On Mon, Nov 6, 2023 at 2:59 PM Stanislav Fomichev sdf@google.com wrote:
On 11/06, Mina Almasry wrote:
On Mon, Nov 6, 2023 at 1:59 PM Stanislav Fomichev sdf@google.com wrote:
On 11/06, Mina Almasry wrote:
On Mon, Nov 6, 2023 at 11:34 AM David Ahern dsahern@kernel.org wrote:
On 11/6/23 11:47 AM, Stanislav Fomichev wrote:
On 11/05, Mina Almasry wrote: > For device memory TCP, we expect the skb headers to be available in host > memory for access, and we expect the skb frags to be in device memory > and unaccessible to the host. We expect there to be no mixing and > matching of device memory frags (unaccessible) with host memory frags > (accessible) in the same skb. > > Add a skb->devmem flag which indicates whether the frags in this skb > are device memory frags or not. > > __skb_fill_page_desc() now checks frags added to skbs for page_pool_iovs, > and marks the skb as skb->devmem accordingly. > > Add checks through the network stack to avoid accessing the frags of > devmem skbs and avoid coalescing devmem skbs with non devmem skbs. > > Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn willemb@google.com > Signed-off-by: Kaiyuan Zhang kaiyuanz@google.com > Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry almasrymina@google.com > > --- > include/linux/skbuff.h | 14 +++++++- > include/net/tcp.h | 5 +-- > net/core/datagram.c | 6 ++++ > net/core/gro.c | 5 ++- > net/core/skbuff.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 ++++ > net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 13 +++++-- > net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 5 ++- > net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 +-- > 9 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h > index 1fae276c1353..8fb468ff8115 100644 > --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h > +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h > @@ -805,6 +805,8 @@ typedef unsigned char *sk_buff_data_t; > * @csum_level: indicates the number of consecutive checksums found in > * the packet minus one that have been verified as > * CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY (max 3) > + * @devmem: indicates that all the fragments in this skb are backed by > + * device memory. > * @dst_pending_confirm: need to confirm neighbour > * @decrypted: Decrypted SKB > * @slow_gro: state present at GRO time, slower prepare step required > @@ -991,7 +993,7 @@ struct sk_buff { > #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP) > __u8 csum_not_inet:1; > #endif > - > + __u8 devmem:1; > #if defined(CONFIG_NET_SCHED) || defined(CONFIG_NET_XGRESS) > __u16 tc_index; /* traffic control index */ > #endif > @@ -1766,6 +1768,12 @@ static inline void skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed(struct sk_buff *skb) > __skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed(skb); > } > > +/* Return true if frags in this skb are not readable by the host. */ > +static inline bool skb_frags_not_readable(const struct sk_buff *skb) > +{ > + return skb->devmem;
bikeshedding: should we also rename 'devmem' sk_buff flag to 'not_readable'? It better communicates the fact that the stack shouldn't dereference the frags (because it has 'devmem' fragments or for some other potential future reason).
+1.
Also, the flag on the skb is an optimization - a high level signal that one or more frags is in unreadable memory. There is no requirement that all of the frags are in the same memory type.
David: maybe there should be such a requirement (that they all are unreadable)? Might be easier to support initially; we can relax later on.
Currently devmem == not_readable, and the restriction is that all the frags in the same skb must be either all readable or all unreadable (all devmem or all non-devmem).
The flag indicates that the skb contains all devmem dma-buf memory specifically, not generic 'not_readable' frags as the comment says:
@devmem: indicates that all the fragments in this skb are backed by
device memory.The reason it's not a generic 'not_readable' flag is because handing off a generic not_readable skb to the userspace is semantically not what we're doing. recvmsg() is augmented in this patch series to return a devmem skb to the user via a cmsg_devmem struct which refers specifically to the memory in the dma-buf. recvmsg() in this patch series is not augmented to give any 'not_readable' skb to the userspace.
IMHO skb->devmem + an skb_frags_not_readable() as implemented is correct. If a new type of unreadable skbs are introduced to the stack, I imagine the stack would implement:
- new header flag: skb->newmem
static inline bool skb_frags_not_readable(const struct skb_buff *skb) { return skb->devmem || skb->newmem; }
- tcp_recvmsg_devmem() would handle skb->devmem skbs is in this patch
series, but tcp_recvmsg_newmem() would handle skb->newmem skbs.
You copy it to the userspace in a special way because your frags are page_is_page_pool_iov(). I agree with David, the skb bit is just and optimization.
For most of the core stack, it doesn't matter why your skb is not readable. For a few places where it matters (recvmsg?), you can double-check your frags (all or some) with page_is_page_pool_iov.
I see, we can do that then. I.e. make the header flag 'not_readable' and check the frags to decide to delegate to tcp_recvmsg_devmem() or something else. We can even assume not_readable == devmem because currently devmem is the only type of unreadable frag currently.
Unrelated: we probably need socket to dmabuf association as well (via netlink or something).
Not sure this is possible. The dma-buf is bound to the rx-queue, and any packets that land on that rx-queue are bound to that dma-buf, regardless of which socket that packet belongs to. So the association IMO must be rx-queue to dma-buf, not socket to dma-buf.
But there is still always 1 dmabuf to 1 socket association (on rx), right? Because otherwise, there is no way currently to tell, at recvmsg, which dmabuf the received token belongs to.
Yes, but this 1 dma-buf to 1 socket association happens because the user binds the dma-buf to an rx-queue and configures flow steering of the socket to that rx-queue.
So why not have a separate control channel action to say: this socket fd is supposed to receive into this dmabuf fd? This action would put the socket into permanent 'MSG_SOCK_DEVMEM' mode. Maybe you can also put some checks at the lower level to to enforce this dmabuf association. (to avoid any potential issues with flow steering)
setsockopt(SO_DEVMEM_ASSERT_DMA_BUF, dmabuf_fd)? Sounds interesting, but maybe a bit of a weird API to me. Because the API can't enforce the socket to receive packets on a dma-buf (rx-queue binding + flow steering does that), but the API can assert that incoming packets are received on said dma-buf. I guess it would check packets before they are acked and would drop packets that landed on the wrong queue.
I'm a bit unsure about defensively programming features (and uapi no less) to 'avoid any potential issues with flow steering'. Flow steering is supposed to work.
Also if we wanted to defensively program something to avoid flow steering issues, then I'd suggest adding to cmsg_devmem the dma-buf fd that the data is on, not this setsockopt() that asserts. IMO it's a weird API for the userspace to ask the kernel to assert some condition (at least I haven't seen it before or commonly).
But again, in general, I'm a bit unsure about defensively designing uapi around a feature like flow steering that's supposed to work.
We'll still have dmabuf to rx-queue association because of various reasons..
-- Thanks, Mina