2025-03-14T14:39:44-07:00, Deepak Gupta debug@rivosinc.com:
This patch creates a config for shadow stack support and landing pad instr support. Shadow stack support and landing instr support can be enabled by selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI` wires up path to enumerate CPU support and if cpu support exists, kernel will support cpu assisted user mode cfi.
If CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is selected, select `ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS`, `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` and DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME for riscv.
Reviewed-by: Zong Li zong.li@sifive.com Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta debug@rivosinc.com
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -250,6 +250,26 @@ config ARCH_HAS_BROKEN_DWARF5 +config RISCV_USER_CFI
- def_bool y
- bool "riscv userspace control flow integrity"
- depends on 64BIT && $(cc-option,-mabi=lp64 -march=rv64ima_zicfiss)
- depends on RISCV_ALTERNATIVE
- select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
- select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
- select DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME
- help
Provides CPU assisted control flow integrity to userspace tasks.
Control flow integrity is provided by implementing shadow stack for
backward edge and indirect branch tracking for forward edge in program.
Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
Indirect branch tracking enforces that all indirect branches must land
on a landing pad instruction else CPU will fault. This mitigates against
JOP / COP attacks. Applications must be enabled to use it, and old user-
space does not get protection "for free".
default y
A high level question to kick off my review:
Why are landing pads and shadow stacks merged together?
Apart from adding build flexibility, we could also split the patches into two isolated series, because the features are independent.