- Linux-kselftest-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH] selftests: mm: Perform some system cleanup before using hugepages

by Nico Pache

When running with CATEGORY= (thp | hugetlb) we see a large numbers of tests failing. These failures are due to not being able to allocate a hugepage and normally occur on memory contrainted systems or when using large page sizes. drop_cache and compact_memory before the tests for a higher chance at a successful hugepage allocation. Signed-off-by: Nico Pache <npache(a)redhat.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh index 246d53a5d7f2..040f27e21f47 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh @@ -206,6 +206,15 @@ pretty_name() { # Usage: run_test [test binary] [arbitrary test arguments...] run_test() { if test_selected ${CATEGORY}; then + # On memory constrainted systems some tests can fail to allocate hugepages. + # perform some cleanup before the test for a higher success rate. + if [ ${CATEGORY} == "thp" ] | [ ${CATEGORY} == "hugetlb" ]; then + echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches + sleep 2 + echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory + sleep 2 + fi + local test=$(pretty_name "$*") local title="running $*" local sep=$(echo -n "$title" | tr "[:graph:][:space:]" -) -- 2.43.0

1 year, 10 months

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[PATCH 2/2] selftests/mm: run_vmtests.sh: add hugetlb_madv_vs_map

by Breno Leitao

hugetlb_madv_vs_map selftest was not part of the mm test-suite since we didn't have a fix for the problem it found. Now that the problem is already fixed (see previous commit), let's enable this selftest in the default test-suite. Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh index a5e6ba8d3579..f41e1978e4d4 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh @@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ nr_hugepages_tmp=$(cat /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages) # For this test, we need one and just one huge page echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages CATEGORY="hugetlb" run_test ./hugetlb_fault_after_madv +CATEGORY="hugetlb" run_test ./hugetlb_madv_vs_map # Restore the previous number of huge pages, since further tests rely on it echo "$nr_hugepages_tmp" > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages -- 2.34.1

1 year, 10 months

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[PATCH net 6/6] selftests: mlxsw: qos_pfc: Adjust the test to support 8 lanes

by Petr Machata

From: Amit Cohen <amcohen(a)nvidia.com> 'qos_pfc' test checks PFC behavior. The idea is to limit the traffic using a shaper somewhere in the flow of the packets. In this area, the buffer is smaller than the buffer at the beginning of the flow, so it fills up until there is no more space left. The test configures there PFC which is supposed to notice that the headroom is filling up and send PFC Xoff to indicate the transmitter to stop sending traffic for the priorities sharing this PG. The Xon/Xoff threshold is auto-configured and always equal to 2*(MTU rounded up to cell size). Even after sending the PFC Xoff packet, traffic will keep arriving until the transmitter receives and processes the PFC packet. This amount of traffic is known as the PFC delay allowance. Currently the buffer for the delay traffic is configured as 100KB. The MTU in the test is 10KB, therefore the threshold for Xoff is about 20KB. This allows 80KB extra to be stored in this buffer. 8-lane ports use two buffers among which the configured buffer is split, the Xoff threshold then applies to each buffer in parallel. The test does not take into account the behavior of 8-lane ports, when the ports are configured to 400Gbps with 8 lanes or 800Gbps with 8 lanes, packets are dropped and the test fails. Check if the relevant ports use 8 lanes, in such case double the size of the buffer, as the headroom is split half-half. Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org> Cc: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: bfa804784e32 ("selftests: mlxsw: Add a PFC test") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com> --- .../selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh index 49bef76083b8..0f0f4f05807c 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh @@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ h2_destroy() switch_create() { + local lanes_swp4 + local pg1_size + # pools # ----- @@ -228,7 +231,20 @@ switch_create() dcb pfc set dev $swp4 prio-pfc all:off 1:on # PG0 will get autoconfigured to Xoff, give PG1 arbitrarily 100K, which # is (-2*MTU) about 80K of delay provision. - dcb buffer set dev $swp4 buffer-size all:0 1:$_100KB + pg1_size=$_100KB + + setup_wait_dev_with_timeout $swp4 + + lanes_swp4=$(ethtool $swp4 | grep 'Lanes:') + lanes_swp4=${lanes_swp4#*"Lanes: "} + + # 8-lane ports use two buffers among which the configured buffer + # is split, so double the size to get twice (20K + 80K). + if [[ $lanes_swp4 -eq 8 ]]; then + pg1_size=$((pg1_size * 2)) + fi + + dcb buffer set dev $swp4 buffer-size all:0 1:$pg1_size # bridges # ------- -- 2.42.0

1 year, 10 months

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[PATCH net 5/6] selftests: mlxsw: qos_pfc: Remove wrong description

by Petr Machata

From: Amit Cohen <amcohen(a)nvidia.com> In the diagram of the topology, $swp3 and $swp4 are described as 1Gbps ports. This is wrong information, the test does not configure such speed. Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org> Cc: linux-kselftest(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: bfa804784e32 ("selftests: mlxsw: Add a PFC test") Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh index 42ce602d8d49..49bef76083b8 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/mlxsw/qos_pfc.sh @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ # | + $swp1 $swp3 + + $swp4 | # | | iPOOL1 iPOOL0 | | iPOOL2 | # | | ePOOL4 ePOOL5 | | ePOOL4 | -# | | 1Gbps | | 1Gbps | # | | PFC:enabled=1 | | PFC:enabled=1 | # | +-|----------------------|-+ +-|------------------------+ | # | | + $swp1.111 $swp3.111 + | | + $swp4.111 | | -- 2.42.0

1 year, 10 months

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[PATCH] selftests/filesystems:fix build error in overlayfs

by Hu Yadi

One build issue comes up due to both mount.h included dev_in_maps.c In file included from dev_in_maps.c:10: /usr/include/sys/mount.h:35:3: error: expected identifier before numeric constant 35 | MS_RDONLY = 1, /* Mount read-only. */ | ^~~~~~~~~ In file included from dev_in_maps.c:13: Remove one of them to solve conflict, another error comes up: dev_in_maps.c:170:6: error: implicit declaration of function ‘mount’ [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] 170 | if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) == -1) { | ^~~~~ cc1: all warnings being treated as errors and then , add sys_mount definition to solve it After both above, dev_in_maps.c can be built correctly on my mache(gcc 10.2,glibc-2.32,kernel-5.10) Signed-off-by: Hu Yadi <hu.yadi(a)h3c.com> --- .../selftests/filesystems/overlayfs/dev_in_maps.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/overlayfs/dev_in_maps.c b/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/overlayfs/dev_in_maps.c index e19ab0e85709..759f86e7d263 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/overlayfs/dev_in_maps.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/filesystems/overlayfs/dev_in_maps.c @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ #include <linux/mount.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sched.h> #include <fcntl.h> @@ -32,7 +31,11 @@ static int sys_fsmount(int fd, unsigned int flags, unsigned int attr_flags) { return syscall(__NR_fsmount, fd, flags, attr_flags); } - +static int sys_mount(const char *src, const char *tgt, const char *fst, + unsigned long flags, const void *data) +{ + return syscall(__NR_mount, src, tgt, fst, flags, data); +} static int sys_move_mount(int from_dfd, const char *from_pathname, int to_dfd, const char *to_pathname, unsigned int flags) @@ -166,8 +169,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) ksft_test_result_skip("unable to create a new mount namespace\n"); return 1; } - - if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) == -1) { + if (sys_mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE | MS_REC, NULL) == -1) { pr_perror("mount"); return 1; } -- 2.39.3

1 year, 10 months

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[PATCH] RISC-V: selftests: fix cbo.c compilation error

by Yunhui Cui

When compiling with -O0, the following error will occur: cbo.c: In function 'cbo_insn': cbo.c:43:9: warning: 'asm' operand 1 probably does not match constraints 43 | asm volatile( | ^~~ cbo.c:43:9: warning: 'asm' operand 2 probably does not match constraints cbo.c:43:9: error: impossible constraint in 'asm' Add __attribute__((optimize("O"))) to fix. Fixes: a29e2a48afe3 ("RISC-V: selftests: Add CBO tests") Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui(a)bytedance.com> Suggested-by: Zhipeng Xu <xuzhipeng.1973(a)bytedance.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c index 50a2cc8aef38..ff1d8e843d70 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/hwprobe/cbo.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static void sigill_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *context) regs[0] += 4; } -static void cbo_insn(char *base, int fn) +static __always_inline void cbo_insn(char *base, int fn) { uint32_t insn = MK_CBO(fn); @@ -47,10 +47,11 @@ static void cbo_insn(char *base, int fn) : : "r" (base), "i" (fn), "i" (insn) : "a0", "a1", "memory"); } -static void cbo_inval(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 0); } -static void cbo_clean(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 1); } -static void cbo_flush(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 2); } -static void cbo_zero(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 4); } +#define OPTIMIZE __attribute__((optimize("O"))) +OPTIMIZE static void cbo_inval(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 0); } +OPTIMIZE static void cbo_clean(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 1); } +OPTIMIZE static void cbo_flush(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 2); } +OPTIMIZE static void cbo_zero(char *base) { cbo_insn(base, 4); } static void test_no_zicbom(void *arg) { -- 2.20.1

1 year, 10 months

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[PATCH] selftests/mm: switch to bash from sh

by Muhammad Usama Anjum

Running charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh generates errors if sh is set to dash: ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 9: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 19: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 27: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 37: [[: not found ./charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh: 45: Syntax error: "(" unexpected Switch to using /bin/bash instead of /bin/sh. Make the switch for write_hugetlb_memory.sh as well which is called from charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh. Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum(a)collabora.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/mm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh index 0899019a7fcb..e14bdd4455f2 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/charge_reserved_hugetlb.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -#!/bin/sh +#!/bin/bash # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Kselftest framework requirement - SKIP code is 4. diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh index 70a02301f4c2..3d2d2eb9d6ff 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/write_hugetlb_memory.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -#!/bin/sh +#!/bin/bash # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 set -e -- 2.42.0

1 year, 10 months

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[RFC PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce mseal()

by jeffxu＠chromium.org

From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu(a)chromium.org> This is V4 of the patch, the patch has improved significantly since V1, thanks to diverse inputs, a few discussions remain, please read those in the open discussion section of v4 of change history. ----------------------------------------------------------------- This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel. In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits. Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur. Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type. Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example, such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case. Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal(). The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature: int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags) addr/len: memory range. flags: reserved. mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range. 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. 2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, via mremap(). 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA. 5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). 6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. In addition: mmap() has two related changes. The PROT_SEAL bit in prot field of mmap(). When present, it marks the map sealed since creation. The MAP_SEALABLE bit in the flags field of mmap(). When present, it marks the map as sealable. A map created without MAP_SEALABLE will not support sealing, i.e. mseal() will fail. Applications that don't care about sealing will expect their behavior unchanged. For those that need sealing support, opt-in by adding MAP_SEALABLE in mmap(). The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing, which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute (RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime of the process. Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory. For example, with madvise(DONTNEED). However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case, the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow integrity. Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases. The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new protections. -------------------------------------------------------------------- Change history: =============== V4: (Suggested by Linus Torvalds) - new signature: mseal(start,len,flags) - 32 bit is not supported. vm_seal is removed, use vm_flags instead. - single bit in vm_flags for sealed state. - CONFIG_MSEAL kernel config is removed. - single bit of PROT_SEAL in the "Prot" field of mmap(). Other changes: - update selftest (Suggested by Muhammad Usama Anjum) - update documentation. Open discussions: ================= Below discussion were brought up in V3, and did not receive any input: the one important to this patch is MAP_SEALABLE in mmap(), which is in current version of patch, list here for input/comments. --------------------------------------------------------------------- During the development of V3, I had new questions and thoughts and wished to discuss. 1> shm/aio From reading the code, it seems to me that aio/shm can mmap/munmap maps on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_shmdt() in shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of the process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then unmap will fail. This isn’t a huge problem, since the memory will eventually be freed at exit or exec. However, it feels like the solution is not complete, because of the leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the process. 2> Brk (heap/stack) Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by calling malloc() and mseal(). This raises the question of what the expected behavior is when sealing the heap is attempted. let's assume following calls from user space: ptr = malloc(size); mprotect(ptr, size, RO); mseal(ptr, size, SEAL_PROT_PKEY); free(ptr); Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protection of the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the protection back to RW before free(), the memory can be reused. Adding mseal() into picture, however, the heap is then sealed partially, user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO, and the result of brk-shrink is nondeterministic, depending on if munmap() will try to free the sealed memory.(brk uses munmap to shrink the heap). 3> Above two cases led to the third topic: There one option to address the problem mentioned above. Option 1: A “MAP_SEALABLE” flag in mmap(). If a map is created without this flag, the mseal() operation will fail. Applications that are not concerned with sealing will expect their behavior to be unchanged. For those that are concerned, adding a flag at mmap time to opt in is not difficult. For the short term, this solves problems 1 and 2 above. The memory in shm/aio/brk will not have the MAP_SEALABLE flag at mmap(), and the same is true for the heap. If we choose not to go with path, all mapping will by default sealable. We could document above mentioned limitations so devs are more careful at the time to choose what memory to seal. I think deny of service through mseal() by attacker is probably not a concern, if attackers have access to mseal() and unsealed memory, then they can also do other harmful thing to the memory, such as munmap, etc. 4> I think it might be possible to seal the stack or other special mappings created at runtime (vdso, vsyscall, vvar). This means we can enforce and seal W^X for certain types of application. For instance, the stack is typically used in read-write mode, but in some cases, it can become executable. To defend against unintented addition of executable bit to stack, we could let the application to seal it. Sealing the heap (for adding X) requires special handling, since the heap can shrink, and shrink is implemented through munmap(). Indeed, it might be possible that all virtual memory accessible to user space, regardless of its usage pattern, could be sealed. However, this would require additional research and development work. ===================================================================== V3: - Abandon per-syscall approach, (Suggested by Linus Torvalds). - Organize sealing types around their functionality, such as MM_SEAL_BASE, MM_SEAL_PROT_PKEY. - Extend the scope of sealing from calls originated in userspace to both kernel and userspace. (Suggested by Linus Torvalds) - Add seal type support in mmap(). (Suggested by Pedro Falcato) - Add a new sealing type: MM_SEAL_DISCARD_RO_ANON to prevent destructive operations of madvise. (Suggested by Jann Horn and Stephen Röttger) - Make sealed VMAs mergeable. (Suggested by Jann Horn) - Add MAP_SEALABLE to mmap() - Add documentation - mseal.rst https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20231212231706.2680890-2-jeffxu@chromium.o… v2: Use _BITUL to define MM_SEAL_XX type. Use unsigned long for seal type in sys_mseal() and other functions. Remove internal VM_SEAL_XX type and convert_user_seal_type(). Remove MM_ACTION_XX type. Remove caller_origin(ON_BEHALF_OF_XX) and replace with sealing bitmask. Add more comments in code. Add a detailed commit message. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231017090815.1067790-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/ v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231016143828.647848-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/ ---------------------------------------------------------------- [1] https://kernelnewbies.org/Linux_2_6_8 [2] https://v8.dev/blog/control-flow-integrity [3] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b… [4] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2 [5] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXge… [6] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426Fkcgnf… [7] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230515130553.2311248-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/ Jeff Xu (4): mseal: Wire up mseal syscall mseal: add mseal syscall selftest mm/mseal memory sealing mseal:add documentation Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 181 ++ arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + include/linux/mm.h | 60 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 7 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 + mm/Makefile | 4 + mm/madvise.c | 12 + mm/mmap.c | 27 + mm/mprotect.c | 10 + mm/mremap.c | 31 + mm/mseal.c | 330 ++++ tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c | 1971 +++++++++++++++++++ 32 files changed, 2659 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst create mode 100644 mm/mseal.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c -- 2.43.0.195.gebba966016-goog

1 year, 10 months

7
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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 03/31] selftests/bpf: Fix pyperf180 compilation failure with clang18

by Sasha Levin

From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song(a)linux.dev> [ Upstream commit 100888fb6d8a185866b1520031ee7e3182b173de ] With latest clang18 (main branch of llvm-project repo), when building bpf selftests, [~/work/bpf-next (master)]$ make -C tools/testing/selftests/bpf LLVM=1 -j The following compilation error happens: fatal error: error in backend: Branch target out of insn range ... Stack dump: 0. Program arguments: clang -g -Wall -Werror -D__TARGET_ARCH_x86 -mlittle-endian -I/home/yhs/work/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/tools/include -I/home/yhs/work/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf -I/home/yhs/work/bpf-next/tools/include/uapi -I/home/yhs/work/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/usr/include -idirafter /home/yhs/work/llvm-project/llvm/build.18/install/lib/clang/18/include -idirafter /usr/local/include -idirafter /usr/include -Wno-compare-distinct-pointer-types -DENABLE_ATOMICS_TESTS -O2 --target=bpf -c progs/pyperf180.c -mcpu=v3 -o /home/yhs/work/bpf-next/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/pyperf180.bpf.o 1. <eof> parser at end of file 2. Code generation ... The compilation failure only happens to cpu=v2 and cpu=v3. cpu=v4 is okay since cpu=v4 supports 32-bit branch target offset. The above failure is due to upstream llvm patch [1] where some inlining behavior are changed in clang18. To workaround the issue, previously all 180 loop iterations are fully unrolled. The bpf macro __BPF_CPU_VERSION__ (implemented in clang18 recently) is used to avoid unrolling changes if cpu=v4. If __BPF_CPU_VERSION__ is not available and the compiler is clang18, the unrollng amount is unconditionally reduced. [1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/1a2e77cf9e11dbf56b5720c607313a5… Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire(a)oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231110193644.3130906-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf180.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf180.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf180.c index c39f559d3100..42c4a8b62e36 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf180.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf180.c @@ -1,4 +1,26 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 // Copyright (c) 2019 Facebook #define STACK_MAX_LEN 180 + +/* llvm upstream commit at clang18 + * https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/1a2e77cf9e11dbf56b5720c607313a5… + * changed inlining behavior and caused compilation failure as some branch + * target distance exceeded 16bit representation which is the maximum for + * cpu v1/v2/v3. Macro __BPF_CPU_VERSION__ is later implemented in clang18 + * to specify which cpu version is used for compilation. So a smaller + * unroll_count can be set if __BPF_CPU_VERSION__ is less than 4, which + * reduced some branch target distances and resolved the compilation failure. + * + * To capture the case where a developer/ci uses clang18 but the corresponding + * repo checkpoint does not have __BPF_CPU_VERSION__, a smaller unroll_count + * will be set as well to prevent potential compilation failures. + */ +#ifdef __BPF_CPU_VERSION__ +#if __BPF_CPU_VERSION__ < 4 +#define UNROLL_COUNT 90 +#endif +#elif __clang_major__ == 18 +#define UNROLL_COUNT 90 +#endif + #include "pyperf.h" -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 02/31] selftests/bpf: satisfy compiler by having explicit return in btf test

by Sasha Levin

From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit f4c7e887324f5776eef6e6e47a90e0ac8058a7a8 ] Some compilers complain about get_pprint_mapv_size() not returning value in some code paths. Fix with explicit return. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102033759.2541186-3-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_btf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_btf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_btf.c index f641eb292a88..a821ff121e03 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_btf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_btf.c @@ -4663,6 +4663,7 @@ static size_t get_pprint_mapv_size(enum pprint_mapv_kind_t mapv_kind) #endif assert(0); + return 0; } static void set_pprint_mapv(enum pprint_mapv_kind_t mapv_kind, -- 2.43.0

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