On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 4:08 PM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 03:32:16PM -0800, Jeff Xu wrote:
On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 10:54 AM Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org wrote:
On Fri, Dec 09, 2022 at 04:04:47PM +0000, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
From: Jeff Xu jeffxu@google.com
Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting it differently.
However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm process created a memfd to share the content with an external process, however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind.
On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].
To address those above, this set of patches add following: 1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time. 2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit. 3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. 4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy.
I think patch 1-5 look good to land. The LSM hook seems separable, and could continue on its own. Thoughts?
Agreed.
(Which tree should memfd change go through?)
I'm not sure, is there a recommendation ?
It looks like it's traditionally through akpm's tree. Andrew, will you carry patches 1-5?
Hi Andrew, if you are taking this, V8 is the latest that contains patch 1-5.
Thanks Jeff
Thanks!
-- Kees Cook