On Fri, May 9, 2025 at 11:39 AM patchwork-bot+netdevbpf@kernel.org wrote:
Hello:
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org:
On Thu, 1 May 2025 09:35:51 +0200 you wrote:
This improves the expressiveness of unprivileged BPF by inserting speculation barriers instead of rejecting the programs.
The approach was previously presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].
To mitigate the Spectre v1 (PHT) vulnerability, the kernel rejects potentially-dangerous unprivileged BPF programs as of commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches"). In [2], we have analyzed 364 object files from open source projects (Linux Samples and Selftests, BCC, Loxilb, Cilium, libbpf Examples, Parca, and Prevail) and found that this affects 31% to 54% of programs.
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf-next,v3,01/11] selftests/bpf: Fix caps for __xlated/jited_unpriv https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/cf15cdc0f0f3
- [bpf-next,v3,02/11] bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn() (no matching commit)
Applied the first patch only. Waiting for respin of the rest.