On 2024-11-01 at 18:43+0000, Dave Hansen wrote:
On 11/1/24 11:31, Manwaring, Derek wrote:
From that standpoint I'm still tempted to turn the question around a bit for the host kernel's perspective. Like if the host kernel should not (and indeed cannot with TDX controls in place) access guest private memory, why not remove it from the direct map?
Pretend that the machine check warts aren't there.
It costs performance and complexity, for an only theoretical gain. This is especially true for a VMM that's not doing a just doing confidential guests. You fracture the direct map to pieces forever (for now).
I'm hopeful we'll navigate the complexity in a worthwhile way for the non-CoCo case. Assuming we get there and have the option to remove from direct map, users with CoCo hardware could choose if they want to do both on their host. For me that's a sensible choice, but maybe that's just me.
As far as performance, are you talking about just the fracturing or something beyond that? The data Mike brought to LSFMMBPF 2023 showed the perf impact from direct map fragmentation for memfd_secret isn't "that bad" [1].
Derek