Add an operation, SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER, that can copy the seccomp filters from another process to the current process.
I roughly reproduced the Docker seccomp filter [1] and timed how long it takes to build it (via libseccomp) and attach it to a process. After 1000 runs, on average it took 3,740,000 TSC ticks (or ~1440 microseconds) on an AMD EPYC 9J14 running at 2596 MHz. The median build/load time was 3,715,000 TSC ticks.
On the same system, I preloaded the above Docker seccomp filter onto a process. (Note that I opened a pidfd to the reference process and left the pidfd open for the entire run.) I then cloned the filter using the feature in this patch to 1000 new processes. On average, it took 9,300 TSC ticks (or ~3.6 microseconds) to copy the filter to the new processes. The median clone time was 9,048 TSC ticks.
This is approximately a 400x performance improvement for those container managers that are using the exact same seccomp filter across all of their containers.
[1] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/moby/moby/refs/heads/master/profiles/secco...
Signed-off-by: Tom Hromatka tom.hromatka@oracle.com --- .../userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst | 10 ++ include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 1 + kernel/seccomp.c | 48 ++++++ samples/seccomp/Makefile | 2 +- samples/seccomp/clone-filter.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 71 +++++++++ 7 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 samples/seccomp/clone-filter.c
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst index cff0fa7f3175..ef1797d093f6 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst @@ -289,6 +289,16 @@ above in this document: all arguments being read from the tracee's memory should be read into the tracer's memory before any policy decisions are made. This allows for an atomic decision on syscall arguments.
+Cloning an Existing Seccomp Filter +================================== + +Constructing and loading a complex seccomp filter can often take a non-trivial +amount of time. If a user wants to use the same seccomp filter across more +than one process, it can be cloned to new processes via the +``SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER`` operation. Note that the clone will only succeed if +the destination process does not have any seccomp filters already applied to +it. See ``samples/seccomp/clone-filter.c`` for an example. + Sysctls =======
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h index dbfc9b37fcae..b0917e333b4b 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1 #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2 #define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3 +#define SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER 4
/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0) diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 41aa761c7738..b726e0d6715d 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -2081,6 +2081,49 @@ static long seccomp_get_notif_sizes(void __user *usizes) return 0; }
+static long seccomp_clone_filter(void __user *upidfd) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + unsigned int flags; + pid_t pidfd; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (atomic_read(¤t->seccomp.filter_count) > 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(&pidfd, upidfd, sizeof(pid_t))) + return -EFAULT; + + task = pidfd_get_task(pidfd, &flags); + if (IS_ERR(task)) + return -ESRCH; + + spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); + spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); + + if (atomic_read(&task->seccomp.filter_count) == 0) { + spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); + spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); + put_task_struct(task); + return -EINVAL; + } + + get_seccomp_filter(task); + current->seccomp = task->seccomp; + + spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock); + + set_task_syscall_work(current, SECCOMP); + + spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); + + put_task_struct(task); + + return 0; +} + /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void __user *uargs) @@ -2102,6 +2145,11 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, return -EINVAL;
return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs); + case SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER: + if (flags != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + return seccomp_clone_filter(uargs); default: return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile index c85ae0ed8342..d38977f41b86 100644 --- a/samples/seccomp/Makefile +++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -userprogs-always-y += bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct user-trap +userprogs-always-y += bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct user-trap clone-filter
bpf-fancy-objs := bpf-fancy.o bpf-helper.o
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/clone-filter.c b/samples/seccomp/clone-filter.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d26e1375b9dc --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/seccomp/clone-filter.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Seccomp filter example for cloning a filter + * + * Copyright (c) 2025 Oracle and/or its affiliates. + * Author: Tom Hromatka tom.hromatka@oracle.com + * + * The code may be used by anyone for any purpose, + * and can serve as a starting point for developing + * applications that reuse the same seccomp filter + * across many processes. + */ +#include <linux/seccomp.h> +#include <linux/filter.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <sys/wait.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <errno.h> + +#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x))) + +static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args) +{ + errno = 0; + return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args); +} + +static int install_filter(void) +{ + struct sock_filter deny_filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | ESRCH), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + }; + struct sock_fprog deny_prog = { + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(deny_filter), + .filter = deny_filter, + }; + + return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &deny_prog); +} + +static int clone_filter(pid_t ref_pid) +{ + int ref_pidfd, ret; + + ref_pidfd = syscall(SYS_pidfd_open, ref_pid, 0); + if (ref_pidfd < 0) + return -errno; + + ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER, 0, &ref_pidfd); + + close(ref_pidfd); + + return ret; +} + +static void do_ref_filter(void) +{ + int ret; + + ret = install_filter(); + if (ret) { + perror("Failed to install ref filter\n"); + exit(1); + } + + while (true) + sleep(1); +} + +static void do_child_process(pid_t ref_pid) +{ + pid_t res; + int ret; + + ret = clone_filter(ref_pid); + if (ret != 0) { + perror("Failed to clone filter. Installing filter from scratch\n"); + + ret = install_filter(); + if (ret != 0) { + perror("Filter install failed\n"); + exit(ret); + } + } + + res = syscall(__NR_getpid); + if (res < 0) { + perror("getpid() unexpectedly failed\n"); + exit(errno); + } + + res = syscall(__NR_getppid); + if (res > 0) { + perror("getppid() unexpectedly succeeded\n"); + exit(1); + } + + exit(0); +} + +int main(void) +{ + pid_t ref_pid = -1, child_pid = -1; + int ret, status; + + ref_pid = fork(); + if (ref_pid < 0) + exit(errno); + else if (ref_pid == 0) + do_ref_filter(); + + child_pid = fork(); + if (child_pid < 0) + goto out; + else if (child_pid == 0) + do_child_process(ref_pid); + + waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0); + if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { + perror("child process failed"); + ret = WEXITSTATUS(status); + goto out; + } + + ret = 0; + +out: + if (ref_pid != -1) + kill(ref_pid, SIGKILL); + if (child_pid != -1) + kill(child_pid, SIGKILL); + + exit(ret); +} diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h index dbfc9b37fcae..b0917e333b4b 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1 #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2 #define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3 +#define SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER 4
/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c index 61acbd45ffaa..df5e0f615da0 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c @@ -177,6 +177,10 @@ struct seccomp_data { #define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3 #endif
+#ifndef SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER +#define SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER 4 +#endif + #ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0) #endif @@ -5090,6 +5094,73 @@ TEST_F(URETPROBE, uretprobe_default_block_with_uretprobe_syscall) ASSERT_EQ(0, run_probed_with_filter(&prog)); }
+TEST(clone_filter) +{ + struct sock_filter deny_filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_getppid, 0, 1), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | ESRCH), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + }; + struct sock_fprog deny_prog = { + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(deny_filter), + .filter = deny_filter, + }; + struct timespec ts = { + .tv_sec = 0, + .tv_nsec = 100000000, + }; + + pid_t child_pid, self_pid, res; + int child_pidfd, ret; + + /* Only real root can copy a filter. */ + if (geteuid()) { + SKIP(return, "clone_filter requires real root"); + return; + } + + self_pid = getpid(); + + child_pid = fork(); + ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid); + + if (child_pid == 0) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &deny_prog)); + + while (true) + EXPECT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_nanosleep, &ts, NULL)); + } + + /* wait for the child pid to create its seccomp filter */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, syscall(__NR_nanosleep, &ts, NULL)); + + child_pidfd = syscall(SYS_pidfd_open, child_pid, 0); + EXPECT_LE(0, child_pidfd); + + /* Invalid flag provided */ + ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER, 1, &child_pidfd); + EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL); + + errno = 0; + ret = seccomp(SECCOMP_CLONE_FILTER, 0, &child_pidfd); + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0); + + res = syscall(__NR_getppid); + EXPECT_EQ(res, -1); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, ESRCH); + + res = syscall(__NR_getpid); + EXPECT_EQ(res, self_pid); + + close(child_pidfd); + kill(child_pid, SIGKILL); +} + /* * TODO: * - expand NNP testing