On Nov 9, 2018, at 1:06 PM, Jann Horn jannh@google.com wrote:
+linux-api for API addition +hughd as FYI since this is somewhat related to mm/shmem
On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 9:46 PM Joel Fernandes (Google) joel@joelfernandes.org wrote:
Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging drivers are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime.
One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any "future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while the sender continues to write to the buffer. See CursorWindow documentation in Android for more details: https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow
This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal. To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while keeping the existing mmap active.
Please CC linux-api@ on patches like this. If you had done that, I might have criticized your v1 patch instead of your v3 patch...
The following program shows the seal working in action:
[...]
Cc: jreck@google.com Cc: john.stultz@linaro.org Cc: tkjos@google.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: hch@infradead.org Reviewed-by: John Stultz john.stultz@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) joel@joelfernandes.org
[...]
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c index 2bb5e257080e..5ba9804e9515 100644 --- a/mm/memfd.c +++ b/mm/memfd.c
[...]
@@ -219,6 +220,25 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals) } }
if ((seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) &&!(*file_seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) {/** The FUTURE_WRITE seal also prevents growing and shrinking* so we need them to be already set, or requested now.*/int test_seals = (seals | *file_seals) &(F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK);if (test_seals != (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK)) {error = -EINVAL;goto unlock;}spin_lock(&file->f_lock);file->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_PWRITE);spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);}So you're fiddling around with the file, but not the inode? How are you preventing code like the following from re-opening the file as writable?
$ cat memfd.c #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <printf.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <err.h> #include <stdio.h>
int main(void) { int fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_create, "testfd", 0); if (fd == -1) err(1, "memfd"); char path[100]; sprintf(path, "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd); int fd2 = open(path, O_RDWR); if (fd2 == -1) err(1, "reopen"); printf("reopen successful: %d\n", fd2); } $ gcc -o memfd memfd.c $ ./memfd reopen successful: 4 $
That aside: I wonder whether a better API would be something that allows you to create a new readonly file descriptor, instead of fiddling with the writability of an existing fd.
Every now and then I try to write a patch to prevent using proc to reopen a file with greater permission than the original open.
I like your idea to have a clean way to reopen a a memfd with reduced permissions. But I would make it a syscall instead and maybe make it only work for memfd at first. And the proc issue would need to be fixed, too.