernel version without SNC
support. Currently the only message displayed in that situation is a
guess that SNC might be enabled and is causing issues. That message also
is displayed whenever the test fails on an Intel platform.
Add a mechanism to discover kernel support for SNC which will add more
meaning and certainty to the error message.
Add runtime SNC mode detection and verify how reliable that information
is.
Series was tested on Ice Lake server platforms with SNC disabled, SNC-2
and SNC-4. The tests were also ran with and without kernel support for
SNC.
Series applies cleanly on kselftest/next.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240628215619.76401-1-tony.luck@intel.com/
Previous versions of this series:
[v1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1709721159.git.maciej.wieczor-retman@inte…
[v2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1715769576.git.maciej.wieczor-retman@inte…
[v3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1719842207.git.maciej.wieczor-retman@inte…
[v4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1720774981.git.maciej.wieczor-retman@inte…
[v5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1730206468.git.maciej.wieczor-retman@inte…
Maciej Wieczor-Retman (2):
selftests/resctrl: Adjust effective L3 cache size with SNC enabled
selftests/resctrl: Discover SNC kernel support and adjust messages
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/cmt_test.c | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/mba_test.c | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/mbm_test.c | 4 +-
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/resctrl.h | 5 +
.../testing/selftests/resctrl/resctrl_tests.c | 9 +-
tools/testing/selftests/resctrl/resctrlfs.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--
2.47.1
From: Yicong Yang <yangyicong(a)hisilicon.com>
Armv8.7 introduces single-copy atomic 64-byte loads and stores
instructions and its variants named under FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V,
LS64_ACCDATA}. Add support for Armv8.7 FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V, LS64_ACCDATA}:
- Add identifying and enabling in the cpufeature list
- Expose the support of these features to userspace through HWCAP3
and cpuinfo
- Add related hwcap test
- Handle the trap of unsupported memory (normal/uncacheable) access in a VM
A real scenario for this feature is that the userspace driver can make use of
this to implement direct WQE (workqueue entry) - a mechanism to fill WQE
directly into the hardware.
This patchset also depends on Marc's patchset[1] for enabling related
features in a VM, HCRX trap handling, etc.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20240815125959.2097734-1-maz@kerne…
Tested with updated hwcap test:
On host:
root@localhost:/# dmesg | grep "All CPU(s) started"
[ 1.600263] CPU: All CPU(s) started at EL2
root@localhost:/# ./hwcap
[snip...]
# LS64 present
ok 169 cpuinfo_match_LS64
ok 170 sigill_LS64
ok 171 # SKIP sigbus_LS64
# LS64_V present
ok 172 cpuinfo_match_LS64_V
ok 173 sigill_LS64_V
ok 174 # SKIP sigbus_LS64_V
# LS64_ACCDATA present
ok 175 cpuinfo_match_LS64_ACCDATA
ok 176 sigill_LS64_ACCDATA
ok 177 # SKIP sigbus_LS64_ACCDATA
# Totals: pass:92 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:85 error:0
On guest:
root@localhost:/# dmesg | grep "All CPU(s) started"
[ 1.375272] CPU: All CPU(s) started at EL1
root@localhost:/# ./hwcap
[snip...]
# LS64 present
ok 169 cpuinfo_match_LS64
ok 170 sigill_LS64
ok 171 # SKIP sigbus_LS64
# LS64_V present
ok 172 cpuinfo_match_LS64_V
ok 173 sigill_LS64_V
ok 174 # SKIP sigbus_LS64_V
# LS64_ACCDATA present
ok 175 cpuinfo_match_LS64_ACCDATA
ok 176 sigill_LS64_ACCDATA
ok 177 # SKIP sigbus_LS64_ACCDATA
# Totals: pass:92 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:85 error:0
Yicong Yang (5):
arm64: Provide basic EL2 setup for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V, LS64_ACCDATA}
usage at EL0/1
arm64: Add support for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V, LS64_ACCDATA}
kselftest/arm64: Add HWCAP test for FEAT_{LS64, LS64_V, LS64_ACCDATA}
arm64: Add ESR.DFSC definition of unsupported exclusive or atomic
access
KVM: arm64: Handle DABT caused by LS64* instructions on unsupported
memory
Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 28 +++++
Documentation/arch/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 9 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 26 ++++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 8 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 3 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 3 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 70 +++++++++++-
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 3 +
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 14 +++
arch/arm64/tools/cpucaps | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++
11 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--
2.24.0
This version 5 patch series replace direct error handling methods with ksft
macros, which provide better reporting.Currently, when the tmpfs test runs,
it does not display any output if it passes,and if it fails
(particularly when not run as root),it simply exits without any warning or
message.
This series of patch adds:
1. Add 'ksft_print_header()' and 'ksft_set_plan()'
to structure test outputs more effectively.
2. Error if not run as root.
3. Replace direct error handling with 'ksft_test_result_*',
'ksft_exit_fail_msg' macros for better reporting.
v4->v5:
- Remove unnecessary pass messages.
- Remove unnecessary use of KSFT_SKIP.
- Add appropriate use of ksft_exit_fail_msg.
v4 1/2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241105202639.1977356-2-cvam0000@gmail.com/
v4 2/2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241105202639.1977356-3-cvam0000@gmail.com/
v3->v4:
- Start a patchset
- Split patch into smaller patches to make it easy to review.
Patch1 Replace 'ksft_test_result_skip' with 'KSFT_SKIP' during root run check.
Patch2 Replace 'ksft_test_result_fail' with 'KSFT_SKIP' where fail does not make sense,
or failure could be due to not unsupported APIs with appropriate warnings.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241028185756.111832-1-cvam0000@gmail.com/
v2->v3:
- Remove extra ksft_set_plan()
- Remove function for unshare()
- Fix the comment style
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241026191621.2860376-1-cvam0000@gmail.com/
v1->v2:
- Make the commit message more clear.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241024200228.1075840-1-cvam0000@gmail.com/T/#u
thanks
Shivam
Shivam Chaudhary (2):
selftests: tmpfs: Add Test-fail if not run as root
selftests: tmpfs: Add kselftest support to tmpfs
.../selftests/tmpfs/bug-link-o-tmpfile.c | 60 ++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--
2.45.2
If the selftest is not running as root, it should fail and
give an appropriate warning to the user. This patch adds
ksft_exit_fail_msg() if the test is not running as root.
Logs:
Before change:
TAP version 13
1..1
ok 1 # SKIP This test needs root to run!
After change:
TAP version 13
1..1
Bail out! Error : Need to run as root# Planned tests != run tests (1 != 0)
Totals: pass:0 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0
Signed-off-by: Shivam Chaudhary <cvam0000(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/acct/acct_syscall.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/acct/acct_syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/acct/acct_syscall.c
index e44e8fe1f4a3..7c65deef54e3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/acct/acct_syscall.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/acct/acct_syscall.c
@@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ int main(void)
// Check if test is run a root
if (geteuid()) {
- ksft_test_result_skip("This test needs root to run!\n");
- return 1;
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("Error : Need to run as root");
}
// Create file to log closed processes
--
2.45.2
The kernel has recently added support for shadow stacks, currently
x86 only using their CET feature but both arm64 and RISC-V have
equivalent features (GCS and Zicfiss respectively), I am actively
working on GCS[1]. With shadow stacks the hardware maintains an
additional stack containing only the return addresses for branch
instructions which is not generally writeable by userspace and ensures
that any returns are to the recorded addresses. This provides some
protection against ROP attacks and making it easier to collect call
stacks. These shadow stacks are allocated in the address space of the
userspace process.
Our API for shadow stacks does not currently offer userspace any
flexiblity for managing the allocation of shadow stacks for newly
created threads, instead the kernel allocates a new shadow stack with
the same size as the normal stack whenever a thread is created with the
feature enabled. The stacks allocated in this way are freed by the
kernel when the thread exits or shadow stacks are disabled for the
thread. This lack of flexibility and control isn't ideal, in the vast
majority of cases the shadow stack will be over allocated and the
implicit allocation and deallocation is not consistent with other
interfaces. As far as I can tell the interface is done in this manner
mainly because the shadow stack patches were in development since before
clone3() was implemented.
Since clone3() is readily extensible let's add support for specifying a
shadow stack when creating a new thread or process, keeping the current
implicit allocation behaviour if one is not specified either with
clone3() or through the use of clone(). The user must provide a shadow
stack pointer, this must point to memory mapped for use as a shadow
stackby map_shadow_stack() with an architecture specified shadow stack
token at the top of the stack.
Please note that the x86 portions of this code are build tested only, I
don't appear to have a system that can run CET available to me.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20241001-arm64-gcs-v13-0-222b78d87…
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
---
Changes in v13:
- Rebase onto v6.13-rc1.
- Link to v12: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241031-clone3-shadow-stack-v12-0-7183eb8bee17@k…
Changes in v12:
- Add the regular prctl() to the userspace API document since arm64
support is queued in -next.
- Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241005-clone3-shadow-stack-v11-0-2a6a2bd6d651@k…
Changes in v11:
- Rebase onto arm64 for-next/gcs, which is based on v6.12-rc1, and
integrate arm64 support.
- Rework the interface to specify a shadow stack pointer rather than a
base and size like we do for the regular stack.
- Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240821-clone3-shadow-stack-v10-0-06e8797b9445@k…
Changes in v10:
- Integrate fixes & improvements for the x86 implementation from Rick
Edgecombe.
- Require that the shadow stack be VM_WRITE.
- Require that the shadow stack base and size be sizeof(void *) aligned.
- Clean up trailing newline.
- Link to v9: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240819-clone3-shadow-stack-v9-0-962d74f99464@ke…
Changes in v9:
- Pull token validation earlier and report problems with an error return
to parent rather than signal delivery to the child.
- Verify that the top of the supplied shadow stack is VM_SHADOW_STACK.
- Rework token validation to only do the page mapping once.
- Drop no longer needed support for testing for signals in selftest.
- Fix typo in comments.
- Link to v8: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240808-clone3-shadow-stack-v8-0-0acf37caf14c@ke…
Changes in v8:
- Fix token verification with user specified shadow stack.
- Don't track user managed shadow stacks for child processes.
- Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240731-clone3-shadow-stack-v7-0-a9532eebfb1d@ke…
Changes in v7:
- Rebase onto v6.11-rc1.
- Typo fixes.
- Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240623-clone3-shadow-stack-v6-0-9ee7783b1fb9@ke…
Changes in v6:
- Rebase onto v6.10-rc3.
- Ensure we don't try to free the parent shadow stack in error paths of
x86 arch code.
- Spelling fixes in userspace API document.
- Additional cleanups and improvements to the clone3() tests to support
the shadow stack tests.
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203-clone3-shadow-stack-v5-0-322c69598e4b@ke…
Changes in v5:
- Rebase onto v6.8-rc2.
- Rework ABI to have the user allocate the shadow stack memory with
map_shadow_stack() and a token.
- Force inlining of the x86 shadow stack enablement.
- Move shadow stack enablement out into a shared header for reuse by
other tests.
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128-clone3-shadow-stack-v4-0-8b28ffe4f676@ke…
Changes in v4:
- Formatting changes.
- Use a define for minimum shadow stack size and move some basic
validation to fork.c.
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120-clone3-shadow-stack-v3-0-a7b8ed3e2acc@ke…
Changes in v3:
- Rebase onto v6.7-rc2.
- Remove stale shadow_stack in internal kargs.
- If a shadow stack is specified unconditionally use it regardless of
CLONE_ parameters.
- Force enable shadow stacks in the selftest.
- Update changelogs for RISC-V feature rename.
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231114-clone3-shadow-stack-v2-0-b613f8681155@ke…
Changes in v2:
- Rebase onto v6.7-rc1.
- Remove ability to provide preallocated shadow stack, just specify the
desired size.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231023-clone3-shadow-stack-v1-0-d867d0b5d4d0@ke…
---
Mark Brown (8):
arm64/gcs: Return a success value from gcs_alloc_thread_stack()
Documentation: userspace-api: Add shadow stack API documentation
selftests: Provide helper header for shadow stack testing
fork: Add shadow stack support to clone3()
selftests/clone3: Remove redundant flushes of output streams
selftests/clone3: Factor more of main loop into test_clone3()
selftests/clone3: Allow tests to flag if -E2BIG is a valid error code
selftests/clone3: Test shadow stack support
Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst | 42 ++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/gcs.h | 8 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 8 +-
arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 62 +++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 11 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 57 +++++-
include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h | 11 ++
include/linux/sched/task.h | 17 ++
include/uapi/linux/sched.h | 10 +-
kernel/fork.c | 96 +++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3.c | 226 ++++++++++++++++++----
tools/testing/selftests/clone3/clone3_selftests.h | 65 ++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/ksft_shstk.h | 98 ++++++++++
15 files changed, 633 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 40384c840ea1944d7c5a392e8975ed088ecf0b37
change-id: 20231019-clone3-shadow-stack-15d40d2bf536
Best regards,
--
Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
There are a few patches in vIRQ series that rework the fault.c file. So,
we should fix this before that bigger series touches the same code.
And add missing coverage for IOMMU_FAULT_QUEUE_ALLOC in iommufd_fail_nth.
Thanks!
Nicolin
Nicolin Chen (2):
iommufd/fault: Fix out_fput in iommufd_fault_alloc()
iommufd/selftest: Cover IOMMU_FAULT_QUEUE_ALLOC in iommufd_fail_nth
drivers/iommu/iommufd/fault.c | 2 --
tools/testing/selftests/iommu/iommufd_fail_nth.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
Currently, sendmmsg is implemented in udpgso_bench_tx.c,
but it is not called by any test script.
This patch adds a test for sendmmsg in udpgso_bench.sh.
This allows for basic API testing and benchmarking
comparisons with GSO.
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh
index 640bc43452fa..88fa1d53ba2b 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/udpgso_bench.sh
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ run_udp() {
echo "udp"
run_in_netns ${args}
+ echo "udp sendmmsg"
+ run_in_netns ${args} -m
+
echo "udp gso"
run_in_netns ${args} -S 0
--
2.39.3 (Apple Git-146)
As discussed in the v1 [1], with guest_memfd moving from KVM to mm, it
is more practical to have a non-KVM-specific API to populate guest
memory in a generic way. The series proposes using the write syscall
for this purpose instead of a KVM ioctl as in the v1. The approach also
has an advantage that the guest_memfd handle can be sent to another
process that would be responsible for population. I also included a
suggestion from Mike Day for excluding the code from compilation if AMD
SEV is configured.
There is a potential for refactoring of the kvm_gmem_populate to extract
common parts with the write. I did not do that in this series yet to
keep it clear what the write would do and get feedback on whether
write's behaviour is sensible.
Nikita
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20241024095429.54052-1-kalyazin@amazon.com/T/
Nikita Kalyazin (2):
KVM: guest_memfd: add generic population via write
KVM: selftests: update guest_memfd write tests
.../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++--
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
base-commit: 1508bae37044ebffd7c7e09915f041936f338123
--
2.40.1
Add ip_link_set_addr(), ip_link_set_up(), ip_addr_add() and ip_route_add()
to the suite of helpers that automatically schedule a corresponding
cleanup.
When setting a new MAC, one needs to remember the old address first. Move
mac_get() from forwarding/ to that end.
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com>
---
Notes:
CC: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org>
CC: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier(a)nvidia.com>
CC: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com>
CC: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
CC: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org
tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 7 ----
tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
index 7337f398f9cc..1fd40bada694 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
@@ -932,13 +932,6 @@ packets_rate()
echo $(((t1 - t0) / interval))
}
-mac_get()
-{
- local if_name=$1
-
- ip -j link show dev $if_name | jq -r '.[]["address"]'
-}
-
ether_addr_to_u64()
{
local addr="$1"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh
index 5ea6537acd2b..2cd5c743b2d9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/lib.sh
@@ -435,6 +435,13 @@ xfail_on_veth()
fi
}
+mac_get()
+{
+ local if_name=$1
+
+ ip -j link show dev $if_name | jq -r '.[]["address"]'
+}
+
kill_process()
{
local pid=$1; shift
@@ -459,3 +466,35 @@ ip_link_set_master()
ip link set dev "$member" master "$master"
defer ip link set dev "$member" nomaster
}
+
+ip_link_set_addr()
+{
+ local name=$1; shift
+ local addr=$1; shift
+
+ local old_addr=$(mac_get "$name")
+ ip link set dev "$name" address "$addr"
+ defer ip link set dev "$name" address "$old_addr"
+}
+
+ip_link_set_up()
+{
+ local name=$1; shift
+
+ ip link set dev "$name" up
+ defer ip link set dev "$name" down
+}
+
+ip_addr_add()
+{
+ local name=$1; shift
+
+ ip addr add dev "$name" "$@"
+ defer ip addr del dev "$name" "$@"
+}
+
+ip_route_add()
+{
+ ip route add "$@"
+ defer ip route del "$@"
+}
--
2.47.0
If the coreutils variant of ping is used instead of the busybox one, the
ping_do() command is broken. This comes by the fact that for coreutils
ping, the ping IP needs to be the very last elements.
To handle this, reorder the ping args and make $dip last element.
The use of coreutils ping might be useful for case where busybox is not
compiled with float interval support and ping command doesn't support
0.1 interval. (in such case a dedicated ping utility is installed
instead)
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 73bae6736b6b ("selftests: forwarding: Add initial testing framework")
Signed-off-by: Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth(a)gmail.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
index c992e385159c..2060f95d5c62 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/lib.sh
@@ -1473,8 +1473,8 @@ ping_do()
vrf_name=$(master_name_get $if_name)
ip vrf exec $vrf_name \
- $PING $args $dip -c $PING_COUNT -i 0.1 \
- -w $PING_TIMEOUT &> /dev/null
+ $PING $args -c $PING_COUNT -i 0.1 \
+ -w $PING_TIMEOUT $dip &> /dev/null
}
ping_test()
@@ -1504,8 +1504,8 @@ ping6_do()
vrf_name=$(master_name_get $if_name)
ip vrf exec $vrf_name \
- $PING6 $args $dip -c $PING_COUNT -i 0.1 \
- -w $PING_TIMEOUT &> /dev/null
+ $PING6 $args -c $PING_COUNT -i 0.1 \
+ -w $PING_TIMEOUT $dip &> /dev/null
}
ping6_test()
--
2.45.2
Create a test for the robust list mechanism. Test the following uAPI
operations:
- Creating a robust mutex where the lock waiter is wake by the kernel
when the lock owner died
- Setting a robust list to the current task
- Getting a robust list from the current task
- Getting a robust list from another task
- Using the list_op_pending field from robust_list_head struct to test
robustness when the lock owner dies before completing the locking
- Setting a invalid size for syscall argument `len`
Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid(a)igalia.com>
---
Changes from v2:
- Dropped kselftest_harness include, using just futex test API
- This is the expected output:
TAP version 13
1..6
ok 1 test_robustness
ok 2 test_set_robust_list_invalid_size
ok 3 test_get_robust_list_self
ok 4 test_get_robust_list_child
ok 5 test_set_list_op_pending
ok 6 test_robust_list_multiple_elements
# Totals: pass:6 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0
Changes from v1:
- Change futex type from int to _Atomic(unsigned int)
- Use old futex(FUTEX_WAIT) instead of the new sys_futex_wait()
---
.../selftests/futex/functional/.gitignore | 1 +
.../selftests/futex/functional/Makefile | 3 +-
.../selftests/futex/functional/robust_list.c | 512 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 515 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/robust_list.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/.gitignore
index fbcbdb6963b3..4726e1be7497 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/.gitignore
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ futex_wait_wouldblock
futex_wait
futex_requeue
futex_waitv
+robust_list
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/Makefile
index f79f9bac7918..b8635a1ac7f6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/Makefile
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS := \
futex_wait_private_mapped_file \
futex_wait \
futex_requeue \
- futex_waitv
+ futex_waitv \
+ robust_list
TEST_PROGS := run.sh
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/robust_list.c b/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/robust_list.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7bfda2d39821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/futex/functional/robust_list.c
@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 Igalia S.L.
+ *
+ * Robust list test by André Almeida <andrealmeid(a)igalia.com>
+ *
+ * The robust list uAPI allows userspace to create "robust" locks, in the sense
+ * that if the lock holder thread dies, the remaining threads that are waiting
+ * for the lock won't block forever, waiting for a lock that will never be
+ * released.
+ *
+ * This is achieve by userspace setting a list where a thread can enter all the
+ * locks (futexes) that it is holding. The robust list is a linked list, and
+ * userspace register the start of the list with the syscall set_robust_list().
+ * If such thread eventually dies, the kernel will walk this list, waking up one
+ * thread waiting for each futex and marking the futex word with the flag
+ * FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.
+ *
+ * See also
+ * man set_robust_list
+ * Documententation/locking/robust-futex-ABI.rst
+ * Documententation/locking/robust-futexes.rst
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include "futextest.h"
+#include "logging.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdatomic.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
+
+#define FUTEX_TIMEOUT 3
+
+static pthread_barrier_t barrier, barrier2;
+
+int set_robust_list(struct robust_list_head *head, size_t len)
+{
+ return syscall(SYS_set_robust_list, head, len);
+}
+
+int get_robust_list(int pid, struct robust_list_head **head, size_t *len_ptr)
+{
+ return syscall(SYS_get_robust_list, pid, head, len_ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Basic lock struct, contains just the futex word and the robust list element
+ * Real implementations have also a *prev to easily walk in the list
+ */
+struct lock_struct {
+ _Atomic(unsigned int) futex;
+ struct robust_list list;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to spawn a child thread. Returns -1 on error, pid on success
+ */
+static int create_child(int (*fn)(void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ char *stack;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ stack = mmap(NULL, STACK_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_STACK, -1, 0);
+ if (stack == MAP_FAILED)
+ return -1;
+
+ stack += STACK_SIZE;
+
+ pid = clone(fn, stack, CLONE_VM | SIGCHLD, arg);
+
+ if (pid == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ return pid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function to prepare and register a robust list
+ */
+static int set_list(struct robust_list_head *head)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(head, sizeof(struct robust_list_head));
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ head->futex_offset = (size_t) offsetof(struct lock_struct, futex) -
+ (size_t) offsetof(struct lock_struct, list);
+ head->list.next = &head->list;
+ head->list_op_pending = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A basic (and incomplete) mutex lock function with robustness
+ */
+static int mutex_lock(struct lock_struct *lock, struct robust_list_head *head, bool error_inject)
+{
+ _Atomic(unsigned int) *futex = &lock->futex;
+ int zero = 0, ret = -1;
+ pid_t tid = gettid();
+
+ /*
+ * Set list_op_pending before starting the lock, so the kernel can catch
+ * the case where the thread died during the lock operation
+ */
+ head->list_op_pending = &lock->list;
+
+ if (atomic_compare_exchange_strong(futex, &zero, tid)) {
+ /*
+ * We took the lock, insert it in the robust list
+ */
+ struct robust_list *list = &head->list;
+
+ /* Error injection to test list_op_pending */
+ if (error_inject)
+ return 0;
+
+ while (list->next != &head->list)
+ list = list->next;
+
+ list->next = &lock->list;
+ lock->list.next = &head->list;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We didn't take the lock, wait until the owner wakes (or dies)
+ */
+ struct timespec to;
+
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &to);
+ to.tv_sec = to.tv_sec + FUTEX_TIMEOUT;
+
+ tid = atomic_load(futex);
+ /* Kernel ignores futexes without the waiters flag */
+ tid |= FUTEX_WAITERS;
+ atomic_store(futex, tid);
+
+ ret = futex_wait((futex_t *) futex, tid, &to, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * A real mutex_lock() implementation would loop here to finally
+ * take the lock. We don't care about that, so we stop here.
+ */
+ }
+
+ head->list_op_pending = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This child thread will succeed taking the lock, and then will exit holding it
+ */
+static int child_fn_lock(void *arg)
+{
+ struct lock_struct *lock = (struct lock_struct *) arg;
+ struct robust_list_head head;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_list(&head);
+ if (ret)
+ ksft_test_result_fail("set_robust_list error\n");
+
+ ret = mutex_lock(lock, &head, false);
+ if (ret)
+ ksft_test_result_fail("mutex_lock error\n");
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+
+ /*
+ * There's a race here: the parent thread needs to be inside
+ * futex_wait() before the child thread dies, otherwise it will miss the
+ * wakeup from handle_futex_death() that this child will emit. We wait a
+ * little bit just to make sure that this happens.
+ */
+ sleep(1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Spawns a child thread that will set a robust list, take the lock, register it
+ * in the robust list and die. The parent thread will wait on this futex, and
+ * should be waken up when the child exits.
+ */
+static void test_robustness()
+{
+ struct lock_struct lock = { .futex = 0 };
+ struct robust_list_head head;
+ _Atomic(unsigned int) *futex = &lock.futex;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_list(&head);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Lets use a barrier to ensure that the child thread takes the lock
+ * before the parent
+ */
+ ret = pthread_barrier_init(&barrier, NULL, 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = create_child(&child_fn_lock, &lock);
+ ASSERT_NE(ret, -1);
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+ ret = mutex_lock(&lock, &head, false);
+
+ /*
+ * futex_wait() should return 0 and the futex word should be marked with
+ * FUTEX_OWNER_DIED
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ printf("futex wait returned %d", errno);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(*futex | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED);
+
+ pthread_barrier_destroy(&barrier);
+
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The only valid value for len is sizeof(*head)
+ */
+static void test_set_robust_list_invalid_size()
+{
+ struct robust_list_head head;
+ size_t head_size = sizeof(struct robust_list_head);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(&head, head_size);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(&head, head_size * 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(&head, head_size - 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(&head, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test get_robust_list with pid = 0, getting the list of the running thread
+ */
+static void test_get_robust_list_self()
+{
+ struct robust_list_head head, head2, *get_head;
+ size_t head_size = sizeof(struct robust_list_head), len_ptr;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(&head, head_size);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = get_robust_list(0, &get_head, &len_ptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(get_head, &head);
+ ASSERT_EQ(head_size, len_ptr);
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(&head2, head_size);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = get_robust_list(0, &get_head, &len_ptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(get_head, &head2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(head_size, len_ptr);
+
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+static int child_list(void *arg)
+{
+ struct robust_list_head *head = (struct robust_list_head *) arg;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_robust_list(head, sizeof(struct robust_list_head));
+ if (ret)
+ ksft_test_result_fail("set_robust_list error\n");
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier2);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test get_robust_list from another thread. We use two barriers here to ensure
+ * that:
+ * 1) the child thread set the list before we try to get it from the
+ * parent
+ * 2) the child thread still alive when we try to get the list from it
+ */
+static void test_get_robust_list_child()
+{
+ pid_t tid;
+ int ret;
+ struct robust_list_head head, *get_head;
+ size_t len_ptr;
+
+ ret = pthread_barrier_init(&barrier, NULL, 2);
+ ret = pthread_barrier_init(&barrier2, NULL, 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ tid = create_child(&child_list, &head);
+ ASSERT_NE(tid, -1);
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+
+ ret = get_robust_list(tid, &get_head, &len_ptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(&head, get_head);
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier2);
+
+ pthread_barrier_destroy(&barrier);
+ pthread_barrier_destroy(&barrier2);
+
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+static int child_fn_lock_with_error(void *arg)
+{
+ struct lock_struct *lock = (struct lock_struct *) arg;
+ struct robust_list_head head;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_list(&head);
+ if (ret)
+ ksft_test_result_fail("set_robust_list error\n");
+
+ ret = mutex_lock(lock, &head, true);
+ if (ret)
+ ksft_test_result_fail("mutex_lock error\n");
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+
+ sleep(1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same as robustness test, but inject an error where the mutex_lock() exits
+ * earlier, just after setting list_op_pending and taking the lock, to test the
+ * list_op_pending mechanism
+ */
+static void test_set_list_op_pending()
+{
+ struct lock_struct lock = { .futex = 0 };
+ struct robust_list_head head;
+ _Atomic(unsigned int) *futex = &lock.futex;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = set_list(&head);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = pthread_barrier_init(&barrier, NULL, 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = create_child(&child_fn_lock_with_error, &lock);
+ ASSERT_NE(ret, -1);
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+ ret = mutex_lock(&lock, &head, false);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ printf("futex wait returned %d", errno);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(*futex | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED);
+
+ pthread_barrier_destroy(&barrier);
+
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+#define CHILD_NR 10
+
+static int child_lock_holder(void *arg)
+{
+ struct lock_struct *locks = (struct lock_struct *) arg;
+ struct robust_list_head head;
+ int i;
+
+ set_list(&head);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CHILD_NR; i++) {
+ locks[i].futex = 0;
+ mutex_lock(&locks[i], &head, false);
+ }
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier2);
+
+ sleep(1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int child_wait_lock(void *arg)
+{
+ struct lock_struct *lock = (struct lock_struct *) arg;
+ struct robust_list_head head;
+ int ret;
+
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier2);
+ ret = mutex_lock(lock, &head, false);
+
+ if (ret)
+ ksft_test_result_fail("mutex_lock error\n");
+
+ if (!(lock->futex | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED))
+ ksft_test_result_fail("futex not marked with FUTEX_OWNER_DIED\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test a robust list of more than one element. All the waiters should wake when
+ * the holder dies
+ */
+static void test_robust_list_multiple_elements()
+{
+ struct lock_struct locks[CHILD_NR];
+ int i, ret;
+
+ ret = pthread_barrier_init(&barrier, NULL, 2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ ret = pthread_barrier_init(&barrier2, NULL, CHILD_NR + 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ create_child(&child_lock_holder, &locks);
+
+ /* Wait until the locker thread takes the look */
+ pthread_barrier_wait(&barrier);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CHILD_NR; i++)
+ create_child(&child_wait_lock, &locks[i]);
+
+ /* Wait for all children to return */
+ while (wait(NULL) > 0);
+
+ pthread_barrier_destroy(&barrier);
+ pthread_barrier_destroy(&barrier2);
+
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);
+}
+
+void usage(char *prog)
+{
+ printf("Usage: %s\n", prog);
+ printf(" -c Use color\n");
+ printf(" -h Display this help message\n");
+ printf(" -v L Verbosity level: %d=QUIET %d=CRITICAL %d=INFO\n",
+ VQUIET, VCRITICAL, VINFO);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ int c;
+
+ while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "cht:v:")) != -1) {
+ switch (c) {
+ case 'c':
+ log_color(1);
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ usage(basename(argv[0]));
+ exit(0);
+ case 'v':
+ log_verbosity(atoi(optarg));
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage(basename(argv[0]));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_set_plan(6);
+
+ test_robustness();
+ test_set_robust_list_invalid_size();
+ test_get_robust_list_self();
+ test_get_robust_list_child();
+ test_set_list_op_pending();
+ test_robust_list_multiple_elements();
+
+ ksft_print_cnts();
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.47.1