On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 04:31:35PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Sat, May 11, 2024, Chao Gao wrote:
On Fri, May 10, 2024 at 05:36:03PM +0800, Li, Xin3 wrote:
if (kvm_is_fred_enabled(vcpu)) {u64 event_data = 0;if (is_debug(intr_info))/** Compared to DR6, FRED #DB event data saved on* the stack frame have bits 4 ~ 11 and 16 ~ 31* inverted, i.e.,* fred_db_event_data = dr6 ^ 0xFFFF0FF0UL*/event_data = vcpu->arch.dr6 ^ DR6_RESERVED;else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))event_data = vcpu->arch.cr2;else if (is_nm_fault(intr_info))event_data =- to_vmx(vcpu)->fred_xfd_event_data;
IMO, deriving an event_data from CR2/DR6 is a little short-sighted because the event_data and CR2/DR6 __can__ be different, e.g., L1 VMM __can__ set CR2 to A and event_data field to B (!=A) when injecting #PF.
VMM should guarantee a FRED guest _sees_ consistent values in CR6/DR6 and event data. If not it's just a VMM bug that we need to fix.
I don't get why VMM should.
I know the hardware will guarantee this. And likely KVM will also do this. but I don't think it is necessary for KVM to assume L1 VMM will guarantee this. because as long as L2 guest is enlightened to read event_data from stack only, the ABI between L1 VMM and L2 guest can be: CR2/DR6 may be out of sync with the event_data. I am not saying it is good that L1 VMM deviates from the real hardware behavior. But how L1 VMM defines this ABI with L2 has nothing to do with KVM as L0. KVM shouldn't make assumptions on that.
Right, but in that case the propagation of event_data would be from vmcs12 => vmcs02, which is handled by prepare_vmcs02_early().
Yes. But delivering this event to L2 may cause VM-exit. So, L0 KVM may need to re-inject this event ...
For this flow, it specifically handles exception injection from _L0 KVM_, in which case KVM should always follow the architectural behavior.
... and go through this exception injection flow. For such an event, there is no guarantee that the associated event data is consistent with the vCPU's DR6/CR2/XFD_ERR.
Ahh, but the code in with __vmx_complete_interrupts() is wrong. Overwriting vcpu->arch.{dr6,cr2} is wrong, because theres no telling what was in vmcs02. And even if vmcs02 holds DR6/CR2 values, those might be L2 values, i.e. shouldn't clobber the vCPU state.
Exactly.
It's not clear to me that we need to do anything new for FRED in __vmx_complete_interrupts(). The relevant VMCS fields should already hold the correct values, there's no reason to clobber vCPU state. The reason KVM grabs
The whole point is to cache the ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA VMCS field so that KVM can set it back to the INJECTED_EVENT_DATA VMCS field when reinjecting the pending event in IDT-vectoring information.
things like instruction length and error code is because that information is visible to other aspects of injection, e.g. to adjust RIP and pushed the error code on the stack.