This patchset is being developed here: https://github.com/cyphar/linux/tree/resolveat/master
Patch changelog: v12: * Remove @how->reserved field from openat2(2), and instead use the (struct, size) design for syscall extensions. * Implement copy_struct_{to,from}_user() to unify (struct, size) syscall extension designs (as well as make them slightly more efficient by using memchr_inv() as well as using buffers and avoiding repeated access_ok() checks for trailing byte operations). * Port sched_setattr(), perf_event_attr(), and clone3() to use the new helpers. v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190820033406.29796-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190728010207.9781-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190719164225.27083-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v09: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190706145737.5299-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v08: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520133305.11925-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v07: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190507164317.13562-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v06: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190506165439.9155-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v05: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190320143717.2523-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v04: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181112142654.341-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v03: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181009070230.12884-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v02: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181009065300.11053-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/ v01: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180929103453.12025-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/
The need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[1,2] patchset (which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[3] which was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[4]) with a few additions and changes made based on the previous discussion within [5] as well as others I felt were useful.
In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However, instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:
* LOOKUP_NO_XDEV blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not trigger this.
* LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change the name.
It should be noted that this is different to the scope of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However, you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.
* LOOKUP_BENEATH disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute paths in openat(2) are also disallowed. Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional to protect against various races that would allow escape using "..".
Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.
In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:
* LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as long as no parent path had a symlink component.
* LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that chroot(2) is not.
If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.
The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[6] when opening paths in a potentially malicious container. There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101, CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a few).
And further, several semantics of file descriptor "re-opening" are now changed to prevent attacks like CVE-2019-5736 by restricting how magic-links can be resolved (based on their mode). This required some other changes to the semantics of the modes of O_PATH file descriptor's associated /proc/self/fd magic-links. openat2(2) has the ability to further restrict re-opening of its own O_PATH fds, so that users can make even better use of this feature.
Finally, O_EMPTYPATH was added so that users can do /proc/self/fd-style re-opening without depending on procfs. The new restricted semantics for magic-links are applied here too.
In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on libpathrs[7] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution. It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.
Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: Eric Biederman ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Cc: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Cc: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Cc: Christian Brauner christian@brauner.io Cc: David Drysdale drysdale@google.com Cc: Tycho Andersen tycho@tycho.ws Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/721443/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/784221/ [3]: https://lwn.net/Articles/619151/ [4]: https://lwn.net/Articles/603929/ [5]: https://lwn.net/Articles/723057/ [6]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin [7]: https://github.com/openSUSE/libpathrs
Aleksa Sarai (12): lib: introduce copy_struct_{to,from}_user helpers clone3: switch to copy_struct_from_user() sched_setattr: switch to copy_struct_{to,from}_user() perf_event_open: switch to copy_struct_from_user() namei: obey trailing magic-link DAC permissions procfs: switch magic-link modes to be more sane open: O_EMPTYPATH: procfs-less file descriptor re-opening namei: O_BENEATH-style path resolution flags namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like path resolution namei: aggressively check for nd->root escape on ".." resolution open: openat2(2) syscall selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.rst | 12 +- arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 1 + arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 39 +- arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + fs/fcntl.c | 2 +- fs/internal.h | 1 + fs/namei.c | 270 ++++++++++-- fs/open.c | 100 ++++- fs/proc/base.c | 20 +- fs/proc/fd.c | 23 +- fs/proc/namespaces.c | 2 +- include/linux/fcntl.h | 21 +- include/linux/fs.h | 8 +- include/linux/namei.h | 9 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 14 +- include/linux/uaccess.h | 5 + include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 4 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +- include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 42 ++ include/uapi/linux/sched.h | 2 + kernel/events/core.c | 45 +- kernel/fork.c | 34 +- kernel/sched/core.c | 85 +--- lib/Makefile | 2 +- lib/struct_user.c | 182 ++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 7 +- tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile | 8 + tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c | 167 ++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h | 118 +++++ .../testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c | 333 +++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c | 106 +++++ .../selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c | 127 ++++++ .../testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c | 402 ++++++++++++++++++ 53 files changed, 1971 insertions(+), 248 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/struct_user.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c