Hi Leonard,
On 11/1/21 16:34, Leonard Crestez wrote: [..]
+struct tcp_authopt_key {
- /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */
- __u32 flags;
- /** @send_id: keyid value for send */
- __u8 send_id;
- /** @recv_id: keyid value for receive */
- __u8 recv_id;
- /** @alg: One of &enum tcp_authopt_alg */
- __u8 alg;
- /** @keylen: Length of the key buffer */
- __u8 keylen;
- /** @key: Secret key */
- __u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN];
- /**
* @addr: Key is only valid for this address
*
* Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set
*/
- struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr;
+};
[..]
+/* Free key nicely, for living sockets */ +static void tcp_authopt_key_del(struct sock *sk,
struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key)
+{
- sock_owned_by_me(sk);
- hlist_del_rcu(&key->node);
- atomic_sub(sizeof(*key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
- kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+}
[..]
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \
- TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \
- TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \
- TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
+int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) +{
[..]
- /* Delete is a special case: */
- if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL) {
info = rcu_dereference_check(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
if (!info)
return -ENOENT;
key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, info, &opt);
if (!key_info)
return -ENOENT;
tcp_authopt_key_del(sk, info, key_info);
return 0;
I remember we discussed it in RFC, that removing a key that's currently in use may result in random MKT to be used.
I think, it's possible to make this API a bit more predictable if: - DEL command fails to remove a key that is current/receive_next; - opt.flags has CURR/NEXT flag that has corresponding `u8 current_key` and `u8 receive_next` values. As socket lock is held - that makes current_key/receive_next change atomic with deletion of an existing key that might have been in use.
In result user may remove a key that's not in use or has to set new current/next. Which avoids the issue with random MKT being used to sign segments.
Thanks, Dmitry