On Thu, Mar 3, 2022 at 11:13 AM Mimi Zohar zohar@linux.ibm.com wrote:
On Thu, 2022-03-03 at 19:14 +0100, KP Singh wrote:
Even Robert's use case is to implement IMA policies in BPF this is still fundamentally different from IMA doing integrity measurement for BPF and blocking this patch-set on the latter does not seem rational and I don't see how implementing integrity for BPF would avoid your concerns.
eBPF modules are an entire class of files currently not being measured, audited, or appraised. This is an integrity gap that needs to be closed. The purpose would be to at least measure and verify the integrity of the eBPF module that is going to be used in lieu of traditional IMA.
Mimi,
. There is no such thing as "eBPF modules". There are BPF programs. They cannot be signed the same way as kernel modules. We've been working on providing a way to sign them for more than a year now. That work is still ongoing.
. IMA cannot be used for integrity check of BPF programs for the same reasons why kernel module like signing cannot be used.
. This patch set is orthogonal.