[PATCH v4 15/19] tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support

23 Dec 2021

This allows making a key apply to an addr/prefix instead of just the
full addr. This is enabled through a custom flag, default behavior is
still full address match.
This is equivalent to TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX from TCP_MD5SIG and has
the same use-cases.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez cdleonard@gmail.com
---
 Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst |  1 +
 include/net/tcp_authopt.h                |  2 +
 include/uapi/linux/tcp.h                 | 10 ++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c                   | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst
index f681d2221ce3..6520c6d02755 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst
@@ -38,10 +38,11 @@ new flags.
* Address binding is optional, by default keys match all addresses
  * Local address is ignored, matching is done by remote address
  * Ports are ignored
  * It is possible to match a specific VRF by l3index (default is to ignore)
+ * It is possible to match with a fixed prefixlen (default is full address)
RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port)
 overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result
 in packet drops and lost connections.
diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
index 800fde277239..743248904552 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
@@ -47,10 +47,12 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info {
    u8 keylen;
    /** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */
    u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN];
    /** @l3index: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.ifindex */
    int l3index;
+	/** @prefix: Length of addr match (default full) */
+	int prefixlen;
    /** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */
    struct sockaddr_storage addr;
    /** @alg: Algorithm implementation matching alg_id */
    struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg;
 };
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h
index ed27feb93b0e..b1063e1e1b9f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h
@@ -403,18 +403,21 @@ struct tcp_authopt {
  * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature
  * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr`
  * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.ifindex`
  * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND: Key invalid for send (expired)
  * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV: Key invalid for recv (expired)
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN: Valid value in `tcp_authopt.prefixlen`, otherwise
+ * match full address length
  */
 enum tcp_authopt_key_flag {
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0),
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1),
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2),
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX = (1 << 3),
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND = (1 << 4),
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV = (1 << 5),
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN = (1 << 6),
 };
/**
  * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option
  */
@@ -465,10 +468,17 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key {
     * connections through this interface. Interface must be an vrf master.
     *
     * This is similar to `tcp_msg5sig.tcpm_ifindex`
     */
    int	ifindex;
+	/**
+	 * @prefixlen: length of prefix to match
+	 *
+	 * Without the TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN flag this is ignored and a full
+	 * address match is performed.
+	 */
+	int	prefixlen;
 };
/* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */
#define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
index c598f3cf72d5..64bcb2a38472 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/kref.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
/* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through
  * a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced.
  */
 int sysctl_tcp_authopt;
@@ -266,10 +267,14 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info,
    	return false;
    if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX))
    	return false;
    if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX) && info->l3index != key->ifindex)
    	return false;
+	if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN))
+		return false;
+	if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && info->prefixlen != key->prefixlen)
+		return false;
    if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND))
    	return false;
    if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
    	if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr))
    		return false;
@@ -283,17 +288,20 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_skb_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
    u16 keyaf = key->addr.ss_family;
    struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb_network_header(skb);
if (keyaf == AF_INET && iph->version == 4) {
    	struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr;
+		__be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen);
-		return iph->saddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		return (iph->saddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
    } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6 && iph->version == 6) {
    	struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (struct ipv6hdr *)skb_network_header(skb);
    	struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr;
-		return ipv6_addr_equal(&ip6h->saddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr);
+		return ipv6_prefix_equal(&ip6h->saddr,
+					 &key_addr->sin6_addr,
+					 key->prefixlen);
    }
/* This actually happens with ipv6-mapped-ipv4-addresses
     * IPv6 listen sockets will be asked to validate ipv4 packets.
     */
@@ -309,16 +317,19 @@ static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_sk_addr(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
    if (keyaf != addr_sk->sk_family)
    	return false;
if (keyaf == AF_INET) {
    	struct sockaddr_in *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr;
+		__be32 mask = inet_make_mask(key->prefixlen);
-		return addr_sk->sk_daddr == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		return (addr_sk->sk_daddr & mask) == key_addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
    } else if (keyaf == AF_INET6) {
    	struct sockaddr_in6 *key_addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr;
-		return ipv6_addr_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr, &key_addr->sin6_addr);
+		return ipv6_prefix_equal(&addr_sk->sk_v6_daddr,
+					 &key_addr->sin6_addr,
+					 key->prefixlen);
    }
return false;
 }
@@ -343,10 +354,16 @@ static bool better_key_match(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *old, struct tcp_authop
    /* l3index always overrides non-l3index */
    if (old->l3index && new->l3index == 0)
    	return false;
    if (old->l3index == 0 && new->l3index)
    	return true;
+	/* Full address match overrides match by prefixlen */
+	if (!(new->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) && (old->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN))
+		return false;
+	/* Longer prefixes are better matches */
+	if (new->prefixlen > old->prefixlen)
+		return true;
return false;
 }
static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net,
@@ -610,21 +627,32 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt)
 #define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND | \
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_IFINDEX | \
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN | \
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NOSEND | \
    TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_NORECV)
+static bool ipv6_addr_is_prefix(struct in6_addr *addr, int plen)
+{
+	struct in6_addr copy;
+
+	ipv6_addr_prefix_copy(&copy, addr, plen);
+
+	return !!memcmp(&copy, addr, sizeof(*addr));
+}
+
 int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
 {
    struct tcp_authopt_key opt;
    struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
    struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info;
    struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = sock_net_tcp_authopt(sk);
    struct tcp_authopt_alg_imp *alg;
    int l3index = 0;
+	int prefixlen;
    int err;
sock_owned_by_me(sk);
    err = check_sysctl_tcp_authopt();
    if (err)
@@ -660,10 +688,36 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
    if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) {
    	if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family)
    		return -EINVAL;
    }
+	/* check prefixlen */
+	if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN) {
+		prefixlen = opt.prefixlen;
+		if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) {
+			if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 32)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if (((struct sockaddr_in *)&opt.addr)->sin_addr.s_addr &
+			    ~inet_make_mask(prefixlen))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) {
+			if (prefixlen < 0 || prefixlen > 128)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if (!ipv6_addr_is_prefix(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&opt.addr)->sin6_addr,
+						 prefixlen))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET)
+			prefixlen = 32;
+		else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6)
+			prefixlen = 128;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
    /* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */
    info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk);
    if (IS_ERR(info))
    	return PTR_ERR(info);
@@ -709,10 +763,11 @@ int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
    key_info->alg = alg;
    key_info->keylen = opt.keylen;
    memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen);
    memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr));
    key_info->l3index = l3index;
+	key_info->prefixlen = prefixlen;
    hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &net->head);
    mutex_unlock(&net->mutex);
return 0;
 }
-- 
2.25.1


    

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[PATCH v4 15/19] tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support