On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 03:45:32PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
On Thu, Aug 22, 2024 at 04:10:49PM +0100, Joey Gouly wrote:
+static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{
- if (!system_supports_poe())
return;
- current->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
- if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) {
write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
/* ISB required for kernel uaccess routines when chaning POR_EL0 */
nit: typo "chaning".
But more substantially, is this just to prevent spurious faults in the context of a new thread using a stale value for POR_EL0?
Not just prevent faults but enforce the permissions from the new thread's POR_EL0. The kernel may continue with a uaccess routine from here, we can't tell.