Hi Pedro
On Fri, Oct 4, 2024 at 10:02 AM Pedro Falcato pedro.falcato@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Sep 30, 2024 at 05:24:39PM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
Hi Pedro
On Sat, Sep 28, 2024 at 6:43 AM Pedro Falcato pedro.falcato@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 06:29:30PM GMT, Jeff Xu wrote:
Hi Pedro,
On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 3:59 PM Pedro Falcato pedro.falcato@gmail.com wrote:
<snip> > > > + > > > + Blocked mm syscall: > > > + - munmap > > > + - mmap > > > + - mremap > > > + - mprotect and pkey_mprotect > > > + - some destructive madvise behaviors: MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE, > > > + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK > > > + > > > + The first set of syscall to block is munmap, mremap, mmap. They can > > > + either leave an empty space in the address space, therefore allow > > > + replacement with a new mapping with new set of attributes, or can > > > + overwrite the existing mapping with another mapping. > > > + > > > + mprotect and pkey_mprotect are blocked because they changes the > > change > > > + protection bits (rwx) of the mapping. > > > + > > > + Some destructive madvice behaviors (MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE, > > > + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK) > > > + for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the > > > + memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, > > > + effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. > > > > What's the difference between anonymous memory and MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FILE? > > > MAP_FILE seems not used ? > anonymous mapping is the mapping that is not backed by a file.
MAP_FILE is actually defined as 0 usually :) But I meant file-backed private mappings.
OK, we are on the same page for this.
The feature now, as is (as far as I understand!) will allow you to do things like MADV_DONTNEED on a read-only file mapping. e.g .text. This is obviously wrong?
When a MADV_DONTNEED is called, pages will be freed, on file-backed mapping, if the process reads from the mapping again, the content will be retrieved from the file.
Sorry, it was late and I gave you a crap example. Consider this: a file-backed MAP_PRIVATE vma is marked RW. I write to it, then RO-it + mseal.
The attacker later gets me to MADV_DONTNEED that VMA. You've just lost data.
The big problem here is with anon _pages_, not anon vmas.
That depends on the app's threat-model. What you described seems to be a case below
- The file is rw
- The process opens the file as rw
- the process mmap the fd as rw
4 The process writes the memory, and the change isn't flushed to the file on disk. 5 The process changes the mapping to RO 6. The process seals the mapping 7. The process is called MADV_DONTNEED , and because the change isn't flush to file on disk, so it loses the change, (retrieve the old data from disk when read from the mapped address later)
I'm not sure this is a valid use case, the problem here seems to be that the app needs to flush the change from memory to disk if the expectation is writing is permanent.
MAP_PRIVATE never does writeback. That's not what this is about. I can trivially discard anonymous pages for private "file VMAs", which aren't refilled with the exact same contents. This is a problem.
That is fair, I appreciate you providing the use case.
I think mseal should support this . In addition, after reviewing MADV_DONTNEED, I believe we should also allow madvise(DONTNEED) when PROT is PROT_NONE.
I will work on fixes for those, but before that, I like to make sure some of the existing fixes are backported to 6.10, which makes it easy to backport future fixes.
In any case, the mseal currently just blocks a subset of madvise, those we know with a security implication. If there is something mseal needs to block additionally, one can always extend it by using the "flags" field. I do think the bar is high though, e.g. a valid use case to support that.
No, this has nothing to do with a flag. It's about providing sane semantics.
For anonymous mapping, since there is no file backup, if process reads from the mapping, 0 is filled, hence equivalent to memset(0)
- Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked syscalls.
- When blocked syscall return -EPERM due to sealing, the memory regions may or may not be changed, depends on the syscall being blocked:
- munmap: munmap is atomic. If one of VMAs in the given range issealed, none of VMAs are updated.- mprotect, pkey_mprotect, madvise: partial update might happen, e.g.when mprotect over multiple VMAs, mprotect might update the beginningVMAs before reaching the sealed VMA and return -EPERM.- mmap and mremap: undefined behavior.mmap and mremap are actually not undefined as they use munmap semantics for their unmapping. Whether this is something we'd want to document, I don't know honestly (nor do I think is ever written down in POSIX?)
I'm not sure if I can declare mmap/mremap as atomic.
Although, it might be possible to achieve this due to munmap being atomic. I'm not sure as I didn't test this. Would you like to find out ?
I just told you they use munmap under the hood. It's just that the requirement isn't actually written down anywhere.
I knew about mmap/mremap calling munmap. I don't know what exactly you are asking though. In your patch and its discussion, you did not mention the mmap/mremap (for sealing) is or should be atomic.
My point is: since there isn't a clear statement from your patch description or POSIX, that mremap/mmap is atomic, and I haven't tested it myself with regards to sealing, let's leave them as "undefined" for now. (I could get back to this later after the merging window)
Use cases:
- glibc: The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealing to
- non-writable memory segments.
- mapping segments.
- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures.
-Notes on which memory to seal:
-It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a mapping, -i.e. the sealed mapping won’t be unmapped till the process terminates or the -exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any virtual -memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the -mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing. +Don't use mseal on: +=================== +Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace, +but it is *crucial to thoroughly analyze the mapping's lifetime* prior to +apply the sealing. This is because the sealed mapping *won’t be unmapped* +till the process terminates or the exec system call is invoked.
There should probably be a nice disclaimer as to how most people don't need this or shouldn't use this. At least in its current form.
Ya, the mseal is not for most apps. I mention the malloc example to stress that.
<snip> > - > - > -Additional notes: > -================= > As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write > -to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not covered > -by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (such as > -seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered. > +to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. And those could be blocked > +by different security measures. > > Those cases are: > - > -- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface. > -- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT). > -- userfaultfd. > + - Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface (FOLL_FORCE). > + - Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT). > + - userfaultfd.
I don't understand how this is not a problem, but MADV_DONTNEED is. To me it seems that what we have now is completely useless, because you can trivially bypass it using /proc/self/mem, which is enabled on most Linux systems.
Before you mention ChromeOS or Chrome, I don't care. Kernel features aren't designed for Chrome. They need to work with every other distro and application as well.
It seems to me that the most sensible change is blocking/somehow distinguishing between /proc/self/mem and /proc/<pid>/mem (some other process) and ptrace. As in blocking /proc/self/mem but allowing the other FOLL_FORCE's as the traditional UNIX permission model allows.
IMO, it is a matter of Divide and Conquer. In a nutshell, mseal only prevents VMA's certain attributes (such as prot bits) from changing. It doesn't mean to say that sealed RO memory is immutable. To achieve that, the system needs to apply multiple security measures.
No, it's a matter of providing a sane API without tons of edgecases. Making a VMA immutable should make a VMA immutable, and not require you to provide a crap ton of other mechanisms in order to truly make it immutable. If I call mseal, I expect it to be sealed, not "sealed except when it's not, lol".
You haven't been able to quite specify what semantics are desirable out of this whole thing. Making prot flags "immutable" is completely worthless if you can simply write to a random pseudofile and have it bypass the whole thing (where a write to /proc/self/mem is semantically equivalent to mprotect RW + write + mprotect RO). Making the vma immutable is completely worthless if I can simply wipe anon pages. There has to be some end goal here (make contents immutable? make sure VMA protection can't be changed? both?) which seems to be unclear from the kernel mmap-side.
If you insist on providing half-baked APIs (and waving off any concerns), I'm sure this would've been better implemented as a random bpf program for chrome. Maybe we could revert this whole thing and give eBPF one or two bits of vma flags for their own uses :)
Please reply to the above. We're struggling to understand exactly what semantics you want from this. *That* is what we want to document and get set in stone, and we'll move from there.
If you meant to make mseal to support blocking /proc/self/mem or ptrace or other cases, I welcome that. Please go ahead to implement it with a flag, the mseal already has a field for such future extension.
The current mseal's semantic doesn't come out from vacuum, for system such as ChromeOS and Android, they are already relying heavily on security mechanisms to block /proc/self/mem or ptrace, as I pointed out previously, SELINUX/YAMA/Landlock/seccomp, and most recently CONFIG_PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_WRITE_ALL all contributes to that, therefore I don't have a use case or needs to make mseal to additionally block those. But I understand others might have different choices on which security mechanism to use, and I don't want to argue about which requirements are correct. Security isn't a true/false binary state, each system is different and no single security feature can achieve the absolute "secure" state.
Thanks -Jeff
For writing to /proc/pid/mem, it can be disabled via [1]. SELINUX and Landlock can achieve the same protection too.
I'm not blocking /proc/pid/mem, and my distro doesn't run any of those security modules :/
It is a choice you can make :-)
Your feature needs to work without "extra choices".
-- Pedro